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ABSTRACT 
 
 For many years, El Salvador and Guatemala were submerged in brutal and bloody 
conflicts that cost the lives of tens of thousands. United Nations-brokered Peace Accords 
officially brought the years of violence to an end in 1992 and 1996, respectively. As the two 
countries slowly emerged from their respective Cold War-inspired internal conflicts, the question 
of what place the past would have in the present came to the fore. This dissertation explores the 
way past violence is talked about in the public sphere. It analyzes post-Peace Accords public 
discourse in both countries, with a particular focus on the issues of memory, forgetting, truth, 
reconciliation, and related terms. It examines the different tasks memory and truth were assigned 
in the Peace Accords, especially in relation to the truth/truth-like commissions created out of 
those accords, and in the years since, and looks at the language those who reject memory and 
truth use to oppose them. 
 This dissertation argues that a common discursive framework exists in Guatemala that 
dictates that all sectors must insist on the importance of remembering the violence to prevent 
repetition. This is the human rights community's discourse, but it is one which even 
conservatives who wish for forgetting must repeat. Conservatives can only promote forgetting 
within the limits of this discursive framework, and they do so by talking about amnesty, perdón 
(pardon/forgiveness), and reconciliation. The situation in El Salvador is different. There is no 
common discursive framework that demands memory to prevent repetition and promote 
reconciliation. Rather than this, conservatives openly insist on amnesty and amnesia, while the 
human rights community insists on truth and memory. The discursive battle between forgetting 
and truth is El Salvador's discursive framework. Yet talking about memory, truth, reconciliation, 
and related topics leaves space to promote different truths, memories, or narratives of the past. 
This, indeed, is precisely what happens in both countries as different sectors actively promote 
their own truth, memory, or narrative, especially at moments of rupture or when their truth or 
discourse is challenged, as in 2012 when Salvadoran president Mauricio Funes asked for perdón 
for the El Mozote massacre and during Guatemala's 2013 genocide trial. 
 Running throughout the discussion about discourse and discursive frameworks is a 
critique of the insistence on the existence of one truth, memory, or narrative of the past. This is 
the foundation on which truth and truth-like commissions are built. Yet rather than focusing on 
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the truth of the past, this dissertation argues that the process of openly talking about the past and 
sharing truths and experiences will do more to contribute to reconciliation and non-repetition 
than insisting that there is and can only be one truth and that everyone must embrace it. 
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Introduction 
On the Calle del Olvido 
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 La 3a Avenida (Third Avenue) is one of downtown Guatemala City's many bustling 
avenues that funnel traffic north and south through the heart of the city to its more far-flung 
zones and suburbs. It is an unexceptional street, and bears a striking resemblance to the Second, 
Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and other nearby avenues.1 And like many of these other avenues, and the 
streets which cross them perpendicularly, 3a Avenida also has another, far more poetic name, 
one likely to be found in a stroll through Gabriel García Marquéz's Macondo, or, closer to home, 
in the pages of Guatemala's Nobel prize-winning author, Miguel Ángel Asturias' works—the 
Calle del Olvido. What exactly is being forgotten, however, on the Street of Forgetting, is 
unclear, for few remember or ever knew why it is called that. The Calle del Olvido is lined with 
houses, shops, and businesses whose (frequently painted) walls are little more than blank 
canvases for street artists and activists armed with paint, stencils, posters, and glue, as well as 
others who are less artistically or politically minded but who have the same tools in their hands. 
The walls are the ideal space on which to make demands on the government or on society, or for 
these others to lay claim to territory or leave evidence of their presence. Given the tendency (one 
which sometimes seems to border on obsession) of property and business owners to paint over 
                                                
1 The notable exception is Sixth Avenue, La Sexta, parts of which are now closed to traffic and other parts of 
which have been narrowed to one lane; the avenue's sidewalks have been widened accordingly. It is one of the 
few streets where traffic is tamed, if only a little.  
2 
the words and pictures artists, activists, and gang members2 leave in their wake, the artwork and 
graffiti are more often than not ephemeral; once painted over, they will be little more than a faint 
memory in the minds of those who saw them, a memory passersby must work to remember as 
they travel down the Street of Forgetting.  
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A brief history of the conflicts 
 Carlos Ernesto Cuevas Molina stares out at those traveling along the Calle del Olvido, 29 
years after he was disappeared. Cuevas Molina, along with his partner, Rosario Godoy de 
Cuevas, and their son,3 are among the tens of thousands of Guatemalans and Salvadorans the 
                                                
2 Gang members are the others mentioned in the previous sentence. See, for example, Ellen Moodie, "Seventeen 
Years, Seventeen Murders: Biospectacularity and the Production of Post-Cold War Knowledge in El Salvador," 
Social Text 99 27, no. 2 (2009): 77-103. 
3 When Héctor Gómez Calito was assassinated for his work with the Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo (GAM, Mutual 
Support Group), Rosario Godoy de Cuevas, his friend and colleague, promised that his death would not be in 
vain. She was killed in a "car accident" soon after. It was, however, a strange car accident. GAM members who 
saw her body noticed bite-marks on her breasts and that her underwear was bloody. Her 2-year-old son was also 
killed, as was her 21-year-old brother. Both showed signs of having been tortured; their fingernails, for 
example, were missing. (Kate Doyle and Jesse Franzblau, "Historical Archives Lead to Arrest of Police Officers 
in Guatemalan Disappearance," The National Security Archive, 17 March 2009, 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB273/.) 
3 
countries' respective governments and militaries targeted during each country's Cold War-era 
conflicts. The next pages will provide some historical background on the conflicts in Guatemala 
and El Salvador, as well as explain some of their key aspects, the ideologies and beliefs that 
drove the different actors, and the kinds of human rights violations that were committed 
throughout. This short history provides an outline of "the past" which must either be remembered 
or forgotten in the post-Peace Accords era.  
 
Guatemala 
 The roots of Guatemalan's "internal armed conflict"4 can be traced back centuries, but its 
more immediate political and social roots lie in the twentieth century. By the mid-1900s, 
Guatemala had suffered through a long string of often military dictators. The lack of democracy, 
as well as corruption in the military and a lack of opportunity for advancement, inspired young 
officers to stage a coup in October 1944, marking the beginning of the so-called Ten Years of 
Spring. The second president of this period of democratic opening, Jacobo Arbenz, sought to 
convert Guatemala into an economically independent, capitalist state and to "raise the standard of 
living of the great masses of our people to the highest level."5 Since the Guatemalan economy 
was based on agriculture, and on highly unequal land ownership where the vast majority did not 
have access to land, this meant land reform, in the form of the 1952 Agrarian Reform Law. The 
Law, inspired by the recommendations of the World Bank's International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development survey, mandated the expropriation of larger tracts of 
uncultivated land to increase production. Landowners would be reimbursed as per tax records.6 
                                                
4 Officially, the period from 1960 to 1996 is called the "internal armed conflict." Gabriel Aguilera Peralta 
suggests that the war was called the internal armed conflict so that international law would not apply; Gabriel 
Aguilera Peralta "Realizar un Imaginario: La Paz en Guatemala" in Desde el Autoritarismo a la Paz, eds. 
Edelberto Torres-Rivas and Gabriel Aguilera Peralta (Guatemala: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias 
Sociales, 1998), 115. Yet many Guatemalans refer to this period, and especially the 1980s, as la violencia. 
Caren Weisbart explains this further; "Considering that the 'armed conflict' was actually an attack on un-armed 
community members fleeing from the army and, in some cases, the guerrilla, many Guatemalans, scholars and 
writers refer to this period in Guatemala’s brutal history as 'la violencia.' " (Caren Weisbart, "Beyond 
Recognition: Alternative Rights-Realizing Strategies in the Northern Quiche Region of Guatemala," 2012, 
http://www.yorku.ca/cerlac/Weisbart.pdf.)  
5 Jim Handy, Gift of the Devil: a History of Guatemala (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1984), 115. 
6 The short survey of twentieth century Guatemalan history found in the next several pages draws on Jim Handy's 
Gift of the Devil: a History of Guatemala (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1984) and Revolution in the 
Countryside: Rural Conflict and Agrarian Reform in Guatemala, 1944-1954 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1994), Susanne Jonas' The Battle for Guatemala: Rebels, Death Squads, and US Power 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), Robert Carmack's Harvest of Violence: The Maya Indians and the 
Guatemalan Crisis (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988), and Marc Drouin's "To the Last Seed: 
4 
 The landed elite, the church, and the military were opposed to Arbenz and the land 
reform, partly because of a concern about the increasing influence of communism in his 
administration. The United States-owned United Fruit Company's opposition to the expropriation 
of their land was also important, as were the company's close ties to the US government. 
Whether Eisenhower was more concerned with communism or with the interests of the United 
Fruit Company,7 he agreed to fund Arbenz's overthrow. Carlos Castillo Armas led the invasion 
of the "Liberation Army" and set about dismantling the Revolution's program. He did not shy 
away from the use of repression. Labor and peasant leaders and activists were assassinated. 
Cindy Forster described approximately 1000 peasants and banana workers being machine 
gunned at Finca Jocotán in Tiquisate. In that instance, the officer in charge of the region "had 
[those who had benefitted from the agrarian reform] dig trenches and they would line up in front 
of the trenches and kill them with machine guns." Forster adds that repression did not often take 
such deadly form.8 1954 marks the beginning of what would turn out to be decades of violence 
and state terrorism, as well as more "soft" techniques, directed against activists of all sorts and 
the rural, indigenous and non-indigenous populations in general.9 
 The first guerrilla movement appeared in 1960, the immediate cause of which was the 
government's decision to allow the US to use the country as a training base for the Bay of Pigs 
invasion. After a failed coup attempt, the officers went into exile, returning soon after to plan a 
guerrilla war with the aim of creating a more just society. The response was repression, the 
virtual defeat of the guerrilla by 1967, and increased military control over government. The 
                                                                                                                                                       
Atrocity Crimes in the Genocidal Continuum in Guatemala, 1978-1984" (MA thesis, Concordia University, 
2006), Daniel Wilkinson's Silence on the Mountain: Stories of Terror, Betrayal, and Forgetting in Guatemala 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2002), and Edward Fischer and R. McKenna Brown's edited work, Maya 
Cultural Activism in Guatemala (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996), in addition to other works cited 
below. 
7 The question of whether or not Arbenz was a communist and how far communists had infiltrated his 
government, as well as whether fear of communism or United Fruit Company pressure pushed the US to 
intervene, is the focus of much of the literature surrounding the Revolution and Arbenz's overthrow. See, for 
example, Handy's Revolution in the Countryside, Piero Gleijeses' Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution 
and the United States, 1944-1954 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), Stephen Schlesinger and 
Stephen Kinzer's Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2006), Jonas' The Battle for Guatemala, and Stephen Streeter's Managing the Counter- 
Revolution: The United States & Guatemala, 1954-1961 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2001). 
8 Cindy Forster, The Time of Freedom: Campesino Workers in Guatemala's October Revolution (Pittsburg: 
University of Pittsburg Press, 2001), 202-4.  
9  For information about repression in the post-coup years, See Cindy Forster's The Time of Freedom, Greg 
Grandin's The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin American in the Cold War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2004) and Jonas' The Battle for Guatemala. 
5 
guerrilla re-remerged in the 1970s with a new strategy for victory—getting the masses, 
especially the rural peasantry, involved. They were able to tap into rural discontent, and 
especially anger at local landowners' monopolization of land and the low wages they paid. It 
must be added that the guerrilla did not arrive in rural communities where residents were simply 
resigned to their fate. Vibrant peasant organizations and co-operatives, partly inspired by Acción 
Católica (Catholic Action) and the spread of liberation theology and its "preferential option for 
the poor,"10 were thriving in the 1960s and 70s. Though Catholic Action had been founded to 
reinforce Catholic dogma especially in indigenous areas, by the 1970s, under the influence of 
often foreign-born priests who embraced liberation theology, the program was involved in 
literacy campaigns, educational radio programming, creating peasant co-operatives, and other 
more socially conscious activities. Peasant organizing was not limited to forming local co-
operatives;11 rather, it extended beyond the local to the national level. The most notable of these 
national organizations, and one which crossed the ethnic divide, is the Comité de Unidad 
Campesina (CUC, Peasant Unity Committee). Founded in 1978, by 1980, the CUC was able to 
mobilize approximately 80,000 peasants in the largest rural strike in Guatemalan history.12  
 The events that took place in Panzós, Alta Verapaz, in May 1978 are clear evidence of 
rural discontent, rural organizing, and rural repression.13 Hundreds of indigenous and 
dispossessed peasants gathered in the town square to demand title to their land. The military 
opened fire and killed over 100. The Panzós massacre marked a turning point. Although the 
conflict was already well under way by 1978, the massacre exposed the military’s true colors; it 
showed their willingness to attack and kill unarmed civilians and was a clear declaration of their 
intention of making war on the population. Shortly after the massacre, in a clearly fraudulent 
process, Romeo Lucas García, was elected president. His time in office continued and expanded 
on the pattern of repression seen at Panzós. Counterinsurgency campaigns targeted union 
                                                
10 Phillip Berryman's Liberation Theology: The Essential Facts about the Revolutionary Movement in Latin 
American and Beyond (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987) is a good introduction to the topic. 
11 Though certainly the level of organizing in co-operatives was high. Handy writes that 20% of indigenous 
Highland residents were members of co-operatives in 1975, and that that number grew following the 1976 
earthquake. (Handy, Gift of the Devil, 240). Betsey Konefal explores different aspects of indigenous activism in 
For Ever Indio Who Falls Falls: A History of Maya Activism in Guatemala, 1960-1990 (Albuquerque: 
University of New Mexico Press, 2010).  
12 Cindy Forster, " 'Miles de Machetes en Alto': Las Luchas Campesinas de la Costa Sur en el Surgimiento de la 
Revolución Guatemalteca, 1970-1980," in Guatemala: La Infinita Historia de las Resistencias, ed. Manolo Vela 
Casteñeda, 573-613, (Guatemala City: SEPAZ, 2013).  
13 Greg Grandin has a useful discussion of the Panzós massacre in The Last Colonial Massacre.  
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members, students, academics, and members of the official opposition. Jean-Marie Simon 
commented, "it was a time when people changed even their pseudonyms"; vice president 
Francisco Villagrán Kramer remarked in 1980, after he fled Guatemala to the safety of 
Washington, "there [were] no political prisoners, only political corpses."14 In the rural areas, 
selective killings turned into massacres of entire communities. The army launched a series of 
counterinsurgency campaigns against civilians, convinced that they were involved with the 
various guerrilla organizations operating at that time. The army put the guerrillas (who united in 
1982 to form the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca [URNG, Guatemalan National 
Revolutionary Unity]) on the defensive, a position from which they never recovered. 
 A coup on 23 March 1982 brought Efraín Ríos Montt to power. The counterinsurgency 
became even more brutal; blood flowed like water as the military razed villages, massacred their 
inhabitants, and displaced a massive portion of the rural population, who the military believed 
were collaborating with the guerrilla. As a member of the Ríos Montt administration said, "The 
guerrillas won over many Indian collaborators. Therefore the Indians were subversives. And how 
do you fight subversion? Clearly you had to kill Indians because they were collaborating with 
subversion. And then it would be said that you were killing innocent people. But they are not 
innocent, they had sold out to subversion."15 As former soldier Chilin Hultaxh said, the army's 
strategy was to "kill ten people, because at least one of them would be a guerrilla, even if the 
other nine were innocent."16 Attempts to win the hearts and minds of the population 
accompanied these violent campaigns. Yet for this to happen, the army needed hearts and minds 
to win, so the military rounded up the displaced and resettled them in "model villages." Beatriz 
Manz describes the model villages as "appear[ing] more like run-down prison camps than 
villages."17 The model villages, populated by people from different regions, communities, and 
ethnic groups, were meant to foster fear, suspicion, and division among inhabitants. Yet even 
those who were not forced to resettle in model villages were under almost constant military 
surveillance. Linda Green describes life in a non-model village with a military garrison perched 
on the hill above town as living in a fishbowl. From the safety of the army post, soldiers were 
                                                
14 Jean-Marie Simon, Guatemala: Eternal Spring, Eternal Tyranny (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1988), 76 
and 72. 
15 Judith Zur, Violent Memories: Mayan War Widows in Guatemala (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 67-8. 
16 Victor Montejo, Voices from Exile: Violence and Survival in Modern Maya History (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1999), 90. 
17 Beatriz Manz, Paradise in Ashes: A Guatemalan Journey of Courage, Terror, and Hope (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2004), 158. 
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able to watch residents and their movements, and residents were entirely subject to the army's 
whims and cruelty.18 
 The already high level of military control was extended through mandatory participation 
in the Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil (PACs, Civil Self-defense Patrols).19 By the mid-1980s, 
approximately one million were mobilized in the PACs.20 The PACs were the army's local 
informers, forced to spy on their neighbors and draw up lists of guerrilla sympathizers or 
collaborators. The PACs were also forced to commit atrocities, thereby spreading guilt to much 
of the rural population, turning victims into perpetrators and converting the conflict into one 
which pitted communities against each other.21 This guilt, the army hoped, would also serve to 
silence the population, as would massacres, rape, torture, and disappearance. These also, of 
course, had the effect of killing the witnesses to the crimes, and discouraging others from joining 
the guerrilla. "It was not possible to speak"22 in Guatemala in the 1980s, and many did not dare 
to in an effort to protect themselves and their families.  
 By 1983, Ríos Montt had lost control of the army, had been unable to appease the 
business sector, and, because of his weekly televised sermons, had become an embarrassment. 
He was overthrown in August 1983 and replaced by Coronel Óscar Humberto Mejía Victores. 
Mejía Victores concentrated on solidifying the military's position in the countryside by 
continuing his predecessors' tactics meant to order, control, and militarize rural society. The 
popular and labor movements also continued to be targeted. Mejía Victores was given the 
additional task of planning the transition to constitutional government. He called an election for 
the Constituent Assembly, which then drafted a new constitution. Elections for the presidency 
                                                
18 Linda Green, Fear as a Way of Life: Mayan War Widows in Rural Guatemala (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1999), 61. 
19 Jennifer Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project: A Violence Called Democracy (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), 72-3 and 65. 
20 Of these only an estimated 5-10% were armed; most patrollers carried only sticks, machetes, or guns carved 
from wood and painted black, the last of which only served to make them a more obvious target for the 
guerrillas. Even when armed, the patrols were no match for the guerrillas given their lack of military training. 
The PACs were also treated as cannon fodder and were frequently used as a “human shield” to protect soldiers 
from the guerrillas’ surprise attacks. 
21 Susanne Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala: Rebels, Death Squads, and US Power (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1991), 150-2 and Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 81-2 and 91. 
22 Carlos Y. Flores, Bajo la Cruz: Memoria y Dimensión Sobrenatural del Gran Sufrimiento entre los Qéqchi' de 
Alta Verapaz (Coban, Guatemala: Ak' Kutan Centro Bartolomé de las Casas, 2001). 
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were held in 1985 and a civilian was elected for the first time in decades, though the military 
maintained significant power, especially in the countryside.23 
 An estimated 200,000 were killed or disappeared in 36 years of violence, from 1960 to 
1996. The vast majority was indigenous, leading many to conclude that acts of genocide had 
been committed in Guatemala. Yet Guatemalans did not simply allow this to happen to them. 
Levels of organizing to protest the violence and to demand that relatives be returned remained 
high throughout the conflict despite the risks involved. Relatives went to morgues and hospitals 
looking for the disappeared; some placed ads in papers describing loved ones and asking for 
information. The most "daring"24 filed writs of habeas corpus, daring because, as anthropologist 
Judith Zur pointed out, "Having a political death or 'disappeared one' (desaparecido) in the 
family is like admitting to a contagious disease."25 With time, relatives organized more formally 
to help the survivors and demand to know what had happened to loved ones. These organizations 
continue their work today. 
 
El Salvador 
 The underlying causes of El Salvador's Civil War are, as in Guatemala, centuries old. Yet 
1932's La Matanza is seen as a precursor to later violence, and is used as a point of comparison. 
Rural unrest and hardship pushed peasants to take action. On 22 January 1932, they occupied a 
handful of towns in the western part of the country. There was some looting and a few 
executions of particularly ruthless landowners. The military quickly put down the rebellion; 
vigilante groups then took over and traveled the countryside killing peasants and rural workers, 
as well as members of leftist parties and unions, many of whom were indigenous. An estimated 
30,000 were killed. The political legacies of the massacre are significant. The events of 1932, 
which took place at the beginning of Maximiliano Martínez Hernández's dictatorship, pushed the 
oligarchy to agree to give up political office in exchange for the military's protection of their 
                                                
23 See also, Ricardo Falla's Masacres en la Selva: Ixcán, Guatemala, 1975-1982, translated by Julia Howland  
 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), Jonas' The Battle for Guatemala, and Simonne Remijnse's Memories of 
Violence: Civil Patrols and the Legacy of Conflict in Joyabaj, Guatemala (Amsterdam: Rozenberg Publishers, 
2002). 
24 Member of the Asociación Familiares de Detenidos-Desaparecidos de Guatemala (Famdegua, Association of 
the Family Members of the Detained-Disappeared of Guatemala), interview with author, 26 March 2012. 
25 Zur, Violent Memories, 77. 
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interests. By the 1970s, the military had to resort to increasingly violent repression to stay in 
power, both in urban and rural areas.26 
 Many Salvadorans organized around land and other rural issues in these decades, despite 
the risks.27 Ironically, the government's decision to do something about the agrarian problem 
contributed to the growth of the same activism that the government wished to repress. The 
government, for example, initiated land reform and encouraged the creation of new rural co-
operatives as a way to solve the rural crisis. The government also supported education projects, 
many of which were sponsored by the US. Workshops were organized to teach about co-
operatives, agrarian laws, health issues, and farming and organizational techniques, among other 
things. These solved little, but, as in Guatemala, they did allow participants to acquire new skills 
and begin to embrace the idea of working together to better their situation. Peasant leagues began 
to form as a result, one of the first of which was the Unión Comunal Salvadoreña (UCS, 
Salvadoran Communal Union), which had over 100,000 members by 1980.28 The UCS had ties 
to both the US and Salvadoran governments, who saw it as a way to bring peasants under the 
watchful eye of the military. But the UCS was also a positive experience for many peasants as 
they became more aware of and educated about issues that were important to them, and as they 
                                                
26 Jeffrey L. Gould and Aldo Lauria-Santiago, To Rise in Darkness: Revolution, Repression, and Memory in El 
Salvador, 1920-1932 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008). For an interesting discussion of the memory 
of 1932, see Jennifer Tilley's Seeing Indians, Héctor Lindo-Fuentes, Erik Ching, and Rafael A. Lara-Martínez's 
Remembering a Massacre in El Salvador, and Roque Dalton's Miguel Mármol, which Lindo-Fuentes, Ching, 
and Lara-Martínez discuss. 
27 The following summary of Salvadoran history draws on Lauria-Santiago and Leigh Binford's Landscapes of 
Struggle: Politics, Society, and Community in El Salvador (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004), 
William Leogrande's Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 1977-1992 (Chapel Hill, NC: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1998), Cynthia McClintock's Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: 
El Salvador's FMLN and Peru's Shining Path (Washington, D.C.: Unites States Institute for Peace, 1998); Irina 
Carlota Silber's Everyday Revolutionaries: Gender, Violence, and Disillusionment in Postwar El Salvador 
(New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2011), Ralph Sprenkels' The Price of Peace: The Human Rights 
Movement in Postwar El Salvador (Amsterdam: Centre for Latin American Research and Documentation, 
2005), Molly Todd's Beyond Displacement: Campesinos, Refugees, and Collective Action in the Salvadoran 
Civil War (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2010), and Elisabeth Jean Wood's Insurgent Collective 
Action and Civil War in El Salvador (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), in addition to other 
works cited.  
28 Molly Todd divides peasant unions into orthodox and progressive unions. Though she recognizes that 
membership was fluid, she places the UCS in the orthodox category along with the Organización Democrática 
Nacionalista (ORDEN, Nationalist Democratic Organization). (Todd, Beyond Displacement, 30.) Significantly, 
the Salvadoran Truth Commission found that there was "substantial evidence" to prove that ORDEN, along 
with the National Guard, were responsible for the deaths of over 300 peasants in 1980, in the Río Sumpul 
massacre. (Comisión de la Verdad para El Salvador, From Madness to Hope: The 12-year War in El Salvador: 
Report of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador, 1993, http://www.usip.org/resources/truth-commission-
el-salvador, 116.) The Commission also described ORDEN as a "precursor of the death squads." (Comisión de 
la Verdad para El Salvador, From Madness to Hope, 191.) 
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learned how valuable they were to the government. Members learned to ask the government for 
benefits (though they did not always receive them), gained experience organizing, and saw 
firsthand the improvements that could be achieved through co-operative efforts.  
 Tied up in all of this is liberation theology, as it was in Guatemala. Peasants organized 
into Comunidades Eclesiales de Base (CEBs, Christian Base Communities) and attended the 
peasant universities and training centers the dioceses sponsored. Peasants talked to each other at 
these training sessions and many realized that they faced the same challenges, as peasants. They 
took these ideas home with them, as they did the skills they learned; some also took these ideas 
and skills into remote villages as they walked around the countryside as catechists or itinerant 
organizers. Peasants also began establishing alliances with other sectors, which helped them 
expand their visions and goals beyond the local. Guerrilla organizations, therefore, found fertile 
ground.29 The five guerrilla organizations that existed by 1980 (when they united to form the 
Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional [FMLN, the Farabundo Marti National 
Liberation Front]) hoped, as in Guatemala, to spark a revolution, overthrow the government, and 
usher in a new, more just system. And it was peasants' support that transformed the FMLN into a 
large movement, so large that by the end of 1984, they controlled one-fifth of the country and 
could move freely in that territory.  
 1979-1983 were the worst years of the war in El Salvador, much like in Guatemala. Also 
as in Guatemala, the army's counterinsurgency strategy was based on the idea that the entire rural 
population was collaborating with the guerrilla. They were the sea in which the guerrilla fish 
swan; thus, to defeat the insurgency, the sea had to be drained. Civilians were massacred in rural 
areas, including almost 1000 in the course of a few days in and around El Mozote, Morazán,30 
but many victims were also selectively targeted for their activism or politics, especially in urban 
areas. These included members of political parties, popular organizations, and the Catholic 
church.31 The military was responsible for the majority of the violence, though the early 1980s 
                                                
29 Recently, scholars have suggested that the leaders of these peasant movements were a driving force behind the 
guerrillas. Joaquín Chávez argues that the involvement of these popular intellectuals and their peasant 
supporters transformed the insurgency from a small conflict led by guerrillas from the urban middle class into a 
force to be reckoned with. Chávez argues that there was already an insurgency in the rural areas, though it was 
not necessarily an armed insurgency, and that the guerrillas were able to tap into it to become truly popular 
organizations; Joaquín M. Chávez, "The Pedagogy of Revolution: Popular Intellectuals and the Origins of the 
Salvadoran Insurgency, 1960-1980" (PhD diss., New York University, 2010). 
30 Mark Danner's The Massacre at El Mozote (New York: Vintage, 1994) offers a detailed reconstruction of the 
massacre. 
31 A range of guerrillas have written about their experiences of repression before and during the war, including 
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also saw an increase in death squad terror, much of it involving members of the newly formed 
Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA, Nationalist Republican Alliance). This included its 
founder, former colonel Roberto D'Aubuisson. While D'Aubuisson left the dirty work to others, 
he was the intellectual author of various assassinations, including the March 1980 assassination 
of Archbishop Romero. Officially lasting from 1980 to 1992, the Civil War cost the lives of an 
estimated 80,000 Salvadorans. 
 
Peace 
 By the late 1980s, after decades of war and conflict, Central Americans were exhausted.32 
The Central American Peace Accords, commonly know as Esquipulas II, committed Costa Rica, 
Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala to work toward finding negotiated settlements 
to the region's conflicts. Though little immediate action was taken in El Salvador or Guatemala, 
Esquipulas II helped to solidify the idea of negotiations. In El Salvador, both the military and the 
FMLN finally agreed to sit down at the negotiating table after the FMLN's second "final 
offensive" in November 1989. Brokered by the UN, the parties signed the final peace agreement 
at Chapultepec Castle in Mexico City on 16 January 1992. The Salvadoran Peace Accords were 
meant to establish the rule of law in El Salvador and to legitimize state institutions. They focused 
on dismantling the military institutions that had committed gross human rights violations. 
Because the FMLN viewed the peace process as a way to become a political party and electoral 
politics as a way to convert their vision of El Salvador to reality, they focused on making sure 
that elections would be free, fair, and open, and that security forces would not be able to easily 
convert themselves into institutions which massacred civilians. As a result, the peace accords 
dealt with socioeconomic problems only in a very limited way, and did not fully address the root 
causes of the war.  
                                                                                                                                                       
Salvador Cayetano, Fermán Cienfuegos/Eduardo Sancho, Nidia Diaz, Marvin Galeas, Ana Guadalupe Martínez, 
and Salvador Sánchez Cerén. 
32 These short summaries of the peace processes come from Cynthia Arnson's Comparative Peace Processes in 
Latin America (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1999.); Jack Spence's "War and Peace in 
Central America: Comparing Transitions toward Democracy and Social Equity in Guatemala, El Salvador, and 
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Eizabeth M. Cousens' Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2002); FLACSO's "De la Experiencia Salvadoreña a la Esperanza Guatemalteca: Acuerdos 
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 In Guatemala, the negotiations took much longer and the peace accords were different. 
The military and URNG finally met in Oslo in 1990, a meeting which the government and 
military only agreed to attend because of the changing international situation and because the 
government was in crisis. The talks broke down soon after, resuming in January 1994 with the 
involvement of the UN. Over the next two years, the parties signed agreements about human 
rights, the formation of the UN verification mission, the establishment of the Comisión para el 
Esclarecimineto Histórico (CEH, Historical Clarification Commission), indigenous rights, the 
agrarian situation, the legal integration of the URNG, the role of the military, and constitutional 
and electoral reform. The final Accord on a Firm and Lasting Peace was signed on 29 December 
1996 in Guatemala City. Yet this was not the end of the process. For the peace to firmly take 
root, reforms to the constitution had to be made, which meant that a referendum had to be held 
on the proposed amendments. Most of the proposed reforms were defeated with the 1999 
referendum, ending the implementation of many aspects of the peace accords. 
 
The Project 
 Ernesto Cuevas Molina refuses to be forgotten. Or, rather, those who painted his name 
and face on the 3a. Avenida refuse to allow him to be forgotten. In reference to South Africa, 
Liepollo Lebohang Pheko wrote, "Memory is an act of defiance because erasure is an instinct of 
conquest."33 This is certainly true in Guatemala and El Salvador, as sectors of the political, 
economic, and social elite have sought to erase the past. In such a context, remembering Cuevas 
Molina is an act of defiance, as are remembering the tens of thousands of disappeared 
Guatemalans and Salvadorans, remembering the acts of genocide committed in Guatemala, 
remembering the Guatemalan and Salvadoran military and paramilitary's massacres, and 
remembering both states' terrorism.   
 Conflict and violence form the backdrop of this project, while these acts of defiance, of 
remembering, as well as the instinct of erasure that inspires them, form the project's core. The 
focus is on what happens after brutal and devastating periods of violence, on how people in 
Guatemala and El Salvador have proposed to grapple with, overcome, or work through34 such 
                                                
33 Liepollo Lebohang Pheko, "Twist Memory and You Distort Identity," Mail and Guardian, 10 October 2104, 
accessed 15 October 2014, http://mg.co.za/article/2014-10-09-twist-memory-and-you-distort-identity. 
34  Sigmund Freud, "Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through (Further Recommendations on the 
Technique of Psycho-analysis II)," in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund 
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violent and divisive pasts. The question is exceedingly important (and is asked all too often, 
given the series of conflicts witnessed around the world in the past decades), yet the answer is far 
from simple. Different societies have responded in different ways over the years. Some opt for 
trials, others create commissions to investigate the "truth" of the past, and still others simply 
refuse to address the past. Lying behind these more technical questions is the larger question of 
whether societies with violent histories will remember or forget their pasts. Is memory the best 
way to achieve the hoped-for goal of "never again," or would oblivion be better? Closely linked 
to this question is the issue of what parts of the past will be brought to the forefront and 
remembered, or pushed to the margins and forgotten. Yet another interrelated question revolves 
around how the past is talked about in the public sphere. It is the intersection of these questions 
that this dissertation explores. What is said about memory and forgetting in the public sphere in 
El Salvador and Guatemala? Are there calls to remember the past or parts of it? To (very actively 
and purposefully) forget it? Why do people promote one or the other? What past is it, which 
"truth" about the past is it, that those who call for memory are talking about? Is forgetting 
promoted within a larger discourse of memory? What mechanisms are used to push for oblivion? 
Is the memory/forgetting discourse even present? If not, how do people talk about the past? Do 
they talk about it at all? Is there a different kind of discourse about the past that dominates?  
 A short comment is necessary before continuing. This investigation is about what 
members of El Salvador and Guatemala's elites35 say about the conflicts. It is about the discursive 
frameworks some of these elites have created, thereby dictating the language that elites who 
oppose that framework must use. These are public declarations, all directed at an audience36 and 
clearly meant to be heard by someone. Most often that "someone" is a rarely defined 
"Guatemalan" or "Salvadoran," though they are not always listening and so do not hear. Indeed, 
in Guatemala, language means that many might hear but cannot understand what is being said. 
That aside, politicians certainly do speak, journalists do write, and activists do act with the 
expectation and understanding that they are not doing so in a space devoid of "Guatemalans" or 
"Salvadorans." The Guatemalans and Salvadorans who fill this space, who read newspapers and 
                                                                                                                                                       
Freud. Volume XII (1911-1913): The Case of Schreber Papers on Technique and Other Works, with Anna 
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the pamphlets and reports which civil society organizations and the government publish, are most 
likely literate residents of one of the two capital cities. They are a minority of the population. Yet 
even if a minority of Guatemalans read newspapers or organizations' reports, this does not mean 
that the discourse these contain does not reach a broader audience. The reach and influence of 
newspapers, for example, should not be underestimated, as anthropologist and political scientist 
Ricardo Saénz de Tejada Rojas' study of electoral politics and participation in Guatemala, 
especially among the Maya, demonstrates. Sáenz de Tejada concludes that, "faced with the 
weakness of political parties...the media and especially those who control them, take charge of 
generating 'public opinion.' The media's influential role and how they accredit or discredit an 
institution or individual's image is recognized internationally. It is almost possible to say that the 
media are the ones who elect the president."37  
 David Gross argues a related point. He suggests that, since the mid-twentieth century, the 
mass media have become the dominant framers of social memory, replacing the state (which had 
itself replaced the church) as determining what is remembered and forgotten. Gross suggests that 
while the mass media—the "overlapping and interpenetrating worlds" of print and electronic 
media, including newspapers, magazines, tabloids, film, radio, and television—are most 
concerned with pop culture, they also determine societal values and frame what is important 
enough to be remembered, and what is not. As such, the mass media have become the most 
important source of information about the past and dictate which aspects of it should be 
remembered. According to Gross, the media also determine what we should think about the past. 
The media is, he adds, able to have such a key role in this because they seem to be "down-to-
earth and democratic," in addition to being omnipresent.38  
 And while human rights organizations' reports might not be read, certainly their message 
and work are more known. This is especially true of organizations that are actively involved with 
relatives of the victims and in rural communities, supporting the search for justice or finding the 
remains of loved ones. These same messages are evident in the work of street artists in 
downtown Guatemala City and in protests and demonstrations in front of El Salvador's National 
Cathedral. Many street artists and demonstrators, however, would likely reject the very 
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suggestion that they are part of either Guatemala or El Salvador's elite. And certainly, many are 
firmly members of the working class. Nevertheless, they are included in this project at various 
moments, in part because their grassroots organizing is a very public, very visible reflection of 
the message of the more formal, and better-funded, human rights community. Yet "reflect" is not 
the right word, for discourse is formed in dialogue, even between members of the larger human 
rights community. Conversations between different members of the larger community 
continually shape discourse. Indeed, since many of those at protests or who spread their message 
on city streets are relatives of the victims of state terrorism (they appear at each protest holding 
photos of their dead) or are the heirs of the activism of the 1970s and 80s (and especially of 
radical student activism), they are often the ones who insist on memory and truth most loudly. 
They refuse to allow the past to be forgotten. In this, they push the human rights community. 
Indeed, it could be argued that the human rights community reflects the discourse present on city 
streets and at demonstrations.  
 Returning to Sáenz de Tejada's comments about the influence of the media, despite his 
declarations and despite the work of activists, the subject of this investigation remains what is 
being said and written, not what is being heard, read, and understood. There will be no discussion 
of whether or how what intellectuals, journalists, activists, and politicians say resonates with "the 
average Salvadoran" or "the typical Guatemalan" (if such people exist) who might hear or read 
their words.39 The focus is on what is said or written, and on what other intellectuals, activists, 
and commentators understand those words to mean.  
 In the series of questions posed above about what to do after periods of violence, the 
focus is on what "people" say and do. This, as well as the excessive, but equally intentional, use 
of the passive voice masks the identity of whoever is speaking these phrases about memory and 
forgetting. But their identities—for there is more than one "people," more than one "they"—are a 
key element of this project. In general terms, "they" are the members of two broadly defined 
sectors that disagree about almost everything: conservatives and the human rights community. 
The catch-all category of "conservatives" includes military officers; the economic elite; members 
of conservative political parties, whether they were politically active during the conflict or not; 
and, individuals, especially academics, journalists, and commentators, who might not belong to 
                                                
39 In the case of politicians, however, victory at the urns might confirm that voters agree with what is said. On the 
other hand, electoral success might indicate that the winner had more money to spend on the campaign, gave 
out more free things, and made more promises that voters wanted to hear, for example, about security and jobs. 
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any particular party but whose ideology or politics mirrors that of the conservative sectors whose 
praise they sing. The "human rights community," on the other hand, includes members of 
victims' organizations, often relatives of the dead or disappeared; individuals with ties to those 
organizations; politicians who identify and work on behalf of victims and their relatives; and 
commentators, journalists, and academics who collaborate and work in solidarity with the 
victims, survivors, and their relatives. The human rights community also generally includes those 
who lean toward the left. In Guatemala, the left (members of which lean to the left in varying 
degrees) fits more comfortably under the umbrella of the human rights community than in El 
Salvador where, as will be seen, the human rights community sees the left (i.e., the FMLN) as 
only sometimes working toward the same goals.  
 A comment on the Catholic church and the countries' respective guerrilla forces is 
necessary here. In Guatemala, the church, and especially its Oficina de Derechos Humanos del 
Arzobispado de Guatemala (ODHA, Human Rights Office of the Archdiocese of Guatemala), 
works in favor of human rights and the victims. Of this there can be no doubt. In El Salvador, on 
the other hand, the church has a close relationship with the conservative elite. The Salvadoran 
church is a conservative institution led by largely conservative bishops, despite the creation of 
what would become the Oficina de Tutela Legal del Arzobispado de San Salvador (Tutela Legal, 
Archbishop of San Salvador's Legal Aid Office) in the 1970s and despite local communities and 
priests' embrace of liberation theology. Thus, in El Salvador, the church as an institution cannot 
be included in the human rights community, though Tutela Legal certainly is.  
 The situation of former guerrillas in El Salvador is rather more complex than in 
Guatemala, where the URNG were unable to transition into a successful and powerful political 
party capable of winning the presidency. Far from it: the URNG had only two deputies in 
Congress in 2012.40 Indeed, in Guatemala, political parties come and go in the blink of an eye, 
during which time membership is in constant flux, creating an environment where membership in 
a particular political party is less important (in determining what one says about the past) than 
ties to the military or economic elite. In terms of the latter, some argue that a "megaparty"—the 
right wing and pro-business Comité Coordinador de Asociaciones Agrícolas, Comerciales, 
Industriales y Financieras (CACIF, Coordinating Committee of Agricultural, Commercial, 
                                                
40 Congreso de la República de Guatemala, "Diputados y Diputadas: Séptima Legislatura, 2012-2016," 
http://www.congreso.gob.gt/legislaturas.php. 
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Industrial, and Financial Associations)—really controls politics in Guatemala, making sure its 
interests are looked after.41 In the discussion about Guatemala, political parties will be largely 
absent, as will, in fact, any significant discussion of CACIF. Nevertheless, it is important to keep 
CACIF's power in mind throughout the discussion. In El Salvador, on the other hand, the FMLN 
has been very successful in their transition from clandestine force to political party, winning 
important mayoral races, legislative contests, and finally the presidency, all within their first 20 
years as a legal political party. They clearly cannot be included under the conservative umbrella, 
yet, given their complicated relationship with human rights and victims' organizations, nor do 
they always fit well with the human rights community. As a result, discussion of the FMLN will 
largely be limited to specific sections of this project.  
 An additional element in this discussion (which points, at the very least, to the many 
shades of gray hiding behind this black and white division of the public sphere into 
"conservatives" and "the human rights community") is the fluidity of group membership. In El 
Salvador, for example, many former guerrillas, who, in the explanation above, would not fit well 
in either category, have become much more politically conservative, disillusioned with the 
FMLN, its in-fighting, and the changing power dynamics among the different factions that make 
up the party. Those who have crossed the floor are harshly criticized by their former comrades. 
In Guatemala, on the other hand, important members of the human rights community have taken 
posts in conservative governments, though they have not abandoned their beliefs as a result. 
Rather, they opted to work in the government to achieve change. Had these individuals begun to 
change their beliefs, they would most certainly have been expelled from the community they had 
once been part of. In both countries, there is little room to challenge group discourse or belief. 
The borders of acceptable discourse are constantly policed and if they are crossed, reaction is 
swift.  
 The issue of policing will be explored in relation to the human rights community in 
Guatemala in Chapter Six, but conservatives also police their own. This can be seen in what 
happened to former ARENA president Tony Saca. Saca, who served as president from 2004 to 
2009, was expelled from ARENA six months after his term ended. He was not expelled 
specifically for betraying ARENA's discursive focus on amnesty and forgetting; rather, the 
                                                
41 Manolo Vela Castañeda, "El Megapartido y Sus Perritos Falderos," El Periódico, 6 July 2014, 
http://elperiodico.com.gt/es/20140706/domingo/250343. 
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Consejo Ejecutivo Nacional (Coena, National Executive Council) voted to kick him out of the 
party for "acting against the party's principles," as the online Salvadoran newspaper El Faro 
reported.42 The Coena, in should be pointed out, includes a Vice President of Ideology, though 
Ernesto Muyshondt, the Vice President until late 2014, dedicated at least some of his time not to 
ideology but to slandering FMLN president, Mauricio Funes.43  
 Internal policing is even clearer in Guatemala, as seen in the reaction to the interview 
Colonel Otto Noack Sierra gave on Dutch radio. In the interview, conducted in July 1998 and as 
reported in the Guatemalan newspaper, Siglo Veintiuno, Noack recognized the military's 
"excesses and abuses" and concluded that the military should "repent." The High Command 
ordered his arrest days later for insubordination. He did not, the Army said, have military 
authorization to express his views.44 It was clear, however, that this had little to do with having 
permission to give an interview and everything to do with what he said. The military was very 
obviously policing its own, and sending a clear message to others who might be tempted to voice 
similar opinions: you, too, will be arrested. You, too, will be stopped. Christian Tomuschat, head 
of the CEH, went to visit Noack while he was detained and reportedly applauded his bravery and 
expressed a hope that others would do the same.45 The military, however, could not arrest 
Tomuschat. Those who opposed his words, such as president Arzú (via the Minister of Foreign 
Relations), could only reject what he had said and accuse him—a foreigner—of interfering in 
internal matters. The implications of this were not lost on Tomuschat. In addition to Tomuschat 
                                                
42 Sergio Arauz, "Arena expulsa a ex presidente Saca," El Faro, 14 December 2009, 
http://www.elfaro.net/es/200912/noticias/730/.  He was also expelled, according to Freedom House, for 
corruption. (Freedom House, "Freedom in the World, 2011: El Salvador," accessed 17 March 2015, 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2011/el-salvador#.VQiuqGYjhG4.) 
43 ARENA, "Coena," accessed 17 March 2014, http://arena.org.sv/noticia-coena/. It is also worth pointing out that 
Funes accused Muyshondt, as well as powerful ARENA members Ana Vilma de Escobar and Roberto 
D'Aubuisson, of libel and slander for their suggestion that Funes was driving a Ferrari which had crashed, and 
that Funes was addicted to both drugs and alcohol. (Edward Gutíerrez, "Ernesto Muyshondt deja el COENA ," 
La Prensa Gráfica, 19 December 2014, http://www.laprensagrafica.com/2014/12/19/ernesto-muyshondt-deja-
el-coena and "Inicia audiencia de intimación contra Muyshondt por supuesta calumnia al Presidente Funes," 
Transparencia Activa, 29 April 2014,  http://www.transparenciaactiva.gob.sv/inicia-audiencia-de-intimacion-
contra-muyshondt-por-supuesta-calumnia-al-presidente-funes/.) Muyshondt later counter-sued Funes for the 
same crimes. (Gloria Funes, "Muyshondt demanda por calumnia y difamación a Mauricio Funes," La Prensa 
Gráfica, 2 June 2014, http://www.laprensagrafica.com/2014/06/02/muyshondt-demanda-por-calumnia-y-
difamacion-a-mauricio-funes.) This is interesting behavior for a Vice President of Ideology, all the more so 
because La Prensa Gráfica reported on his resignation in 2014 by saying that, as Vice President "Muyshondt 
remaind critical of the the FMLN's first government and Mauricio Funes." (Gutírrez, "Ernesto Muyshondt deja 
el COENA.") 
44 "Arrestan al coronel Noack Sierra," Siglo Veintiuno, 18 July 1998. 
45 "Arrestan al coronel Noack Sierra"; Carlso Castañaza Rosales, "Caso coronel Noack: Gobierno arremete contra 
Tomuschat," Siglo Veintiuno, 21 July 1998. 
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stating that his declarations about Noack were those of the CEH as a whole (the other two 
commissioners, it must be remembered, were Guatemalan), commissioner Alfredo Balsells Tojo 
added that the commission hoped that the government was not trying to "prematurely 
delegitimize" the CEH's report.46 The military, therefore, could and did police one of its own 
when his words challenged the military's version of the conflict. The government, however, try 
as it might, could not police what members of the internationally-supported CEH might say or 
do. Its power in this regard was limited. 
 The issue of policing aside, the labels of conservative (which is also sometimes called the 
state or military in this dissertation) and human rights community (or progressives or subalterns) 
should not be understood as describing concrete or unchanging groups. It is clear that the military 
and the state are not the same thing. Though both might be conservative, their interests can also 
collide. And their words are not identical. In the human rights community, some who repeat an 
overall discourse which highlights the importance of remembering are politically and/or 
economically more conservative than others who have a similar view about the past. And 
certainly some organizations that work in favor of human rights focus very little on the past. The 
labels used to describe the different sectors are, therefore, a convenient shorthand for 
heterogeneous groups of individuals who might only be united in their views about the past. The 
binary this project creates is an over simplification which is only sometimes made more 
complicated. The fractures, fissures, and fuzziness of group membership discussed here should 
not be forgotten. 
 Given the nature of the two conflicts, the two general sectors that exist in each country, 
which will be discussed in greater depth in the section on sources below, have every right and 
might even be expected to disagree. Conservatives, including military officers, were in power 
during the conflicts, directing counterinsurgency efforts and, seen from the most generous angle, 
turning a blind eye to human rights violations. The conservative heirs of those in power during 
the conflicts have every reason to want what happened in the past to remain in the past, for the 
crimes of the past to remain buried, for the past, in short, to be forgotten. The human rights 
community, on the other hand, emerged out of the ashes the military and its proxies left in their 
wake as they disappeared activists, burned crops, and razed communities. The human rights 
                                                
46 Castañaza Rosales, "Caso coronel Noack"; Julie López, "Caso Noack: Sigue pugna entre Gobierno y CEH," 
Siglo Veintiuno, 22 July 1998.  
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community works to exhume the past, to keep the past relevant, to reveal the names of those 
responsible for past crimes; they work to keep the memory of the past alive and to find out what 
happened to the victims.  
 I argue that the question of how to talk about the past, about whether the past should be 
remembered or forgotten, has been answered in different ways in Guatemala and El Salvador. In 
Guatemala members of different sectors—from the most conservative with ties to the 
perpetrators and economic elite, to the most adamant advocate of finding the remains of an 
assassinated or disappeared mother, brother, wife, or son—insist very broadly that the past be 
remembered so that it never happens again. I suggest that promoting the work which memory 
does to prevent repetition is Guatemala's common discursive framework. In William Roseberry's 
words, this framework determines "the central terms around which and in terms of which 
contestation and struggle can occur."47 In Roseberry's argument, it is the state that hopes to 
determine the discursive framework that dominates. This is its ultimate goal, and one that is 
rarely achieved. In this scheme, the state's discourse becomes the discourse subalterns must use 
to challenge the status quo.48 In Guatemala, on the other hand, the importance of memory in 
preventing repetition is the discourse of non-state actors; it is the discourse of the country's two 
historical commissions and the domestic (and international) human rights community. Though 
they are part of the country's elite sectors, they are also certainly subalterns in terms of their 
economic and political influence. Conservatives and those with an agenda counter to that of the 
human rights community must use the human rights community's discourse to oppose that 
sector's message and work. Thus, instead of openly declaring that Guatemalans must forget to 
prevent repetition and to ensure reconciliation, conservatives repeat the human rights 
community's call for memory, but do so in such a way that, if the meaning is interrogated, if the 
surface discourse is peeled back, it becomes clear that they, in fact, celebrate a sweeping, and 
deliberate, forgetting. When conservatives speak of the importance of amnesty, reconciliation, 
and perdón (pardon or forgiveness), these words are understood, and especially by the human 
rights community, as synonyms for forgetting. Indeed, when conservatives call for perdón or 
                                                
47 William Roseberry, "Hegemony and the Language of Contention," in Everyday Forms of State Formation: 
Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule in Modern Mexico, eds. Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 1994), 360-1. 
48 William Roseberry, "Hegemony, Power, and Languages of Contention," in The Politics of Difference: Ethnic 
Premises in a World of Power, eds. Edwin N. Wilmsen and Patrick McAllister (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1996), 81-2. 
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reconciliation, the human rights community reminds Guatemalans quite loudly that far from 
forgetting the conflict, it must be remembered. 
 Yet within this common framework, there is space for different versions or truths of the 
conflict to exist. The human rights community's truth of the conflict is largely that revealed by 
the Catholic church's Proyecto Interdiocesano de Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica (Remhi 
Project, Interdiocesan Project for the Recuperation of Historical Memory) and the CEH. That is, 
they agree that an estimated 200,000 died or were disappeared and that the military and its 
proxies, most significantly the PACs, committed over 90% of tens of thousands of human rights 
violations. Notably, the CEH also concluded that the military had committed acts of genocide 
against particular indigenous communities in the early 1980s. This is the human rights 
community's truth, and this is what they are talking about when they call for the past to be 
remembered. Conservatives' truth is quite distinct and focuses on the guerrilla's crimes. An 
additional element of conservatives' truth is that, while they do not necessarily deny that the 
military committed violations—indeed, they talk quite calmly about crimes against humanity—
they deny that genocide was committed in Guatemala. The denial of genocide became 
increasingly loud in the 2010s, and represents not a shift in the discursive framework, but a 
strong challenge to the human rights community's truth and narrative of the conflict. Both 
groups, to be sure, insist on the truth of their truth and refuse to cede space to alternate narratives. 
 In El Salvador, there is no common discursive framework. Instead, the human rights 
community and conservatives each have their own discourse which compete against each other 
in the public sphere. In this, conservatives have the upper hand; more often than not, the 
mainstream media and political, social, and economic elite support the conservative agenda. In 
terms of the place of the past in the present, conservatives, led by members of ARENA, have 
come to settle on a discourse rooted in the benefits of forgetting; they have loudly and repeatedly 
celebrated the work forgetting does in achieving reconciliation and non-repetition, a forgetting 
they believe will be achieved via amnesty. The human rights community, on the other hand, sees 
forgetting as doing little more than promoting impunity, and even repetition; instead of 
forgetting, they declare that only by knowing the truth of the conflict will repetition be 
prevented. Truth, they declare, works toward non-repetition. This truth-centered discourse is El 
Salvador's counterdiscourse, one that refuses to let conservatives' dominant discourse of 
forgetting be the only option heard in the public sphere. This discursive environment where truth 
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challenges forgetting does not mean that talk of memory is absent in El Salvador. Indeed, there 
have been calls for memory from the first days of the post-Peace era; much like in Guatemala, 
the role of memory is stated to be preventing repetition. 
 In El Salvador's public discourse, as in Guatemala's, a range of truths or historical 
narratives survive. And as in Guatemala, the human rights community's truth assigns 
responsibility in much the same way that the Salvadoran Truth Commission did. Thus, for the 
human rights community, the military and paramilitary organizations were overwhelmingly 
responsible for human rights violations. This is their truth of the war, a truth which is also often 
described as historical memory or memory. Conservatives, on the other hand, insist without 
actually mentioning it by name that the Truth Commission's truth, and so that of the human rights 
community, is partial; it is incomplete and biased. Instead, they embrace a truth which 
emphasizes the FMLN's violations and which ignores and silences the military's crimes. These 
are the competing truths/narratives of the war. Until 2009, conservatives' narrative certainly 
dominated the public sphere. With Funes' election, however, the human rights community's 
discourse and truth received a boost, as they became the official, presidential narrative of the 
war. Yet despite the change in the truth the president speaks, there is no space for another 
narrative of the war in either conservatives' nor the human rights community's understanding of 
the conflict. 
 Comparing the ways the past is talked about in the public sphere in Guatemala and El 
Salvador reveals the differences in two countries which are often seen as having suffered from 
similar Cold War era conflicts that both ended with UN-brokered Peace Accords that did little to 
address the immediate and more historic causes of the conflicts. As well, today, and ever since 
the Peace Accords were signed, the two countries have been drowing in violence, much of it 
related to narcotrafficking and gangs, and impunity. Yet despite the similarities in past (and 
present) violence, it is important to remember that the two countries have very different ways of 
dealing with that violence. These differences reveal the relative strength and weakness of 
different sectors in the two countries and their ability to dictate the terms of the debate. The 
comparison also highlights the uniqueness of each country's approach to the past. 
 The issue of truth is essential to societies transitioning out of periods of conflict, though 
what exactly these societies are transitioning to is frequently unclear since "peace" is often full of 
conflict and can be just as violent as the pre-peace was. In El Salvador and Guatemala, as in 
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many other places, determining the truth of what happened is seen (perhaps especially by 
international brokers and facilitators, but also by the domestic human rights community and its 
allies) as an essential item on the agenda of those negotiating peace agreements and involved in 
other transition processes. Truth and other similar historical commissions are created to answer 
the question of what really happened during the conflict. The issue of the truth, however, is not 
so easily resolved, as conservatives in both Guatemala and El Salvador reject the truth that these 
commissions revealed and instead use all the means at their disposal to promote their own truth 
of what happened. Truth commissions are certainly not the only initiatives that work in favor of 
one truth; monuments, commemorations, public declarations, ads taken out in the media, 
protests, and demonstrations are among the other platforms conservatives, the human rights 
community, and the now demobilized guerrilla use to make their truth known. As a result, the 
two societies have witnessed struggles over the truth of the past since the reports were published 
(and even long before this) and different sectors have consistently promoted their truth as the one 
and only truth of the past.  
 Yet there is a danger to insisting that there can only be one truth (or narrative or 
memory), especially in regard to the goals of reconciliation and non-repetition.49 Critics of truth 
commissions highlight some of the dangers of these truth-finding projects, criticisms that can be 
extended to other projects rooted in the idea of a unitary truth. Critics highlight the way that truth 
commissions merely offer a different official narrative of the past than the one that previously 
existed. While this new narrative, this new truth generally coincides to a greater extent with how 
the majority lived past conflicts, it still excludes the memories and truths of those who lived the 
conflicts differently. Truth commissions, therefore, seek to determine what people remember and 
believe to be the truth. Drawing on Michel Foucault's idea of counter-memories, truth 
commissions can be seen as turning counter-memory (i.e., the victims' and the opposition's 
                                                
49 There can be no question that especially non-repetition will be best be achieved by economic and political 
reforms, and most significantly land reform. Structural injustice, especially related to land, was addressed in 
both the Guatemalan and Salvadoran Peace Accords. As well, the CEH recognized structural injustice as a key 
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guaranteeing non-repetition. This project, however, begins not from the question of how to reconcile the two 
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terms, are tasked with doing. The issues of reconciliation and non-repetition are, therefore, discussed in relation 
to memory and forgetting, and not in relation to other ways that these will be achieved.  
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memory) into memory, thereby converting what had been memory (i.e., the military and political 
elite's memory) into counter-memory. For critics, substituting one group's truth as "the truth of 
the past" with another group's truth, as truth commissions do, is counterproductive, doing little 
more than creating new counter-memories, new silences, which will likely pose a threat to the 
nation in the future.50 Thus, projects in El Salvador, Guatemala, and elsewhere that promote the 
existence of one truth, leaving little space for even an acknowledgement that other truths exist, 
can actually work against the goals of reconciliation and non-repetition. Paul Ricoeur's work 
about amnesties and national unity is relevant here. He wrote that, as useful as it might be to pass 
amnesties and affirm what he describes as an imaginary national unity, doing so "condemn[s] 
competing memories to an unhealthy underground existence."51 One way forward for societies 
transitioning from periods of violence is, as Priscilla B. Hayner proposes, to "com[e] to a 
generally agreed understanding of a country’s history and past wrongs" based on agreement 
about the truth of "fundamental facts."52 Thus, it would be constructive, and contribute to a 
deeper transition, for societies to write a history that incorporates different groups’ contradictory 
memories, rather than excluding and delegitimizing them. 
 I argue that, in response to the question of whether it is best for societies emerging from 
periods of violence to remember or purposefully forget, it is very important to remember the 
past; the past must be remembered, but it should not be framed as being the one and only truth, 
while other truths are delegitimized and imagined, presumably, as lies. There must be, as Hayner 
argued, some basic agreement on the events of the past, but the idea that there is only one truth of 
the past must be questioned. A country's narrative of the past, if it is to be the foundation of a 
new reconciled nation, a nation at peace, a nation where a repetition of past wrong is highly 
unlikely, must recognize a diversity of experiences. This narrative must not work to exclude; 
rather, it must find a way to include. But more than this, the focus in transitional societies and of 
transitional justice mechanisms, including truth commissions, must be reconciling. It is an active 
                                                
50 Maria G. Cattell and Jacob J. Climo, "Meaning in Social Memory and History: Anthropological Perspectives," 
in Social Memory and History: Anthropological Perspectives, eds. Jacob J. Climo and Maria G. Cattell (New 
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51 Paul Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2004), 452-3. 
52 Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity (New York: Routledge, 2001), 
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process and involves reconciling both people and stories so that they can co-exist. In this view, 
the process—i.e., the discussion and debates, and how to discuss and debate in a productive (and 
not destructive) way—involved in figuring out what the "generally agreed understanding" of the 
past is and which facts are the fundamentally important ones is more significant for 
reconciliation than the results of that process. And it is precisely as the social body is screaming 
that the process of reconciling people and memories—of untangling the different strands of 
memory which have been knotted for decades53—can be most effective, for it is at these 
moments that narratives of the past are written. This will not happen overnight, and it will require 
much work. That it will happen at all might be overly optimistic, but in the meantime, open 
dialogue about the past is essential. Salvadorans and Guatemalans must talk openly about what 
happened, instead of accusing those with a different truth of being wrong and trying to drown the 
nation in another war. 
 Returning to Cuevas Molina, activists' search for knowing what happened to him and 
other Guatemalans and Salvadorans was largely unsuccessful during the conflicts. However, at 
least in Cuevas Molina's case and that of 182 others, what happened was revealed by the 
publication of the Diario Militar, or Death Squad Dossier, smuggled out of Guatemala in 1999. 
The Diario Militar is a list compiled by Military Intelligence of the names, pseudonyms, and 
photos (taken from the identity documents of the targets) of 183 of the Guatemalan military's 
many thousands of victims; it reveals extensive surveillance of political and other organizations, 
as well as the fate of the 183 individuals named. Seeking, it seems, to conceal its responsibility  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: National Security Archive. 
 
                                                
53 This mention of the social body screaming and knots is in reference to Steve Stern's idea of memory knots, 
which will be discussed in greater depth in the next chapter. 
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for the range of illegal activities in which it was involved, Military Intelligence used codes to 
describe what had happened. Penciled below the type-written information about Cuevas Molina's 
abduction at 10 am on 15 May 1984 in Guatemala City's Zona 1, on the 3a Avenida and 5a Calle, 
are a series of numbers: 01-08-84: 300. Cuevas Molina was assassinated on 1 August 1984, 
almost three months after he was captured. Unfortunately, and despite the non-stop efforts of 
organizations dedicated to the task of finding the dead and disappeared, the whereabouts of his 
and most others' remains are still a mystery.54 And it is precisely because this mystery remains 
that El Salvador and Guatemala's journeys down the Calle del Olvido have not been and will not 
be smooth and free from reminders that something happened in the past which must be addressed 
and worked through, not painted over as if it had never happened, as if the dead and disappeared 
had never existed.  
 
Sources 
 In her masterful work, Reckoning: The Ends of War in Guatemala, Diane Nelson speaks 
of engaño (duplicity) and being two-faced. She writes about a conversation she had with a 
catechist in Patzulá, a small community near Joyabaj, Quiché. The catechist told her he had also 
been the leader of the PACs in the community. He said, " 'I have two faces'….'One I show to the 
army, the other I show to my people.' "55 After hearing numerous declarations like this and other 
stories that make a similar point, Nelson wonders who was being duped? She writes, "In one 
case, when it thought it made the catechist work for them, the army couldn't see his second face. 
In the other [case, when, as Doña Miguela told Nelson, the "bad" people in the community  
" 'would tell the army that someone was a guerrilla when they were not' " to settle an often long-
standing disagreement or to get "a little bit of land"], as bad people tricked [the army] into acting 
for them, [the military] didn't see how they were being used for very local ends."56 Though this 
dissertation does not address the issue of engaño, the idea that people have two (or more) faces is 
important. In the range of sources consuted for this dissertation, which are discussed below, I 
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explore the face people choose to show to the public, the statements and declarations they choose 
to make. Their other face(s) remain hidden. 
 Research for this dissertation was conducted over the course of several trips to Guatemala 
and El Salvador. Much of that time was spend in the two countries' hemerotecas, or newspaper 
archives, leafing through newspapers since 1996 and 1992, respectively. The newspapers will be 
discussed in greater depth below. Another significant written source consisted of the publications 
of human rights and other organizations and government institutions related to the conflicts, as 
well as their webpages or social media pages. Testimonios and (auto)biographies of those who 
participated in the conflicts or peace negotiations, as well as other works they have written, form 
a final component of the written sources consulted. As for non-written sources, or at least 
sources not written on paper, I observed protests, demonstrations, trials, and commemorations; 
visited the exhumation at Guatemala City's La Verbena cemetery, various monuments related to 
the conflicts in both countries, and both countries' military museums; and spent time walking 
around Guatemala City and San Salvador, appreciating the work of street artists and mural 
painters. I also conducted formal interviews and had more informal conversations with 31 human 
rights activists, former military officers, academics, and journalists.57  
 The selection of which sources and whose words to draw on was partially inspired by 
Gramsci's discussion of intellectuals. Gramsci explains that the struggle between different social 
groups for dominance is at least in part a struggle about ideology, a struggle between different 
groups' intellectuals. For one group to become dominant, the other group's intellectuals must be 
"conquer[ed]" and "assimilat[ed]." Gramsci located the political party as heavily involved in 
much of this process, for the party "is responsible for welding together the organic intellectuals 
of a given group—the dominant one—and the traditional intellectuals."58 While the latter seem 
to always have existed, despite dramatic changes in politics and society, the "organic" 
intellectuals are new, like the group they belong to. Gramsci explains that as new social groups 
were created, new groups of intellectuals were "organically" created alongside them to give each 
group "homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in 
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the social and political fields."59 While traditional intellectuals may have fulfilled their role by 
simply speaking, by orating, this was not enough for new intellectuals. Rather, the new 
intellectuals were actively involved in "practical life, as constructor, organiser, 'permanent 
persuader.' "60  
 Certainly some of these intellectuals fit into what Tani Adams describes, in the case of 
Guatemala at least, as the "cosmopolitan network." In Guatemala, this network "came to play a 
definitive role in determining the course of the post-war era, especially in the fields of 
governance, cultural, and socio-economic policy and practice, and the respective roles of civil 
society and the state." The network includes Guatemalan and international actors, including 
intellectuals, members of "certain [religious] dominations," activists, journalists, the staff of 
donor and international agencies, the members of Guatemalan and international NGOs, "some 
graduate students and international scholars," and some members of the guerrilla. While Adams 
dates the formation of this network to during the conflict, the network really expanded and took 
root during the peace negotiations and in the years after the signing of the Peace. Members were 
heavily involved in the CEH and Remhi Project, have "led the implementation of post-war social 
initiatives in the fields of transitional justice, human rights, and state reform and social reform, 
and have generated much of the academic and NGO research on the critical social processes that 
have occurred in recent decades."61 Adams recognizes that "[v]irtually none" of the members of 
the cosmopolitan network worked in government during the war. In the post-Peace era, however, 
some "began to move more fluidly in and out of government positions," though they have often 
maintained a certain level of distrust for the state.62  
 Adams adds to her discussion by acknowledging the distance that exists in terms of post-
Peace needs and issues between members of the cosmopolitan network and those "on the 
ground." She traces this to the emergence of professional NGOs, which have largely replaced the 
"mainly volunteer organizations of the past led by grassroots leaders who never expected to live 
off of their social commitments." The professional, often national, organizations rely almost 
completely on international funding to operate (as does, Adams points out, the state). Funding is 
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neither constant nor guaranteed, and reliance on it shapes the "agenda" of both the state and 
NGOs.63 Adams uses organizations that work "in the 'peace' or 'transitional justice' field" to 
demonstrate her point. While NGOs tend to believe that an essential step on the path to peace is 
justice, a belief that seems "natural" to them and that allows them to receive international 
funding, community members who lived the conflict might disagree.64 Despite potential 
community opposition, internationally-funded professional organizations, nevertheless, push for 
justice, imposing an external framework of post-Peace reconciliation and social reconstruction 
on complex and diverse local situations. 
 Kirsten Weld's work on the Archivo Histórico de la Policía Nacional (AHPN, Historic 
Archive of the National Police) certainly highlights the importance of international support, 
though she does not discuss how international funding might reproduce or further the divide 
between community and professional organizations in great detail. Given the non-existence of 
state resources, she describes the AHPN as "dependent...upon international funding and political 
capital."65 She added that, due to this dependence, projects were "to some extent, inflected with 
the donors' priorities." In the case of the AHPH, the projects the international community was 
willing to fund were related to human rights issues and justice, not straightforward archival 
projects.66 As Åsa Wallton of the Swedish International Development Agency told Weld, 
"Funding depends on the sexiness of the project," and archives were not sexy. Human rights 
"discoveries," however, were.67 The AHPN, therefore, was only able to secure funding by 
framing the archive as a human rights project. Both Weld and Adams' comments should be kept 
in mind, but the existence of international pressure or distance between activists and 
communities does not negate what these individuals and organizations say, nor their inclusion in 
this project.  
 The situation of intellectuals and members of something which might occasionally 
resemble a network of activists in El Salvador is quite a different matter. Margaret Popkin and 
Ralph Sprenkels have both written on the issue of Salvadoran civil society and human rights 
organizations. They agree that post-Peace civil society is quite weak, especially those 
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organizations which (barely) survived the end of the Civil War. Both authors tie this weakness to 
the FMLN. Popkin describes the weakness of civil society organizations as a result of the 
strength of the FMLN and the initial post-Peace presence of the Misión de Observadores de las 
Naciones Unidas en El Salvador (ONUSAL, United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador), 
in addition to a lack of financial and technical resources. ONUSAL, she writes, "reinforced an 
unhealthy tendency toward dependence on international actors"; this, in some ways, hijacked 
human rights work. The strength of the FMLN, she argues, also limited the independence of 
some organizations,68 bringing to mind Gramsci's comments about the importance of political 
parties in struggles about ideology or, more particularly, ideas about the past. 
 Sprenkels' works adds depth to the subject, and especially the relationship between the 
decline of human rights organizations and the FMLN.69 He argues that links between human 
rights groups and the FMLN existed during the Civil War; they were, he said, a "public secret," 
but one which was not widely known internationally, lest the credibility of these organizations be 
undermined. Many organizations were, in fact, part of the FMLN's political strategy and 
"provided important political leverage, improved the climate for political opposition and peace 
negotiations and channeled international pressure and support."70 Yet while the FMLN used 
human rights organizations, such as the various mothers' committees and the Comisión de 
Derechos Humanos de El Salvador (CDHES, Human Rights Commission of El Salvador), to 
increase national and international support, the guerrilla did also commit a number of human 
rights violations, violations which human rights organizations often ignored or denied as a result 
of their loyalty to the FMLN. This loyalty to the FMLN, Sprenkels suggests, had a negative 
impact on the human rights movement's credibility.71 As well, during the peace negotiations, 
unlike in Guatemala, the FMLN focused negotiations on the political system. Human rights 
organizations were sidelined in negotiations and Sprenkels hints that the FMLN did not want an 
"active human rights movement." Indeed, he argues that the FMLN believed that the Peace 
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Accords made human rights organizations "obsolete" for, once the war was over, certainly 
human rights would no longer be violated.72 In the post-Peace era, as Sprenkels points out, 
human rights organizations have thus felt rather like orphans, abandoned by those who had 
previously supported them. Without the support of the FMLN or any other political party, and 
also without access to the media and without very much international support, these 
organizations have simply tried to survive, to continue working. They have found it difficult to 
do so not only because of the lack of support, but also because they had a difficult time adapting 
to the new Salvadoran reality, a reality where, Sprenkels argues, it seemed that human rights 
were unimportant.73 The human rights community in El Salvador, except those with ties to the 
Jesuit's Universidad Centroamericana "José Simeón Cañas" (UCA, Central American University 
"José Simeón Cañas"), is far more modest that the human rights community in Guatemala. This 
is even more true with the Church's 2013 closing of Tutela Legal. Members of the Salvadoran 
human rights community have not served in government, and they certainly do not include 
individuals like former president of Guatemala's Congress Nineth Montenegro or Nobel Peace 
Prize Winner Rigoberta Menchú.  
 The situation of the human rights community is, therefore, quite different in the two 
countries, as is the political environment in which they operate. Yet in terms of the place of the 
past in the present and future, the human rights community in both Guatemala and El Salvador 
locates itself in opposition to conservatives, and members speak, write, and act hoping to 
convince the societies they belong to of what they are saying. Much of this discussion about the 
past takes place in newspapers, and they are one of the sources used most often in this 
dissertation. This broader category of newspapers includes paid ads taken out by a range of 
individuals and organizations; more straightforward (though never entirely straightforward, as 
will be seen below) new stories that often contain quotes from politicians, judges, and members 
of government; and opinion pieces written by editors and other commentators, many of whom 
have weekly columns in the various papers. Reading pieces written by the same individuals week 
after week, year after year is indispensible in understanding the conversations that take place in 
the public sphere. Reading 15 or 20 years of newspapers and opinion pieces allows the reader to 
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understand the different commentators' general ideological tendencies and to observe ideas and 
truths doing battle as commentators respond to statements others made in their own opinion 
pieces, as seen in the political cartoon below. Political cartoonist, José Manuel Chacón, better 
 
 
Source: Siglo Veintiuno. 17 March 2000. 
 
known as Filóchofo, responds to pro-military, conservative commentators Karen Escaler and 
Alfred Kaltschmitt’s description of the Guatemalan army as "victorious." He asks them if there is 
anything victorios about the fact that, "of the 24 remains found in the last exhumation [in the 
department of Chichicastenango]…10 were girls and boys, 11 were women, 2 were elderly."74 
A brief exploration of select Guatemalan and Salvadoran newspapers, as well as the 
general climate in which journalists and commentators write, is useful. It is important to keep in 
mind, however, that in neither El Salvador nor Guatemala are newspapers the most commonly 
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accessed source for information. Rather, the television is.75 Yet, as Centro Civitas reported, "in 
countries like Guatemala," which surely includes El Salvador, printed media "still dictate the 
agenda" of non-print media.76 Newspapers, therefore, shape opinion significantly, as Saénz de 
Tejada wrote about Guatemala, and as will become clear in El Salvador. 
 A 2008 study by the United Nations Development Project (UNDP) offers some revealing 
information about how the media works in Guatemala. How the mainstream media operates, 
according to the UNDP is "free enough." There are no laws to prevent the free circulation of 
information, nor does the government use "official advertisements as a way to limit the spread of 
information." However, how information is selected and how it is processed is not "totally free." 
What information the media reports on is not only determined, or indeed limited, by the editorial 
staff's political ideology and by how particular information might affect the newspaper's revenue, 
but also by the fact that the newspaper, "as a social agent, when it enters into contact with the 
reality in which it functions, finds itself subject to a series of forces," four of which are more 
important than the others: the owners or investors, political agents, the (most often self-
interested) sources, and the audience.77 These all set the limits of what is and is not written about 
in a newspaper. Thus, the report concluded, "private interests" still determine freedom of 
expression, and these interests are most often tied to media owners, to corporate interests, or to 
other groups that influence the contents of the media.78  
 Many who write or comment about the Guatemalan media, including many who are 
journalists themselves, are highly critical of it. Journalist Marielos Monzón, for example, pointed 
to many of the same issues as the UNDP, but also added more depth to the discussion. Monzón, 
a columnist with Prensa Libre, commented not only that ownership of the media is concentrated 
in a very few hands, but that "freedom of expression is threatened" because the "media's agenda 
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is constructed—almost unanimously—based on one way of seeing and understanding the world," 
a way that almost completely reflects the perspectives and values of those who have traditionally 
had economic and political power. Other sectors, views, beliefs, etc., are made invisible. And, 
she added, this is not very different from other sectors; the same concentration that is clear in 
media ownership can also be seen in land ownership, industrial and agricultural production, and 
the financial and services sectors. While those who own the means of communication are not 
always the same as those who control the financial sector, they are certainly from the same 
"social class" and so, for the most part, share the same outlook on the world.79  
 Filóchofo, fired by Siglo Veintiuno in 2001, agreed. In an interview in El Periódico, a 
newspaper he would soon work for, he stated that he believed he had been fired for ideological 
reasons. Siglo Veintiuno, he said, supported neoliberal policies and his cartoons "contradict the 
ideas and the discourse of the free market." He added, echoing Monzón, that Guatemalan 
newspapers had historically been unable to allow space for different opinions and voices. Part of 
the reason for this, and another part of the reason he believed he had been fired, is that 
advertisers and owners pressure editors to control content; after all, an oil company would be 
unlikely to want to advertise in a newspaper that also published critiques of oil companies.80 
Newspapers are privately owned and operate on a for-profit basis,81 much of which comes from 
advertising; as a result, keeping advertisers happy is essential to the newspaper's existence. 
Editors and journalists must try not to criticize or offend advertisers.82 
 In Guatemala, the newspapers explored for this dissertation are Prensa Libre, Siglo 
Veintiuno, and El Periódico. Prensa Libre, founded in 1951 by those openly opposed to the 
Arbenz regime, is by far the most read of the three and, according to Monzón, is the most 
influential. It is owned by Grupo Prensa Libre, which also owns Nuestro Diario, the most read, 
but far more sensational, newspaper in the country. The Grupo Prensa Libre as a whole 
controlled 82% of the market between April and June 2007. Centro Civitas reported an average 
daily printing of 126,000, distributed throughout the country, in 2009. Prensalibre.com also is the 
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most visited of Guatemala's online newspapers, with 58,000 visits per day.83 Siglo Veintiuno, 
founded in 1990 by a group of businessmen, is owned by the Corporación de Noticias, S.A. and 
prints a daily average of 26,000 issues, most of which are distributed in Guatemala City. The 
newspaper is considered to voice the views of the business and conservative religious sectors, 
such as Opus Dei. From April to June 2007, the Corporación de Noticias, which also owns the 
newspaper Al Día, controlled 9% of the market.84 Finally, El Periódico was first published in 
November 1996 after journalist José Rubén Zamora and others split from Siglo Veintiuno. Aldea 
Global, S.A., which Zamora is president of, currently owns the newspaper. Between April and 
June of 2007, Aldea Global controlled 5% of the market.85 It should also be noted that the media 
in Guatemala is further concentrated in the hands of the Marroquín family, members of which 
head Prensa Libre, Siglo Veintiuno, and La Hora, another daily. Rick Rockwell and Noreene 
Janus, who study the media in Central America, describe the situation in Guatemala as a media 
oligarchy. A dozen families control non-print media, while nine families dominate all of 
Guatemala's newspapers and 99% of the circulation. These same families also own the main 
industries in Guatemala and many are large-scale landowners.86  
 The situation is hardly better in El Salvador; indeed, Chappell Lawson and Sallie Hughes 
argue that the average Latin American "gets information about politics from oligopolisitc 
systems characterized by concentrated ownership, collusion between owners and political elites, 
tabloidization, and spotty journalistic standards."87 This idea of oligopoly is certainly true in the 
case of El Salvador, as it was in Guatemala. As well, in El Salvador levels of collusion are high. 
According to the United Nations, El Diario de Hoy and La Prensa Gráfica, both of which were 
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consulted for this investigation, control 87% of the market. Both print approximately 100,000 
copies per day and are closely tied with the political right, and in particular with ARENA. The 
remaining 13% is controlled by the leftist Diario Co-Latino, which was one of the sources for 
this dissertation, and Diario el Mundo.88 In addition to so few papers circulating, ownership of 
the media is highly concentrated. La Prensa Gráfica is owned by the Dutriz family, which also 
owns the third most read newspaper in the country, while El Diario de Hoy is owned by the 
Altamirano family, which also owns the fourth most read newspaper. Both belong to El 
Salvador's "fourteen families" who have traditionally controlled wealth in the country, and both 
are connected to the political right. For example, as journalist Carlos Martínez, of the online 
investigative and not right-leaning newspaper El Faro, noted, the most recent editors-in-chief of 
La Prensa Gráfica have had close relationships with the presidency.89  
 In his analysis of the influence of the media in politics, Lawrence Michael Ladutke paints 
a rather grim picture of the situation in El Salvador. He argues that ARENA was able to win 
election after election in part by instilling fear in voters, and so in newspaper readers, about the 
consequences of voting for the FMLN. Journalists wrote about the terrible things that 
Salvadorans would suffer if the FMLN won. This was combined with these newspapers' refusal 
to publicize events the human rights community organized, their insistence on charging these 
organizations higher advertising rates, and a very obvious bias in favor of those who had violated 
human rights both during the Civil War and after.90 These helped ensure ARENA's electoral 
victories, as did the fact that death squads continued to operate, especially in the early post-Peace 
era, using threats and violence to prevent the full enjoyment of freedom of expression.91  
 Sonja Wolf's view on the Salvadoran media is only a bit less dire. Wolf acknowledged 
that the post-Peace era was characterized by greater freedom of expression and greater plurality. 
Ownership and audience, however, are still highly concentrated and the main media outlets, most 
notably El Diario de Hoy and La Prensa Gráfica, but also the country's telecommunications 
giant, Telecorporación Salvadoreña, do not question the conservative status quo; rather, they 
support it and ARENA wholeheartedly. The media, thus, continues to protect elite interests, as 
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they did during the Civil War, allowing only a narrow range of voices and perspectives to be 
heard, creating a "homogeneous, uncritical and biased coverage." This is especially true during 
elections, when conservative media outlets transform into what Wolf describes as "party 
mouthpieces." While "open censorship" no longer exists, businesses and the government use 
advertising dollars to manipulate what the media does and does not report. As well, while La 
Prensa Gráfica's journalists "enjoy relative independence and encounter limits only when the 
owners consider their social and economic status to be threatened," the owner of El Diario de 
Hoy "exercises internal censorship" and writes the newspaper's daily editorial column. Wolf 
concluded, drawing on the work of Sallie Hughes, that an "authoritarian news model" exists in El 
Salvador, where the interests of the owners, the government, and the private sector converge, 
silencing alternative visions of the world.92  
 Yet it is not only the Salvadoran right which sees the benefit of having control over the 
media. Interestingly, since Funes' election in 2009, government control over state media has 
increased significantly; Funes, a former journalist and popular television presenter, transferred 
control over the various state media outlets, in particular Canal 10 and Radio Nacional, to the 
presidency.93 As well, the leftist Diario Co-Latino, though it has a smaller circulation that either 
Diario de Hoy or La Prensa Gráfica, can hardly be accused of impartiality. The newspaper is 
often little more than a "party mouthpiece," though for the FMLN instead of ARENA.    
 The media in El Salvador and Guatemala are, therefore, not the best places to try to 
collect information about what happened; but they are excellent places to find out what particular 
sectors believe about what happened, or what those sectors want others to believe, remember, 
and know. Newspapers, and those who write for them, reproduce and also produce public 
narratives of the past and the meaning attached to those events; they are, therefore, a useful 
source for exploring public discourse.94 Yet given their limitations, newspapers, and especially 
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mainstream newspapers, cannot be the only source consulted. Other sources, mentioned above, 
and most significantly the publications and paid ads of human rights organizations and their 
allies, are necessary to counter the tendency of the mainstream media to silence other views. 
 
Organization 
 Chapter One lays out the theoretical framework of this dissertation, with a particular 
focus on writers who address discourse, memory, and truth. A key aspect of this literature relates 
to William Roseberry's work on discursive frameworks, and particularly on a common discursive 
framework, which "sets out the central terms around which and in terms of which contestation 
and struggle can occur."95 Roseberry's discursive framework overlaps with Michel Foucault's 
regimes of truth, Steve Stern's emblematic memory, and Maurice Halbwach's social frameworks 
to form the theoretical foundation of this dissertation. These not so different kinds of frameworks 
help determine what is included in a society's narrative of the past, how these events are talked 
about, and, significantly, which narratives and memories are understood to be true or untrue.  
 Chapters Two and Three explore the way the past is talked about in the public sphere in 
Guatemala. Instead of diving into a discussion of the common discursive framework, Chapter 
Two focuses on the period immediately following the 29 December 1996 signing of the Peace 
Accords. More specifically, it looks at how especially conservative politicians pushed for 
forgetting without actually saying the word. The masking of forgetting began with the passage of 
the Ley de Reconciliación Nacional (National Reconciliation Law), more often spoken of as the 
Amnesty Law. Drawing on Ricoeur's discussion of amnesty and amnesia, the chapter explores 
how the human rights community re-imagined the Amnesty Law as the Law of Forgetting; the 
issue of reconciliation was largely forgotten. The Amnesty was also spoken of, both by 
conservatives and members of the human rights community as a law which granted perdón, or 
pardon, which, for human rights activists, then became tangled up in the issue of forgetting. 
Thus, for the human rights community reconciliation, amnesty, perdón, and forgetting were 
discursively linked. It was, therefore, hardly a leap for the human rights community to 
understand requests for perdón (forgiveness, rather than pardon) as being another way 
conservatives promoted forgetting behind the façade of something else. This is seen in 
conservative president Álvaro Arzú's request for perdón in December 1998. The chapter 
                                                
95 Roseberry, "Hegemony and the Language of Contention," 360-1. 
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concludes by returning to the issue of reconciliation. Connections between forgetting and 
reconciliation have been made throughout the post-Peace era, and point to the importance of the 
speaker's ideology and past actions when the human rights community tries to understand what 
speakers really mean when they talk about reconciliation. 
 Chapter Three examines why it is that conservative Guatemalans used reconciliation, 
amnesty, and perdón when they wanted to forget. Why did they not just openly declare that 
Guatemalans must, in the name of peace, forget the conflict? The reason lies in the existence of a 
common discursive framework, or emblematic memory. The chapter includes the different truths 
that can exist within the boundaries of this framework. The chapter concludes with a short 
comparison between a discourse which declares that memory will prevent repetition, and 
frequent assertions that the past is repeating itself. In a discursive environment where non-
repetition is linked to memory, repetition can only happen if there is not enough memory. On the 
other hand, it points to the insufficiencies of memory itself for preventing repetition and 
promoting reconciliation. 
 Chapters Four and Five deal with the public discourse in El Salvador's post-Peace era. 
Chapter Four explores the lack of a common discursive framework in El Salvador, as mentioned 
above. Chapter Five explores the presence of memory in the public discourse of El Salvador, for, 
even though the discourse focuses on truth, talk of memory and historical memory are certainly 
not absent. The chapter begins with a short discussion of why Salvadorans from diverse 
ideological or political backgrounds have at least occasionally promoted memory; that is, they 
have pointed out the way that memory prevents repetition. That said, though conservatives might 
call for memory from time to time, it is either a memory that does little work or which is quickly 
buried under calls to forget. As for what different sectors want to be remembered, it is clear, as in 
Guatemala, that conservatives have quite a different idea about this than the human rights 
community. For conservatives, the FMLN's crimes must be remembered above all else; the 
human rights community does not deny FMLN's crimes, but the overwhelming focus is 
nevertheless on the army's far more numerous crimes. Thus, it is clear that the human rights 
community understands memory to be roughly the same as the truth revealed in the report of the 
Comisión de la Verdad para El Salvador. This memory/truth is understood to be the equivalent of 
historical memory, and it is on this truth/memory/historical memory that the new El Salvador 
must be built. But far more than simply believing that the army's violations must be remembered 
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to prevent repetition, the human rights community promotes rewriting the historical narrative of 
the war so that it is centered on the victims and survivors. This is not a passive memory of the 
war; memory/truth must actively be used to ensure non-repetition. Funes' celebration of 20 years 
of "Peace" in 2012 lent added weight to the human rights community's discourse, and its version 
of truth. 
 Chapter Six focuses on two moments of rupture when the complexities of group 
membership and the limits of discourse, as well as the process of narrative construction, emerge. 
In El Salvador, this rupture occurred when the FMLN's Mauricio Funes was elected president in 
2009, and even more so when he asked for perdón for the El Mozote massacre on the 20th 
anniversary of the Peace in 2012. His actions related to the past, including his long-
awaited/much-dreaded request for perdón, provide an opportunity to observe the struggle 
between truth and forgetting. In these moments and in discussions about them, in the embrace 
and rejection of Funes' words and actions, the limits and shape of each sector's narrative/truth of 
the past, are clearly defined. In Guatemala, debates about the 2013 genocide trial against Efraín 
Ríos Montt and Mauricio Rodríguez Sánchez revealed many of the same things, all contained 
within the limits of Guatemala's common discursive framework. What emerged very clearly in 
discussions about the trial and the issue of genocide more broadly is the fuzziness of group 
membership and how conservatives and the human rights community are not homogeneous and 
do not all espouse similar beliefs about all-important issues like whether genocide was 
committed in Guatemala and what role justice has in the post-Peace era. What emerged most 
clearly in declarations about these topics is that there are things members of the human rights 
community cannot say—they cannot deny that genocide was committed or that trials are 
divisive—if they want to continue to belong to that group.   
 Chapter Seven also includes a discussion of both countries, but does not necessarily focus 
on the discursive framework in either Guatemala or El Salvador. Rather, the chapter explores 
exhumations. The right in El Salvador buries the past with their words and in legislation, 
covering up the truth of what happened, and also has worked to prevent exhumations from being 
conducted. Yet exhumations have taken place, specifically at El Mozote. The exhumations, 
which had to overcome many obstacles, generated significant debate as different sectors insisted 
that the bones confirmed their own version of what had happened. In Guatemala, the focus shifts 
away from discourse to the dirty process of exhumation. Exhumations, which relatives and the 
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human rights community request take place, are approved by one of the state's many institutions, 
and are conducted by non-governmental organizations. The exhumation, identification, and 
reburial of the dead helps relatives make sense of what happened to loved ones; it helps them to 
understand what happened so they can lay the bones, and the ghosts of the past, to rest. 
Exhumations, more often than not, reveal the state's responsibility for human rights violations, 
which is certainly why many state institutions and their members oppose them. But, even so, 
exhumations also help the state and its operation. In addition to allowing the state to count and 
categorize, and based on Michel Foucault's discussion of the art of government, exhumations 
extend the reach of the state into regions of the country and communities it has long sought to 
control. It was these communities the state sought to control in its violent counterinsurgency 
campaigns. Exhumations allow the state to enter into these communities in a much more 
bureaucratic way: through the filling out of paper work. They involve the state in the lives of its 
citizens, and citizens into the operation of the state. Given this, the Salvadoran state could benefit 
from exhumations, though this would first involve revoking the Amnesty Law, and so 
completely unforgetting that there are bones buried in the soil. 
 Running throughout all of these chapters is a critique of both the human rights 
community and conservatives' insistence on the existence of one truth, memory, or narrative of 
the past. The topic is brought up again in the Conclusion.  
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Chapter One 
Theory 
 
Memory is a partial forgetting, in both senses of the word, that is indispensable to making sense 
of the past. —Tzvetan Todorov1 
 
 
 There has been keen interest in the topic of memory in the academy since the 1980s. 
Andreas Huyssen calls this heightened interest in memory "a contemporary obsession"; memory, 
he writes, "has become a cultural obsession of monumental proportions across the globe."2 Pierre 
Nora and Huyssen suggest a link between the sudden interest in memory and the Holocaust, and 
specifically the spate of fortieth and fiftieth anniversaries celebrated or commemorated in the 
1980s and 1990s.3 Others also point to the Holocaust as a catalyst for the blossoming of memory 
work in the last decades of the twentieth century, suggesting that many became increasingly 
concerned that the memory of the Holocaust would die along with its survivors. Indeed, Huyssen 
describes society as being "somehow in the grips of fear, even a terror, of forgetting." There was, 
as a result, a memory boom, a rush to remember and record the trauma of the Holocaust.4 For 
Huyssen, the memory boom, and the "fear of oblivion and disappearance," are not solely 
connected to the Holocaust. Rather, they are directly related to "the information explosion and 
the marketing of memory." These and other things have the effect of making time seem to be 
moving far too quickly, making "lived space" seem "fractured," and altering the relationship 
between the past, present, and future "beyond recognition." Thus, we feel a very keen need to 
"anchor ourselves" in time using memory and commemoration, even though we know full well 
that, as Huyssen writes, "such strategies of memorialization may in the end themselves be 
transitory and incomplete."5   
                                                
1 Tzvetan Todorov, Hope and Memory: Lessons from the Twentieth Century, trans. by David Bellos (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2003), 127. 
2 Andreas Huyssen. "Present Pasts: Media, Politics, Amnesia" in Globalization, ed. Arjun Appadurai (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 2001), 62-3.  
3 Pierre Nora, Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past, Volume 1: Conflicts and Divisions, ed. Lawrence 
D. Kritzman, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Huyssen, "Present 
Pasts," 2000; and Andreas Huyssen, Twilight Memories: Marking Time in a Culture of Amnesia (New York: 
Routledge, 1995). 
4 Peter Gray and Kendrick Oliver, "The Memory of Catastrophe, " History Today 51 (2001), 13; Huyssen, 
"Present Pasts," 2001, 65. 
5 Huyssen, "Present Pasts," 2001, 65 and 75-6. Huyssen makes the connection to the desaparecidos, the 
disappeared, the victims of dictatorship in Latin America by declaring that both cases "share the absence of a 
proper burial site so key to the nurturing of human memory." 
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 The memory boom did not simply inspire people to safeguard memory; it also produced a 
significant body of literature on, as Nietzsche might have described it, the "use and abuse of 
memory." The literature about memory is extensive, and much of it is not directly related to the 
topic under investigation. The focus here will be on ideas and writings that form the theoretical 
backbone of this dissertation. Though some of these ideas (most significantly the work of 
William Roseberry, which is discussed first) are not specifically about memory, as vaguely as it 
might be understood, taken together they form an interconnected framework which is used to 
explore how people talk about the past and its role in post-Peace El Salvador and Guatemala. 
This chapter begins by exploring ideas and discussions about the discursive/memory/social/truth 
frameworks that determine how issues are talked about in the public sphere, what is remembered 
or forgotten, and what is understood to be true or untrue. These not so different kinds of 
frameworks help determine what is included in a society's narrative of the past, which is the next 
issue discussed. An examination of the opposition, or links, between forgetting and memory 
follows the discussion about narratives, for those things that the dominant 
discursive/memory/social/truth framework determines will be left out of the narrative are 
condemned to at least temporary oblivion. Having explored the relationship between forgetting 
and memory, the chapter then turns to the relationship between memory and commemoration, 
and indeed between oblivion and commemoration, since many academics suggest that 
commemorations are, in fact, about forgetting. Finally, the relationship between memory, truth 
(and the truth commissions which reveal this truth), and reconciliation is examined. In these final 
sections, it is important to keep in mind that these topics are closely connected not only to 
memory, but also to frameworks, narratives, and oblivion, and that the relationship between all 
these different issues is not one of uni-directional causality. Rather, while frameworks certainly 
help to determine the narrative of the past, and so determine what is remembered, what is truth, 
and what is commemorated, truth commission reports and monuments, for example, can also 
work to shift historical narratives and their corresponding frameworks.  
 
Frameworks and Memory 
 William Roseberry's discussion of (un)common discursive frameworks is a central 
element of the theoretical framework which shapes this dissertation. Roseberry bases his 
argument on Antonio Gramsci, who understands hegemony as struggle, and specifically as the 
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struggle between elites and subalterns in the political process. Hegemony, Roseberry points out, 
does not describe subalterns' consent to their position in society, for they do not accept their 
subordination. Rather, they resist it, and so hegemony refers to the process in which the terms of 
the relationship between subalterns and elites are negotiated. Hegemony, therefore, relates to 
"the ways in which the words, images, symbols, forms, organizations, institutions, and 
movements used by subordinate populations to talk about, understand, confront, accommodate 
themselves to, or resist their domination are shaped by the process of domination itself."6 When 
the dominant group has been able to establish the ways in which other groups in society 
demonstrate their acceptance or rejection of their domination or of certain issues or norms, 
Roseberry suggests that a "common discursive framework" has been established.7 The 
hegemonic process, thus, does not create consent or a belief system that elites and subalterns 
both embrace; rather, it works to create "a common material and meaningful framework for 
living through, talking about, and acting upon social orders characterized by domination." This 
framework is partly discursive; it describes a "common language or way of talking about social 
relationships," a common language which "sets out the central terms around which and in terms 
of which contestation and struggle can occur."8 Subalterns, as a result, cannot simply use any 
vocabulary or type of protest to oppose their subordination; rather, they must use the "languages 
of domination in order to be registered or heard."9   
 Roseberry argues that states are most interested in the creation of a common discursive 
framework, but that the creation of such a common way of expressing both acceptance and 
opposition is rare. This is partly due to the fact that, though the state talks incessantly, it is 
speaking to such a range of audiences with different histories and outlooks that each understands 
the state's words differently. This lack of common understanding is exacerbated when audiences 
relay the state's message to other audiences, altering the "words, tones, inflections, and 
meanings" in the process.10 Because of this, Roseberry proposes that, rather than view the 
                                                
6 William Roseberry, "Hegemony and the Language of Contention," in Everyday Forms of State Formation: 
Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule in Modern Mexico, ed. Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 1994), 360-1. 
7 Roseberry, "Hegemony and the Language of Contention," 363-4.  
8 Roseberry, "Hegemony and the Language of Contention," 360-1. 
9 William Roseberry, "Hegemony, Power, and Languages of Contention," in The Politics of Difference: Ethnic 
Premises in a World of Power, ed. Edwin N. Wilmsen and Patrick McAllister (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1996), 81-2. 
10 Roseberry, "Hegemony and the Language of Contention," 365.  
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creation of a common discursive framework as something that the state has achieved, it is best to 
see it as something the state hopes to achieve. He, furthermore, supports a focus on moments of 
rupture, when the discursive framework breaks down—"where national holidays are disregarded 
and locally significant days or places...are marked and revered...where historical markers or 
monuments...provoke profoundly different meanings and memories for different groups within a 
social field"—as the best way to fully explore domination and the hegemonic process.11 At these 
moments, the hegemonic process is laid bare and the struggle and contestation that are key to the 
process can best be observed.  
 Jenny Edkins offers a related view of discourse, elites, and subalterns, at least in relation 
to trauma. She argues that abuse, when it is perpetrated by the state, is unspeakable. To label it 
unspeakable, she continues, "is not only an excuse to avoid the need to listen to what is being 
said. It also reflects the view of survivors that what they have been through cannot be 
communicated." This is because, though survivors of the state's abuse have a very real need to 
speak, the "only words they have are the words of the very political community that is the source 
of their suffering. This is the language of the powerful, the words of the status quo, the words 
that delimit and define acceptable ways of being human within that community." Yet after state-
sponsored trauma, and for survivors of abuse, the "social order" has been destroyed. After 
trauma, when the social order, which includes language, has crumbled, "what we can say no 
longer makes sense; what we want to say, we can't. There are no words for it."12  
 Certainly the idea of trauma as marking a time when the (former) social order falls apart 
means that trauma is one of Roseberry's broadly defined moments of rupture; it is a moment 
when the hegemonic process is most easily seen. Trauma, when survivors are left without words 
to explain what happened, can be seen as a time when the state's dominant discourse is rejected 
and survivors struggle to find a way to relate their experiences. Instead of speaking, survivors 
give testimony in other ways,13 and indeed, since trauma is "outside the realm of language," "to 
bring it back to within that realm by speaking of it, by setting it within the linear narrative form, 
                                                
11 Roseberry, "Hegemony, Power, and Languages of Contention," 82-3. 
12 Jenny Edkins, Trauma and the Memory of Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 7-8. Veena 
Das adds that "If the process of naming the violence presents a challenge, it is because such naming has large 
political stakes, and not only because language falters in the face of violence"; Veena Das, Life and Words: 
Violence and the Descent into the Ordinary (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 205. 
13 Edkins, Trauma and the Memory of Politics, 127. 
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is to destroy its truth."14 When testimony, which Edkins argues is one form of resistance, is 
spoken, when trauma is put into words, it is converted into a form which can more easily be 
"appropriated and co-opted." Those with testimony to give, and especially "marginal or isolated" 
groups, "lose control" over their own experiences and how those experiences are more generally 
understood. Once put into words, testimony, she argues, is more easily appropriated into "state-
building or money-making projects."15 Edkins' focus is not on hegemony and resistance, though, 
as with this mention of state-building, she does certainly recognize that remembering, and 
especially remembering trauma, is political and closely tied to power. Her description of 
survivors as inhabiting a world without words, however, does point to a broader understanding of 
"discursive" frameworks and the state's struggle to dictate how subalterns will contest their 
domination. In this view, words themselves, and even orality, are the state's framework, while 
silence and non-words are subalterns' framework and how they communicate. When survivors do 
decide to speak, they are agreeing to use the language of domination (i.e., orality) to be heard; in 
this moment, the state's framework dominates once again. When survivors decide to speak, a 
common discursive framework (that revolves around orality itself) is created. 
 Not everyone shares Edkins' view on testimony and her belief that speaking destroys the 
truth of testimony and allows it to be appropriated. For example, in his work on massacres in 
Guatemala's Ixcán, Ricardo Falla states, "testimony is good news." Testimony "states an 
existentially positive reality for [the witness]: that he is alive. ...The more terrible the account of 
what he witnessed, the more awesome the reality that he announces: I am alive."16 The Catholic 
Church's Proyecto Interdiocesano de Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica (Remhi Project, 
Interdiocesan Project for the Recuperation of Historical Memory) makes a similar point. Remhi 
Project staff wrote that the Project's final report, Nunca Más, or Never Again, is more than a 
denunciation of human rights violations; it is, instead un anuncio, an announcement of "the 
resurrection of the martyred people."17 In this view, far from having been weakened when said 
out loud, spoken testimony is strong. 
                                                
14 Edkins, Trauma and the Memory of Politics, 214. 
15 Edkins, Trauma and the Memory of Politics, 177-8 and 190. 
16 Ricardo Falla, Massacres in the Jungle: Ixcán, Guatemala, 1975-1982, trans. Julia Howland (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1994), 2. 
17 Proyecto Interdiocesano de Recuperatión de la Memoria Histórica, Guatemala: Nunca Más, Volume 1: 
Impactos de la Violencia, (Guatemala City: Oficina de Derechos Humanos del Arzobispado de Guatemala, 
1998), xiv. 
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 Michel Foucault's writing on discourse, which accepts putting into words as a necessary 
given, and the way discourse is tied to and interacts with regimes of truth, adds depth to 
discussions about discourse. Foucault spends a great deal of time talking about discourse, which 
he defines as "the totality of all effective statements (whether spoken or written)."18 For 
Foucault, an analysis of discourse is centered on exploring the statements that are made and their 
possible connection with other statements, as well as determining what statements are excluded. 
Yet one should not "seek below what is manifest, the half silent murmur of another discourse."19 
Thus the task of the archaeologist, of one who is concerned with discourse, is  
not to give voice to the silence that surrounds [statements], nor to rediscover all that, in 
them and beside them, had remained silent or had been reduced to silence. Nor is it to 
study the obstacles that have prevented a particular discovery, held back a particular 
formulation, repressed a particular form of enunciation, a particular unconscious 
meaning, or a particular rationality in the course of development; but to define a limited 
system of presences.20 
 
Thus, when describing a statement, one should make every effort to find out the importance of 
the statement and the place it holds in society; one should not seek out what is unsaid or hidden.  
 Regimes of truth are closely related to discourse, and function much like Roseberry's 
discursive frameworks. Foucault describes regimes of truth as the "types of discourse which [a 
society] accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to 
distinguish true and false statements." Each society possesses its own regime of truth, where 
truth is perpetually being consumed and debated, among other things, and is forever being called 
up for economic or political motivations (or for "state-building or money-making projects," as 
Edkins said about testimony). Not only is truth used for diverse motives, but it is also "produced 
and transmitted under the control...of a few great political and economic apparatuses," including 
the university, the military, and the media.21 In his discussion of Foucault, Michael Hutton brings 
these two threads together when he declares that, in Foucault's estimation, discourse creates the 
rules about what "is appropriate to the quest for truth."22  
                                                
18 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Routledge, 2002), 
29. 
19 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 30-1.  
20 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 134. 
21 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon, 
trans. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham, and Kate Soper (Brighton: The Harvester Press, 1980), 131-
2. 
22 Patrick H. Hutton, History as an Art of Memory (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1993), 112-3.  
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 Discursive frameworks and (discursive) regimes of truth function very much like Steve 
Stern's memory frameworks and emblematic memory and Maurice Halbwachs' social 
frameworks. Stern uses the idea of a memory box in his study of post-Pinochet Chile to explain 
what he means by a memory framework. In The Memory Box of Pinochet's Chile, Stern 
describes memory boxes as being built by a community and foundational to it. The contents of a 
particular community's box include "several competing scripted albums, each of them works in 
progress that seek to define and give shape to a crucial turning point [i.e. a moment of rupture] in 
life." Together with these albums, the box contains " 'lore' and loose memories, that is, the stray 
photos and mini-albums that seem important to remember but do not necessarily fit easily in the 
larger scripts." The contents of the box, however, are not unchanging, as people add memories 
and argue about others.23 Memory frameworks act as anchors, as moorings. People use them to 
organize and understand their own experiences, and to organize the albums in the memory box. 
Without anchors, individual experiences "would otherwise float or circulate more 
loosely...disconnected from the collective experience." The frameworks people use to locate their 
own knowledge and memories seem appropriate and valid because they are reinforced in the 
media, at demonstrations, in "books or truth reports," in music, or in commemorative events and 
public speeches.24   
 Closely tied to Stern's memory frameworks is emblematic memory. Prefacing his 
explanation of emblematic memory by saying, "Memory is the meaning we attach to experience, 
not simply recall of the events and emotions of that experience," Stern goes on to write that 
emblematic memory does not refer to the content of memory or to a "concrete or substantive 
'thing,' " but rather to the framework itself. When the vast range of memories are being sifted 
through, emblematic memory acts to select which memories will be included in the collective 
memory, and what significance these memories will have.25 He describes how emblematic 
memory works, and how loose memories are either incorporated or not, as follows: 
Emblematic memory functions like a moderately interactive show taking place under a 
big open-air tent. The performance spectacle goes on incorporating and imparting 
meaning to the varied specific remembrances people bring into the tent, articulating them 
into a wider meaning. This wider meaning defines which kinds of otherwise loose 
memories matter and are welcome to move forward and in effect join the show and, 
                                                
23 Steve J. Stern, Remembering Pinochet's Chile: On the Eve of London 1998 (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2004), xxviii. 
24 Stern, Remembering Pinochet's Chile, 68. 
25 Stern, Remembering Pinochet's Chile, 105-6. 
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conversely, which kinds of memories are best forgotten or pushed back toward the 
fringes. At the same time, emblematic memory imparts meaning to—encourages personal 
identification with—select events or lore drawn from media and public domain 
happenings.26 
 
Lest the reader imagine that emblematic memory is merely the self-interested creation of 
a particular group or individual in a given society, Stern is quick to point out that, for a memory 
to be emblematic, it must at least claim to reflect society's collective experience and truth. As 
well, these claims must find an echo in people's beliefs.27 Though an invention, this memory 
scaffolding, which allows for the construction of a society's collective memory, cannot simply be 
erected and shaped on a whim but must speak to and reflect lived experiences and events. These 
lived experiences and events most often are instances of societal rupture or trauma (as in 
Roseberry and Edkins), moments that prove to be turning points in history and are understood as 
foundational.28 It is at these moments of transition that emblematic memory emerges to give 
meaning to the trauma or break in history. Emblematic memory, like regimes of truth and 
discursive frameworks, is not permanent. Dominant memory frameworks can change over time 
and a "dissident" emblematic memory can become more mainstream and socially important. 
However, this shift in the dominant memory framework, Stern argues, can only happen when 
these dissident emblematic memories become more widely circulated, for example in the 
media.29 And as the emblematic memory or memory framework shifts, memories and the 
meanings attached to them shift and once-dominant memories become dissident, like the 
frameworks which dictate that they are important. The frameworks, therefore, sort memories into 
important and unimportant, into accepted and rejected, into remembered and forgotten. They are 
a blueprint for social memory, for society's understanding of its history. They dictate which 
events, individuals, and places will be included in the narrative of the past, how these will be 
portrayed, as well as the emotions these will evoke. They also, however, dictate which figures 
and events are silenced, which are pushed to the background and subordinated to the dominant 
group's narrative of the past. The "making of memory," as Stern points out, is also the "making 
of silence." Emblematic memory and memory frameworks determine which memories get 
                                                
26 Stern, Remembering Pinochet's Chile, 106. 
27 Stern, Remembering Pinochet's Chile, 113. 
28 Stern, Remembering Pinochet's Chile, 119-20. 
29 Stern, Remembering Pinochet's Chile, 116. 
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"pushed to the bottom of the memory box," where the "floor opens and they fall away—into the 
tomb of oblivion."30    
 Foucault spends some time discussing these dissident or marginal memories, memories 
that have been "forgotten." He labels them counter-memory. To explain what counter-memory is, 
the work of the genealogist must be explained. A genealogist's work is to (re)discover the 
forgotten and seemingly unimportant. As Michael Mahon describes it, Foucault's genealogists 
work to "dredge up forgotten documents, minor statements, apparently insignificant details in 
order to recreate the forgotten historical and practical conditions of our present existence."31 
They seek out "local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledges"; they preserve what 
Foucault terms "subjugated knowledges."32 It is this process of dredging up subjugated 
knowledges that have been "buried and disguised" or "disqualified as inadequate" that creates a 
counter-memory that "recover[s] what has been forgotten, [restores] what has been lost."33 
Counter-memory, therefore, contests the "official version" of history that dominates in a given 
society; it rejects the naturalness or inevitability of a (common) discursive or memory 
framework, regime of truth, or emblematic memory that insists that some (often awkward or 
uncomfortable) memories have no place. Counter-memory "introduces discontinuity into our 
very being."34 Counter-memories are, as a result, infinitely valuable and point to the 
impermanence of the status quo. 
 Much of Stern and others' work draws on that of Maurice Halbwachs, a French 
philosopher and sociologist whose writings have become influential since their rediscovery in the 
1980s. Halbwachs argues that individuals remember as members of a social group and can only 
remember as members of that group. Individuals remember using the "social frameworks" that 
exist in that group. These social frameworks act much like the emblematic memory that Stern 
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explores in Chile (both of which function in a similar way to Roseberry's discursive frameworks 
and Foucault's regime of truth) and are recreated through repetition. Halbwachs suggests that if 
individuals call a particular memory to mind often enough, if that memory is repeated with great 
enough frequency, the specifics of that memory, in addition to being revised, become less 
distinct and the memory is transformed into an ideal or stereotypical memory. Such stereotypical 
memories merge over time into an equally stereotypical collective memory, defined by Patrick 
Hutton in his discussion of Halbwachs as "an elaborate network of social mores, values, and 
ideals that mark out the dimensions of our imaginations according to the attitudes of the social 
groups to which we relate."35 This collective memory provides the social frameworks, or 
conceptual schemes, within which individual memories can be recalled; more than this, it is only 
within these frameworks that individual memories can be recalled.36 Yet the individual is not 
aware of the existence of these frameworks. In the words of Paul Ricoeur, "the social framework 
ceases to be simply an objective notion and becomes a dimension inherent in the work of 
recollection."37   
 In Halbwachs' view, it is impossible for memory to exist outside of the framework of a 
particular group. In this way, as David Gross writes, the individual "seems at times to be little 
more than a conduit through which group's memories are made manifest."38 Halbwachs 
recognizes that individuals belong to different groups at different moments in their lives and 
argues that each of these groups' memories is determined by different frameworks. As one's 
group membership changes, so do one's memories and the frameworks within which one 
understands the past, present, and future.39 As a result, if an individual claims to have "forgotten" 
some period of her life, it is simply because she is no longer surrounded by those with whom she 
had contact at that time, for to remember one's past, one must appeal to others' memories or to 
place oneself within the group once again. 
 Halbwachs' discussion of death and remembering the dead illustrates some of these 
points. Should an individual seek to keep the memory of dead relatives alive, that person will 
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"soon experience universal indifference" because the group whose support he needs to remember 
the dead no longer exists and contemporary society has other memories and concerns that 
dominate. A person, he declares, "who alone remembers what others do not resembles someone 
who sees what others do not see." The dead, therefore, are not forgotten because of the simple 
passage of time; rather, the group the dead belonged to, a group that "needed to name them," no 
longer exists, so their names disappear. Those figures of the past who are remembered are 
remembered because their "memory has become the object of a cult by men who remain at least 
fictitiously in contact with them." The rest, like the individual's dead relatives, "become part of 
an anonymous mass."40  
 Halbwachs, thus, argues that a society cannot simply forget its past. If a person or event 
appears to have been forgotten, it is merely a result of the disappearance of the group and the 
social frameworks that previously dictated it be remembered. When a group disappears, so too 
does its memory. As Stern noted with emblematic memory, social frameworks change over time, 
often because the dominant group in society, the group that determines the "reigning conceptions 
and mentality" during a particular era, "fade[s] away" to make way for a new group with 
different social frameworks. Therefore, the ability of a particular version of collective memory to 
survive depends on the continued existence, as well as the continued social power, of the group 
that holds that particular memory.41 Those in power can determine, to a large extent, how the rest 
of society remembers the past, and so how the present and the future are experienced and 
understood.  
 Halbwachs' discussion of shifts in the dominant social framework is enriched by 
incorporating Roseberry's, and so Gramsci's, thoughts on resistance and hegemony. Halbwachs 
writes that those groups that are able to determine social frameworks that construct the 
scaffolding that shapes a group's memory "fade away in time, making room for others."42 He 
describes this as a passive action. Roseberry, on the other hand, highlights the struggle inherent 
in the process of trying to determine not specifically what people remember, but the related issue 
of how they talk about social concerns. Rather than quietly disappearing or losing social or 
political power, elites do all they can to remain in power in the face of subalterns' efforts to 
                                                
40 Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, ed. and trans. Lewis A. Coser (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1992), 73-4. 
41 Halbwachs, The Collective Memory, 65; Hutton, History as an Art of Memory, 7. 
42 Halbwachs, The Collective Memory, 65. 
53 
improve their situation in the social order, or even to upend it. That they might use the language 
of domination does not mean that they do not contest that domination. It is useful to take this into 
consideration when reading Halbwachs. Halbwachs does acknowledge that social power is 
important in the continued existence of a group and its frameworks, but the process of "fading 
away" that he talks about is more usefully seen as involving potentially high levels of resistance 
and contestation.   
 Returning to Halbwachs, he adds that a society can only thrive if there is great "unity of 
outlooks." Bringing Stern's explanation of what happens to loose memories to mind, Halbwachs 
continues that individual memories that diverge too much from the collective memory, memories 
that do not fit within the social frameworks that dictate what a group remembers, will be erased. 
The homogenization of the past that Halbwachs describes reduces the amount of information 
included in the memory of the past significantly. As a result, only a few individuals and events 
are remembered. Those historical figures and happenings that are not believed to be important 
enough, or to which not enough people can relate, are condemned to be forgotten.43 The 
simplification of the past and the culling of diverse memories occur when people attempt to 
"reconstruct [the past] through an effort of reasoning." In this process, the past is altered to 
become more unitary and coherent, as shaped by the needs of the group in power at the time.44 
Social frameworks, then, "reconstruct an image of the past which is in accord, in each epoch, 
with the predominant thoughts of the society."45 The narrative and understanding of the past are 
thus shaped by the needs of the present.46 
 David Gross makes a similar point in Lost Time: On Remembering and Forgetting in 
Late Modern Culture. He muses on the rising and fading fortunes of remembering and forgetting, 
and on why it is that some promote one while others favor the other. He argues that society and 
social institutions, recognizing that memory "can be very effective social cement," make 
decisions about what is worthy of remembrance and what is not. Thus, the preservation of certain 
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memories is "purposeful, intentional, and institutionally supported," and directed toward social 
cohesion.47 While this has been the case for some centuries, he declares that society's tools for 
determining which memories are remembered have evolved. It used to be that collective memory 
was determined using brute force. In time, however, as it became clear that, except at moments 
of deep crisis, the infliction of pain was not necessary to the exercise of power over memory, this 
crude method was exchanged for more subtle means, such as schooling and commemoration. 
During periods of instability or rapid change, Gross points out, those in power might revert to the 
use of force to impose a particular view of the past on the population, which ruling groups deem 
essential to restore stability and strengthen the bonds that hold society together. But in non-
exceptional times, all that is necessary to determine collective memory is to control the 
frameworks that people use to understand the past, and so also the present and the future.48 
 The interconnected ideas Roseberry, Stern, Foucault, Halbwachs, and Gross explore point 
to the existence of things—frameworks—that determine how and what societies remember (and 
forget) and how we talk about those things.49 They also underscore that these frameworks change 
as the societies they belong to change, as power struggles play out, as elite groups change, and 
as, perhaps, subalterns become the elite. A discursive/memory/social/truth framework helps to 
dictate what is excluded, pushed to the margins, and at least temporarily forgotten. This is the 
overarching, more official, and rather homogenized version of history that is not uncontested, but 
which shapes how people make demands on the state and how they struggle against it. It helps 
determine, in an incessant process of negotiation and contestation, the language and images that 
will be accepted in the debate around the meaning of the past, present, and future. 
 
Narratives and memory 
 Frameworks, then, help to determine what is included and remembered in a society's 
collective memory, founding myth, and/or narrative of the past. In Memory, History, Forgetting, 
Paul Ricoeur discusses memory and narrative in greater depth. He argues that in deciding how to 
tell a story, "one can always recount differently, by eliminating, by shifting the emphasis, by 
recasting the protagonists of the action in a different light along with the outlines of the action." 
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Narratives, therefore, are selective, and forgetting is an active part of the process of telling and 
re-telling. Speaking of forgetting, he warns against official history, history that is "authorized, 
imposed, celebrated, commemorated." This type of history involves a "devious" type of 
forgetting, whereby individuals are denied the power to tell their own stories; however, he 
concludes that they are, to some extent, accomplices in their own disempowerment.50  
 Michel-Rolph Trouillot's discussion of memory in Haiti also includes an exploration of 
narrative and silencing. Narrative, he suggests, is one of the ways in which people participate in 
history, the other being as actors. History is not merely "what happened," but also "what is said 
to have happened."51 Through the "subjective capacity" of history, people become involved in 
both the process of history and in the creation of narratives about that process. Trouillot calls 
these the "two sides of historicity." Yet while the contents of the narratives are important, the 
process through which a narrative is created is more significant, for "only a focus on that process 
can uncover the ways in which the two sides of historicity intertwine in a particular context." 
Additionally, "only in overlap can we discover the differential exercises of power that make 
some narratives possible and silence others,"52 narratives that are condemned to oblivion, much 
as other authors' dissident memories were. 
 According to Trouillot, the "bundles of silences"53 that exist in historical narratives are 
created at four distinct moments: at the moment of fact creation, at the moment of fact assembly, 
at the moment of fact retrieval, and at the moment of retrospective significance. The first two 
moments he describes as the making of sources and the making of archives. These processes are 
"neither natural nor neutral." Rather, including or excluding information are both active, 
complementary processes; the absence or presence of particular information is created, and the 
presence of some information requires the absence of other information. Thus, speaking of Haiti, 
Trouillot argues that every time the palace of Sans Souci is purposefully and actively included in 
history, Sans Souci the man is purposefully and actively excluded. The absence of the man is 
part of the production of history.54 At the moment of fact retrieval, at the moment when the 
narrative is made, some facts are recalled more often and given more weight than others. In his 
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re-discovery of Sans Souci the man, therefore, Trouillot did not have to find new facts; he only 
had to create a new narrative of the facts that already existed.55 In this view, Sans Souci the man 
bears a striking resemblance to Foucault's counter-memory, and Trouillot's work to that of a 
genealogist. 
 The final moment of historical production, which Trouillot labels the moment of 
retrospective significance, is perhaps the most important for it is only in this final moment when 
"the combined silences accrued through the first three steps of the process of historical 
production intermesh and solidify." This does not have to occur after some time has passed and 
all the actors have died; Trouillot argues, "Retrospective significance can be created by the actors 
themselves, as a past within their past, or as a future within their present." In the Haitian case, 
Henri Christophe killed Sans Souci the man first in flesh and blood, and then by naming his 
palace after him. This naming silenced Sans Souci the man from Christophe's past and from his 
future, but did not eliminate him from the sources. Evidence of the man remained, waiting for an 
intrepid historian like Trouillot to unearth it. Trouillot continues this discussion by suggesting 
that Christophe's silencing may have been too successful; soon, people forgot Sans Souci the 
man, who represented Christophe's victory over all his enemies, and made the connection 
between Christophe's castle and Potsdam. This would have been opposite to Christophe's 
intentions; Christophe was, according to Trouillot, nothing if not vain and proud.56 Trouillot 
concludes his discussion of the silencing of Sans Souci the man by arguing that later Haitian 
historians continued the process because Sans Souci represented a moment in history they would 
like to overlook—"fratricide," where blacks fought blacks and not the French. The lack of unity 
of purpose among black Haitians is "the only shameful page in the history of the sole successful 
slave revolution in the annals of humankind." In the years since, Haitian historians have sought 
to forget this disunity in the name of nation-building by silencing Sans Souci and the battles he 
fought.57 This silencing, Trouillot states, is more effective than "the absence or failure of 
memory, whether faked or genuine."58  
 Incorporating the works of Roseberry, Stern, and others with Trouillot's discussion of 
historical production and narrative making, it is clear narratives are produced by frameworks like 
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Roseberry's and Stern's that limit what can be and is remembered; narratives, however, as in the 
moment of retrospective significance, also help to reproduce those frameworks and their limits. 
These narratives recall mnemohistory. Jan Assmann describes his exploration of the grand 
narrative of Western monotheism, and the place of an idolatrous Egypt in that narrative, in this 
way. Egypt represents everything that Israel is not and that Israel has moved beyond, a past that 
has been pushed aside and disavowed. However, Egypt cannot simply be forgotten; it must be 
remembered so that Christians know that idolatry is in their past and that they must work to 
prevent it from returning. To remember Egypt, then, is to remember conversion.59 Assmann's 
investigation is mnemohistory; it is not concerned with the past as it happened, but with how it is 
remembered (which certainly also includes how it is talked about and written down). 
Mnemohistory focuses on "those aspects of significance and relevance which are the product of 
memory—recourse to the past—and which appear only in the light of later readings."60 
Mnemohistorians, therefore, study the past with the present in mind; they aim to discover the 
meaning and significance that a specific present attributes to the past. They explore memories 
and how they have been reconstructed and mediated by the needs of the present.61 This 
dissertation, therefore, is in some ways and in some moments a mnemohistory, one focused not 
on the contents of history, but on the way it is recalled and used in the present. The focus, 
however, is less on how exactly memories have been reconstructed and more on the frameworks 
in place which determine, in large part, which memories will be reconstructed, and how those 
memories will be talked about. 
  
Oblivion and Memory 
 But what is memory? And what is forgetting? As Jay Winter wrote, "Just as we use 
words like love and hate without ever knowing their full or shared significance, so are we bound 
to go on using the term 'memory,' the historical signature of our generation." "The only fixed 
point," he concludes, "is the near ubiquity of the term."62 Some scholars, however, have more 
clear ideas about what it is, though their ideas cover a wide range. Assmann, for example, 
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describes memory as recourse to the past, while Manolo Vela Castañeda uses memory as a 
metaphor to describe the "combination of historical narratives and cultural production related to 
the past."63 Stern, for his part, declares, "Memory is the meaning we attach to experience, not 
simply recall of the events and emotions of that experience." This definition and Stern's 
discussion of one of the memory frameworks he identified in post-Pinochet Chile help to clarify 
memory and forgetting, and Stern's understanding of memory will form the foundation of this 
investigation’s use of the term. In the "memory as a closed box" framework, adherents practice 
"passionate indifference." There is, thus, in some sectors of Chilean society, a will to forget. This 
will arises from the belief that there are some memories that are so divisive that society will 
benefit very little if they are remembered publicly. These memories inhabit the closed box of 
memory, the closing of which is inspired by a range of different motivations and is not confined 
solely to the right, the military, or others who benefitted from Pinochet's policies. Some 
Chileans, therefore, "forget" to help Chile move forward and overcome its dictatorial and violent 
past. Forgetting or indifference, however, is often just a public façade; Stern suggests that even 
those who are outwardly indifferent to the past still remember privately and "visit the memory 
box" with trusted relatives and friends.64 Stern concludes,  
Keeping the box closed is the practical precondition for tranquility and reconciliation.... 
At bottom, memory as a closed box is remembrance as olvido ("oblivion" or "forgetting"). 
Far from the involuntary amnesia of someone who has suffered a bad fall, however, the 
forgetting is filled with memory and meaning. Based on remembrance, one defines the 
usefulness of forgetting. Based on remembrance, one defines what needs to be consigned 
to the back burner of cultural oblivion. Some loose memories or lore are useful because 
they remind one of the dangerousness that justifies closing the box. Other memories stir 
up trouble. Prudence allows them to drift to the margins of consciousness.65 
 
"Forgetting" the past is a conscious decision that is made with the future in mind; it is a multi-
faceted and complex process that has little in common with the more everyday uses people make 
of the verb "to forget." "Forgetting" is best understood as choosing not to remember, as 
intentionally silencing the past for the sake of the present and future.  
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 Stern, thus, situates forgetting as counter to remembering in some ways, though for this 
to work, the meaning of forgetting must be altered. It must be recognized that he also insisted 
that imagining memory to be in a battle to the death against forgetting was too "restrictive," 
"tend[ing] to align one set of actors with memory and another with forgetting." Instead, Stern 
writes, "In the approach I have taken, the social actors behind distinct frameworks are seeking to 
define that which is truthful and meaningful about a great collective trauma. They are necessarily 
selective as they give shape to memory, and they may all see themselves as struggling, at one 
point or another, against oblivion propagated by their antagonists."66 Different actors are thus not 
always struggling against forgetting, but against other memories which are imagined as truth. 
 Allan Megill's discussion of remembering and forgetting is also relevant, and raises the 
question of whether memory is narrative. He adds to discussions of memory and forgetting—
which he declares are "so closely tied up with each other that they are inseparable"—by 
suggesting that a better way to imagine the issue is to "speak of the acceptance or rejection of 
certain narratives―each of which is itself a bundle of rememberings and forgettings."67 Tzvetan 
Todorov, for his part, argues that when we are called on to never forget a past, "we should realize 
that we are not being asked to undertake any recovery of memory... What we are being invited to 
undertake is the defense of a particular selection of facts that allow its protagonists to maintain 
their status as heroes, victims, or teachers of moral lessons, against any other selection that might 
give them less gratifying roles."68  
 Elizabeth Jelin agrees. She suggests that the remembering/forgetting binary is false. Jelin 
argues that the struggle for memory and about memory, which she recognizes is political, is 
often imagined and described as a struggle against forgetting or against silence, a struggle to 
remember so as not to repeat. What the struggle is really about, however, is competing 
memories. Memory's battle against forgetting "hides what is in reality an opposition between 
different rival memories, each one of which incorporates its own forgettings." In the end, the 
struggle is "memory against memory,"69 which lends weight to the idea that memory is not so 
different from narrative. Jelin's work with Susana G. Kaufman underscores the falseness of the 
remembering/forgetting dichotomy. They suggest that forgetting is the "presence of the 
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absence." Forgetting is the "representation of what was once there and no longer is, the 
representation of something that has been erased, silenced or denied." When a society forgets, it 
"implies a societal cleft, a rupture between individual memory and public and/or collective 
practices." This forgetting suggests that the transmission of memory from one generation to the 
next has failed.70  
 
Commemoration and Memory 
 Yet no matter if forgetting is the best way to understand something that is contrary to 
remembering, it is not something that is easily accomplished. Returning to Stern, he points out 
that forgetting is not as easy as simply not remembering, for many things exist which work 
against forgetting and in favor of remembering. This includes the existence of "memory knots," 
"sites where the social body screams." Memory knots can be "sites of humanity, sites in time, 
and sites of physical matter or geography." In Chile, the first refers to journalists, members of 
both the government and anti-government groups, including those in religious and human rights 
organizations and those groups dedicated to finding the disappeared, but also those "who feel 
drawn to participate in a street commemoration or protest." Sites in time are those events or dates 
where the "symbolic power to 'convene' or project memory" is located. Events and their yearly 
anniversaries "demanded human efforts of interpretation, control, and projection" and made more 
people pay attention to remembrance. The third variety of memory knot, "sites of physical matter 
or geography," includes the bodies of the disappeared, detention centers, museums, books, 
monuments, or sites of massacres. These sites consist of places or objects that can "evince a 
power of almost sacred connection to the past, and consequently stir up and project polemics 
about memory and amnesia." The physical and tangible memory knots are perhaps the most 
powerful and, in Stern's mind, "exert a certain cultural magic." Their magical qualities, and their 
power, originate in the fact that they are the direct result and product of great historical trauma.71  
 Taken as a group, these knots "stir up, collect, and concentrate memories, thereby 
'projecting' memory and polemics about memory into public space or imagination." Memory 
knots demand that something be remembered. By so doing, they interrupt a "more unthinking 
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and habitual life" and insist that people make connections between their own memories and 
experiences and collective memory.72 Memory knots insist that society keep the "troublesome 
past within the present" and not let it fade into oblivion.73 Stern summarizes the way memory 
knots determine emblematic memory as follows: 
the human relations and activities organized either to create or to respond to memory 
knots enable us to trace the making and unmaking of emblematic memories—the 
contentious processes that project some ways of organizing memory forcefully into the 
public cultural domain, as essential "truths" through which people build bridges between 
personal knowledge or experience and the imagined national community of experience, 
while pushing other lore and narratives to the margins.74  
 
Thus, reminiscent of Roseberry's discussion about how moments of rupture reveal how the 
hegemonic process works, and Edkins' work on trauma, memory knots are sites of struggle 
between memories and provide a point of entry into understanding emblematic memory and how 
it is formed.  
 Stern's talk of memory knots being sites recalls Pierre Nora's discussion, in Realms of 
Memory: Rethinking the French Past, of the places where the past is brought to mind. Nora calls 
these places lieux de mémoire, sites of memory.75 He writes that, "as traditional memory has 
vanished, we have felt called upon to accumulate fragments, reports, documents, images, and 
speeches—any tangible sign of what was—as if this expanding dossier might some day be 
subpoenaed as evidence in who knows what tribunal of history."76 Lieux de mémoire, which are 
meant to "to stop time, to inhibit forgetting, to fix a state of things, to immortalize death, and to 
materialize the immaterial,"77 only exist because of the "acceleration of history." The French, in 
Nora's work, are pushed to create these "bastions of memory" because they feel that history 
threatens memory, that history and its constant acceleration promote memory's disappearance; "if 
history did not besiege memory," he writes, "deforming and transforming it, penetrating and 
petrifying it, there would be no lieux de mémoire."78 In his mind, therefore, history and memory 
are opposites, and so what memory is, is defined by what it is not. They do not work toward the 
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same ends; and indeed how could they if, though it might be over-stating Nora's point, history 
gobbles memory up on its endless march toward the future. Yet memory is important and serves 
a vital function in society. Thus, since milieux de mémoire, "settings in which memory is a real 
part of everyday experience,"79 no longer exist (having been consumed by history), society is 
pushed to commemorate and celebrate important anniversaries, create archives by amassing "any 
tangible sign of what was," and generally construct lieux de mémoire because this no longer 
happens by itself. Memory increasingly exists only though its "exterior scaffolding." Yet, lest it 
be believed that Nora is only critical of lieux de mémoire, he believes that without them and 
without their "commemorative vigilance," history would distort, transform, or destroy memory.80  
 Lieux de mémoire, therefore, are places where struggles about memory and meaning take 
place and where the (un)importance of the past for the present and future is determined.81 Nora's 
discussion of how the past is re-remembered when it is remembered together (that is, through 
commemoration), and how divisive memories are forgotten, is particularly significant.82 There is 
no reason to imagine that lieux de mémoire are free from the power struggles and social, 
economic, political, or other types of pressure that discursive/memory/social frameworks or 
regimes of truth co-exist with, and Nora underscores that one of the more "exciting" qualities of 
lieux de mémoire is their "capacity for change, their ability to resurrect old meanings and 
generate new ones along with new and unforeseen connections."83 But these new and old 
meanings are not simply new and old; rather, like lieux de mémoire themselves, they reflect the 
dominant concerns and discourses of the time, discourses which change with the passage of time 
and the rise and fall of different groups in power.84 Indeed, the appeal of a monument, for 
example, is that its meaning, like lieux de mémoire more generally, can be endlessly recycled.85 
Given the opposition between lieux de mémoire and milieux de mémoire (and history and 
memory), Nora's comments about the un-fixedness of the meaning of lieux de mémoire, and his 
celebration of memory, it is possible to conclude that, counter to other authors' arguments, it is 
less (or perhaps not at all) possible to manipulate memory to serve the needs of the present. 
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 Nora's opposition between history and memory, and Eelco Runia's views on it, are 
interesting here, perhaps especially because the relationship between history and memory forms 
a central part of the post-Peace discourse in El Salvador and even more so in Guatemala, and 
also because the question of what memory is has not yet been answered adequately (and nor will 
it be in this discussion). Runia's argument also provides a perhaps unexpected introduction to the 
topic of remembering together, which will be addressed below. Runia rejects Nora's explanation 
that history and memory are opposed to each other. He locates the core of the problem in the fact 
that memory is "an extremely complex phenomenon and that anybody can find anything in it to 
suit his or her taste or purpose." As a result, defining the opposite of history as memory is as 
useful as describing history as the "antithesis" of "consciousness" or "love." Instead, he argues 
that in describing ways to address the past, the more appropriate opposite of history is not 
memory, but commemoration.86 Nora, it seems, has a similar view on the issue of 
commemoration and history, as seen in his description of history as distorting memory, and his 
belief that lieux de mémoire help to protect memory from this onslaught.  
 All this, however, begs the question of whether commemorating, building monuments, 
and creating other lieux de mémoire actually contribute to memory being less and less 
experienced in day-to-day life, to it being increasingly experienced only through the scaffolding 
Nora describes, leading to further memory loss.87 That Nora also argues that commemoration is 
little more than "participation without participation" and separates the on-lookers and the event 
being commemorated, leading to indifference,88 also makes one wonder if commemoration and 
lieux de mémoire are beneficial at all.  
 Other authors have addressed this and similar questions about commemoration. Jeffrey 
K. Olick and Joyce Robbins, for example, echo Nora's sentiments and suggest that, "once we 
assign monumental form to a memory, we have to some degree divested ourselves of the 
obligation to remember."89 For Peter Carrier,   
Although the transmission of history as an aesthetic medium for mass consumption does 
fulfill the object of commemoration by 'calling to mind,' it also categorizes and fixes the 
past in a given form that ritually creates and fulfills an appetite for uncritical information, 
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and thereby renders ineffective the pertinence of the past in the present. It petrifies the 
past both literally and metaphorically by imposing monolithic form which, ritualized and 
banalized, is historically redundant and effectively invisible.90 
 
Carrier, like Nora, sees commemoration as paradoxical; it is meant to keep the past present, but 
instead creates greater distance. James E. Young, one of the leading commentators on Holocaust 
memorials and monuments, goes so far as to suggest that "the initial impulse to memorialize 
events such as the Holocaust may actually spring from an opposite and equal desire to forget 
them."91 Edkins, for her part, argues that commemoration can facilitate forgetting as those in 
power "can use accounts of heroism and sacrifice that tell a story of the founding of a state, a 
narrative of glorious origin."92 For these authors, there is certainly some validity to Runia's 
description of commemoration as being counter to history. 
 Trouillot also weighs in on the issue, though in a more roundabout way. Like Nora, he 
discusses the malleability of commemoration and argues that diverse interpretations of the events 
commemorations call to mind are possible because they are so decontextualized. Indeed, he 
suggests that the "richer the ritual, the easier it is for subsequent performers to change parts of 
the script or to impose new interpretations."93 Commemorations "sanitize" and "mythicize" 
history, they "adorn the past with certainty," a false certainty that revolves around the fact that a 
particular event is commemorated regularly, without fail. The yearly celebrations mask the fact 
that a given event was not inevitable; only its celebration is. Additionally, these celebrations give 
shape to an otherwise amorphous history and define the meaning of a particular event.94 In a 
description that bears a striking resemblance to how discursive/social/memory frameworks 
operate, Trouillot declares that commemoration is selective. For all those events or people that 
are remembered through commemoration, no matter how sterile these memories are, other events 
and people are not remembered. They are silenced, pushed aside, and forgotten.95  
 Others are far more supportive of the building of monuments and the commemorating of 
key dates. Alexandra Barahona de Brito, Carmen González-Enríquez, and Paloma Aguilar argue 
that commemoration is an "established foci of resistance to the logic of amnesty and forgetting." 
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The authors recognize that the meaning of the commemorations and monuments is not fixed, but 
that the struggle over both meaning and "ownership" keeps the past alive in the present and helps 
to prevent forgetting.96 Jelin and Kaufmann's study of post-dictatorial Argentina draws on the 
idea of commemoration being a site of struggle and expands on it. Jelin and Kaufman argue that 
when a death, disappearance, or detention center is commemorated, "the labors of memory 
became more inclusive and shared, invading every day life. It is hard work for everybody, on all 
sides of the controversies, for all people, of different ages and experiences. Facts are reorganized, 
existing perspectives and schemes of interpretation are shaken, voices of new and old 
generations ask questions, tell stories, create spaces for interaction, share clues about what they 
experienced, what they heard, what they silenced before."97  
 Jelin and Kaufman's argument relates to attempts to remember and commemorate not 
great acts of heroism or victorious war, but repression, all of which involved great struggle on 
the part of civil society. Dacia Viejo-Rose also differentiates between different kinds of 
memorials or commemorative events. For her, the difference lies not in what is being 
commemorated, but in how the memorials were created. She identifies two types of memorials—
official memorials and grassroots or spontaneous memorials. The two types, however, should not 
be viewed as polar opposites, but on a spectrum; depending on how they are used, official 
memorials can become grassroots memorials, and vice versa. She adds that, while memorials are 
physical, unchanging objects, their meaning is not; rather, such meaning is in constant flux. Over 
time, in an explanation that brings Nora to mind, different meanings and interpretations are 
added to memorials and old meanings are pushed aside. These older meanings, however, are not 
forgotten or erased but "intermittently wax and wane in different contexts with each use and 
reuse."98 Yet, in addition to the meaning or import of a monument changing over time, so too can 
its significance change depending on who is seeing the monument or listening to a 
commemorative speech. This, Viejo-Rose argues, can promote division in a given society.99 
Viejo-Rose does not deny that memorials can be used as a means of social control or to help 
create a founding myth to support the claims to power of a particular group, but she never loses 
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sight of her point that memorials and monuments can become sites of resistance, nor, in what 
would surely be a hegemonic process similar to those Roseberry describes, that official 
memorials and the memory they support can be supplanted by previously grassroots memorials 
and the understanding of the past that they embrace.  
 Runia also finds some positive aspects to commemoration. Commemoration, he argues, is 
essentially the way that a society discovers who it is; commemoration is how a society searches 
for its essence, for commemoration has as its most basic purpose answering the question, "who 
are we that that this could have happened?" Runia recognizes that this question is most often 
answered in an "identity-enhancing, yes, self-celebratory way," but potentially, commemoration, 
if done with "self-exploration" in mind, can lead to a coming to terms with some past societal 
trauma in which "we did things we didn't think we were capable of doing." It is, he suggests, 
exactly these events that we wish to remember later.100 Thoughtfully commemorating past 
behavior we are not proud of will have the benefit of both helping us work through trauma and, 
he adds, will help us become the people who did not do the things we commemorate.101 Runia's 
defense of commemoration also directly confronts "platonists like Nora" and what Runia sees as 
their more negative view of memory sites. Runia declares that commemoration is not "an 
epiphenomenon of some basic fault of humanity, but the necessary concomitant of the 
exquisitely human faculty of externalization." To prove his point, he first discusses burying the 
dead as a way to achieve both closure and perpetuation. It also allows humanity to "bring much 
more to bear on the present than what their consciousnesses can contain." Using these ideas as a 
foundation, he argues that commemoration is a "complement of burial," and indeed it is essential 
in societies with an "excess of memory" or where there are no bodies to bury. In such societies, 
commemoration serves to bring the unique combination of closure and perpetuation that usually 
accompanies burial.102 
 
Truth, Reconciliation, and Memory 
 Remembering, as well as commemorating, are at the core of truth and other similar 
investigatory commissions created as countries transition from conflict to "peace." Indeed, truth 
commissions' investigations and reports can themselves be seen as commemorations, for they 
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certainly serve as memorials for the dead.103 Continuing in this vein, and from Runia's 
perspective, commemoration, as a "complement of burial," is necessary in societies where there 
are many disappeared. That truth-seeking or fact-finding commissions complement burial, 
however, is not the main reason why post-conflict or post-crisis societies opt to create them. 
They are, above all, motivated by a belief that "the truth" about human rights violations 
committed during a particular period was hidden or silenced, and that it must be known. For 
Priscilla B. Hayner, who has written extensively about truth commissions, they aim to "establish 
an accurate record of a country’s past, clarify uncertain events, and lift the lid of silence and 
denial from a contentious and painful period of history,"104 one characterized by the massive 
commission of human rights violations. Thus, these commissions work to reveal the 
(dis)information of the previous regime as lies told to maintain power and justify repression. Yet 
as Hayner points out, truth commissions do not "find the truth"; rather, they "acknowledg[e 
it]."105 Commissions unsilence truths with the hope that, by recording what really happened 
during a dictatorship or conflict, by acknowledging the truth of that era, the now "more 
knowledgeable citizenry will recognize and resist any sign of return to repressive rule."106 As 
Kimberly Theidon wrote in Intimate Enemies, her exploration of Sendero Luminoso and 
reconciliation in Peru, the general equation which inspires truth commissions, is "more memory 
= more truth = more healing = more reconciliation,"107 with a key aspect of reconciliation being 
non-repetition. This is on full display in the title of the report of the Argentine truth commission, 
the first major truth commission in Latin America: Nunca Más.108  
 Yet truth and similar commissions are not without their critics. Wole Suyinka focuses on 
the ease with which truth is thought to lead to reconciliation in the "logic of 'Truth and 
Reconciliation.' " This logic, he writes, "demands that the mind prepare itself for the spectacle of 
a 'penitent' Pol Pot, freed, morally cleansed, at liberty to go about his business in a humanely 
                                                
103 I discuss this in my MA thesis, "Truth and Forgetting in Guatemala: An Examination of Memoria del Silencio 
and Nuna Más" (MA thesis, University of Saskatchewan, 2005). 
104 Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity (New York: Routledge, 2001), 
24-5. 
105 Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 607. 
106  Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 609. 
107 Kimberly Theidon, Intimate Enemies: Violence and Reconciliation in Peru (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 269. Yet how exactly truth would prevent future violence is unclear, as Theidon 
acknowledged when she questioned the mathematics behind the equation. 
108 Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas, Nunca Más, 1984, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20031013222229/http://nuncamas.org/english/library/nevagain/nevagain_004.htm. 
68 
restored milieu!" He continues, in reference to the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission and its "truth for amnesty" deal: 
This risk-free parade of villains, calmly—and occasionally with ill-concealed relish—
recounting their roles in kidnappings, tortures, murders, and mutilation, at the end of 
which absolution is granted without penalty or forfeit, is either a lesson in human 
ennoblement, or a glorification of impunity.109 
 
He argues that the "missing link" in the idea that truth will lead to reconciliation is reparations. 
They "serve as a cogent critique of history and thus a potent restraint on its repetition."110 
 Edkins criticizes truth commissions from a different angle. She declares, "The reduction 
of suffering and trauma to a question of truth silences the voices of survivors, as does the 
appropriation of their truth to a discursive contest in the service of power relations." She adds, 
"We should not seek for 'the truth' or 'the facts' since so often these are given to us as heroic 
narratives or written as convenient lies."111 Her comments are supported, in some ways, by the 
work of Jacques Le Goff, who notes that collective memory, which is surely what truth 
commissions contribute to creating, "is not only a conquest, it is also an instrument and an 
objective of power." Indeed, he writes that collective memory is "one of the great stakes of 
developed and developing societies, of dominated and dominating classes, all of them struggling 
for power or for life, for survival and for advancement."112 As a result, some argue that truth 
commissions are simply evidence that a new group has come to power. Truth commissions are 
normally formed in a time of political transition, and often in a transition from military 
government to something that resembles democracy. Though this most often means that the new 
government will be more open, commit fewer human rights violations, and more accurately 
reflect the wishes and needs of the majority, critics nevertheless argue that the new narrative of 
the past which truth commissions acknowledge is still one official version of the past. Though it 
might correspond more closely with what the majority experienced, this new official history, as 
with the official history(ies) which preceded it, seeks to determine what and how people 
remember and the meaning attached to past events. For critics, truth commissions, therefore, are 
evidence of the dominance of a different social group with its corresponding 
social/memory/discursive framework. 
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 Maria G. Cattell and Jacob J. Climo point out a different weakness of truth commissions. 
They argue that the process of elevating the status of the memory or narrative of the past (one 
which closely resembles Foucault's counter-memory) to the official memory or history imposes 
new silences on the past and relegates some (previously dominant) memories to counter-
memories.113 The creation of new silences is, indeed, a common criticism of truth and truth-like 
commissions, and it is closely related to the similarities between truth commissions and 
memory/social/discursive frameworks and commemorations, at least in regard to the way they all 
operate. All of these dictate what will be remembered and what will be condemned to oblivion, 
thereby limiting the range of memories, narratives, or ways of talking that are understood to be 
"true" or valid. Yet more than simply creating silences, truth commissions are criticized for the 
way that they delegitimize competing memories that exist about the past and tend to even out the 
ups and downs of memory, eliminating its nuances and complexity.114 In truth commission 
reports, therefore, a range of experiences and testimonies are reduced to one simplified 
experience.  
 The imposition of homogeneity on a heterogeneous past is most often motivated by a 
desire to build national unity and encourage citizens' sense of belonging to a nation.115 Indeed, 
unity and the desire to build a new (reconciled) nation are, in addition to guaranteeing non-
repetition, often explicitly stated goals of truth and truth-like commissions. They are also the 
most difficult goals to achieve.116 Indeed, Linda Bishai believes that the "unity mantra" that 
motivates the work of truth commissions and the push to create a grand narrative of the past are 
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self-defeating.117 Though scholars like Hayner recognize that truth and truth-like commissions, 
as in the case of the commission created by Idi Amin in Uganda in 1975, can be "political 
tools,"118 Brian Havel takes this criticism further. He suggests that truth commissions are "public 
law device[s]" which are created to "outmaneuver" the victims' and survivors' testimony. They 
are the new government's attempt to include the victims' narratives into a new national founding 
myth that will, hopefully, guarantee peace and stability.119 The danger of this is that these new 
counter-memories will likely pose a threat to the project of nation-building in the future, the 
same project which elevates counter-memory to the status of memory.120 Overall, then, truth 
commissions and the reports they publish ignore the complexity of memory and force a range of 
memories into an umbrella framework of reconciliation.  
 One way forward for truth commissions is, as some scholars argue, to reimagine what 
reconciliation (among other terms) is. For Cheryl Natzman, reconciliation should be understood 
as drafting a history that incorporates contradictory memories of past conflict,121 and it is this 
idea of reconciliation that truth commissions should use. For Hayner, truth and investigatory 
commissions should promote a view of reconciliation based on "a generally agreed 
understanding of a country's history and past wrongs"; they should not be focused on finding 
"the truth" about the past because it does not exist. Yet, though there is never only one truth, 
there are certain facts that must be accepted as true. These form the basis of Hayner's "generally 
agreed understanding" of the past, and their acceptance is also the basis of reconciliation.122 
 On (what is perhaps) the other hand, in their work about transitional justice projects in 
Peru, Lisa J. Laplante and Kelly Phenicie argue that consensus about the past is just what 
societies like Peru that are transitioning from dictatorship and conflict to (ideally) democracy and 
peace need. This consensus about the past, which they argue forms the basis of collective 
memory, involves, at its most basic, the "replace[ment of] the version of history promoted by 
'repressors' with that of the 'oppressed,' " and revolves around the understanding that "grave 
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human rights violations even in times of national security can never be justified."123 This, 
certainly, is what truth commissions do, which makes the Laplante and Phenicie's comments so 
interesting. The authors believe that the media ought to contribute to the creation of consensus 
about the past. Journalists should, thus, take a "short-term detour from traditional journalism" 
and its focus on objectivity and reporting "what each side says" and contribute to the goals of 
transitional justice by promoting this consensus that past human rights violations were wrong. 
The authors' argument about the "short-term detour" is, as they acknowledge, paradoxical. 
Indeed, they argue that the goals of transitional justice itself are paradoxical. Transitional justice 
aims to foster respect for human rights, which certainly includes free speech and freedom of the 
press, and understands public discussion and dialogue as essential to the overarching goal of 
reconciliation. Yet, "by definition, transitional justice projects [such as truth commissions] 
promote one version of the past: (1) human rights violations occurred, and (2) they were morally 
and legally wrong." With such a common understanding of the past as the foundation of 
transitional justice, there is, in the end, little room for the debate and dialogue which freedom of 
expression allows.124 The shorter term goals of transitional justice (i.e., free speech), thus, take 
precedence over the longer term functioning of a democracy. In this view, "the media's 
emulation of the classic aims of journalistic objectivity may actually undermine transitional 
justice goals, especially when a society needs a new direction in public discourse." They argue 
that objective journalism (which Salvadoran journalist Carlos Dada declares does not exist125) 
"does not always ensure a fruitful discussion that leads to the establishment of a collective 
memory and national reconciliation. It may do just the opposite, perpetuating polarity and 
distracting society from the content of transitional justice work, which seeks to set the record 
straight about unlawful violations of human rights."126  
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 Laplante and Phenicie's view on this issue are only perhaps on the other hand because 
Natzman's idea of reconciliation as incorporating different memories of the past into the 
narrative of the past, like Hayner's belief that reconciliation should be rooted in "a generally 
agreed understanding of a country’s history and past wrongs," is vague. Where they end and 
where Laplante and Phenicie's one version of the past centered on the fact that "human rights 
violations occurred" and that "they were morally and legally wrong" begins is unclear. Or 
perhaps they overlap? Perhaps "human rights were violated and it was wrong" is the common, if 
basic, understanding of the past Hayner talks about?  
 
 This dissertation uses ideas about discursive/social/memory/truth frameworks, 
commemoration, and truth commissions to help explore the way that Salvadorans and 
Guatemalans have tried to answer Runia’s question: "Who are we that this could have 
happened?" The question is exceedingly relevant, though it might more appropriately be 
rephrased as, "Who are they that they could have done this to us?," for this seems to be the 
question many in Guatemala and El Salvador ask as they engage in post-Peace soul-searching. In 
attempting to answer this question, and often in an effort to ensure non-repetition, Guatemalans 
and Salvadorans write narratives of their respective conflicts that certainly, and necessarily, 
contain many silences about the past. The narratives they write in the name of nation-building 
actively forget parts of the past so as to highlight other parts of it. The shape these narratives 
take, of course, depends on group membership and on which framework or regime of truth 
dominates. 
This dissertation explores unstable moments when struggles between competing 
frameworks, memories, and narratives of the past are most clearly revealed, as well as the stories 
of the past that emerge in these moments. These are moments when, significantly, truth or truth-
like commission investigate the past, gather testimony, and publish their reports, and when the 
past forces its way into the present, forcing the social body to scream out. These are also 
moments when the narrative of the past itself is written, and when frameworks which determine 
how the past will be talked about and what parts of the past will be understood as true are 
challenged, and even shift. Despite criticisms of both truth commissions and commemoration, 
they are key in the creation and negotiation of discursive/social/memory/truth frameworks and 
the narratives of the past that these frameworks shape. 
73 
Ideas about frameworks, commemoration, and truth commissions, therefore, help to 
explore larger questions about the place of the past in the present and future and how the past is 
talked about in post-Peace El Salvador and Guatemala. They do not help answer the question of 
whether it is better to remember or forget, though certainly many authors have addressed that 
question. Søren Kierkegaard, for example, suggests that one must both remember and forget, 
because, "in order to be complete, [each individual] must live as much in the hope that stems 
from forgetting as in the continuity that is produced by recollection"?127 Friedrich Nietzsche 
argues more forcefully for forgetting. He states, "life in any true sense is absolutely impossible 
without forgetfulness." Happiness is rooted in "the power of forgetting" and for those who 
cannot forget, happiness will remain illusive. He continues his argument in favor of forgetting, 
stating, "we must know the right time to forget as well as the right time to remember."128 It is 
very possible, therefore, to remember too much. Nietzsche echos Ernest Renan's views on the 
forgetting. In his lecture on nation-building, given in 1882, Renan argues that "forgetting, I 
would even say historical error, is essential to the creation of a nation." For Renan, the creation 
of a nation requires that its members "have a great deal in common and also that they have 
forgotten a great deal."129 Marc Augé, for his part, writes, "Oblivion is a necessity both to society 
and to the individual. One must know how to forget in order to taste the full flavor of the present, 
of the moment, and of expectation, but memory itself needs forgetfulness."130  
 Finally, in her discussion of the Spanish Civil War and the role it played in the 
democratization of Spain, Paloma Aguilar explores the issue of forgetting, of amnesia, in the 
creation of a new nation, reconciled with itself and its past. Drawing on the work of Trevor 
Lummis, Aguilar suggests that amnesia and memory are equally important. Lummis argues that 
the parts of the past that are silenced are dangerous, and often more so than the past that is 
remembered; however, as Aguilar writes, and much as Gross argued, "amnesia can also be as 
important as memory in cementing the peaceful bonding of a nation."131 Amnesia, with the same 
                                                
127 Gross, Lost Time, 139 
128 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Use and Abuse of History, trans. Adrian Collins (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co, 
Inc., 1949), 6-8. 
129 Ernest Renan, Qu'est-ce que qu'une une nation? / What is a Nation?, trans. Wanda Romer Taylor (Toronto: 
Tapir Press, 1996), 19-20.  He also argued that "the advance of historical study often poses a threat to 
nationality, for historical inquiry, in effect, brings to light the violent events that are at the source of all political 
formations, even those whose consequences have been beneficial." 
130 Marc Augé, Oblivion, trans. Marjolijn de Jager (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004), 3. 
131 Paloma Aguilar, Memory and Amnesia: The Role of the Spanish Civil War in the Transition to Democracy, 
trans. Mark Oakley (New York: Berghahn Books, 2002), 15. 
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root as amnesty, becomes even more important when "offenses which must be pardoned are so 
unpalatable that reconciliation is only possible through amnesia."132  
 For these authors, therefore, the answer to the question of whether the past should be 
remembered or forgotten is that it must be remembered and forgotten if the future is to be more 
peaceful than the past. This view echos the epigraph that opened this chapter. Memory, Todorov 
writes, is incomplete and biased forgetting, and both are essential. Though, as will be seen in the 
following chapters, this view of memory is not commonly heard in either Guatemala or El 
Salvador, it is useful to keep it in mind. Perhaps, rather than ask if the past should be forgotten or 
remembered (rather than view the place of the past in the present and in future in black and 
white), a more productive question is to ask what we should remember to forget, and what we 
should forget to remember. Recognizing that remembering requires forgetting and that forgetting 
requires memory, recognizing the nuance and complexity which are inherent in the seemingly 
straightforward ideas of memory and forgetting, might offer a way beyond the memory/oblivion 
dichotomy which further divides many post-conflict societies, and so might contribute to the 
always illusive and poorly defined reconciliation societies emerging from periods of violence so 
desire and to which transitional justice projects like truth commissions and commemoration hope 
to contribute. 
                                                
132 Aguilar, Memory and Amnesia, 17-18. 
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Chapter Two  
Guatemala: Schizophrenic Memory 
 
El pasado es siempre una morada. Cuando nos mudamos al presente, a 
veces alimentamos la ilusión de que cerrando aquella casa con tres 
candados (digamos perdón, la ingratitud o el simple olvido) nos vamos a 
ver libres de ella para siempre. Sin embargo, no podemos evitar que una 
parte de nosotros quede allí, coleccionando goces o rencores, 
transmutando los momificados hechos, en delirios, visiones o pesadillas.1 
 
 On 29 December 1996, amidst much fanfare, the "Accord for a Firm and Lasting Peace" 
was signed, officially ending Guatemala 36-year long conflict. From then until the 26 April 1998 
assassination of monseñor Juan Gerardi, various actors worked to make sure that, as Steve Stern 
pointed out in Chile, memories of the conflict would remain sealed in a memory box and 
destined for oblivion.2 The Ley de la Reconciliación Nacional, better known as the Amnesty 
Law, was passed on 27 December 1996 and was the most significant of the range of discursive 
and legislative tactics used to promote forgetting. Paul Ricoeur has suggested that amnesty laws 
are a form of "institutional forgetting." He adds that, "the proximity, which is more than 
phonetic, or even semantic, between amnesty and amnesia signals the existence of a secret pact 
with the denial of memory, which...distances it from forgiving, after first suggesting a close 
simulation."3 Indeed, the Oxford English Dictionary defines amnesia as a loss of memory, from 
the Greek root meaning "forgetfulness."4 The first definition listed for amnesty is "forgetfulness, 
oblivion; an intentional overlooking," while the second entry narrows the definition to "an act of 
oblivion, a general overlooking or pardon of past offenses, by the ruling authority." As with 
"amnesia," the Oxford English Dictionary locates the root of the word in Greek, though for 
amnesty the Greek root is oblivion, or not remembering.5 This is also true for the Spanish, 
amnestía and amnesia. Given that the Reconciliation Law was commonly called the Amnesty 
                                                
1  "The past is always a dwelling. When we relocate to the present, sometimes we feed the illusion/hope that by 
closing that house with locks (lets say perdón, ingratitude or simply forgetting) we will be free from it forever. 
However, we cannot prevent a part of us from staying there, collecting pleasures and rancors, transforming 
mummified acts into wild dreams, visions or nightmares; Mario Benedetti, Variaciones sobre el Olvido, (Rivas-
Vaciamadrid, Spain: H Kliczkowski-Onlybook, SL, 2005), 13. 
2 Steve J. Stern, Remembering Pinochet's Chile: On the Eve of London 1998 (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2004), 112. 
3 Paul Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2004), 453.  
4 Oxford English Dictionary, "Amnesia," http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/6483?redirectedFrom=amnesia&. 
5 Oxford English Dictionary, "Amnesty," http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/6488?rskey=P5fJZa&result=1#eid. 
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Law, the forgetfulness of amnesty easily attached itself to reconciliation. As for Ricoeur, the 
etymological roots led him to assert that amnesty is nothing more than forced forgetting. He 
wrote that, 
It is certainly useful—this is the right word—to recall that everyone has committed 
crimes, to set a limit to the revenge of the conquerors, and to avoid compounding 
the excesses of combat with the excesses of justice. More than anything, it is 
useful, as it was in the time of the Greeks and the Romans, to reaffirm national 
unity by a liturgy of language, extended by the ceremonies of hymns and public 
celebrations. But is it not a defect in this imaginary unity that it erases from the 
official memory the examples of crimes likely to protect the future from the errors 
of the past and, by depriving public opinion of the benefits of dissensus, of 
condemning competing memories to an unhealthy underground existence?6  
 
Ricoeur's assertion that the way that amnesty fades into amnesia prevents past crimes from 
serving as a warning or as an example to the future finds many echoes in Guatemala's post-Peace 
discourse. 
  The passage of the Amnesty Law was part of a move to promote amnesia and forgetting 
behind the guise of reconciliation. It sought to forget the crimes themselves and responsibility for 
them. Closely tied to the issue of reconciliation/amnesty and forgetting, is that of perdón. Perdón 
and the verb perdonar have many meanings. As expected, it means pardon in the legal sense, but 
it also means forgiveness, and even absolution. Given the legal nature of amnesties, it is possible 
to assume that perdón was often used in the legal sense in discussions about the Ley de 
Reconciliación Nacional. However, perdón was also increasingly used in official discourse and 
in the media to mean forgiveness, highlighting not only the importance of context in 
understanding the word, but also its flexibility. As perdón-pardon shifted to perdón-forgiveness, 
the connection to amnesty and forgetting the crimes, responsibility, and the conflict itself 
remained. When conservative governments were involved, forgiveness meant that the relatives 
were denied justice. To maintain some of the fluidity of the word perdón, the Spanish will be 
used here.  
  This chapter peels back the layers of meaning or intention that lie hidden below the 
surface of the things people say about the conflict. The focus of this chapter is the un-said, that 
which lurks beneath the dominant discourse (discussed in the next chapter). The archaeological 
project involved in exploring the implications of or intentions behind discourse is akin to 
                                                
6 Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, 452-3. 
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pentimento, when an artist "repents," or changes her mind about the work and paints over her 
original idea. With time, as Lillian Hellman described, as paint fades, it is sometimes possible to 
see through the top layer of paint to the layers below; "a tree will show through a woman's dress, 
a child makes way for a dog, a large boat is no longer on an open sea." "Perhaps," she wrote, "it 
would be as well to say that the old conception, replaced by a later choice, is a way of seeing and 
then seeing again."7  
 In Guatemala's post-Peace discursive framework, the issue is less about one artist 
repenting and more about one artist trying to cover over the work of a different artist, as seen in 
the photo below. The original graffiti appeared on the side of a government building in  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
"Assassin President. The Ixil does not forget you. The Ixcán does not forget you." 
Photo by author. 15 March 2012. 
 
downtown Guatemala City shortly after the inauguration of president Otto Pérez Molina in 
January 2012. Less than a day passed before the message had been painted over with a thin layer 
of white paint. This process is identical to the discursive struggles that exist in Guatemala. The 
                                                
7 Lillian Hellman, Pentimento: A Book of Portraits (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973), 3. 
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broader human rights community insists that Guatemalans talk about the conflict and that they do 
so within the framework that demands that the past be remembered so that it never happens 
again, as will seen in the next chapter. This is the tree in the original version of Hellman's 
painting. Those who prefer that the past be forgotten—those who would rather see a woman 
wearing a skirt than a tree—"paint over" the discursive framework by speaking of reconciliation 
and perdón. They paint over the tree, hoping to mask it completely. Yet they cannot paint an 
entirely different picture than the one that already existed. They must work within what is 
already on the canvas to make sure that their addition is not out of place; they must speak of 
amnesty, reconciliation, and perdón in order to promote forgetting. 
 
The Ley de Reconciliación Nacional as Forgetting 
 Guatemala's Ley de Reconciliación Nacional is rooted in the idea that to achieve 
"reconciliation," to achieve a "firm and lasting peace," certain political crimes and common 
crimes connected to them should not be prosecuted. The exceptions, listed in Article 8, were 
"genocide, torture, and forced disappearance," as well as other crimes included in international 
agreements Guatemala signed. The Amnesty Law was overwhelmingly approved in Congress 
days before the final Peace Accords were signed. While what exactly lawmakers thought 
"reconciliation" was remained unclear, who would be reconciled did not. Lawmakers, as stated 
in Article 1, understood the law to be, "a basic instrument to achieve the reconciliation of those 
people involved in the internal armed confrontation." This is precisely what Ricoeur pointed to 
as the reason behind decrees which mandated institutional forgetting; amnesties, he affirmed, 
were directed toward the "reconciliation of enemy citizens" and toward "civil peace."8 Gustavo 
Palma, of the Asociación para el Avance de las Ciencias Sociales en Guatemala (AVANCSO, 
Association for the Advance of the Social Sciences in Guatemala), repeated this reasoning the 
day the Peace was signed, and was among the first to highlight the connection to forgetting. He 
wrote that both the Ley de Reconciliación Nacional and the mandate of the Comisión de 
Esclarecimiento Histórico (CEH, Historical Clarification Commission) were very obviously 
meant to "submerge in forgetting the whole series of tremendous and undeniable acts of terror 
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and violence which took place in the recent past," but to do so "under the pretext of protecting 
national unity."9  
 Given the contents of Article 1 and the details of the amnesty, the Ley de Reconciliación 
Nacional was clearly oriented toward "reconciling" those who had been actively involved in the 
conflict, those who had taken up arms or had been forced to, and also those who had negotiated 
the peace. The law made no mention of how other Guatemalans, specifically non-combatants, 
might fit into the picture. Human rights and anti-impunity activist Helen Mack investigated why 
this was the case. She argued that the idea of reconciliation that reigns in Guatemala, as seen in 
the Ley de Reconciliación Nacional, was rooted in the Central American peace processes of the 
1980s. At that time, reconciliation was "only and exclusively understood as the laying down of 
arms and as ceasefire."10 In the Guatemalan peace process, as Mack wrote in a piece about the 
"absent process" of reconciliation in Guatemala, reconciliation was only present in the agreement 
about reincorporating the guerrilla into civilian life; that is, reconciliation was only discussed in 
relation to the agreement that laid the legal foundation for what would become the Ley de 
Reconciliación Nacional.11 In this Agreement on the Basis for the Legal Integration of the 
Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG, Guatemalan National Revolutionary 
Unity), the signatories agreed that, "Guatemalan society needs to develop conditions conducive 
to reconciliation and lasting governability" and that "the legal integration of members of the 
URNG, in full exercise of their constitutional rights and duties and in security and dignity, will 
contribute to the democratic process and its consolidation, the restoration of the social fabric in 
Guatemala, reconciliation and the establishment of a firm and lasting peace." As a result, among 
other measures, the signatories agreed that Congress would draft a "National Reconciliation Act 
whose object shall be, in accordance with the spirit and content of the Peace Agreements, to 
promote a culture of harmony and mutual respect that will eliminate any form of revenge or 
vengeance, while safeguarding the fundamental rights of the victims, as prerequisites for a firm 
                                                
9 Gustavo Palma Murga, "La memoria histórica y la firma de la paz," Siglo Vientiuno, 29 December 1996. 
10 Fundación Myrna Mack, "Justicia Transicional: Una Deuda Pendiente  (Extracto de un Estudio a Publicarse en 
marzo del 2010 Titulado Procesos de Justicia Transicional: ¿Cómo Están Cumpliendo los Estados 
latinoamericanos con los Estándares Internacionales?)," 10 January 2010. 
11 Helen Mack, "La Reconciliación en Guatemala: Un Proceso Ausente," in Verdad, Justicia y Reparación: 
Desafíos para la Democracia y la Convivencia Social, eds. Gilda Pacheco Oreamuno, Lorena Acevedo Narea, 
and Guido Galli (Stockholm and San José, Costa Rica: Instituto Internacional para la Democracia y la 
Asistencia Electoral / Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos, 2005), 196. 
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and lasting peace."12 As Mack wrote, reconciliation in the Peace Accords was about not holding 
those who had committed certain crimes legally responsible.13 This is why the left-leaning Frente 
Democrático Nueva Guatemala (FDNG, New Guatemalan Democratic Front) voted against the 
law, arguing that it was little more than an amnesty for the military and the guerrilla,14 and it is 
why discussions about the law often revolved around amnesty rather than around reconciliation, 
leading to the words becoming associated. 
 The failure to speak of reconciliation other than in the sense of amnesty meant that 
reconciliation was tied to perdón and forgetting.15 Mack asserted, "this omission was, without a 
doubt, deliberate, because the concept of 'reconciliation' inevitably requires the promotion of 
large scale social, political, and institutional transformations, something which Guatemalan 
society has not been prepared for, especially not the groups which hold power unlawfully." 
Understanding reconciliation as related to perdón and forgetting excludes "institutional 
transformations, economic improvement, the reconstruction of a social fabric damaged by so 
many years of war, the repairing of personal and interpersonal trust, the recuperation of the 
dignity of those who survived the violence, and the search for social justice," all of the essential 
aspects of what Mack knew reconciliation to be. Mack concluded that, since the Peace was 
signed, those with political, economic, or social power "have tried to establish the ideas of 
'wiping the slate clean,' of 'looking to the future and not toward the past,' and of 'not seeking 
reprisals or vengeance' as synonyms for reconciliation."16 For activists like Mack, these phrases 
were also all understood to be synonymous with forgetting. 
 The Ley de Reconciliación Nacional was explicitly associated with forgetting from the 
beginning. It was, FDNG representatives said, "the Law of Perdón and Forgetting."17 Despite the 
FDNG's opposition to the law, other parties supported the law. Such support was no doubt due to 
the fact that many agreed with Acisclo Valladares Molina, former Attorney General and two-
time presidential candidate, who wrote in El Periódico in 2007 that "those who were in power 
                                                
12 "Agreement on the Basis for the Legal Integration of the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca," 
United States Institute for Peace, 
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/guat_961212.pdf.  
13 Mack, "La Reconciliación en Guatemala," 196. 
14 "En Vigencia la Ley de la Reconciliación Nacional," Prensa Libre, 29 December 1996. 
15 Helen Mack, Verdad y Justicia: Discursos y Ponencias Escogidos (Guatemala City: Fundación Myrna Mack, 
2007), 164-5. 
16 Mack, "La Reconciliación en Guatemala," 196-7. 
17 "En vigencia la Ley de la Reconciliación Nacional," Prensa Libre, 29 December 1996. 
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were not ready to accept that peace meant that they would have to spend the rest of their days in 
prison, and nor were those who wished to achieve power. Peace and amnesty, therefore, were 
inseparable: take them or leave them, but together." "Both sides needed the amnesty," he 
continued, "without it, the peace would not have been signed."18 Valladares Molina repeated this 
two days later in another piece, titled "Ingratitude." In this second piece, his dislike for the 
Amnesty Law was clearer; he described it as a "truly cruel institution" and as "the final slap in 
the face for the victims." Nevertheless, he repeated that the amnesty, which made it "as if the 
crimes had never been committed," was necessary.19 With the amnesty, more than simply 
forgetting criminal responsibility, based on Valladares Molina's words, the crimes themselves 
would be forgotten.   
 Criticisms of the Ley de Reconciliación Nacional, such as those made by the FDNG and, 
to some extent, Valladares Molina, were based on the way the amnesty promoted forgetting past 
crimes and not just evading criminal responsibility for them.20 Yet as much as critics would 
accuse the law of promoting forgetting, the law nevertheless itself does not openly call for 
forgetting. Rather, in Article 10, the Law supported the search for truth. The Law decribed the 
CEH as contributing to making the "historical truth" of the armed conflict known "to prevent 
such acts from being repeated" and re-confirmed the State's support for the body, declaring that 
State institutions "should provide the required support to the Commission."21 Indeed, when the 
CEH began investigating the conflict the Procurador de Derechos Humanos (Human Rights 
Ombundsman), Julio Arango Escobar, and the head of the Secretaría de la Paz (Sepaz, Secretary 
of the Peace), Raquel Zelaya, used Article 10 to criticize the State for not providing information 
to the Commission.22  
 Far from calling for forgetting, the Amnesty Law required memory. Before amnesty 
could be granted, something had to be remembered. Before amnesty could be granted, the crime 
had to be recognized. Especially in the case of the victims of state terrorism, the first step toward 
                                                
18 Acisclo Valladares Molina, "¿Fue necesaria la amnistía?" El Periódico, 27 March 2007, 
http://www.elperiodico.com.gt/es/20080327/opinion/51062/.  
19 Acisclo Valladares Molina, "Ingratitud" El Periódico, 29 March 2007, 
http://www.elperiodico.com.gt/es/20080329/opinion/51282/. 
20 Others had more concrete complaints about the Amnesty Law. See, for example, Alfredo Balsells Tojo, "La 
inconstitucionalidad de la Ley de Reconciliaicón," El Periódico, 23 January 1997; "Interponen recurso contra 
Ley de Reconciliación Nacional," El Periódico, 4 January 1997. 
21 Ley de Reconciliación Nacional. 
22 "Arango: La CEH debería ser más firme," Siglo Veintiuno, 3 April 1998; "Esclarecimiento Histórico: Arango 
denuncia falta de colaboración," Siglo Veintiuno, 7 April 1998. 
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amnesty was remembering both the crime and the victim's work, and so remembering why they 
had been killed. For the human rights community, remembering the victims' work was so 
important because their work was a powerful indictment of the many kinds of injustice in 
Guatemala, injustices that the victims were trying to eliminate and which remained in the post-
Peace era. Remembering the victims' work reminded Guatemalans that there was still work to be 
done. For these reasons, it was dangerous for those who wished to maintain the status quo.  
 The way the amnesty dictated what could be remembered can be seen in the Myrna Mack 
and Jorge Carpio Nicolle cases. Myrna Mack was an anthropologist who worked with 
communities that had been displaced by the military’s scorched earth campaigns, campaigns that 
she denounced. A death squad killer her on 11 September 1990. Jorge Carpio Nicolle, on the 
other hand, was a journalist and politician who founded the Unión del Centro Nacional (UCN, 
National Centrist Union) in 1984. Defeated in the second round of the 1990 presidential 
elections, Carpio remained active in politics until the paramilitary Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil 
(PACs, Civil Self-defense Patrols) assassinated him on 3 July 1993. In the Mack case, defense 
attorneys declared that they would seek amnesty for their defendants not because their 
defendants were or were not guilty, but because the assassination was a political crime; the 
assassination was part of the conflict and so was covered by the amnesty. They used Myrna 
Mack's sister Helen Mack's statements that the crime had been politically motivated to make 
their case. Furthermore, the lawyers wondered how it was even possible to separate Myrna 
Mack's assassination from the conflict given the fact that she had worked with those who had 
been displaced as a direct result of it.23 The defense for the PACs accused of assassinating 
Carpio sought amnesty for their clients using a similar strategy. The lawyers argued that Carpio's 
widow had always asserted that the crime was political, and so the defendants could be protected 
by the amnesty.24  
                                                
23 "Amnistía para militares," El Periódico, 6 January 1997; Martín Juárez, "Militares piden ser perdonados," El 
Periódico, 7 January 1997. The Attorney General and courts finally agreed that neither the intellectual nor the 
material authors of the crime, the latter of whom had sought amnesty after the former did, would receive 
amnesty since Myrna Mack's assassination had not been committed within the framework of the conflict, as 
required by the law. (Martín Juárez, "Beteta tembién quiere el perdón," El Periódico, 9 January 1997; Julia 
Corado, "Sala deniega amnistía a militares sindicados del asesinato de Myrna Mack," Siglo Veintiuno, 11 
September 1997; and "A siete años del crimen de Myrna Mack, Sala deniega amnistía a militares acusados," 
Prensa Libre, 11 September 1997.) The intellectual authors were later found guilty. 
24 Martin Juárez, "Presuntos asesinos de Carpio se acogerán a la amnistía," El Periódico, 11 January 1997. Little 
has come of the case.  
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 In these and many other cases, lawyers were required to demonstrate, first, that the 
perpetrators had served in the military or the guerrilla or had been members of a state institution 
and, second, that the crimes had been committed in the context of the conflict and so were 
politically motivated.25 Thus, in this initial period after the Peace, soldiers and patrollers who 
were accused of having committed certain human rights violations and the lawyers who 
represented them remembered the political nature of the conflict, and indeed insisted that the 
violations had been part of it.  
 Amnesty, therefore, was not only amnesia. In seeking amnesty, the political had to be 
remembered and proven so that the crime would be forgotten.26 As well, and stepping back, 
remembering the crime and details about it, including the political motivation behind a particular 
crime, ultimately showed that the official version of what had happened (a version which 
suggested, for example, that male activists had not been disappeared, but had run off with their 
mistresses27) was not how events had unfolded. In these cases the amnesty allowed "the historic 
truth" of the past to be known.  
 Despite applications for amnesty in a few cases after Gerardi was assassinated, such as in 
the Dos Erres and El Jute cases, as well as in the case against genocidaire, Efraín Ríos Montt,28 
most discussions about amnesty were concentrated in the years between the Peace Accords and 
Gerardi's assassination. In this time period especially, for there to be any hope that their crimes 
would be covered by the amnesty, these crimes and their political nature had first to be 
                                                
25 In the first years of the post-Peace era, the only successful applications for amnesty mentioned in the 
newspapers were made by guerrillas. See, for example, "Otorgan libertad a primer guerrillero amparado en Ley 
de Reconciliación," Prensa Libre, 28 February 1997; "Segundo guerrillero fue beneficiado con amnistía," 
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excomisionado Noriega," Prensa Libre, 28 February 1997; "Fiscalía rechaza petición de amnistía de Cándido 
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politically motivated post-Peace crime. For post-Peace crimes, as in Gerardi's assassination and attacks against 
human rights defenders, various state representatives and members of Guatemala's conservative sectors vocally 
rejected the political, and hoped to convince the Guatemalan public by talking about the crimes as common and 
by proposing theories about robbery and sex to distract from the victims' work.  
27 Member of the Asociación Familiares de Detenidos-Desaparecidos de Guatemala (Famdegua, Association of 
the Family Members of the Detained-Disappeared of Guatemala), conversation with author, 26 March 2012. 
28 Estuardo Paredes and Verónica Gamboa, "Juez niega amnistía a Ríos Montt," Prensa Libre, 15 December 2014, 
http://www.prensalibre.com/noticias/Juez-niega-amnistia-Rios-Montt-Guatemala-Conflicto-Armado-Video-
exmilitar_3_655764420.html. 
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remembered. While defense attorneys reminded the courts that the assassinations of Myrna Mack 
and Jorge Carpio Nicolle were political, just as Helen Mack and Marta de Carpio had said over 
and over again, the prosecution was forced to navigate between the desire to confirm their 
political nature while seeking to punish the perpetrators. 
 Those so critical of the Amnesty Law may have felt slightly hopeful as soldiers and other 
members of state institutions were consistently refused amnesty. This hope surely disappeared as 
it became clear that those who sought to keep Guatemala's memory box open would do so at 
their own risk.29 The rejection of amnesty applications also meant that amnesty, and the at least 
temporary remembering it involved, was not the best way to encourage forgetting. The even 
short-lived presence of the past in the public sphere which applications for amnesty required 
was, perhaps, still too much remembering for certain sectors.  
 
Perdón as Forgetting 
 Forgetting was also pushed on the country by the use of the word perdón. Perdón, again, 
has various meanings. This can be seen in Prensa Libre's 1997 report about Edelberto Torres-
Rivas' response to the Amnesty Law. Torres-Rivas, one of Guatemala's leading academics, wrote 
in the inaugural issue of Diálogo, the monthly publication of the Facultad Latinoamericana de 
Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO, Latin America Social Sciences Institute), that with the Law, "the 
possibility to perdonar common crimes committed in connection with political crimes has been 
opened." For Torres-Rivas, perdón for the crimes was possible, as long as this was done with the 
support of "the only people capable of granting it," "the offended, their families, and society 
itself."30 While Torres-Rivas started out using perdón to mean pardon, the forgetting of criminal 
responsibility for a crime, in the end, the understanding of the word became more like 
forgiveness. It is not pardon that only the families can grant, for pardon is something the courts 
grant. Relatives of the victims are, however, the only ones who can forgive the perpetrators.  
 Helen Mack's piece, "Amnesty and Impunities," also makes this clear. Using perdón 
much as Torres-Rivas had, Mack wrote that when the idea to seek justice for crimes committed 
during the conflict arises, "forgetting and perdón without prior judgment are proposed." Yet, 
"peace and reconciliation cannot be constructed on top of the victims' pain, nor on top of 
                                                
29 Human rights activists are consistently threatened in relation to their work. 
30 "Gobierno abre posibilidad de perdonar crimenes contra civiles, señala FLACSO," Prensa Libre, 7 March 1997. 
The author was unable to obtain a copy of the original investigation. 
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forgetting converted into impunity." The state, she wrote, "can perdonar the acts which have 
affected it, such as the armed uprising. That is to say, it is authorized to forget or perdonar the 
crimes which...threatened it, such as rebellion, treason," and other crimes which took place in the 
context of the war. But the state does not "have the right to forget and perdonar in the name of 
those who suffered political violence which originated in the internal armed conflict."31 Only 
those who suffered can perdonar. Mack's use of perdón points to the word's fluidity. For 
Ricoeur, "the question of forgiving arises when there has been an indictment, a finding of guilt, 
and a sentencing." Yet when an amnesty exists, the possibility of determining guilt is usually 
denied. Thus, in the passage of amnesty laws, he argued, the "boundary between forgetting and 
forgiving is crossed surreptitiously,"32 and the danger exists that forgetting a political crime will 
melt into forgiving that crime, without the necessary acknowledgement of responsibility.  
 The discursive connection made between amnesty and perdón, though the word is not 
used in the Ley de Reconciliación Nacional, is more clearly seen in newspaper reports from early 
1997 that describe applications to benefit from the "Law of Perdón and Forgetting." The 
intellectual authors of Myrna Mack's assassination, for example, "ask to be perdonados," they 
ask to be pardoned/forgiven. This, at least, was the headline El Periódico used for the article.33 
The newspaper repeated this the following two days. On 8 January, "the accused for Xamán ask 
for perdón," while on 9 January, Noel Betata, the soldier who had already been convicted as the 
material author in Myrna Mack's assassination, "also wants perdón."34 The idea that 
reconciliation/amnesty/forgetting were tied to perdón can clearly be seen in other pieces. In early 
January 1997, for example, Alfredo Balsells Tojo likened the Amnesty Law to forgetting and 
wrote that both sides had agreed to it as a way to "perdonar themselves for the offenses 
inflicted." "They ask for perdón," he wrote, "they ask for forgetting, but they do not want to talk 
about justice as the minimum tribute that should be paid to their compatriots sacrificed in this 
deaf war, this hidden war, but a war impossible to deny."35 The Amnesty Law, and the related 
concept of perdón, promoted forgetting—a not knowing, an ignorance, a lack of memory about 
the atrocities of the past. Thus, in discussions about the Amnesty Law, reconciliation, amnesty, 
                                                
31 Helen Mack, "Amnestía e impunidas," in Verdad y Justicia: Discursos y Ponencias Escogidos, ed. Helen Mack 
(Guatemala City: Fundación Myrna Mack, 2007), 34-5. 
32 Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, 452-3. 
33 Martín Juárez, "Militares piden ser perdonados," El Periódico, 7 January 1997. 
34 Martín Juárez, "Acusados de Xamán solicitan perdón," El Periódico, 8 January 1997; Martín Juárez, "Beteta 
tembién quiere el perdón," El Periódico, 9 January 1997. 
35 Alfredo Baleslls Tojo, "¿Cuál guerra sucia?" El Periódico, 30 January 1997. 
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forgetting, and perdón are spoken of in one breath, creating a sort of discursive continuum where 
amnesty and perdón are seen as steps on the path to reconciliation and forgetting, as necessary 
pre-requisites for them, or as synonymous with them.  
 As perdón-pardon became perdón-forgiveness, as discussions of amnesty/amnesia 
became fewer, the relationship between perdón and forgetting became clearer. In his speech the 
day the final Peace Accord was signed, then-president Alvaro Arzú highlighted the importance 
of perdón and called for "perdón without forgetting." Citing Pope John Paul II, he explained that 
peace required a sincere perdón that eliminated any aspirations for vengeance. Yet he added that 
perdón did not mean forgetting; after all, "a people who wish to reconcile themselves need 
historical memory."36 In his speech, Arzú tried to separate forgetting and perdón, speaking of 
them almost as binaries.  
 Arzú's speech, made before applications for amnesty had been submitted and before 
debates about it had taken place, did not generate much discussion about perdón in the media. 
However, his announcement two years later that he would ask for perdón for the "excesses" 
committed during the conflict did generate significant debate. Arzú made his announcement at a 
critical moment. In December 1998, the first guilty verdict for a massacre committed during the 
conflict was passed down and three patrollers were condemned to death, a sentence which was 
appealed before the month ended; the twists and turns of the Gerardi case continued as the 
government's attorney stepped down, archbishop Próspero Penados Barrios accused the military 
of the assassination and the government accused the Valle del Sol criminal group, and the priest 
involved in the assassination was admitted to hospital; an armed group operating in the 
southwestern part of the country was rumored to be composed of ex-guerrillas; investigations 
into a 1982 massacre in Nebaj got underway; the case related to the Xamán massacre also 
continued twisting and turning; David Stoll's book, Rigoberta Menchú and the Story of All Poor 
Guatemalans, was published, sparking some debate about Menchú's "lies," (this, of course, days 
after she had met with French president Jacques Chirac and her work was celebrated); the 
campaigns related to the constitutional referendum continued; and, last but certainly not least, the 
country waited (im)patiently for the publication of the CEH report. The climate in Guatemala 
was tense, to say the least.  
                                                
36 Ramón Hernández and Emilio Godoy, "Arzú dice: Misión cumplido y llama a un perdón sin olvido," Prensa 
Libre, 30 December 1996; Anna Fresse, "Arzú exhorta al pueblo a perdonarse," Siglo Vientiuno, 30 December 
1996.  
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 A glance at the headlines in December 1998 is enough to see that Arzú's announcement 
would not ease tensions. Prensa Libre, for example, published "A polemical perdón" the day 
after Arzú's initial announcement.37 That Arzú's decision was indeed polemical is clear, not only 
from the range of passionate reactions to it, but also from the fact that he felt the need to repeat 
his call for perdón in the middle of the month.38 Prensa Libre followed this up on the front page 
on 29 December with "Debate about perdón two years after the Peace." El Periódico opted to 
announce that, "Arzú's proposal generates criticisms."39 For Siglo Veintiuno, it was "The most 
controversial perdón" and "The perdón of discord."40 The articles, as can be expected, were full 
of the opinions and reactions of various individuals from a range of social and political sectors, 
some expressing support for the perdón and others wholeheartedly rejecting it.  
 Looking beyond the headlines, the editors of Prensa Libre wrote in December 1998 that 
Arzú's plan to ask for perdón was not only about perdón; it would also contribute to the 
"achievement of forgetting, not understood as synonymous with impunity, but as the acceptance 
that, as a country and as a human group, we Guatemalans were victims of circumstance beyond 
our control which erased the division between 'the good' and 'the bad,' which made all of us 
responsible for what happened, whether for action or omission."41 At other times, of course, the 
editors had called for memory. Vice president of Prensa Libre, Mario Antonio Sandoval, 
contributed to the same issue of Prensa Libre. His piece, "Perdón, forgetting and knowing," 
echoed support for perdón, highlighting the fact that, given Arzú's role in the repressive Lucas 
García and Serrano Elias regimes, he had a personal reason to ask for perdón. He also made the 
connection between perdón and forgetting when he wrote, "deep pain requires a heavy dose of 
forgetting." Underscoring the importance he clearly placed on requests for perdón, he went on to 
argue that the guerrilla should ask for perdón since they were "equally guilty."42 In both Prensa 
Libre's editorial and in Sandoval's piece, far from being statements in support of wholesale 
forgetting, the authors were proposing what Jelin and others describe not as forgetting, but as the 
remembering of a different truth. The authors of both pieces, however, framed their arguments 
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within the context of memory versus forgetting and saw the value of at least some forgetting. 
Sandoval, especially, prescribed forgetting as a way to achieve reconciliation.  
 Not all of Guatemala's conservative commentators were so bold as to openly describe the 
remembering of different truths as forgetting. Conservative, pro-military commentator Karin 
Escaler's view of the "truth" of the conflict was clear when, in reaction to Arzú's announcement, 
she asked, much as Sandoval had, if the guerrilla were also going to ask for perdón. She wrote 
that it was completely cynical of Arzú to ask "widows and orphans, people who saw their 
property destroyed and their pockets plundered, to forget."43  
 Escaler's understanding of perdón as forgetting finds an echo in many other 
commentaries written in the weeks before the second anniversary of the Peace. Human rights 
activists and more left-leaning individuals, surprisingly, agreed with this aspect of Escaler's 
commentary, though their idea of what Arzú wanted forgotten, as well as their idea of the "truth" 
of the conflict, are certainly quite different than hers. The leaders of both the Central General de 
Trabajadores de Guatemala (CGTG, Confederation of Workers of Guatemala) and the Alianza 
contra la Impunidad (ACI, Alliance against Impunity) asserted that Arzú's act of "political 
hypocrisy" was little more than an effort to "wipe the slate clean."44 Journalist and feminist Laura 
E. Asturias agreed in her piece, "Wiping the slate clean." She described Arzú as attempting to 
"promote a sort of perdón and forgetting." What was needed for true reconciliation was that the 
perpetrators be punished and the victims compensated; "anything else is an insult."45 Helen Mack 
concurred. Guatemalans did not, she said, know the truth of what had happened, and so, though 
she saw Arzú's announcement as a step forward, she also believed that it was not the right 
moment. She added that she hoped that "when the Truth Commission delivers its final document, 
the parties that were involved in the conflict truly ask Guatemalans for perdón so that what 
happened never happens again." She also offered her thoughts on the fact that Arzú intended to 
ask forgiveness for "excesses" and declared that what had happened in the conflict was more 
than excesses; instead, it was a well thought out campaign to violate human rights.46 Asturias and 
Mack both understood that asking for perdón first required knowledge about the past, knowledge 
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of what exactly Arzú was asking perdón for, and Mack, at least, hoped the "truth commission" 
report would contribute to this.  
 Mack's mention of the CEH report is significant. Many activists believed that the timing 
of Arzú's perdón was dedicated solely to promoting a pre-emptive forgetting of what the CEH 
was rumored to have concluded: that state security institutions had been responsible for the vast 
majority of the violations committed during the conflict. Mack, to be sure, did not state this 
explicitly, nor did Jesuit Juan Hernández Pico when he wrote, "it was not the same to ask for 
perdón before knowing the [contents of the] disturbing CEH report."47 Miguel Ángel Sandoval 
and Mario Monteforte Toledo, however, were more clear. Sandoval, who had signed a number of 
the Peace Accords on the URNG's behalf and would go on to be their presidential candidate in 
2007, wrote in "Perdón...and a clean slate" that it seemed to him that Arzú was trying to "kill two 
birds with one stone: one, to stay ahead of the CEH report and its possible recommendations and, 
two, to give Guatemalans a reason to 'celebrate' this 29 December" when, in reality, there was 
nothing to celebrate.48 Monteforte Toledo, an author and member of both the Juan José Arévalo 
and Jacobo Arbenz governments, believed that Arzú had decided to ask for perdón shortly before 
the CEH report was published with the hope of "minimiz[ing] the contents of this fundamental 
work and mak[ing] the perpetrators of genocide vanish,"49 thereby condemning them to oblivion. 
Interestingly, the Secretary of the Peace, Raquel Zelaya, waded into the discussion and, evidence 
of the strength of the discursive framework, used the same language to assure Guatemalans that 
the government was not seeking to "wipe the slate clean." The perdón, she added, did not 
eliminate the victims' "right to truth, justice, and compensation," which were guaranteed in the 
Peace Accords.50 Commentators' beliefs that the perdón was motivated by a wish to forget was 
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supported by Arzú's actions when the CEH was published. In addition to refusing to walk on 
stage to accept the report, he declared it "one more investigation," and one whose findings were 
"arguable and provisional."51 His truth, it seems, was quite a different one. 
 With the perdón, and given its timing, activists and progressive commentators believed 
that Arzú hoped to finally be able to declare an end to the conflict. It was his way of closing the 
book on the past, and then putting that book back on the shelf to gather dust. They believed that 
his request for perdón, combined with the Amnesty Law, sent a clear message: Arzú hoped that 
the crimes committed during the conflict and the military's "excesses" would be forgotten. This, 
perhaps, is why they insisted so loudly and frequently that state security institutions, as the CEH 
would soon conclude, had committed 93% of the human rights violations. They saw the perdón 
as a political move, a move Arzú made to reduce the impact the CEH's findings were sure to 
have, to promote forgetting by disguising it behind a façade of memory. On the surface, asking 
for forgiveness, does require remembering, remembering that someone did something that was 
wrong; in this it is quite like applying for amnesty. But, as activists noticed, by calling for 
reconciliation before the CEH's clarified history had been made public and imagining that a well-
planned and extremely violent counterinsurgency was simply "excesses," Arzú was attempting to 
dictate what was remembered and what was forgotten. Describing what the CEH would conclude 
were acts of genocide as "excesses" was Arzú's attempt to forget institutional responsibility and 
re-imagine human rights violations as the result of individual soldiers or patrollers' decision to 
rape, torture, massacre, and destroy communities.  
 But of course individuals had committed human rights violations. Though the CEH, 
prohibited from naming names, would find state institutions responsible as institutions, 
individuals had wielded machetes with deadly effect and tossed infants down wells. Many 
members of human rights organizations and their allies, therefore, insisted that perdón was 
                                                
51 Hernández Pico, Terminar la Guerra, Traicionar la Paz, 169. Discussions of official forgetting in December 
1998 were not limited to Arzú's perdón, though certainly these other discussions lent weight to the idea that the 
perdón was not sincere and that Arzú really sought to forget. On 11 December, Prensa Libre reported that 
Congress "forgot" the posthumous tribute to Gerardi which had been agreed on in Acuerdo Legislativo 21-98, 
passed 28 April of the same year. While Luis Mijangos, of the ultra-conservative Frente Republicano 
Guatemalteco (FRG, Guatemalan Republican Front), stated that this forgetting was simply another example of 
the "government's general policy of downplaying that importance of the crime," the FDNG's Nineth 
Montenegro argued that it suggested that the government was not really interested in true forgiveness. Given 
that the tribute had been forgotten, she described Arzú's actions as "demagogic." The newspaper's editorial for 
the next day declared that "it cannot be forgotten that, in light of the behavior of groups and people related to 
the official party, a forgetting of this nature can easily be considered as a premeditated action, stemming from a 
superior order." ("Una nueva duda en el caso Gerardi," Prensa Libre, 11 December 1998.) 
91 
impossible without knowing what had happened and who was responsible. Political cartoonist 
Filóchofo asked Arzú to "tell us who" to perdonar.52 Human rights activist Miguel Ángel 
Albizures wrote passionately on the issue. He was critical of the perdón and demanded that the 
names of the perpetrators be known, for how else can one perdonar? He wrote that, "More than 
asking for perdón for crimes [that "the current president of the Republic, the Minister of 
Defense, the Interior Minister and the Director of the Police"] did not commit, they should foster 
justice and, just as they [the church] have put the names of thousands of victims on pillars in  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
"If the perdón is not going to be demagogic…It is necessary to compensate the victims and know 
the names of the perpetrators, so that their crimes are never repeated. " 
Arzú (wearing the conquistador’s hat): "We have to perdonar! " 
Response: "Yea!...But tell us who…" 
Siglo Veintiuno. 29 December 1998. 
 
front of the Cathedral, there should be a place where the people can read the names of the 
perpetrators, so that they never forget their executioners."53 Though the more conservative Mario 
Antonio Sandoval was against naming because "a country like Guatemala should be sure to 
reduce its problems, not add to them," historian Nery Villatoro Robledo agreed with Albizures in 
"Perdonar is not to forget." He wrote that he supported Arzú's move and that it showed some 
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courage on his part to "ask perdón for the crimes and atrocities which others ordered and 
committed." But, he added, these "others" must also ask for perdón, for, to perdonar, the 
question of "who?" must be answered. And this, he continued, "brings us inevitably to the theme 
of justice." Without justice, "asking for perdón only has the meaning of wiping the slate clean, of 
forgiving and forgetting," all of which would make reconciliation, which was the aim of Arzú's 
perdón, quite difficult. And, he added, in a statement that fits perfectly within the larger 
discursive framework of post-Peace Guatemala where memory prevents repetition, "forgetting 
our history is to invite a new tragedy."54  
 At the ceremony celebrating the anniversary of the Peace, Arzú did ask for forgiveness in 
the name of the state as planned. He asked forgiveness for the violence which Guatemalans 
suffered "as a result of the decisions of political power and the actions of the army and of the 
security forces of the time."55 The army also asked forgiveness, and declared that it was not a 
forgiveness that sought to silence the truth. On the contrary, as Erick Campos reported in Prensa 
Libre, Minister of Defense Héctor Barrios Celada insisted that "the clear, transparent truth must 
emerge, not a malicious one, and much less a partial one."56 (With the publication of the CEH 
report, Memoria del Silencio, however, Barrios Celada would surely feel that the truth he had so 
lauded had been betrayed.)  
 The close relationship between perdón and forgetting, the way that many believed that 
perdón was simply a different way to promote forgetting, can also be seen in other moments not 
related to official requests for perdón. This is clear in the words of Wendy Santizo Méndez, a 
member of Hijos e Hijas por la Identidad y la Justicia contra el Olvido y el Silencio (HIJOS, 
Sons and Daughters for Identity and Justice against Forgetting and Silence), who was 
interviewed by the Oficina de Derechos Humanos del Arzobispado de Guatemala (ODHA, 
Human Rights Office of the Archdiocese of Guatemala) for their publication about the ten years 
that had passed since the presentation of Nunca Más. Santizo Méndez described the state's 
request for perdón as "a joke, a farce," and recalled that the HIJOS' slogan is "Neither forgetting, 
nor perdón."57 
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 The relationship between perdón and forgetting continues. On 15 April 2013, El 
Periódico's Juan Luis Font wrote "Perdón and forgetting." The piece underscored the 
relationship between the two, and brought the discussion back to Ricoeur. Speaking of the 
genocide trial of Ríos Montt and Mauricio Rodríguez Sánchez, chief of military intelligence 
during the former's time as de facto head of state, Font wrote of a refusal on the part of 
Guatemalans who lived through the early 1980s to admit even a small amount of responsibility 
for supporting one side or the other in the conflict. It is worthwhile, he wrote, to read Nelson 
Mandela's autobiography, for he is "able to admit the consequences of his actions." He pointed 
out that those who somehow find a way to support the violations of the 1980s also point to 
Mandela as an example to follow, though in their case he is an "example of perdón and 
forgetting." But, as Font pointed out, no one in South Africa forgot. Speaking of South Africa's 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission's "truth for amnesty" deal, he wrote, "there was perdón, 
but only after a recognition of the crime committed by one's own hand." In a rather optimistic 
understanding of the process and its results, he added that "only then was [the perpetrator] freed 
from responsibility. Only then was it possible to look ahead and leave behind what was 
suffered." In Guatemala, however, the perpetrators have not admitted responsibility,58 thereby 
preventing perdón.  
 
Reconciliation as forgetting 
 Closely related to amnesty and perdón, and so also to forgetting, is reconciliation. The 
relationship between reconciliation and forgetting was clear from the first days of the post-Peace 
era when journalists and commentators relabeled the Ley de Reconciliación Nacional the Ley de 
Amnestía, thereby associating reconciliation with amnesia/forgetting. Whenever more 
conservative actors called for or spoke of reconciliation, the human rights community would 
once again spring into action, denouncing attempts to "wipe the slate clear" or "turn the page on 
                                                                                                                                                       
impossible because... We think they have to reconcile themselves with history, with this country, with society. 
They have to say where [the disappeared] are, they have to say what they did, where our brothers and sisters 
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it, that's the problem. So no reconciliation is possible. They won't do it"; Vincent Druliolle, "H.I.J.O.S. and the 
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of Democracy in Argentina," Journal of Human Rights 12, no. 2 (2013): 272. 
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the past." Those whose words had sparked the denunciations could only deny that they had 
hoped for forgetting when they called for reconciliation, often insisting more loudly that 
Guatemala must remember so that the past would not be repeated. In this back and forth between 
activists and conservative actors, in the accusations and denials, the construction of post-Peace 
Guatemala's discursive framework is very clear; it is a discursive framework that demands 
memory and loudly condemns those conservative sectors, often with ties to the military, that seek 
to promote forgetting from behind the discursive protection of words. Yet much depends on who 
is speaking. When, days before he was assassinated, Gerardi declared, "We are called to 
reconciliation. Christ's mission is one of reconciliation. His presence calls us to be agents of 
reconciliation in this broken society and to try to place the victims and perpetrators within the 
framework of justice"59 no one believed that he was secretly hoping Guatemalans would forget. 
Yet when Arzú called for perdón and reconciliation, when a conservative Congress passed the 
Ley de Reconciliación Nacional, progressive sectors and the human rights community were 
unwavering in their belief that forgetting hid behind this talk of reconciliation. Historian Arturo 
Taracena Arriola, for example, wrote in 2007 that, "under the slogan of 'reconciliation,' official 
memory in Guatemala advocates forgetting [and] stimulates silence" as an effort to avoid 
fulfilling the CEH's recommendations and as a way to maintain impunity. There was little hope 
for the creation of democracy "when consecutive governments call for a 'reconciliation' they 
understand as forgetting."60 In discussions about reconciliation and in denials about it, it is 
perhaps most clear that, for post-Peace Guatemala, the speaker, as much as the words spoken, 
determine meaning. 
  While commentators and activists loudly denounced amnesty and perdón as simply 
being official attempts to discourage memory, discussions of reconciliation and its connection to 
forgetting were often quieter. The strength of the association between reconciliation and 
forgetting can be seen most clearly in the insistence of members of human rights organizations 
that reconciliation did not, in fact, mean forgetting. In these statements, they were recuperating 
Gerardi's belief, and one echoed by the CEH, that reconciliation was not based on forgetting, but 
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on justice.61 Activist Frank La Rue, for example, declared shortly after the CEH report was 
published that "It is the time for reconciliation, but this does not imply forgetting, which 
constitutes a danger for the future of a country."62 The Instancia Multiinstitucional por la Paz y la 
Concordia (Multi-institutional Initiative for Peace and Harmony) explained that, if there was to 
be any hope for reconciliation, all Guatemalans must "know and make known to others the 
causes, development, and consequences of the Internal Armed Conflict."63 They expanded on 
this in El Libro Azul, which guided the basic principles of how the government's Programa 
Nacional de Resarcimiento (PNR, National Reparations Program) would operate. Reconciliation, 
the Instancia insisted, was only possible if it was rooted in a "knowledge of the past, access to 
justice, the reconstruction of the social fabric, and the improvement of the socioeconomic 
conditions of the sector who was most effected" by the conflict.64 This understanding of 
reconciliation mirrored that of the CEH in many ways, and the Instancia acknowledged that their 
use of the term drew on the CEH's, which declared, "truth would lead to reconciliation and, 
furthermore, that coming to terms with the truth is the only way to achieve this objective."65 
CEH commissioner, Alfredo Balsells Tojo, in Olvido o Memoria: El Dilema de la Sociedad 
Guatemalteca, perhaps unsurprisingly, repeated much of this understanding of reconciliation 
when he wrote that, "the truth might be painful for many people, but....it is necessary because, 
without it, it is not possible to talk of justice, a step necessary to arrive at the much-desired 
national reconciliation."66  
                                                
61 The CEH staff declared, for example, that "truth, justice, reparation and forgiveness are the bases of the process 
of consolidation of peace and national reconciliation," that "collective reparatory measures should be 
implemented in such a way as to facilitate reconciliation between victims and perpetrators, without stigmatizing 
either," that "exhumation...is in itself an act of justice and reparation and is an important step on the path to 
reconciliation," and that "to achieve national harmony and reconciliation, a concerted effort at cultural change is 
required." (CEH, Conclusiones y Recomendaciones, 62-3 and 67-8) 
62 Rodolfo A. Flores García, "¿Y ahora, qué hacer con el informe de la CEH?," Siglo Vientiuno, 28 February 1999. 
63 Instancia Multiinstitucional por la Paz y la Concordia, Cumplimiento de la Recomendación Número 36 de la 
CEH: Propuesta para la Reforma Educativa (Educación Secundaria) (Instancia Multiinstitucional por la Paz y 
la Concordia, 2009), 4.  
64 Instancia Multiinstitucional por la Paz y la Concordia, El Libro Azul: Política Pública de Resarcimiento, 
(Instancia Multiinstitucional por la Paz y la Concordia, 2003), 5.  
65 Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico, Guatemala: Memoria del Silencio, Volume 1, Causas y Orígenes 
del Enfrentamiento Armado Interno (Guatemala City: Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico, 1999), 16. 
The CEH commissioners did recognize, however, that "no one today can be sure that the enormous challenge of 
reconciliation, through knowledge of the truth, can be successfully faced."  
66 Edgar Alfredo Balsells Tojo, Olvido o Memoria: El Dilema de la Sociedad Guatemalteca (F&G Editores: 
Guatemala City, 2001), 16. 
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 Jesuit Juan Hernández Pico agreed, writing that "refusing to forget history and 
recuperating it with humanity, with lucidity and, moreover, with dedication, implies fully 
embarking on the path to reconciliation."67 Margarita Carrera and Helen Mack concurred. 
Carrera, a regular contributor to Prensa Libre who also authored a book about Gerardi, wrote in 
2005 that, "Reconciliation is impossible if the past is forgotten, if the truth and the search for 
justice are not known, and if war criminals and their victims continue living together, the former 
protected by impunity and the latter drowning in helplessness."68 For Mack, truth and justice 
were the bases of reconciliation. They were, in fact, the "indispensable preconditions" for it.69 As 
well, the 2009 Sepaz study about "reconciliation policies in Guatemala" between 1996 and 2008 
also echoed this rejection of reconciliation as tied to forgetting. In his contribution to the work, 
Argentine social scientist Marcelo Colussi felt compelled to affirm "reconciliation is not 
forgetting, it is not wiping the slate clean with a call to drop past hatreds." Those who used 
reconciliation, he said, as a way to promote forgetting did not understand the term. A more 
accurate understanding of reconciliation, Colussi argued, involved an "attempt to recuperate 
historical memory so as to not forget what happened in the internal armed conflict." It involved 
"seeking justice and compensation for the damages which were suffered."70 When human rights 
activists or other members of more progressive groups speak of it, reconciliation rejects 
forgetting because, as was repeated time and time again, it requires memory.  
 For the human rights community, reconciliation, which was often left undefined, was 
based on memory, truth, and justice.71 When they spoke of the need for reconciliation, they were 
very clearly not using it to mask a desire for forgetting. They repeated demands for memory, 
truth, justice, and reconciliation over and over as the Peace, and the hope which accompanied the 
signing of the Peace, receded into the past. And they felt compelled to do so because they 
believed that conservative sectors and those with ties to the military were masking forgetting 
with talk of reconciliation, trying to hijack the word and turn it into something else. When 
                                                
67 Hernández Pico, Terminar la Guerra, Traicionar la Paz, 91 and 115. 
68 Margarita Carrera, "Memoria histórica," Prensa Libre, 19 August 2005. 
69 Helen Mack, "Condiciones Esenciales para Promover la Justicia y la Reconciliación," in Verdad y Justicia: 
Discursos y Ponencias Escogidos, ed. Helen Mack (Guatemala City: Fundación Myrna Mack, 2007), 133 and 
136.   
70 Marcelo Colussi, "El Rol del Estado en el Proceso de Reconciliación de Guatemala 1996-2008," in Entre 
Pasado y Olvido: Políticas de Reconciliación en Guatemala, 1996-2008, ed. Secretaría de la Paz (Guatemala 
City: Secretaría de la Paz, Guatemala, 2009), 108 and 111. 
71 It is also, of course, based on structural reforms to reduce or eliminate injustice and inequality, but again, this 
project focuses on memory and forgetting. 
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conservative actors and government officials spoke of reconciliation, the human rights 
community understood that they were really promoting forgetting. This was, in part, because 
these officials also spoke in support of amnesty and perdón, both of which are clearly tied to 
forgetting, to not knowing, to not remembering past violations. Both are also related very closely 
to the denial of justice, which activists so clearly saw as a necessary requirement for 
reconciliation. These individuals and groups viewed the official understanding about 
reconciliation as not based on memory and justice, but rather on forgetting.  
 
(Re?)Conciliation 
 There are fundamental problems with calls for reconciliation in Guatemala, and they lie 
partly in the difference between conciliation and reconciliation. The idea of reconciliation re-
writes 500 years of Guatemalan history. Instead of being a history of genocide after genocide, as 
José Roberto Morales Sic and others discussed at a 2004 conference on racism and genocide,72 
Guatemalan history becomes dominated by "friendships," as the Real Academia Española 
describes reconciliar. Reconciliation suggests that there was something in the past, some element 
of past social relations, which had, unfortunately, broken but which was worth being rescued. It 
sanitizes centuries of social and political conflict by re-naming it "friendship."  
 A quick glance at Guatemalan history reveals that this is not the case. As the CEH 
concluded, the causes of the conflict can be traced back at least to independence in 1821, when a 
racist, hierarchical, and exclusionary state was installed which used violence against the poor and 
indigenous to maintain power.73 This is, perhaps, the long history many hope will be forgotten 
when they talk of an admittedly ill-defined reconciliation. Forgetting Guatemala's history of 
inequality, exploitation, and dispossession certainly re-imagines Guatemalan history and paints it 
in a far more positive light. Imagining Guatemalan social relations in this way, re-writing the 
historical narrative, also makes fixing post-Peace Guatemala's problems far more manageable. 
Instead of having to construct friendly social relations from nothing, all that must be done is to 
go back to 1959, before the internal armed conflict officially started, find the seed of friendship, 
and plant it again in 1997 (or in 2015). 
                                                
72 Centro para la Acción Legal en Derechos Humanos, Genocidio, la Máxima Expresión del Racismo: Primer 
Encuentro en Guatemala sobre Racismo y Genocidio (Guatemala: Industria Litográfica Maga, 2004), 47; 
Marcelo Colussi, "El Rol del Estado en el Proceso de Reconciliación de Guatemala 1996-2008," 103. 
73 CEH, Causas y Orígenes del Enfrentamiento Armado Interno, 82-3. 
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 Yet if Guatemala is described as simply needing to be reconciled, and not "conciled," if 
history is re-written to erase centuries of exclusion and inequality, then the reasons the guerrilla 
took up arms and the reasons labor, student, and peasant activists struggled for rights are also 
erased; their ideals and politics are eliminated. Rather than having fought for the radical 
transformation of a racist, violent, exploitative, and exclusive state, guerrillas and activists 
become the ones who destroyed the "friendship" which had (in this new version of Guatemalan 
history) previously existed and which had to be recreated in the post-Peace era. Guerrillas and 
activists are transformed, as during the conflict, into common criminals who seek only profit or 
vengeance. To speak of conciliation, on the other hand, acknowledges the long-term causes of 
the conflict. Conciliation recognizes that activists and guerrillas were motivated by something 
other than greed. Conciliation recognizes that the causes of the conflict and the reasons to 
organize still exist. 
 Reconciliation forgets why Guatemalans fought for a better life. It forgets a long history 
of activism and resistance, in both rural and urban areas. It forgets the possibility that a better life 
exists and seeks to turn Guatemalans into passive beings who accept racism, exclusion, and a 
highly unequal distribution of land and wealth.  
 
 Alfredo Balsells Tojo described the Amnesty Law as an attempt to "throw the veil of 
forgetting over the Guatemalan nightmare" by hiding history, by "absolv[ing] the torturers, the 
massacrers, the executioners of extrajudicial deaths, the members of death squads, the offenders 
of humanity's most basic norms, of guilt." The amnesty, he continued, sought to prevent future 
generations from knowing "what happened inside police dungeons and military barracks to 
thousands of their compatriots who were not part of the warring factions."74 Doctor and author 
José Barnoya also spoke to the issue of amnesia in "Ungrateful memory." "[S]ome officials," he 
wrote, claimed to suffer from Alzheimers. Yet, he added, "It is inexplicable that there is someone 
who denies remembering that he completely destroyed a village; that another recasts the 
massacre of a noble tribe as forgetting, or that he...disregards the thousands of voices which he 
silenced forever." Barnoya rejected officials' claims to have forgotten. Drawing on Jorge Luis 
Borges' belief that "'our past is our memory,'" he declared, "of all the faculties that man 
                                                
74 Alfredo Baleslls Tojo, "¿Cuál guerra sucia?" El Periódico, 30 January 1997. 
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possesses, memory is the last which is lost." No matter what disease you are suffering from, no 
matter how serious it is,  
memory always surpasses forgetting...it accompanies us to the last of our days. The 
shadow of the past is always present in the light of the future. All of us, absolutely 
all of us, atheists and believers, civilians and soldiers, the intelligent ones and the 
others, we all have something awful to tell, some abominable act to relate. 
Barbarities, cruelties, atrocities always float up from the depths of memory. ... 
 
Recollections survive death, and the memories live on in the embers of the ashes. 
Memory is everlasting, immortal, indelible, as ungrateful as it may be...it remains 
there forever and ever, though many attempt to erase it, eradicate, it or banish it.75  
 
Despite Barnoya's assertions about the permanence of memory, other commentators 
suggested that Guatemalans in general, and not only the perpetrators, were "given to 
forgetting."76 Journalist Marcela Gereda pointed to the continued dominance of a generalized 
forgetting in 2010. She wrote that, "if something characterizes this era [an era where 'the country 
is drowning, and us with it' because of the high number of femicidios, the increase in poverty, the 
assassination of bus drivers, and the social cleansing, because violence has become a way of 
being among youth], it is forgetting, indifference, the little or non-existent interest in the history 
of what has happened to us to make us as we are."77 Forgetting and a lack of knowledge of 
history condemned Guatemala to have to endure the violence of the Peace and to be forced to 
survive the same conditions which had sparked the conflict and which the Peace Accords were 
supposed to have transformed.  
If Guatemalans are a people prone to forgetting, as Gereda declared, have conservative 
sectors been successful? Has their support for forgetting, masked as reconciliation, amnesty, and 
perdón, somehow convinced Guatemalans that Guatemala will only find true peace without 
memory? Given debates about genocide sparked by the 2013 genocide trial and discussions 
about the trial itself, given continued commemorations on the anniversaries of local massacres, 
given HIJOS' and others' very public, very visible reminders about the past, splashed across 
                                                
75 José Barnoya, "La ingrata memoria," Siglo Veintiuno, 30 January 2002. Barnoya did not provide names of the 
officials to whom he was referring, but Romeo Lucas García was likely one of them. The injustice of Lucas 
García developing Alzheimers and losing his memory while his victims were unable to forget, as they repeated 
to both the CEH and Remhi, is clear.  
76 "De una cosa estoy seguro, sea quien sea el nuevo presidente: habrá nuevas penas y más olvidos," Siglo 
Veintiuno, 19 September 1999. 
77 Marcela Gereda, "¿Inermes o dormidos?," El Periódico, 17 May 2010, 
http://www.elperiodico.com.gt/es/20100517/opinion/151627/.  
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Guatemala's walls, the answer is certainly not simple. Clearly there is a direct relationship about 
what Guatemalans believe about memory and forgetting and what their ideologies and 
biographies are. Group membership determines Guatemalans' views on whether the past should 
be remembered or not, and on which past is truth.  
 While Gereda argued that forgetting characterizes the post-Peace era, it is a forgetting 
which disguises itself as amnesty, perdón, and reconciliation. These masks create a discursive 
environment which encourages memory and highlights its necessity on the surface, but which 
also strongly discourages it. Those who shroud the conflict in amnesty, perdón, and 
reconciliation hope that what is forgotten is state security institutions' responsibility for 
violations. But more than this, the hope exists that the violations themselves and, by extension, 
the conflict, will also be forgotten, that they will be lost to oblivion and never emerge to threaten 
the perpetrators with prosecutions or be used to promote fundamental changes to Guatemala's 
highly inequitable social, economic, and political structures. Human rights and victims' activists 
and more progressive commentators reject forgetting. They continue to advocate for memory, 
justice, and profound institutional and social transformations. Their incessant insistence that the 
conflict be remembered and their public unmasking of the forces of forgetting serve as a bulwark 
against officialdom's attempts to dictate forgetting by passing a law which dictates amnesia and 
by asking for perdón, disguising forgetting as reconciliation in a country where "conciliation" 
never existed. 
101 
Chapter Three  
Guatemala: Nunca Más 
 
 
 Y otra vez la llama del recuerdo 
 vuelve a encenderme la memoria...   
[...] 
  Que su memoria se mantenga encendida 
 y que la llama del recuerdo  
no se apague nunca....   
 
No más sangre,  
no más dolor,  
nunca más....  
--Humberto Ak'abal1  
  
 
 When conservative Guatemalans spoke of amnesty, perdón, and reconciliation, the 
human rights community understood these words to simply be masks for olvido, for forgetting. 
This was what conservatives left un-said in calls for amnesty, perdón, and reconciliation; it lay 
beneath their calls for memory.2 Yet why did they hide their desire to forget? It cannot be denied 
that voices that openly call for the closing of Guatemala's memory box are heard from time to 
time, but these voices are few. Why do most feel the need to deny that they want to forget? Why 
not openly call for forgetting if that was what they feel will best contribute to reconciliation and 
non-repetition?  
 Demands for memory and denials of forgetting bring Steve Stern's emblematic memories 
and William Roseberry's discursive frameworks to mind. In his discussion of post-Pinochet 
Chile, Stern described these as frameworks which dictate which events will be included in a 
group's collective memory and which "kinds of memories are best forgotten or pushed back 
                                                
1 "And once again the flame of remembrance /  returns to ignite memory.../   [...] / That your memory remains 
alight / and that the flame of memory / never goes out... / No more blood / no more pain / never again...." 
Humberto Ak'abal, "Dolor a Flor de Rostro," in Rescatando Nuestra Historia: Represión, Refugio y 
Recuperación de las Poblaciones Desarraigadas por la Violencia en Guatemala, eds. Jonathan "Jonás" Moller 
and Derrill Bazzy (Guatemala City. F&G Editores, 2009). 
2 "Beneath," however, is perhaps the wrong word to use, as is "un-said." Conservative politicians and 
commentators were loudly criticized when they promoted amnesty, perdón, or reconciliation. All that was left 
for conservative actors to do was to insist that they were not promoting forgetting when they supported the 
Amnesty Law, when they asked for perdón, or when they declared that what Guatemala needed was 
reconciliation.  
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toward the fringes,"3 while Roseberry's discursive frameworks "[set] out the central terms around 
which and in terms of which contestation and struggle can occur."4 The existence of a common 
discursive framework focused on memory as a guarantor of non-repetition, the dominance of an 
emblematic memory which insists on memory, is why president Álvaro Arzú insisted that, "We 
cannot forget, we should not forget"5 when, as seen in the previous chapter, it seemed that he 
actually did want to forget.  
 In post-Peace Guatemala, people demand memory (or historical memory or history or 
truth) to make the future better. These are understood as contributing to a poorly defined 
reconciliation. It is important, presidents and other public figures say, to remember, to know 
what happened in the past, so that it does not happen again, so that a new Guatemala emerges 
from the very literal ashes of the old. This is Guatemala's post-Peace discursive framework, one 
that centers around the idea of nunca más, never again. Yet this is not the state's preferred 
framework. The state, once again, is not monolithic. It is made up a range of institutions with 
different and sometimes competing agendas. The Procuraduría de Derechos Humanos (PDH, 
Human Rights Ombudsman's Office), for example, does not have the same interests, guiding 
principles, or discourse as the military, and neither is the same as the judiciary. As well, different 
parts of these institutions also disagree on these things. In the judiciary, for example, it is 
possible to identify different courts or judges who are more open than others to hearing cases 
from the conflict, and issuing a ruling in favor of the victims and their relatives.6 Nevertheless, it 
is still possible to identify something that can be described as "the state's discourse" based on 
state institutions' general tendencies. In this view, the PDH, for example, or former Attorney 
General Claudia Paz y Paz, are often outliers, the lone dissident voices among a range of state 
institutions which promote forgetting from behind a mask of memory.  
                                                
3 Steve J. Stern, Remembering Pinochet's Chile: On the Eve of London 1998 (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2004), 105-6. 
4 William Roseberry, "Hegemony and the Language of Contention," in Everyday Forms of State Formation: 
Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule in Modern Mexico, eds. Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 1994), 360-1. 
5 Ramón Hernández and Emilio Godoy, "Arzú dice: misión cumplido y llama a un perdón sin olvido," Prensa 
Libre, 30 December 1996. 
6 This became very clear during the 2013 genocide trial, which is discussed in Chapter Six. This is not to say that 
judges do not listen to evidence or that their rulings are solely based on their own opinions or politics. However, 
a more conservative trio of judges than the ones, led by Jazmín Barrios, who presided over the genocide trial 
would likely have given Ríos Montt's attorneys more leeway than Barrios gave them. Judges' tendency to rule 
one way or the other is also clear in the Corte Suprema de Justicia (CSJ, Supreme Court of Justice)'s review of 
the case. Of the five judges reviewing the case, based on previous rulings and the judges' written decisions, the 
conclusion of four of the five were already certain even before the case was reviewed. 
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 What exists in Guatemala is a common discursive framework turned upside down. The 
discourse that insists on memory for a better future comes mainly from the demands and hopes 
of Guatemala's elite subalterns. It is not one that the state necessarily embraces willingly. After 
all, as Guatemalan political and social scientist Manolo Vela Castañeda writes, the state has 
never tried "to explain the war. Put simply, it was not a theme that was addressed. Unlike what 
happens in other countries that remember their wars, in Guatemala heroes are not exalted, battles 
are not remembered, important dates are not commemorated, not even monuments have been 
erected.... It is not possible to say that the state exploited the memory of the war in Guatemala." 
Instead, "The official history of the war is silence."7 Yet despite this official policy of silence, the 
state and its representatives do nevertheless speak from time to time. And when they do, it is 
within the framework of nunca más, the common discourse in Guatemala and around which 
discussions of the conflict take place.  
 Nunca más is the discourse of Guatemala's vibrant network of human rights and victims' 
organizations. Nunca más is the discourse of the progressive sectors of Guatemalan society, the 
same sectors against which the state directed its repression during the conflict. As with the state, 
these sectors and their larger interests sometimes collide. Some organizations and individuals 
are, for example, more economically, politically, or socially conservative than others, despite 
sharing an understanding of the work that memory does in the present and future. Members of 
Hijos e Hijas por la Identidad y la Justicia contra el Olvido y el Silencio (HIJOS, Sons and 
Daughters for Identity and Justice against Forgetting and Silence) and the student movement, for 
example, are often significantly more radical in their political and economic views than most 
other organizations, and are also very critical of the Church as an institution and members of the 
Church hierarchy. This is, of course, despite the work of the Oficina de Derechos Humanos del 
Arzobispado de Guatemala (ODHA, Human Rights Office of the Archdiocese of Guatemala) in 
investigating and documenting human rights abuses and at least ODHA's echoing of HIJOS' 
mantra: Neither forgetting, nor perdón. Despite the fractures and differences of opinion in the 
larger human rights community, it has promoted memory and understanding the violence of the 
conflict and demanded that the whereabouts of the disappeared be known since at least the 
1980s, a time when the past so many declare must not be forgotten was the very real present.  
                                                
7 Manolo Vela Castañeda, "Memorias de una batalla," unpublished manuscript, 23. 
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 Human rights organizations and activists must constantly work to maintain the 
dominance, and common-ness, of their discursive framework. Sectors which promote forgetting, 
and which have done so from within the nunca más framework, have economic, political, and 
social power in Guatemala. They have an arsenal of (not only) discursive weapons at their 
disposal. Some of these discursive weapons were explored in the previous chapter. Yet it is 
important to point out that nunca más is not necessarily a Guatemalan creation. It is the discourse 
embraced internationally when truth and similar commissions are discussed, and it is the 
discourse many of these commissions, in Guatemala and elsewhere, use in their reports. The 
framework of nunca más limits the language used to talk about the past (in a manner not too 
distinct from the way that truth commissions themselves limit how people can talk about the 
past).  
 For the purposes of this chapter, following Foucault's discussion of discourse analysis 
which focuses not on "the half silent murmur of another discourse,"8 but on what statements are 
made, the words public figures utter and write will be taken at face value and explored as such. 
As a result, the memory/forgetting binary public figures use to talk about the past will not be 
interrogated in great depth. Stern, Jelin, and Megill's comments about struggles between 
memories, and so not between memory and forgetting, will be kept in mind, and their relevance 
will emerge from time to time, but the words people use will be of greater importance. As 
Foucault wrote, this chapter will not "give voice to the silence that surrounds [statements]," nor 
will it "rediscover[r] the unsaid whose place [a statement] occupies." Rather, it will "define a 
limited system of presences."9  
 Before continuing, it is important to repeat that there will be little discussion in this 
chapter about the absence of reform to address Guatemala's many deeply rooted inequalities, 
inequalities which pushed many to organize for change and/or take up arms to achieve their 
goals. The focus of this chapter, as with the dissertation, is on the work that memory is tasked 
with doing in post-Peace Guatemala. Few would say that Guatemala's numerous problems will 
all be solved by remembering the past. Yet it is also true that if memory is the starting point of a 
discussion about contemporary Guatemala, it becomes clear that its primary task is to reconcile 
                                                
8 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Routledge, 2002), 
31.  
9 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 134-5. 
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and prevent repetition. Memory is a tool; it will help build a reconciled Guatemala where the 
violations of the past are not repeated.   
 
Remember so that nunca más 
 It is clear that nunca más is Guatemala's common discursive framework when the 
statements of conservative figures are taken into consideration. After all, the Comisión para el 
Esclarecimiento Histórico (CEH, Historical Clarification Commission), Guatemala's official, 
United Nations-backed version of a truth commission, concluded that state security forces and 
their proxies were responsible for 93% of the human rights violations committed during the 
conflict. While some, though not all, post-Peace conservative figures have no direct ties to the 
perpetrators, they share, broadly speaking, a political project and ideology. Indeed, as mentioned 
in the introduction, some observers argue that, though conservative political parties appear and 
disappear, the "megaparty,"10 the right wing and pro-business Comité Coordinador de 
Asociaciones Agrícolas, Comerciales, Industriales y Financieras (CACIF, Coordinating 
Committee of Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial, and Financial Associations), remains, 
operating behind the scenes to promote its interests and make sure that issues which its members 
do not want to be broached in the public sphere or in policy are ignored. One of these issues, as 
investigative journalist Martín Rodríguez Pellecer makes clear, is the business sector's 
involvement in (and responsibility for) genocide.11 Since conservatives might be expected to 
support forgetting, their insistence on memory is relevant here.  
 A selected sample of statements shows that very little changed in the 15 years after the 
Peace Accords were signed. One of the more significant of the voices calling for remembering in 
the post-Peace era was then-president Arzú. As newspapers reported, on the day the final Peace 
Accords were signed, Arzú called on Guatemalans to perdonar one another in this "new chapter 
of history" that the nation was about to begin. Perdón, he stated, is the only "path which allows 
for the construction of a prosperous and democratic nation," a task which he acknowledged 
would be difficult to accomplish. Yet perdón did not mean forgetting "images of violence, since 
the widows, the orphans, and the wounded of the conflict will always carry these images of pain 
                                                
10 Manolo Vela Castañeda, "El megapartido y sus perritos falderos," El Periódico, 6 July 2014, 
http://elperiodico.com.gt/es/20140706/domingo/250343. 
11 Martín Rodríguez Pellecer, "Los militares y la élite, la alianza que ganó la guerra," 21 August 2013, 
http://www.plazapublica.com.gt/content/los-militares-y-la-elite-la-alianza-que-gano-la-guerra. 
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with them."12 In addition to rejecting forgetting, Arzú stated that, "It is one thing to perdonar in 
order to pursue a path of rebuilding our wounded society with positive and fraternal spirit, and it 
is something else to forget." Historical memory, he said, is essential for a people who wish for 
reconciliation; there must, he added, exist a "collective need to turn the page and overcome our 
recent unrest, but with the full awareness and knowledge of what happened to us, of what we 
were capable."13 Guatemala must not forget, Arzú explained, and only a "full awareness of what 
happened" would prevent repetition.14  
 The sentiment Arzú expressed in 1996 was repeated in former general and president Otto 
Pérez Molina's inaugural speech on 13 January 2012. Pérez Molina, who had been one of the 
military's representatives in the peace negotiations and is named as responsible for genocide by 
Guatemalan and international human rights organizations, was sworn in as Guatemala's president 
shortly after the 15th anniversary of the Peace. He stated, in a manner reminiscent of the rhetoric 
of 1996, "We should not forget the past but overcome it, to be able to collectively accept 
responsibility as a society, to be able to really perdonar ourselves, and to be able to look forward 
to construct a society and a culture of peace."15 A few weeks later, Pérez Molina held a press 
conference where he asserted, "we should not forget so that [the past] is not repeated"; "we 
should look," he added, "for a way to reconcile ourselves with each other."16  
 Leaving aside the idea that the human rights community "translated" perdón and 
reconciliation as forgetting (meaning that Pérez Molina was really saying that "we should not 
forget the past...but we should forget the past"), Arzú and Pérez Molina both loudly repeat the 
framework that demands memory as the best path for Guatemala to follow. They underscore the 
fact that the past must not be forgotten. They insist on it, explicitly rejecting forgetting and 
refusing to leave any room for others to question their commitment to memory. Arzú and Pérez 
Molina's statements against forgetting and in support of memory are clear evidence that a 
discursive framework focused on memory exists in post-Peace Guatemala, yet that conservatives 
speak of remembering in one breath and push for oblivion masked as perdón and reconciliation 
                                                
12 Ana Fresse, "Arzú exhorta al pueblo a perdonarse," Siglo Vientiuno, 30 December 1996.  
13 Ramón Hernández and Emilio Godoy, "Arzú dice: misión cumplido y llama a un perdón sin olvido," Prensa 
Libre, 30 December 1996. 
14 "Extracto del discurso de Alvaro Arzú," El Periódico, 30 December 1996. 
15 Carolina Gamazo, "Pérez comienza 'la era del cambio,'" El Periódico, 15 January 2012; "Discurso de 
investidura de Otto Pérez Molina," Plaza Pública, 15 January 2012, 
http://www.plazapublica.com.gt/content/discurso-de-investidura-de-otto-perez-molina. 
16 Daniela Castillo, "En Guatemala no hubo genocidio," El Periódico, 27 January 2012. 
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in the next clearly points to the fact that this framework is not their own. Rather, it has been 
imposed on them by the human rights community, as will be seen in greater depth below. 
Memory and nunca más are Roseberry's "languages of domination," which conservatives use and 
manipulate to promote their own ends. 
 
Testimonial Truth 
 The reports of the Catholic Church's Proyecto Interdiocesano de Recuperación de la 
Memoria Histórica (Remhi Project, Interdiocesan Project for the Recuperation of Historical 
Memory) and the CEH, and the discussion surrounding both, repeat Arzú's calls to remember. 
But, within this discursive framework, these discussions also reveal the struggle over "truth," 
over what to remember. As Vela Castañeda argued, ceasefires and decisions to lay down arms do 
not end wars. After the weapons have been silenced, the battle begins about the "clarification" of 
the violence committed during the conflict.17  
 Remhi's final report, Nunca Más, was published on 24 April 1998. The project's director, 
monseñor Gerardi, made the connection between recuperating historical memory and truth 
explicit. The Remhi project was fundamentally oriented toward "know[ing] the truth that will 
make us all free (Jn 8:32)," for, "if we orient ourselves according to the Word of God, we cannot 
hide or cover up reality. We cannot distort history, nor should we silence the truth." The Remhi 
Project collected the testimonies of the survivors of the conflict to find the truth which "has been 
twisted and silenced," "intentionally distorted in our country through thirty-six years of war 
against the people."18 Unsilencing the silenced, knowing the truth, would allow for peace,  
a peace that is born from the truth that comes from each one of us and from all of 
us. It is a painful truth, full of memories of the country's deep and bloody wounds. 
It is a liberating and humanizing truth that makes it possible for all men and 
women to come to terms with themselves and their life stories. It is a truth which 
challenges each one of us to recognize our individual and collective responsibility 
and to commit ourselves to action so that those abominable acts never happen 
again.19  
 
                                                
17 Manolo Vela Castañeda, "Las Pesadas Cargas del Pasado: la tradición de la violencia en Guatemala," in El Lado 
Oscuro de la Eterna Primavera: Violencia, Criminalidad y Delincuencia en la Guatemala de Post-guerra, eds. 
Manolo Vela Castañeda, Alexander Sequén-Móncez, and Hugo Antonio Solares (Guatemala City: FLACSO, 
2001), 76. 
18 Oficina de Derechos Humanos del Arzobispado de Guatemala (ODHA), Guatemala: Never Again! (New York: 
Orbis Books, 1999), xxiv. 
19 ODHA, Guatemala: Never Again!, xxv. 
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Recuperating and reclaiming historical memory, reconstructing history, discovering the truth—
these are what the ODHA and the Church hoped Nunca Más would achieve. The collection of 
the survivors' testimonies, the writing of the report, and work in the communities related to the 
report were part of the recuperation of memory, the reconstruction of history, the discovery of 
truth. In this understanding, historical memory, history, and truth are different ways to say the 
same thing. None thrived during the conflict, when history was distorted and the truth silenced, 
and all were directed toward reweaving the social fabric and preventing a repetition of the past.  
 The refrain "never again" and the understanding that remembering was forward-looking 
were also repeated in the report itself. To prevent future violence, for example, the ODHA 
recommended the rewriting of "official history" to include the findings of Remhi and the CEH,20 
suggesting that the official history that existed at the time was, at the very least, problematic. 
Gerardi's words and Remhi's discourse shed some additional light on Jelin's argument that the 
opposition between memory and forgetting/silence is truly the opposition between different 
memories and narratives. Remhi was oriented toward helping the survivors find their voice, 
speak, and communicate their pain. The memories of Guatemala's survivors had been silenced by 
something; they had been silenced by fear, to be sure, but also by the state's own version of the 
past. With this understanding of a more active idea of silence and silencing, Jelin's comment that 
the struggle for memory is not against silence but against a competing memory becomes more 
relevant, as do Vela Castañeda and Megill's thoughts about historical narratives. Remhi's 
unsilencing of one past was intended to allow that past to be heard; this unsilencing would then 
silence, and delegitimize, the twisted history which had dominated during the conflict. Rather 
than the struggle for memory being one against silence, it might more usefully be described as 
one against silencing, where silencing does not leave silence—a lack of historical narrative—but 
replaces one narrative with another.  
 On 27 April, Guatemala awoke to the news that "the voice of the voiceless"21 had been 
silenced. Gerardi had been bludgeoned to death.22 With Gerardi's assassination, however, it 
                                                
20 ODHA, Guatemala: Never Again!, 315 
21 Miguel Ángel Albizures, "Caso Gerardi: el móvil político aparece con más claridad," El Periódico, 28 April 
2001. 
22  For a thorough exploration of the Gerardi assassination, see Francisco Goldman's The Art of Political Murder. 
From the beginning, the Church and human rights community insisted that Gerardi's assassination was political 
and clearly tied to Nunca Más. Members of some state institution, therefore, were responsible. The government 
proposed a series of non-political motives and perpetrators until the evidence finally overwhelmed these 
versions. In the end, members of the Estado Mayor Presidencial (EMP, Presidential General Staff) were found 
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seemed that the forces of the past sought to return Guatemala to an era of fear and darkness,23 a 
fear that, in Gerardi's words, had silenced Guatemalans and silenced truth.24 Truth, historical 
memory, memory, history, and even reality blend into one another and emerge clearly in the 
testimonies Remhi collected. For human rights organizations, the testimonies are where truth, 
memory, and history reside, and it is only through knowledge of these things that a return to 
Guatemala's "dark night"25 would be prevented.  
 The discourse surrounding the UN and government sponsored CEH initially focused 
more on history and truth and less on memory, but the same discursive framework of nunca más 
is evident nevertheless. Part of the similarity between the two is due to the fact that many of the 
same people, especially historians and foreign academics, were involved in both projects; as 
well, Remhi provided testimonies and other information to the CEH. Yet the CEH's nunca más 
framework, and the tying of history to truth, was evident in Guatemala even before Remhi 
published its report, and even before Arzú's speech celebrating the signing of the Peace Acords. 
It is clear in the Acuerdo sobre el establecimiento de la Comisión para el Esclarecimiento 
Histórico de las violaciones a los derechos humanos y los hechos de violencia que han causado 
sufrimiento a la población guatemalteca (Agreement on the establishment of the Commission to 
clarify past human rights violations and acts of violence that have caused the Guatemalan 
population to suffer), signed 23 June 1994. The CEH was meant to clarify "the human rights 
violations and acts of violence that have caused the Guatemalan population to suffer." Yet 
clarified history is also truth, for "the people of Guatemala have a right to know the whole truth 
                                                                                                                                                       
guilty of the assassination. The priest who shared the parish house with Gerardi was also sentenced as an 
accomplice to the assassination.  
23 Remhi, "Comunicado del Equipo Interdiocesano de la Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica de Guatemala," 
Prensa Libre, 4 May 1998. Remhi asserted that his assassination was clearly linked to his work of 
"reconstructing the memory of the people," and specifically to the presentation of Nunca Más. Now more than 
ever, they asserted, it was essential that Nunca Más be made known to the public to contribute to the process of 
social reconstruction and reconciliation. 
24 ODHA, Guatemala: Never Again!,  xxv. 
25 Carolina Escobar Sarti, "Nuestra Memoria," Prensa Libre, 14 May 1998. The importance of memory, of truth, 
of knowing what happened in the past so that it would never happen again, and more generally so that the future 
would be better, is also clear in the words and work of others who commented on both Remhi and the CEH. 
See, for example, Maynor Amézquita, "Una memoria histórica sin acuerdo: Entrevista con Armando de la Torre 
y Frank la Rue," Siglo Vientiuno, 5 July 1998; Claudia Argueta, "Tomuschat no promete milagros para 
esclarecer los excesos de la guerra," Siglo Vientiuno,  2 August 1997; Julio F. Lara, "Justicia y reivindicación de 
los mártires de la guerra piden en Marcha de la Verdad," Prensa Libre, 2 August 1997. 
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concerning these events, clarification of which will help avoid a repetition of these sad and 
painful events and strengthen the process of democratization."26  
 Though the CEH was oriented toward clarifying history and Remhi toward recuperating 
historical memory, both were seen as equivalent to knowing the truth and were essential if a 
repetition of the past was to be prevented. And those who worked with or supported both 
commissions hoped, and demanded, that the truths the reports contained would become the new 
official history, the new official historical narrative of Guatemala. Though the Accord was 
greatly criticized for having created a weak Commission, the simple statement that the truth must 
be known, and the implication that the then-dominant understanding of the conflict, an 
understanding imposed and promoted by state institutions and the media, was not true, was a 
powerful indictment of the state and its campaigns of disinformation. 
 The connection between truth and the history the CEH would clarify through the 
collection of testimonies was further solidified when, on various occasions, the CEH was called a 
Truth Commission in newspaper reports. For example, on 1 August 1997, Prensa Libre's front 
page headline read, "Truth Commission begins work with 50,000 denunciations."27 Arzú 
repeated the equation of historical clarification and truth the same month.28 The wording of the 
February 1998 ad taken out by the former guerrillas, the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional 
Guatemalteca, (URNG, Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity), is similar, though perhaps 
more significant was the URNG's acknowledgement that they had committed "errors and 
excesses...[and] injustices" in "concrete situations" during the conflict. The URNG was 
completely supportive of efforts to clarify what had happened during the conflict, to find out the 
                                                
26 Agreement on the Establishment of the Commission to Clarify Past Human Rights Violations and Acts of 
Violence that Have Caused the Population to Suffer. Signed 23 June 1994, 
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/commissions/Guatemala-Charter.pdf. "Human 
rights violations" were those acts committed by the state, while the "acts of violence" were those committed by 
the guerrilla. Both, however, were the "history" the CEH was charged with clarifying. Similar declarations 
about truth and history were repeated as the CEH began its work. In September 1997, for example, the CEH 
placed an ad in Prensa Libre where they affirmed, "It is time to tell the truth!" "Knowing our history," the ad 
continued, "we will be sure that it never happens again." (CEH, "Hay verdades que no se cuenta a cualquiera," 
Prensa Libre, 25 September 1997.) 
27 Prensa Libre, 1 August 1997. See also, for example, "Piden a Comisión de la Verdad investigar la muerte de 
Flaquer," Prensa Libre, 31 July 1997; Julio F. Lara, "Justicia y reivindicación de los mártires de la guerra piden 
en Marcha de la Verdad," Prensa Libre, 2 August 1997; Eduardo Antonio Velázquez Carrera, "Fin del tema; 
and "Las Comisiones de la Verdad," Siglo Veintiuno, 26 August 1997. Marielos Monzón opted to call both 
Memoria del Silencio and Nunca Más "truth reports." (Marielos Monzón, "Históricas sentencias," Prensa Libre, 
15 December 2009.) 
28 Francisco Mauricio Martínez, "Tomuschat exhorta a víctimas a denunciar violaciones registradas durante la 
guerra," Prensa Libre, 1 August 1997. 
111 
truth of the events, and to contribute to reconciliation. They would supply the CEH with 
"documentation and testimony" so that "the Guatemalan people...are fully aware of the 
bloodiness of the armed confrontation...so that it never again happens."29  
 The CEH's final report was published on 25 February 1999, in a ceremony which, as 
Prensa Libre reported, a "massive" number of people were expected to attend. Those present, the 
article read, would witness the moment when "the truth of what happened was made known."30 
A few weeks before this, historian and commentator Nery Villatoro Robledo had written that 
many had high expectations, but also doubts, about the contribution the CEH report would make 
to the construction of a peaceful and democratic nation. Villatoro Robledo recognized that this 
process of construction would require "a deep knowledge of the truth about the tragic history of 
this country so that it never, ever is repeated." The report must be a "contribution to an awareness 
of the historical truth"; only in this way would it further reconciliation and democracy. Yet, 
because of the perceived weakness of the CEH mandate, if the CEH revealed the truth of the past 
or facilitated any of these things, Villatoro Robledo declared that it would be "the miracle 
commission."31 Yet its report, Memoria del Silencio, surprised everyone, including Villatoro 
Robledo, with its strength. After the Report was published, after its conclusion that acts of 
genocide had been committed against select indigenous communities during specific years, after 
it named the military as institutionally responsible for gross human rights violations, Villatoro 
Robledo was quick to acknowledge that a miracle had indeed taken place.32  
 Other opinion pieces and editorials echoed the idea that, with the publication of Memoria 
del Silencio, the (one and only) truth would be known, thereby preventing a repetition of past 
atrocities. Vice President of Prensa Libre, Mario Antonio Sandoval, for example, wrote an 
opinion piece titled "The truth hurts, but it also liberates" about the CEH and its truth.33 The 
editorial in Prensa Libre two days after the report was presented repeated what Sandoval had 
said, arguing that the state should institute policies "so that the country and its inhabitants 
                                                
29 URNG, "Un compromiso con el escalrecimiento, la verdad y la reconciliación," El Periódico, 23 February 
1998, paid ad. That said, however, they were quick to state that their tactics did not include "repression, torture, 
massacre, vengeance or injustice," which was, the ad implied, precisely the nature of their opponents' tactics. 
Reporting on the URNG's acknowledgement, El Periódico pointed out quite correctly that the URNG did not 
clarify what excesses they were talking about. ("La mea culpa de la URNG," El Periódico, 23 February 1998.)   
30 Julieta Sandoval and Miguel Acabal, "Esperan masiva audiencia," Prensa Libre, 25 February 1999. 
31 Nery Villatoro Robledo, "El informe de la CEH," Siglo Vientiuno, 14 January 1999. 
32 Nery Villatoro Robledo, "La CEH: una comisión del milagro," Siglo Veintiuno, 27 February 1999. 
33 Mario Antonio Sandoval, "La verdad duele, pero además libera," Prensa Libre, 26 February 1999. 
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accommodate ourselves to the pain of the truth of what happened." The government should, first 
and foremost, make "the true history of the internal armed confrontation" known. This, combined 
with the fulfillment of the CEH's recommendations, would make sure that "the past cannot ever 
be repeated."34  
 The description of memory as truth, and the idea that the CEH contributed to both 
through its clarification of history, is most clear in Forgetting or Memory: The Dilemma of 
Guatemalan Society, the 2001 work by CEH commissioner, Alfredo Balsells Tojo. Oscar 
Clemente Marroquín, director of the Guatemalan newspaper, La Hora, set the tone in the 
prologue, affirming that an in-depth knowledge of the recent past was an "indispensable step 
toward assuming the truth, as painful as it is, and toward seriously committing ourselves to 
building peace."35 Balsells Tojo mostly limited himself to summarizing the CEH's findings and 
recommendations, but he also discussed the battle for memory that existed in Guatemala, a battle 
against those who promoted forgetting. He wrote that while "the eternally weak" promote 
memory and seek "peace and harmony by way of an awareness of the truth and the application of 
justice," those who promote forgetting do so from "the highest circles of power" as "the best way 
to avoid justice," for they are implicated in the past violations which the CEH revealed. The wish 
of the powerful that the past be forgotten continues "the official policy of lies, impunity and a 
moral deterioration which smothers us."36 He declared, "historical memory is the recent truth of 
Guatemala" and concluded that Guatemalans must "remember the terrible acts [of the past] to 
force ourselves to avoid a repetition of this horror."37  
 Balsells Tojo added detail to the international discourse surrounding truth commissions 
where more memory leads to reconciliation by his insistence on justice, but he also repeated the 
dichotomy between memory and forgetting which Jelin highlighted as overly simplistic at the 
very least. At the same time, while he contrasts memory and forgetting, it is also clear that he 
                                                
34 "Algo más sobre el reporte de la CEH," Prensa Libre, 27 February 1999.  
35 Oscar Clemente Marroquín, "Prólogo," in Olvido o Memoria: El Dilema de la Sociedad Guatemalteca, Edgar 
Alfredo Balsells Tojo (F&G Editores: Guatemala City, 2001), xv-xvi.  
36 Edgar Alfredo Balsells Tojo, Olvido o Memoria: El Dilema de la Sociedad Guatemalteca, (F&G Editores: 
Guatemala City, 2001), 3-5. 
37 Balsells Tojo, Olvido o Memoria, 17 and 211. The Fundación Myrna Mack recognized both the limited impact 
of Memoria del Silencio and Nunca Más and their truth. They argued that "[t]urning our backs on [the truth 
contained in the CEH and Remhi reports] prevents us from learning from our history, mistakes, and 
weaknesses." They added that "It makes us tolerant and indifferent to highly violent and criminal situations like 
the ones we are currently living with." Fundación Myrna Mack, "De una Guerra a la Otra," (25 February 2009), 
2. 
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sees forgetting as akin to lying. So, while he suggests that remembering and forgetting are 
opposites, he, too, understands that forgetting also involves remembering "lies," rather than the 
CEH's "truths." Whether the discursive opposition of memory and forgetting is false or not is, 
however, less important than the fact that it nevertheless forms part of the framework around 
which post-Peace discussions about the conflict are constructed. Balsells Tojo's work is also 
interesting in that he clearly defines the different groups that exist in Guatemala—the powerful 
and the eternally weak—and their different positions on memory. As Halbwachs wrote, different 
groups do have different memories. In Balsells Tojo's work, they also have different ideas about 
memory, and about whether the past ought to be remembered.  
 All of these statements and comments about truth affirm that "the truth" and "the history" 
of the conflict were unknown until the Remhi and, to a greater extent, the CEH reports were 
published. This suggests that only lies had been known, and also that the truth was based on 
victims' and survivors' testimonies. But truth and history are vague terms. In Arzú's comments 
that the truth of the conflict must be known to prevent a repetition of the past, "the truth" and 
"the past" could mean anything. There is little to suggest that his "truth" about "the past" was the 
same as Balsells Tojo's or Gerardi's "truth." It is entirely possible that Arzú was hoping that the 
"truth" the CEH revealed would in the end be the same truth/historical narrative as that which 
dominated during the conflict. Perhaps he was hoping that the CEH's clarified history of the 
conflict would turn out to be the same version the conservative media, military, and government 
had repeated for decades? After all, the CEH was charged with investigating both the guerrillas' 
and the military's violence. Truth and history are broad enough terms that those who might have 
different ideas about what the truth or the history of the conflict was can nevertheless use the 
words, promoting the search for both, thereby fitting in the discursive framework. Even if some 
hoped that the truth the reports would reveal would highlight the guerrilla's atrocities or 
indigenous communities' involvement in the guerrilla, the idea that the reports and their 
testimonies would reveal the truth of the conflict certainly represents a shift from previous 
decades when those who came forward to tell their stories about the military or paramilitary 
organizations' human rights violations were ignored. The idea that the reports would reveal "the 
truth" of the conflict, that they would clarify "the history" of the past is problematic and leaves 
little room for discussions about the past. It is, nevertheless, a significant shift in the value placed 
on the victims' and survivors stories. 
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 Those who worked with or supported Remhi and the CEH spoke of the reports, and of the 
testimonies on which their conclusions were based, as memory, history, historical memory, and 
truth, equating the terms in the process. They asserted that knowing the truth of the testimonies 
would prevent history from repeating itself. The "testimonial truth," as explained in Remhi and 
the CEH, is that the military and its proxies, most significantly the Patrullas de Autodefensa 
Civil (PACs, Civil Self-defense Patrols), were responsible for 93% of the human rights 
violations. Yet this testimonial truth is, as some have pointed out, only a partial truth. As Tani 
Adams argued, this "relatively simplistic and dualistic" understanding of the CEH's conclusions 
about state responsibility is repeated over and over. While there is no doubt that this is "true," 
and certainly Adams is in no way denying state responsibility, she argued that the more 
simplistic understanding of the conflict "omits important complexities" about how the war was 
actually experienced.38 There is more to the CEH than its conclusions about responsibility. She 
lists a few aspects of the CEH's findings that, if incorporated into the more generalized 
understanding or discussion of the conflict, would contribute to reconciliation. These include an 
understanding of the guerrilla's actions and how they, too, contributed to the destruction of social 
fabric and also left communities "vulnerable" to the army's reprisals. She also argues that 
acknowledging that there were more than two groups involved in the conflict, and particularly 
that economic sectors played a key role in the conflict, would contribute to a better 
understanding of it and of how to rebuild Guatemalan society.39 She argues for a more inclusive, 
complete, or multifaceted truth.  
 Adams' discussion of the silences surrounding the CEH report recalls Stern's exploration 
of memory-making and the interconnected process of silence-making. Rather than memory-
making involving the "flat denial of historical facts or truths," it more often entails the "use of 
some slices of history to cover up others."40 For Adams, military responsibility for violations has 
                                                
38 Tani Marilena Adams, Cumulative Impact Case Study: Consumed by Violence: Advances and Obstacles to 
Building Peace in Guatemala Fifteen Years After the Peace Accords (CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 
April 2011), 21. 
39 Adams, Consumed by Violence, 22-3. As had the Remhi and CEH reports, Adams highlights the role of 
economic elites. "These groups," she writes, "were central in the evolution of the conflict, played a definitive 
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focus is on the work memory and forgetting are tasked with. 
40 Steve J. Stern, Reckoning with Pinochet: The Memory Question in Democratic Chile, 1989-2006 (Durham, NC: 
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obscured the guerrilla's actions and inactions and the role of powerful economic sectors. This is 
one piece of history covering up another, a cover up that others also recognize, and condemn. In 
a Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales—Sede Guatemala (FLACSO, Latin America 
Social Sciences Institute—Guatemala Office) publication, Alexander Sequén-Mónchez, for 
example, highlighted the way that the guerrilla, too, militarized the countryside. In a footnote, he 
noted that it was virtually taboo to say that the guerrilla and the military were both responsible 
for violations. Making such a declaration, he wrote, "turns you into a persona non grata, which 
shows how far we are from reconciliation."41  
 Adams argues for a more complete understanding of the conflict and a more detailed 
remembering of the contents of the CEH report. Her comments about the simplified version 
which dominates in Guatemala, a version where portions of the report are forgotten or just not 
talked about, as Sequén-Mónchez confirmed, finds some parallels in the criticisms surrounding 
truth and historical commissions. In much the same way that the dominant discourse about the 
CEH relates to state responsibility and forgets that of the guerrilla and economic sectors, one of 
the key criticisms made of truth commissions is that they tend to limit the memories which are 
seen as valid; only those which fit into the commission's overall narrative framework are given a 
place in history. While commissions' reports usually rewrite the historical narrative to be more 
representative of how the majority experienced a particular historical era, they nevertheless limit 
the accepted "truths" of history. In Guatemala, culling dissident or undesirable memories seems 
to have happened (at least) twice: at Trouillot's moment of fact retrieval and at the moment of 
retrospective significance. 
 
Testimonial Non-Truths 
 For activists and academics, the testimonies contained in both the CEH and Remhi 
reports are truth. But there is more than one truth in Guatemala, more than one memory, and 
many others reject the findings of Remhi and the CEH. Yet those who disagree with the numeric 
breakdown of responsibility do so in the same language as those who accept these findings, by 
declaring that it is important to remember, to know history, to know the truth. These are 
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Guatemala's more conservative sectors, often those with ties to the military or the paramilitary 
groups the reports named as responsible for gross human rights violations. These are the sectors 
Balsells Tojo described as promoting forgetting from "the highest circles of power" and as being 
implicated in violations. Yet these conservative, often military sectors, are not promoting 
forgetting per se; rather, they are promoting different truths and different memories, evidence 
that the opposite of memory is, as Jelin and others suggested, memory. They are promoting, in 
the end, a different historical narrative, a different telling of the recent past. 
 Shortly after Nunca Más was published, Siglo Veintiuno interviewed right-leaning 
academic Armando de la Torre. He declared that the processes underway that aimed to recover 
Guatemala's historical memory, including those undertaken by the CEH and Remhi, and another 
by the Asociación de Veteranos Militares de Guatemala (Avemilgua, Association of Military 
Veterans of Guatemala), would tell only one side of the story. What Guatemala really needed 
was a "scientific investigation" written "from the perspective the passage of time gives and with 
more complete information." De la Torre also argued that projects that sought to reclaim 
historical memory were "part of the ideological war against the Army and a justification for the 
subversion" and would contribute only in a minimal sense to reconciliation.42 For de la Torre, it 
was important to know what had happened in the past, but not now, not in 1998. It was too soon; 
the past was too recent for it to be investigated "scientifically"; that these investigations were 
taking place nevertheless meant, presumably, that they would not be valid. Yet de la Torre is 
very careful with his words. He does not say the report was not true, but that it was not scientific. 
And he did not say that it was best to forget, to not investigate the past, but that it was best to 
wait so that there would fewer emotions involved and until more "complete information" would 
be available. The truth Gerardi has praised so much, thus, was an incomplete truth and so could 
not be "the truth" of the conflict. 
 The interview with de la Torre ran along side one with human rights activist and then-
director of the Centro para la Acción Legal en Derechos Humanos (CALDH, Center for Legal 
Action in Human Rights), Frank La Rue. The visual display of the struggles over which 
memories to remember, over which history is true, was matched by La Rue's words. La Rue 
rejected claims that Remhi was biased and that the CEH would be as well by declaring, "I do not 
                                                
42 Mynor Amézquita, "Una memoria histórica sin acuerdo: entrevista con Armando de la Torre y Frank la Rue," 
Siglo Veintiuno, 5 July 1998. 
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know why they would be partial if what emerges are the testimonies. The indication that the 
Army is responsible for 85% of human rights violations is not a product of the reports, but of 
reality." In response to de la Torre's suggestion that the reports were part of a campaign to 
discredit Guatemala, La Rue said, "Telling the truth is not a discredit."43 In La Rue's view, and 
very unlike de la Torre's, the Remhi report's truth, based on the testimonies, was fully true and 
was "the truth" of the conflict. Their lack of agreement on truth as it related to the Remhi report, 
and even on whether there is only one truth, is also a lack of agreement about historical memory, 
for Siglo Veintiuno published the interviews under the heading "No agreement on historical 
memory." With this headline, historical memory and truth are discursively connected. Thus, 
while different individuals and sectors might disagree on the contents of the report, it seems at 
least that there is some agreement (if only for the editors of Siglo Veintiuno) that historical 
memory and truth are the same thing. 
 The juxtaposition of La Rue's affirmation that the reports and the testimonies were true 
against de la Torre's assertion that investigations into the past were partial and were part of an 
anti-military campaign was repeated the following year, shortly after Memoria del Silencio was 
published. At the end of February 1999, Siglo Veintiuno once again paired an interview with La 
Rue with the interview of a more conservative figure, in this case right-wing politician Jaime 
Cáceres Knox.44 La Rue affirmed his support for the contents of the CEH when he said, "I 
believe the numbers and the acts speak for themselves. It is one thing to tell the truth and if the 
weight of responsibility falls more heavily to one side, it is because it happened that way. This 
does not imply bias." Echoing his support for the truth behind the testimonies, he responded to 
journalist Rodolfo A. Flores García's question about whether the CEH's attribution of "93% of 
the massacres" to the army was "a real number," by stating, "it happened that way because [that 
is what] the testimonies established."45 The testimonies contained truth; they were a true 
reflection of reality. The CEH's clarified history, thus, based on the truth of the testimonies, on 
the memories of survivors, was the true history of the conflict.  
                                                
43 Ibid. 
44 Cáceres Knox had been part of the military governments of Carlos Arana Osorio and Kjell Laugerud García in 
the 1970s, and then ran for vice president for the right-wing Movimiento Nacional de la Liberación (MLN, 
National Liberation Movement). 
45 Rodolfo A. Flores García, "¿Y ahora, qué hacer con el informe de la CEH?," Siglo Vientiuno, 28 February 1999. 
The CEH, to be sure, had not concluded that the army was responsible for 93% of the massacres. This finding 
related to all human rights violations. 
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 Cáceres Knox disagreed. Situating himself within the discursive framework, he said that, 
"the complete history [of the conflict] and the true instigators should be known"; he was not, 
however, entirely sure that this was written in the CEH report. Indeed, he believed that the report 
was distorted. In response to the same question about the army's responsibility for 93% of the 
massacres, for example, he declared that, as a mathematician, he knew that "statistics can be 
manipulated to tell the biggest lies,"46 something which he clearly believed had happened. 
Gerardi had said that the military had distorted past events; Cáceres Knox declared that the CEH 
did the same thing. In this he was bolder than de la Torre had been. Cáceres Knox openly called 
the CEH's conclusions lies, which obviously contrasts with La Rue's declaration that the CEH's 
conclusions about responsibility, based on the testimonies, were "the truth." Yet despite Cáceres 
Knox's criticisms of Memoria del Silencio, he still argued for the importance of knowing the 
truth, of knowing history. Cáceres Knox and La Rue had different understandings of the past, 
just as de la Torre and La Rue had. Their versions of history were distinct because, as Halbwachs 
argued, they belonged to different social groups. Nevertheless, despite their embrace of different 
truths, members of both groups could still talk about the past in the same way. 
  Arzú's response to the publication of Memoria del Silencio was further evidence of the 
battle between memories of the conflict, between understandings of its truth, between narratives 
of the past. The report was presented in late February, but it was not until mid-March that an 
official reaction was issued. In an ad taken out in newspapers, the government's "initial position" 
about the report was that "the historical interpretation about the internal armed conflict is a 
contribution for a task which, given the complexity of the issue and its controversial character, 
has barely begun." In Jesuit Juan Hernández Pico's mind, this was simply "reducing the CEH 
Report to being one more investigation, and a debatable one at that."47 The official reaction to 
Memoria del Silencio was, therefore, not to explicitly reject it, but to undermine it from within a 
discursive framework where it is important to know what happened in the past. Arzú's rejection 
is worded as a need to know more about the complexities of the conflict and by declaring the 
CEH to be one investigation among many. 
 The need to know what had happened in the past was not openly challenged, nor could 
the CEH report be silenced through assassination and disappearance, as the opposition had been 
                                                
46 Rodolfo A. Flores García, "¿Y ahora, qué hacer con el informe de la CEH?" 
47 Juan Hernández Pico, " 'Memoria del silencio': un informe estremecedor," Revista Envío 205 (April 1999), 
http://www.envio.org.ni/articulo/935 and reprinted in FLACSO's publication of his works. Emphasis added. 
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silenced since the 1950s. Such strategies for silencing views that were contrary to elite interests 
may have worked in previous decades, but the post-Peace era was (at least a little) different; 
things had to be done with greater subtlety.48 This involved, in addition to declaring the CEH 
report to be simply one interpretation of history, and so not "the history" or "the truth" of the 
conflict, writing an alternate history: the Ministry of Education's Historia Sinóptica de 
Guatemala, published in 1999. In the letter introducing the Summarized History of Guatemala, 
Minister of Education Arabella Castro Quiñones stated, "It is impossible to imagine the 
construction of a renewed nation, pretending to ignore the importance of knowing its past." The 
knowledge she spoke of, furthermore, would help guide Guatemala to a better future, a future of 
"unity within diversity."49 Her words fit well within the common discursive framework but, 
curiously, the internationally supported CEH, the creation of which the government had agreed 
to, is barely mentioned. Instead of including information from the report, readers are told to read 
the CEH report to learn more about, for example, Ríos Montt's scorched earth strategy.50 As 
well, the short, very basic chronology of the conflict at the end of the volume does not mention 
genocide, perhaps the CEH's most significant conclusion. While not explicitly declaring the CEH 
report to be lies, as Cáceres Knox had done, the Historia Sinóptica is clearly a way to promote 
the government's own version of the conflict, one which does not include genocide, and barely 
includes the CEH.  
 The suggestion that Guatemalans read the report for themselves also has the effect of 
silencing it and its findings. The CEH report is over 5000 pages long and much of it is written in 
legal and complex language. In a country with 76% adult literacy, a number that drops for the 
indigenous population, where up to 43% do not speak Spanish, and where less than 50% are 
enrolled in secondary school,51 the suggestion is ridiculous.52 The Historia Sinóptica de 
                                                
48 Gerardi's assassination, of course, was not subtle. It was, however, one of the last times such a public and 
important figure would be dealt with in such an open and brutal way. Human rights defenders and peasant and 
anti-mining activists are consistently threatened and killed in post-Peace Guatemala, but none of them are 
archbishops. 
49 Ministerio de Educación, Historia Sinóptica de Guatemala (Guatemala City: Ministerio de Educación, 1999), 
ix. 
50 Ministerio de Educación, Historia Sinóptica de Guatemala, 451. 
51 Statistics from 2008-2012. (UNICEF, "At a Glance: Guatemala," last modified 26 December 2013, 
http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/guatemala_statistics.html and UNESCO, "Integral Family Literacy," last 
modified 10 February 2012, http://www.unesco.org/uil/litbase/?menu=16&programme=94.) 
52 Understanding Guatemala's shortcomings in education and literacy, not to mention the cost and logistical 
difficultly in publishing and widely distributing copies of its report to far-flung and isolated communities, the 
ODHA produced a pictorial version of Nunca Más which included the types of violations committed and 
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Guatemala is the government's response to Memoria del Silencio; while the latter offered, 
according to Arzú, one "interpretation" of history, the former offered students what can only be 
understood as "the history" of Guatemala. The government, therefore, challenged the CEH not 
by calling for forgetting or calling its conclusions lies, but by putting the weight and resources of 
the state behind a different version of history, a version full of silences. 
 The idea that there is more than one truth or version of history can also be seen in former 
Director of Military Intelligence Mario Mérida's many opinion pieces in El Periódico and the 
few books he has published about the conflict. Fashioning himself a historian, in Denied History 
Mérida offered readers a compilation of "documents for debate" to help clarify "part of what 
happened during the internal armed conflict...so as to stimulate an exploration of its real origins." 
He sought not to exculpate those "charged with defending the State," nor to declare that the CEH 
was "absolutely false." Rather, in his effort to clarify parts of history (which the CEH also did 
and which is understood to be the equivalent of finding the truth) he wanted only to "record the 
partiality of a few aspects [of the CEH] which prevent it from attaining the description of 
'official history.' "53 For Mérida, there really could be no doubt that the CEH report "twist[ed]" 
reality, a result of the fact that the Commission "undoubtedly" sympathized with the guerrilla.54 
Given this, Mérida, quoting a piece he had written for El Periódico, declared that it was 
necessary to "listen to all versions of history with critical judgment" in order to write history as it 
should be—"self-critical, without ideological nuances, and unlike fiction."55 It is especially 
important, he added, for the youth to know all versions of history "so they can judge what 
happened impartially and prevent its repetition."56  
 Mérida clearly rejected the truth of the CEH, yet he spoke of the benefits of history and 
truth in much the same way as did those who believed in the CEH's truth. He also confirmed that 
there could be more than one version of history. Gerardi had argued that the military had 
silenced, twisted, and distorted the truth during the conflict, and that the Remhi Project, and also 
the CEH, un-silenced, un-twisted, and un-distorted it, finally exposing the one truth of the 
conflict for all to see. Mérida also observed a twisted and distorted truth, but for him, it was the 
CEH's history/truth. Mérida embraces a different history/truth than the one presented in Memoria 
                                                                                                                                                       
Remhi's conclusions and recommendations.  
53 Mario Mérida, La Historia Negada: Compendio acerca del Conflicto Armado Interno en Guatemala (2010), 29.  
54 Mérida, La Historia Negada, 42. 
55 Mérida, La Historia Negada, 31. 
56 Mérida, La Historia Negada, 42. 
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del Silencio. In his ideas about versions of history Mérida seems to contradict himself. He 
recognizes that there is more than one version of history, but he also seems to support the idea 
that there is an official history and that there really should only be one (self-critical and non-
ideological) version of history. In this he is a bit like de la Torre and his insistence that a 
"scientific investigation" into the past be carried out. Yet for both men, and for many others, it is 
clear that they only want scientific and non-ideological investigations because they did not agree 
with the reports and their findings. The reports did not reflect their truth of the conflict so they 
must not, in fact, be true. The irony they seem unable to recognize is that their rejection of the 
reports is just as ideological as they believe the reports to be, suggesting that, unlike what they 
say in the public sphere, they do actually believe that there is only one truth and one history of 
the conflict.  
 Mérida brought memory and truth into his discussion in "Restoring memory." In the 
piece, he drew on guerrilla documents from the early 1980s to argue that the guerrilla's tactics, 
and not the state's, targeted Guatemala's indigenous groups; however, lest he be accused of trying 
to "refute what has been written about the supposed genocide," he stated that he merely sought to 
"correct the inexact allusions made regarding Plan Victoria 82."57 For Mérida, as for Arzú, the 
past needs to be investigated in greater depth. In Mérida's view, as in de la Torre's, the guerrilla 
orchestrated a campaign of disinformation, both in Guatemala and internationally. This 
campaign cast the military in a negative light, leading to the arrival of unspecified international 
observers. Fortunately, Mérida wrote, these observers found evidence to show that the guerrilla 
also committed massacres and that the army was not solely responsible. As a result of these 
investigations, "other opinions are known," evidence that "certain reports about the armed 
conflict are not the only truth."58 Though his truth and his history differed from those human 
rights activists, the Church, and more progressive sectors embraced, he, like they, framed history 
as memory and understood memory as history. What Mérida understood as "restoring memory" 
was the same process as what the CEH understood as "clarifying history" and what Remhi 
understood as "recuperating historical memory." Though the sources used to accomplish these 
                                                
57 Mario Mérida, "Restaurando la memoria," El Periódico, 19 July 2011. Plan Victoria 82 was the army's 
counterinsurgency strategy and a key piece of evidence human rights activists use to denounce the military and 
its actions.  
58 Ibid. Mérida repeated much the same thing in conversation in 2012, stating that exhumations being conducted in 
Guatemala were unearthing hard evidence of the guerrilla's crimes. (Conversation with author, 29 February 
2012.) 
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things were different, all of them were oriented toward finding "the truth" of the conflict, or at 
least a truth that was more true. 
 Mérida and Arzú talk about different versions of history, different opinions about or 
interpretations of the past, and the existence of more than one truth. Taken at face value, their 
comments seem almost post-modern, whereas the human rights community's ideas about "the 
truth" and "the history" of the conflict seem untouched by post-modernism. But if their 
comments are put in the historical context of the post-Peace era, it becomes clear that 
conservatives' embrace of post-modern ideas about truth are opportunistic. Before Remhi and 
CEH's findings were made public, conservatives, including Arzú, also spoke of "the truth" and 
declared that the CEH would reveal "the truth" of the conflict and become the official history of 
that era. Once the findings about responsibility and violations were known, conservatives shifted 
their discourse. Conservatives like Arzú and Mérida rejected the Commission's findings by 
affirming that there was more than one truth about the past, and by reaffirming how important it 
was to know it. Just as Stern and others argued, the battle for memory is not waged against 
forgetting, but against the different memories different social groups understand as truth. Not all 
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conservatives, of course, embrace these seemingly post-modern ideas. Avemilgua is an excellent 
example of this. At the bottom of every page on the veterans' association's website, they declare 
that "There is something more powerful than history....the truth. and [sic].....Guatemalans 
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deserve to know the truth!" The Avemilgua portal also includes a separate page on "The Only 
Version of our History," above. Interestingly, and perhaps tellingly, this page is blank.59    
 Different groups have different narratives of the past that determine what is true and what 
is not. La Rue belongs to the human rights community, which has consistently opposed, among 
other things, military government and its version of the past. Cáceres Knox was himself part of 
one of Guatemala's long procession of military governments, while Mérida, de la Torre, and 
others are members of conservative social groups and so have similar memories and 
understandings about the past and its truth. Yet despite the difference of opinion about which 
history was true, in writing about Nunca Más and Memoria del Silencio, both conservative and 
more progressive commentators speak of history, memory, historical memory, and truth in the 
same way. The words are used almost interchangeably and, whether an individual believed that 
the testimonies and findings of either report were "the truth" or not, she or he argued for the 
importance of knowing the truth, of remembering the conflict so that the past would never be 
repeated.  
 
Governmental Remembering 
 This chapter and the previous one have placed the human rights community as standing 
in opposition to conservatives sectors, including members of government, with little suggestion 
that the situation might be more complex. Yet the line between these groups is often blurry; 
speaking of the government, Tani Adams describes human rights activists as "mov[ing] fluidly in 
and out of government positions" in the post-Peace era.60 This was especially true during the 
conservative administrations of Óscar Berger and Alfonso Portillo. Those who served in Berger's 
administration, at least for a time, include Rosalina Tuyuc as the head of the Programa Nacional 
de Resarcimiento (PNR, National Reparations Program), which will be discussed below; Víctor 
Montejo as the Secretary of the Peace; and Frank La Rue as the head of the Comisión 
                                                
59 Asociación de Veteranos Militares de Guatemala, "La Única Versión de nuestra Historia," Asociación de 
Veteranos Militares de Guatemala, accessed 6 October 2013, http://www.avemilgua.org/lahistoria.html. 
Avemilgua has since updated their webpage. It no longer includes declarations about the one version of history. 
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Peace Was Manipulated. In announcing the books, the Asociación wondered, "Is it worth it to look to the past?" 
The question was left unanswered, though Avemilgua's foray into history suggests that it is, even if the way 
they ask the question suggests that the answer is no. 
60 Adams, Consumed by Violence, 11-2. 
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Presidencial Coordinadora de la Política del Ejecutivo en Materia de Derechos Humanos 
(Copredeh, Presidential Human Rights Commission). In Portillo's Frente Republicano 
Guatemalteco (FRG, Guatemalan Republican Front) administration, former guerrilla leader 
Pedro Palma Lau served as Secretary of Agrarian Affairs, former CEH commissioner Otilia Lux 
de Cotí served as the Secretary of Culture and Sport, and Remhi's Edgar Gutiérrez served (quite 
polemically) as the head of the Secretaría de Análisis Estatégico (SAE, Secretariat of Strategic 
Analysis).  
 These individuals worked within state institutions and often promoted agendas that were 
at odds with the agendas or interests of other state institutions. They also sometimes, as in the 
case of the PNR, imported the human rights community's discourse into the functioning of state 
institutions. The PNR, tasked with compensating victims of the conflict, was finally created in 
2003, several years after the CEH recommended it be created and due in large part to the human 
rights community's reaction to Berger's announcement that he would pay ex-PACs for the 
"services" they had given to the military during the conflict. The legislation creating the PNR 
spoke only of "national reconciliation," "the construction of a culture of harmony and mutual 
respect," and a firm and lasting peace, so the PNR itself was left to flesh out its mission and 
vision. In 2002, prior to the PNR's creation, the Instancia Multiinstitucional por la Paz y la 
Concordia (Multi-institutional Agency for Peace and Harmony) published a report, known as El 
Libro Azul, which the PNR would adopt and assume as its guiding principle.61 To repair some of 
the damage done to the social fabric, the Instancia, and later the PNR, promoted "processes 
directed toward the knowing of the truth, with an emphasis on the study and comprehension of 
the causes and effects of the armed confrontation." The authors of El Libro Azul wrote that "only 
based on the effective knowing and recognition of the past, access to justice, and reparations and 
compensation, can the foundations of reconciliation be laid."62 They added that the state's 
commitment to create the PNR was "a sure sign that the lesson of history has been learned" and 
that the state sought to avoid repetition.63 
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PNR de GTZ y PNUD," (2007), 33, http://www.berghof-
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62 Instancia Multiinstitucional por la Paz y la Concordia, El Libro Azul: Política Pública de Resarcimiento, 
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63 Instancia Multiinstitucional por la Paz y la Concordia, El Libro Azul, 9-10. 
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 The PNR, initially directed by Tuyuc, respected human rights activist and founder of the 
Coordinadora Nacional de Viudas de Guatemala (Conavigua, National Coordinating Committee 
of Widows of Guatemala),64 adopted much of the Instancia's vision, as seen in the Executive 
Director's 2005 report. The report declared that it would continue to work to contribute to 
"community cohesion" and to support "the construction of the social fabric." These, for the PNR, 
were the "foundation for the non-repetition of human rights violations."65 The "preserv[ation of] 
historical memory" and knowing "the truth of what happened" were imagined as measures which 
would contribute to the dignification of the victims. The PNR also hoped to create museums in 
public spaces to help Guatemalans know the truth of the past "as a guarantee of non-repetition."66 
In this report, the PNR, a state institution, obviously embraces the human rights community's 
idea of "the truth"/historical memory, very likely because the PNR was originally directed by a 
human rights activist. Unlike in Arzú's later statements or those of Mérida, there is little room for 
more than one truth or interpretation of history. All this highlights the fluidity of group 
membership and discourse in post-Peace Guatemala. 
 
The present past 
 Declarations that practices of the past were returning to darken the present, that powerful 
individuals and sectors from the past were gaining power once again, form an additional part of 
Guatemala's post-Peace discourse. Not only must the past be remembered so that it never 
happens again, but the past was happening again. With each assassination, each clash between 
police and civilians, each military operation, each act of violence newspapers reported on in the 
post-Peace era, concerns were raised that these were signs that past patterns of violence were 
reemerging. Comparisons between past and present violence and policies are well founded. Joint 
military-police operations against criminal organizations or protestors did bear a striking 
resemblance to tactics used during counterinsurgency campaigns. The assassination or 
intimidation of activists and the raiding of their offices was very similar to the actions taken 
                                                
64 Diane M. Nelson, Reckoning: The Ends of War in Guatemala (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009), 299. 
65 Director Ejecutivo Programa Nacional de Resarcimiento, "Informe Final" (2005), 2. 
66 PNR, "Informe Final," 21-22. To be sure that the truth was known throughout the country, the PNR proposed to 
deliver copies of the CEH report to communities which had suffered massive and systematic human rights 
violations, as the CEH had intended but ultimately failed to do.  
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against labor, students, and victims' activists. Femicidio67 was very like the violence women had 
suffered during the conflict.  
 Yet more than a return to the past, there is continuity with the past. As Sam Colop wrote 
in 2002, "the awful past was never left behind. It has always been present, just as the general of 
the scorched earth has."68 For Colop, Efráin Ríos Montt, "the general of the scorched earth," 
represented a continuation of the past in the present. Ríos Montt represented the past and its 
abuses, and his power and position in the post-Peace suggested that Arzú's speech on 29 
December 1996, when he declared that the signing of the Peace marked the beginning of a new 
chapter in Guatemala's history, was empty rhetoric. The continued power and presence of men 
like Ríos Montt and the ex-PACs spurred many to confirm that the past, its protagonists—more 
accurately, antagonists—and practices, was neither dead not buried. Instead, the past was alive, 
haunting the halls of Congress, the Presidential Palace, and the highways of the Petén. As Vela 
Castañeda wrote, "we must stop thinking as if the past were something foreign and strange 
compared to what we are now."69  
 Yet why was the past present? Guatemalans had been told that if they remembered the 
past, it would not happen again. This, again, is the international discourse of truth commissions. 
Since "the past" was happening again, did Guatemalans not remember enough? Was the past 
repeating itself because there was not enough memory? The continued calls for memory 
journalists and members of Guatemala's human rights organizations have made throughout the 
post-Peace period point to this conclusion. Yet searching for a reason within the discursive 
framework as to why the past has returned is disappointing. Perhaps the idea that remembering 
will prevent a repetition of the past is too simplistic, too linear. When contrasted with 
declarations that the past is indeed happening again, the discursive ease with which remembering 
prevents repetition is revealed to be lacking.  
 More than just a lack of memory contributes to a return to the past. Priscilla Hayner 
wrote that fulfilling truth commissions' recommendations is also a key aspect of the discourse of 
truth commissions. Indeed, both the CEH and Remhi included potentially transformative 
reforms, many of which echoed the contents of the Peace Accords, and some of which went 
further than the Accords. The lack of meaningful reform is certainly an essential part of the 
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68 Sam Colop, "Las huestes del general," Prensa Libre, 26 June 2002. 
69 Vela, "Memorias de una Batalla," 1.  
127 
explanation as to why the "ghosts of the past"70 have reappeared; that Guatemalan politics, 
society, and the economy remain largely unchanged, that the Peace Accords and the 
commissions' recommendations have gone unfulfilled contributes directly to why the ghosts 
continue to haunt Guatemala. They refuse to go quietly to their graves because the causes of the 
conflict remain, and continue to inspire.  
 
The walls of the buildings that line la Sexta Avenida in downtown Guatemala City serve 
as an ideal canvas for street artists to denounce governmental policies, and to highlight 
similarities and continuities between past and present. In the photo below, desalojos, or violent 
evictions, in the Polochic Valley inspired artists to write, "Desalojos continue genocide." The 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
La Sexta Avenida, Zona 1. Photo by author. 9 January 2012. 
 
artists added, "civilian or military government....history repeats itself." The sketches on the wall 
are also interesting. On one side of the wall, a house in flames. On the other, a woman's face and 
                                                
70 As many called them. See, for example, Carlos Ajanel Soberanis, "Violencia política: Denuncian retorno de 
fantasmas del terror," Siglo Veintiuno, 15 Mayo 1999; Martín Rodríguez, " 'Estamos de regreso al pasado,' " 
Prensa Libre, 31 August 2003. 
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the question "¿Donde estás?," the quintessential question about the disappeared. The artist asks 
the woman, "Where are you?" The question goes unanswered. She responds with silence, a 
silence the government imitates. Likely the work of various artists, the wall represents the 
conflict and post-Peace discourse about the ghosts of the past perfectly. "Where are you?" rejects 
forgetting. The woman is reminded that she has not been forgotten, and passersby are not 
allowed to forget her. The question is a call for memory and a statement that at least one person 
remembers. "Desalojos continue the genocide" is also a call for memory, a call to remember 
what the state and military did to its own citizens, and what they continue to do. "Desalojos 
continue the genocide" is a statement that the past lives on, that history is repeating itself; it is a 
statement, as the artist said, that little changed in the shift from military to civilian government.  
 Desalojos, of course, are carried out for economic reasons, at the request of large 
landowners who ask the military to remove peasants who have "invaded" their land so that more 
land can be planted with export crops.71 The links between economic interests and state-
sponsored violence are on full display in the idea that "desalojos continue the genocide." During 
the conflict, "development" and national security were closely linked, as seen in the National 
Plan for Security and Development, put into effect in April 1982.72 The Río Negro massacre, 
which was linked to the construction of a hydroelectric dam on the Chixoy River, also clearly 
demonstrates these links, as does the presence of numerous army detachments in eastern parts of 
Guatemala where the guerrilla were far less active than in the highlands and other regions. Vast 
fincas and ranches dominate the eastern part of the country, including the Polochic Valley. It is 
also, however, where many Q'eqchi' communities lived during the conflict and continue to live 
(often, landowners would be quick to point out, on land to which they do not have title) and 
where massacres, assassinations, and forced disappearances of peasant activists were and are 
common. This can be seen in the case of the 1978 Panzós massacre and the 2011 desalojos of 
several communities in the Polochic Valley, located just to the south of Panzós.  
 While "desalojos continue the genocide" links past and present repression and violence 
against rural communities, it might also do more than this. Unlike other calls for memory that 
focus on remembering the violations and the victims, "desalojos continue the genocide" also 
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reminds passers by of the links between powerful economic sectors and state-sponsored 
violence. This is true for state-sponsored violence both during the conflict and after its official 
end. It recalls the ties between the economic elite (i.e., CACIF), Ríos Montt's de facto 
government, and counterinsurgency campaigns, as the CEH and Rodríguez Pellecer pointed out. 
It also recalls continued inequality and the failure of the Peace Accords to transform Guatemala 
and eliminate the causes of the conflict,73 of the "need" for violently evicting peasants from the 
communities they founded and the land they farm. In this, it is perhaps even more powerful a 
reminder than "Dónde estás?," which focuses on state-sponsored violence, but does not bring the 
depth and range of the government's motivations to mind in the same way as "desalojos continue 
the genocide." The latter is an indictment of post-Peace Guatemala's extreme inequality, and of 
the failure of the Peace Accords to address the situation.  
 The statements on the wall echo the human rights community's discursive framework of 
nunca más. Guatemala's common discursive framework can be seen in Gerardi's declaration that 
truth would encourage Guatemalans to "commit ourselves to action so that those abominable acts 
never happen again." It can be seen in Arzú's declaration that "We cannot forget," a statement 
Pérez Molina completed when he added the reason for remembering: "so that [the past] is not 
repeated." This discourse dominates thanks to the human rights community's tireless efforts and 
insistence, at great personal risk, that their loved ones not be forgotten and that their whereabouts 
be revealed. The discourse dictates what language those who oppose remembering must use. 
Open calls for forgetting are rare; instead, forgetting is masked, as seen in the previous chapter. 
The need to hide forgetting, to disguise it as remembering, is further evidence that a common 
discursive framework exists in Guatemala. But the strength of this once marginalized and now 
common discourse cannot be over-estimated. The forces pushing for forgetting remain those 
with the most economic, cultural, and political power, and their will to forget is as strong as it 
has ever been. 
                                                
73 Again, Tani Adams, adds that CACIF campaigned strongly against the 1999 referendum which would have 
allowed many of the Peace Accords provisions to be enacted. (Adams, Consumed by Violence, 22-3.) 
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Chapter Four  
El Salvador: Verdad or Olvido 
 
 Recuerdas aún? O has decidido olvidar, como la mayoría, esta guerra cuyos muertos 
todavía cantan por las noches and aman las causas por las que murieron? 
 
 Dónde están los nombres de los hombre y mujeres, de los niños y las niñas de la guerra? 
Porque una pared de granito, por inmensa que sea, no devuelve sus rostros ni su vida. Por mucho 
que así lo haya recomendado una comisión entranjera y el gobierno de turno no haya dado el 
apoyo requierido y el nombre de Oscar Arnulfo Romero se encuentre entre ellos, éstos aún nos 
llaman. 
 
No los oyes? Es porque el olvido, no la muerte, ha comenzado a silenciarlos.1 
 
 While Otto Pérez Molina, Monseñor Gerardi, and others from a range of sectors insist 
that Guatemala must remember its past so that it never happens again, the situation is quite 
different in El Salvador. No common discursive framework exists in El Salvador that dictates 
that those who promote forgetting and silence must do so from within its limits. Aspects of the 
nunca más framework are certainly present in El Salvador's post-Peace public spaces, but far 
from being common to all sides of the political divide, only more progressive sectors and human 
rights and victims' organizations demand that Salvadorans remember the past to prevent its 
repetition. At the same time, calls made specifically for memory have been slow to develop in El 
Salvador and have not become as omnipresent as they are in Guatemala. (The presence of 
memory in post-Peace Salvadoran discourse will be discussed in the next chapter.) Instead, the 
human rights community insists first and foremost that the truth be known so that El Salvador's 
future is distinct from its past. The formula whereby truth works to foster national reconciliation 
and prevent a repetition of the past is clearly laid out in the mandate of the Comisión de la 
Verdad para El Salvador (Truth Commission for El Salvador); this is the discourse which 
progressive and human rights groups and activists repeat when discussing the past and its role in 
the future. Reconciling and guaranteeing non-repetition are the work that truth does. 
                                                
1 Do you still remember? Or have you, like the majority, decided to forget this war whose dead still sing in the 
night and love the causes which they died for? 
 Where are the names of the men and women, of the boys and girls of the war? Because a wall of granite, as 
immense as it is, does not give back their faces nor their lives. No matter that a foreign commission has 
recommended it [be built] like that and that the current government has given the necessary support and that the 
name of Óscar Arnulfo Romero can be found among them, they still call to us. 
  You don't hear them? It's because forgetting, not death, has begun to silence them. 
  Vanessa Núñez Handal, Díos Tenía Miedo, (Guatemala City: F&G Editores, 2011), 103. 
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 Progressive sectors—perhaps most significantly and certainly most vocally and 
persistently, the Jesuits and their colleagues at the Universidad Centroamericana "José Simeón 
Cañas" (UCA, Central American University "José Simeón Cañas") in San Salvador—repeat that 
truth is the foundation for any hope that the past will not be repeated and that only by knowing 
the truth is reconciliation possible. When they say this, they are proclaiming their opposition to 
very powerful conservative sectors' equally persistent declarations that only amnesty and 
forgetting will lead to nunca más. Yet in the first several months after the final Peace Accord 
was signed, the right—those with ties to the military or the Alianza Republicana Nacionalista 
(ARENA, Nationalist Republican Alliance)—did not openly reject truth and call for amnesty and 
forgetting. Though the ARENA government led by the "Peace President," Alfredo Cristiani, 
passed its first post-Peace amnesty in January 1992, less than a week after the final Peace Accord 
was signed, the Ley de Reconciliación Nacional (National Reconciliation Law) acknowledged 
the work of the Truth Commission and recognized, to some extent, that some Salvadorans might 
want to "clarify" some of the events of the past. As the months passed, conservative politicians 
and commentators increasingly voiced concerns that the truth the Truth Commission would 
reveal would be partial—both incomplete and biased. Yet even in these worries, and despite the 
Ley de Reconciliación Nacional, which proposed amnesty and perdón as the best ways to 
achieve national reconciliation, the work of truth was rarely questioned.  
 The rejection of truth in favor of the work that amnesty does became more and more 
present in the public sphere in late 1992 and early 1993. In those months, from the perspective of 
those on the right, the promotion of amnesty and forgetting became necessary. At that time, it 
became increasingly clear that the two UN-sponsored commissions charged with investigating 
human rights abuses during the war (the Truth Commission and the Ad-Hoc Commission) would 
reveal a truth that was not the right's own. These commissions were expected to confirm that 
ARENA's founder, Roberto D'Aubuisson, had been heavily involved in death squads and had 
ordered the 1980 assassination of monseñor Óscar Arnulfo Romero, and that the military and 
paramilitary organizations were responsible for the majority of the human rights violations 
committed during 12 years of Civil War. Conservative discourse solidified after the Ad-Hoc 
Commission recommended discharging or transferring 102 senior officers involved in human 
rights abuses, including the Minister of Defense and the rest of the Military Academy's 1966-67 
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graduating class,2 and when Cristiani's request to the UN to withhold the names of the 
perpetrators was rejected. It was no longer enough to undermine the work of the Truth 
Commission; rather, it was necessary to attack the work of truth itself. Led by Cristiani, 
conservatives declared that only amnesty would lead to reconciliation and non-repetition. The 
night before the Truth Commission report was published Cristiani declared that a complete and 
unconditional amnesty was necessary and that all of the past must be "erased, eliminated, and 
forgotten."3 His declaration was given shape in the Ley de Amnistía General para la 
Consolidación de la Paz (General Amnesty Law for the Consolidation of Peace), passed in 
March 1993, which equated amnesty with perdón and olvido. Amnesty as the best way to 
achieve reconciliation and non-repetition has dominated conservative discourse ever since. 
 A struggle over words exists in El Salvador. While conservatives promote their dominant 
discourse about amnesty and forgetting, the human rights community insists on a 
counterdiscourse that calls for truth, and sometimes memory. These are El Salvador's competing 
discourses and discursive frameworks, and they emerge most clearly when the 1993 Amnesty 
Law is threatened. It is at this and other moments of rupture and debate when conservatives' 
discourse is questioned and the hegemonic process reveals itself. In these moments, struggles 
over language and meaning appear and it becomes most apparent that, other than to declare that 
the past—often vaguely labeled "it"—must not happen again, there is no common way to talk 
about the past or present; subalterns do not use elite frameworks to express their own views on 
the subject. Rather, two groups with not always stable membership have each established their 
own way of talking about the past; they each have their own discursive framework. They have 
each created what Steve Stern terms emblematic memory, dictating which events will be 
included in the group's collective memory and which will be forgotten or "pushed back toward 
the fringes," as well as what meaning these events will be imbued with.4  
 Conservative Salvadorans' embrace of amnesty and forgetting is akin to what Stern 
describes as "memory as a closed box." As in Chile, Salvadorans who promote forgetting believe 
that it is the best way to overcome the past. The conservative political, economic, and social elite 
                                                
2 Diana Villiers Negroponte, Seeking Peace in El Salvador: The Struggle to Reconstruct a Nation at the End of 
the Cold War (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 138-43. 
3 "Mensaje dirigido a la nacion por el excelentismo señor presidents de la República, Licenciado Felix Alfredo 
Cristiani el día 18 de marzo 1993," La Prensa Gráfica, 19 March 1993. 
4 Steve J. Stern, Remembering Pinochet's Chile: On the Eve of London 1998 (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2004), 105-6. 
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and their allies insist on amnesty and seek to silence the past, thereby closing El Salvador's 
memory box and sealing it firmly. Human rights and progressive civil society organizations and 
their allies refuse to allow the box to be closed. They demand truth and justice; they demand that 
the amnesty be overturned and that the victims' dignity be returned to them. Though the different 
sectors do not share a discursive framework, the debate between truth and amnesty/forgetting 
does itself bear a striking resemblance to such a framework, with the debate setting the limits of 
what can be said about the past in El Salvador. Certainly, few promote a third option.  
 One final comment is necessary. The Truth Commission plays a central role in this 
chapter's narrative about the development of post-Peace El Salvador's discourse. Yet this does 
not mean that the Truth Commission itself is frequently mentioned in the Salvadoran public 
sphere. Quite the opposite: the Truth Commission is rarely mentioned in the conservative media 
or in conservative discourse and is discussed only a bit more often among more progressive 
sectors. There are certainly various reasons for this, not the least of which is likely the firm grip 
conservatives have had on government and the mainstream media, and conservatives' 
corresponding interest in not talking about past actions which paint them in a negative light. 
Another reason might be that much of the information in the Truth Commission report was 
known prior to the signing of the Peace Accords. According to Salvador Samayoa, the real 
importance of the report, De la Locura a la Esperanza, lies in fact that the report corroborated 
and supported information that was already circulating and helped to spread that information 
further.5 The Truth Commission mandate and report are used here as very clear, very official 
examples of human rights organizations' truth-centered discursive framework. They are also both 
very public and very early examples of that framework. As for conservative sectors' framework 
rejecting truth, the Truth Commission and its report are also central and have a critical place in 
debates about amnesty. Thus, though the Truth Commission and its report are rarely mentioned 
in El Salvador, they remain an absent presence in post-Peace discourse. 
 
 
 
                                                
5 Xiomara E. Lazo Fuentes and Eduardo Rey Tristán, "Es la Justicia el Precio de la Paz? Logros y Limitaciones 
en el Proceso de Paz salvadoreño," in Conflicto, Memoria y Pasado Traumáticos: El Salvador Contemporáneo, 
eds. Eduardo Rey Tristán and Pilar Cagiao Vila (Santiago de Compostela: Universidade de Santiago 
Compostela, 2011), 225. 
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Amnesty and Reconciliation 
 The ink was hardly dry on El Salvador's final Peace Accord when newspapers exploded 
with a debate about the work of the Comisión de la Verdad. The government and Frente 
Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN, Farabundo Martí National Liberation 
Front) negotiated and agreed on the mandate of the Comisión de la Verdad in the Mexico 
Accords, signed 27 April 1991.6 This rather bare bones outline of the Commission and its work 
was fleshed out more in the Annex to those Accords, signed the same day. The government and 
FMLN "reaffirmed" their commitment to reconciliation and acknowledged both that "the 
complete truth" about key acts of violence must be known and that "the resolve and means to 
establish the truth [must] be strengthened." Taking these general principles into consideration, 
the Commission was charged with "investigating serious acts of violence that have occurred 
since 1980 and whose impact on society urgently requires that the public should know the truth." 
In selecting which acts of violence to investigate, the commissioners were instructed to  
take into account: 
a) The exceptional importance that may be attached to the acts to be investigated, their 
characteristics and impact, and the social unrest to which they gave rise; and  
b) The need to create confidence in the positive changes which the peace process is 
promoting and to assist the transition to national reconciliation. 
 
The Truth Commission, furthermore, was tasked with making recommendations about "legal, 
political or administrative measures" that "may include measures to prevent the repetition of such 
acts, and initiatives to promote national reconciliation." Significantly, the government and 
FMLN agreed to comply with the Commission's recommendations.7 The work of the Truth 
Commission and its recommendations, therefore, would help to ensure that "such acts" were not 
repeated in the future. The initial framework of understanding regarding the work that truth does 
was that knowing the truth about grave acts of violence was not only essential in and of itself, 
but would also contribute to national reconciliation and help ensure non-repetition.  
                                                
6 David Escobar Galindo's comments about how the mandate came into being are interesting. One of the 
government's negotiators, he wrote that the Truth Commission was negotiated in one day, in the midst of heavy 
debate about constitutional reform, meaning that the Accord creating the Truth Commission was largely 
unnoticed. (David Escobar Galindo, "Las jornadas de abril," La Prensa Gráfica, 2 May 1998.)  
7 "El Salvador: Mexico Peace Agreements—Provisions Creating the Commission on Truth," 27 April 1991, 
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/commissions/El%20Salvador-Charter.pdf. 
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 In the months after the final Accord was signed, conservatives did not necessarily 
challenge this vision,8 but they passed a partial amnesty nevertheless and quickly began to 
challenge the truth the Truth Commission's investigations would reveal, though not the benefits 
of truth itself. The January 1992 Ley de Reconciliación Nacional and subsequent concerns about 
the Truth Commission's bias served both to undermine the work of the Truth Commission and its 
ability to foster reconciliation, and began to temporarily shift the terms of discussion to be less 
about truth and more about amnesty and perdón. 
 As soon as ARENA proposed the partial amnesty that would become the Ley de 
Reconciliación Nacional, conservatives rushed to support the idea that amnesty and perdón were 
the most appropriate ways to address past violence. President of the Legislative Assembly, 
ARENA's Roberto Angulo, announced his support for a full amnesty that granted "perdón for 
all" and called on Salvadorans not to rub salt in society's open wounds and to look for true 
reconciliation instead. The conservative Partido de la Conciliación Nacional (PCN, National 
Conciliation Party) echoed Angulo's support for a complete amnesty that reconciled the military 
and the FMLN, declaring that perdón must be neither "restricted nor partial."9  
 The Law passed unanimously on 23 January. The Amnesty focused in particular on 
members of the FMLN, ensuring that they would be able to participate in politics after they had 
laid down their arms. Though lawmakers also spoke of "social coexistence based on mutual 
respect," the more overarching motivation behind the law was the need to promote "a process of 
national reconciliation in which perdón plays an important role."10 An unnamed journalist at La 
Prensa Gráfica agreed. When the newspaper announced the passage of the Law, it was described 
as "the first legislative step in the process of 'reconciliation.' "11  
 In the text of the Law and in reactions to its passage, neither the work of the Truth 
Commission nor that of truth itself were openly challenged. Indeed, the Ley de Reconciliación 
Nacional affirmed the necessity of  "giv[ing] the Truth Commission time to carry out its 
investigations." However, while not directly challenging the work of truth or that of the Truth 
Commission, the Law imposed time limits on the search for truth, and even for justice. 
Lawmakers reasoned that, "to reconstruct our society, it is convenient to establish a sensible time 
                                                
8 See, for example, Mauricio Ernesto Vargas, "Amanece en El Salvador," La Prensa Gráfica, 13 December 1992. 
9 Alba Elsia Lizama, "Pugna política por términos de la amnistía que aprobará Asamblea," La Prensa Gráfica, 22 
January 1992. 
10 Ley de Reconciliación Nacional.  
11 "Aprobada a medianoche Ley de Reconciliación," La Prensa Gráfica, 24 January 1992. 
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period so that those citizens who feel that they are victims of the acts that took place in those 
years can request the clarification of those acts," adding, "it is also equally important to prevent 
the uncertainty of judicial prosecution from burdening society for an undefined length of time." 
Support, even if only nominal, for the work that both truth and the Truth Commission were 
meant to do can further be seen in the fact that those cases which would be investigated by the 
Truth Commission were excluded from the amnesty.12 Six months after the publication of the 
Commission's report, the Law granted the Legislative Assembly the power to award amnesty in 
these cases or not.13 Six months, apparently, was enough time for truth to create reconciliation; if 
it had not succeeded by then, amnesty would be given a chance.  
 Though it is unclear how exactly the details of not granting amnesty to those responsible 
for an as of yet undetermined list of crimes created by an as of yet unformed Commission was 
going to function, it is nevertheless clear that neither the Law nor conservative politicians and 
journalists were explicitly denying the value of truth or the validity of needing to find it. Though 
the Law might more appropriately be seen as limiting truth and justice, the Law fits within the 
framework established by the Peace Accords that determined that knowing the truth about past 
violence would contribute to reconciliation. Lawmakers and commentators, however, were also 
introducing an alternate way to achieve reconciliation and prevent a repetition of the past: 
amnesty and perdón. Thus, the Peace was not even a week old when the pairing of truth with 
reconciliation and non-repetition, as in the Truth Commission mandate, was consumed, at least 
for a short time, by a conservative-led discussion about amnesty and perdón and how these were 
best for El Salvador's future. 
 
A Partial Truth I 
 With the passage of the Ley de Reconciliación Nacional, conservative groups were 
already leaning toward the idea that amnesty and perdón—soon to be joined by olvido—would 
perform the work that the Mexico Accord set out for truth; yet conservative sectors could not 
simply reject truth as guaranteeing non-repetition. Both ARENA and the FMLN constantly 
accused the other of not complying with the Peace Accords. They seemed to be involved in a 
competition over who was fulfilling their part of the Peace Accords best. So with the 
                                                
12 Ley de Reconciliación Nacional. 
13    See, for example, "Aprobada a medianoche Ley de Reconciliación," La Prensa Gráfica, 24 January 1992. 
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groundwork laid for the equation of amnesty and perdón with reconciliation and non-repetition, 
conservative journalists, commentators, politicians, and military officers shifted their focus and 
embarked on a campaign that raised concerns about the Truth Commission's investigations. In 
addition to generally undermining the Truth Commission's work, they questioned whether the 
Commission would investigate and reveal the whole truth. These concerns further prepared 
Salvadorans to accept declarations Cristiani and the military made once the report was published.  
 In an opinion piece in El Diario de Hoy, Rubén Zeledón offered what is likely the most 
eloquent reminder that the FMLN were not without responsibility for human rights violations. 
He called on the commissioners to keep in mind that, "the other side...was not walking around 
handing out candy during 12 years of fighting."14 Others made more specific suggestions about 
which of the FMLN's crimes should be investigated. These included the assassination of mayors 
in FMLN-controlled areas; the 1989 assassination of then-Minister of the Presidency, Antonio 
Rodríguez Porth; and the assassination of judges and other judicial personnel in the early 
1980s.15 Commentator Antonio de Sandoval-Martínez y Urrutia wondered if the truth that "the 
truth commission," in quotation marks and lower case, came to investigate was the left's truth 
because people only talked about "monseñor Romero, the Jesuit priests, etc." His response was 
to offer the Commission a long list of crimes to investigate.16 Carlos Girón S. also expressed 
concern about the Truth Commission's work, and displayed his fondness for quotation marks. He 
wrote that "the 'Truth Commission' " had arrived in the country and would have the "delicate 
task" of investigating the past in an "attempt to clarify the 'crimes' " committed during the 
conflict, a conflict which, he noted, the FMLN had unleashed. "Even though," he wrote, "it is 
said that 'the war crimes' will be clarified," the only ones discussed are those connected to the 
Armed Forces. "The Salvadoran people," he added, "doubt very much that, according to the 
pattern of 'truth' that has been adopted and in accordance with how it is 'nourished' with pertinent 
                                                
14 Rubén Zeledón, "Sobre la comisión de la verdad," El Diario de Hoy, 8 January 1993. 
15 "Comisión deberá investigar los asesinatos de alcaldes," El Diario de Hoy, 13 February 1992; "Comisión de la 
Verdad llegará mañana al país," El Diario de Hoy, 13 July 1992; "Casos de jueces asesinados por FMLN a 
Comisión de la Verdad," El Diario de Hoy, 21 July 1992. 
16 Antonio de Sandoval-Martínez y Urrutia, "Los 'observadores' de ONUSAL (II)," El Diario de Hoy, 19 August 
1992. Hermann W. Bruch would explain what all the lower case meant at the end of March 1993, after the 
report had been published. He wrote the truth commission in lower case (minúsculos) because it had minor 
(minúsculo) value. (Hermann W. Bruch, "Una verdad que no es seria, deja de ser verdad," La Prensa Gráfica, 
28 March 1993.) El Diario de Hoy employed a similar strategy to attempt to delegitimize the Truth 
Commission's work, calling it the "so-called 'truth commission'" throughout April 1993 (for example, on 4, 15, 
16, 24 April). 
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information, 'the Truth Commission' will really succeed in clarifying the acts." He also pointed to 
the "type of information and 'evidence' " the Commission used to raise questions about its 
impartiality. He concluded by calling on the Commission to investigate the FMLN's 
assassinations.17  
 Girón's disdain for the Truth Commission and its investigation is clear, but his strategy 
for discrediting the Commission does not necessarily contradict the idea that truth was an 
essential foundation for reconciliation. He and other critics seemed to be operating on the 
principle that truth actually would lead to reconciliation, as seen in Armando Calderón Sol's 
January 1993 statement to that effect. Calderón Sol, the leader of ARENA and the next president 
of El Salvador, reminded commissioners that they must "keep the search for the truth and the 
complete and absolute reconciliation of our society in mind."18 Truth was not specifically being 
undervalued; Girón, Calderón Sol, and others simply wanted the truth—indeed, the regime of 
truth—that emerged from the Truth Commission's report to be one that included the crimes they 
believed were significant. They did not want the Commission to only investigate the military's 
violence.19 
 Concerned that the Truth Commission's investigations into the truth would not be 
complete, many state institutions and their members agreed to cooperate with the Commission. 
This included the Armed Forces, for, as Minister of Defense René Emilio Ponce said, "We have 
nothing to hide"; "there is no need to fear truth."20 While offering to cooperate and proclaiming 
support for the Truth Commission and actually cooperating are very different things, few openly 
opposed the Truth Commission's work. They worked within this reality and the framework 
established by the Mexico Accord to try to ensure that the truth revealed would be neither 
incomplete nor biased, at least not in their eyes, for an incomplete or biased truth would certainly 
not lead to reconciliation. This is clear in the military's delivery of information regarding 327 of 
the FMLN's violations to the Truth Commission.21  
                                                
17 Carlos Girón S., "Llega la "Comisión de la Verdad,'' El Diario de Hoy, 16 July 1992. In 1994, he called it the 
Comisión de la Vergüenza, the Commission of Shame, and said that Salvadorans needed, "once and for all, to 
throw the report of 'Commission of Shame' into the trash." (Carlos Girón S., "Hay que olvidarse de la 'Comisión 
de la vergüenza,'" El Diario de Hoy, 23 May 1994.) 
18 "Critican a Comisión Ad Hoc por actuar con subjetividad," El Diario de Hoy, 16 January 1993. He added that 
their work, he added, must not contribute to "reviving wounds."  
19 After all, this was what the Ad-Hoc Commission was for. 
20 "Demandan investigación y castigo de crímenes FMLN," El Diario de Hoy, 8 July 1992; "El Ejército no dejó 
zonas minadas afirma Gral. Vargas," El Diario de Hoy, 21 August 1992.  
21 "Informe de delitos e imputados en crímenes del Fmln da la FA," La Prensa Gráfica, 9 October 1992. 
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 Cristiani's affirmations in the weeks before the Truth Commission report was published 
are a case in point. He declared that the report should lead to reconciliation and not more 
confrontation. The whole purpose of finding the truth was to help the "wounds" of the past "close 
and heal." The truth was supposed to guarantee that "this type of situation" would not be 
repeated in the future. And he hoped that it did.22 Here, Cristiani was both supporting the work of 
truth, and expressing his doubts about the work of the Truth Commission, as others had done. 
Significantly, however, what he seems to really believe is that a limited, incomplete truth is best, 
for he added that since the report was meant to foster reconciliation, it would be best not to name 
names, not just yet, as it could lead to "confrontation," precisely what the report was meant to 
prevent.23 Rather than immediately naming the names of the perpetrators, he proposed doing so 
at a more opportune moment.24 His solution was an incomplete or delayed truth, or even an 
incomplete and delayed truth. This type of truth would, as Cristiani said in his requests to the 
UN, "make the path toward reconciliation easier."25 So while, on the one hand, an incomplete 
truth which did not include the FMLN's crimes (and so only included the military's) would not 
lead to reconciliation or work to guarantee non-repetition, an incomplete truth which left out the 
perpetrators' names, or a delayed truth (delayed until it would do less harm to ARENA's election 
campaign) would. But, regardless of the kind of truth being promoted, the idea remained that 
truth, in some form, would lead to a better future for El Salvador.  
 Not everyone on the right, however, agreed that a nameless (i.e., incomplete) or delayed 
truth was as necessary as Cristiani did. These differences of opinion revealed some of the 
fissures in the Salvadoran right. In early March, though they would soon declare the opposite,26 
La Prensa Gráfica's editors reminded readers that the whole point of the Truth Commission was 
"to contribute, through the most truthful knowledge about what happened during the war, to 
reconciliation," and to make recommendations to prevent a repetition of the past. Given this, and 
since it was necessary to "forever close a tragic chapter in our history," the editors expressed 
their doubts that the best way to close that chapter was "to know a generic part [of it], or to aim 
to defer knowing the full report." The editors continued, affirming that, if the investigation was 
meant to unearth "a truth that was really true, it would be necessary to prepare for a bitter pill to 
                                                
22 "Informe de Comisión de la Verdad deberá construir no desunir," La Prensa Gráfica, 2 March 1993.   
23 Ibid. 
24 "Cristiani espera no afecte reconciliación el Informe," La Prensa Gráfica, 12 March 1993. 
25 "Acuerdo establece que ONU hará publica Informe," La Prensa Gráfica, 4 March 1993. 
26 Editorial, "La hora del 'punto final,' '' La Prensa Gráfica, 15 March 1993. 
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swallow." Everyone had always known that, "And so why delay this until 'an opportune moment' 
if the dynamics of the process say that this is the best moment?" Indeed, the truth was the best 
way to honor the suffering Salvadorans had experienced, though the editors did recognize that it 
would never be a complete truth, or a flawless one.27 Nor did Calderón Sol see much point in not 
naming names, as long as there was enough evidence to support it; to support his argument, he 
reminded Salvadorans of Jesus' statement that "the truth will set you free."28 Commentator 
Hermann W. Bruch was also strongly in favor of truth and its salutary effects. It was necessary to 
know the contents of the report, he wrote, for "internal peace...demands that [conflict] ends with 
the public disclosure of [that conflict's] black parts." He was sure that after the report was 
published, all Salvadorans would vow to "never, ever again fall into a similarly repugnant 
maelstrom of collective behavior." Only in that way, he concluded, would El Salvador achieve 
lasting peace.29 
 
The "Whole Truth" 
 When it became clear that the truth would be neither delayed nor incomplete in the way 
that Cristiani wished, the discourse shifted, from undermining the work of the Truth Commission 
while declaring that some kind of truth was necessary, to undermining the work of truth itself by 
declaring that what El Salvador really needed was amnesty. A similar refrain had been heard in 
relation to the Ley de Reconciliación Nacional, but those voices had hardly challenged the work 
of truth. In early 1993, affirmations substituting amnesty and perdón for truth in the recipe for 
reconciliation and non-repetition became more focused, and more frequent. In January 1993, in 
the days leading up to the first anniversary of the signing of the final Peace Accord, Calderón Sol 
stated that reconciliation was only possible through complete amnesty.30 This is in stark contrast 
to his declaration of 11 months earlier that, "It is not possible that these bloody acts [i.e. the 
FMLN's assassination of mayors] remain unpunished."31   
 While a handful of other conservative figures waffled on the usefulness of truth and 
amnesty, most repeated the sentiments Cristiani expressed in January 1992 in support of the Ley 
                                                
27 Editorial, "Lo que se busca con la verdad," La Prensa Gráfica, 3 March 1993.  
28 "Que se publique Informe de la Verdad pide Calderón Sol," La Prensa Gráfica, 11 March 1993; "Presidente de 
ARENA demanda publicar informe Comisión de la Verdad," Diario Latino, 3 March 1993. 
29 Hermann W. Bruch, "La verdad: estamos listos para recibirla?" La Prensa Gráfica, 7 March 1993. 
30 "Sólo con una amnistía general se puede reconciliar sociedad," El Diario de Hoy, 12 January 1993. 
31 "Comisión deberá investigar los asesinatos de alcaldes," El Diario de Hoy, 13 February 1992. 
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de Reconciliation Nacional, comments he repeated with greater force the night before the 
presentation of De la Locura a la Esperanza. He stated that perdón and amnesty were the best 
course for El Salvador to follow. In a message broadcast on radio and television and then printed 
in newspapers, Cristiani proposed amnesty and called for "mutual perdón." He did not deny that 
truth and the report, with all the "limitations" it might contain, were important; but, he said, "it is 
time to perdonar." To this end, and to make it so the report "produced the fruits of reunification 
for which it was conceived," he proposed a "general and absolute" amnesty.32 Like the 1992 Ley 
de Reconciliación Nacional, the Ley de Amnistía was rooted in the idea that "sweeping, absolute, 
and unconditional amnesty" was essential if El Salvador were to achieve reconciliation.33 This 
was how lawmakers, led by Cristiani and ARENA, increasingly described the work of amnesty. 
The Mexico Accords had tasked truth with working toward reconciliation, but by March 1993 it 
was clear to conservatives that truth, at least the truth in De la Locura a la Esperanza, which was 
certainly not their truth, was actually working against reconciliation. Thus, repeating much of the 
discourse surrounding the limited 1992 amnesty, Cristiani and his allies called for absolute 
amnesty. Amnesty, and not truth, would lead to reconciliation.  
 
A Partial Truth II 
 In the week before the 1993 Amnesty Law was passed, while Cristiani promoted 
amnesty, perdón, and olvido as working in favor of reconciliation and non-repetition, he and 
many others also sought to discredit the truth the Commission had revealed—the regime of truth 
which focused on the military's violations and, if accepted, would help Salvadorans distinguish 
between truths and lies. Conservatives, thus, attacked truth and the Commission from two sides: 
not only was amnesty a better way to achieve reconciliation, but, in any case, the truth described 
in De la Locura a la Esperanza was not really true. While some had specific complaints about 
the Truth Commission,34 ARENA's Gloria Salguero Gross and others criticized the Report for 
generally being partial. This can be seen in her comments in support of the 1993 Amnesty Law. 
                                                
32 "Perdón mutuo y amnistía total propone Cristiani," La Prensa Gráfica, 15 March 1993; "Mensaje del señor 
presidente de la República, Licenciado Alfredo Cristiani, con respeto al Informe de la Comisión de la Verdad," 
La Prensa Gráfica, 16 March 1993. 
33 Ley de Amnistía General para la Consolidación de la Paz, Decreto N.486 (1993). 
34 See, for example, "A la conciencia nacional e internacional ARENA," La Prensa Gráfica, 18 March 1993, paid 
ad; Lisandro Antonio Manzano, "La ofensiva 'Hasta el tope' del 1989," El Diario de Hoy, 1 April 1993; 
"Categótico rechazo hizo anoche la FA al Informe," La Prensa Gráfica, 24 March 1993; "Identifican a 
masacrados por FMLN," El Diario de Hoy, 15 April 1993. 
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As the La Prensa Gráfica headline declared, she stated that the amnesty would "correct holes 
and errors" in the report.35 But the report was also partial in the sense of being biased. 
Commentator Hermann W. Bruch, for example, who had lauded the work that truth did at the 
beginning of March, had changed his mind by the end of the month, at least in regard to the 
specific truth of " 'the truth commission' " report. The report, he said, exhibited a "lack of 
balance, impartiality, [and] ethics."36 The former commander of the First Infantry Brigade, 
Francisco Elena Fuentes, had no doubt that the report was partial, and his comments about the 
"so-called 'truth commission' "—the "terrible" Truth Commission—and its report bring together 
many different types of criticism. Elena Fuentes said that the Commission, "made up of 
foreigners who lent their ears to groups related to the subversion [i.e. human rights 
organizations], presented a partial report which clearly tramples on the sovereignty of a people 
like ours." The report was "absurd and false" and those mentioned in the report were the victims 
of slander. Elena Fuentes, it must be said, as El Diario de Hoy did, was accused of participating 
in the plot to the kill the Jesuits. His response to this was that he was only defending his 
country.37 The Commissioners, it seems, had not taken the advice they had been given about 
being impartial and about which crimes to investigate.  
 The editors of La Prensa Gráfica were very clear that the Truth Commission had only 
revealed a sample of the truth, and a "crude" one at that.38 They had, of course, good reason to 
speak of a sample of the truth. The Truth Commission discussed only 32 cases in depth and, in 
addition to a statistical breakdown of responsibility, simply provided overviews of the general 
types of violations each side had committed during the war. The report and the truth it contained 
certainly were partial in the sense that they were incomplete, for how could the Commission 
have found the whole truth of 12 years of war in the few short months the Mexico Accord gave it 
to investigate? So when conservatives (with reason, in this sense) criticized the incompleteness 
of the report, were they, at root, calling for more truth? When Vice President Francisco Merino 
said that the conclusions were "poorly-timed, imprecise, and incomplete" since they did not 
identify those responsible for all of the war's 75,000 casualties,39 was he actually demanding that 
                                                
35 "Con la amnistía se corrigen vacíos y errores del Informe," La Prensa Gráfica, 29 March 1993. 
36 Hermann W. Bruch, "Una verdad que no es seria, deja de ser verdad," La Prensa Gráfica, 28 March 1993. 
37 "Dice Helena [sic] Fuentes: Comisión se prestó a juego de izquierda para destruir F.A.," El Diario de Hoy, 2 
April 1993. 
38 Editorial, "La verdad: el adecuado tratamiento," La Prensa Gráfica, 17 March 1993. 
39 "Gobierno analiza situación de militares involucrados en el Caso Jesuitas," Diario Latino, 19 March 1993. 
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the truth of all those deaths be revealed and the perpetrators named? Was he rejecting President 
Cristiani's call that the perpetrators not be named? Given the work truth was tasked with in the 
Mexico Accord, was this some sort of reaffirmation of truth's reconciliatory powers? Clearly not. 
Those on the right would likely have been satisfied with a partial-incomplete truth if it had 
reflected their truth about the war. And Cristiani's call that the report not name names is clear 
evidence that such an incomplete report would not have been entirely unwelcome. But the report 
was incomplete in a different way; it was incomplete because it did not include as many of the 
FMLN's crimes as conservatives were convinced the FMLN had committed. And so, in addition 
to being incomplete, the report was biased. Indeed, the truth the Truth Commission revealed was 
partial-incomplete because it was partial-biased, a bias which was, perhaps, the result of the fact 
that, as Elena Fuentes said, the commissioners were foreigners who listened to subversives. 
(Surely it could not be true that the "terrorists" of the FMLN had committed only 5% of the 
violations!) Thus the partial-incomplete truth Cristiani and others had promoted the previous 
week was quite distinct from the partial-incomplete truth revealed on 15 March. In addition to 
being incomplete in different ways, the second incomplete truth (i.e., the Truth Commission's 
truth) would most certainly not work to prevent a repetition of the past and foster reconciliation, 
as will be seen, whereas, in the eyes of those who called for the perpetrators not to be named, 
apparently the first would. (Indeed, this incomplete truth would have promoted reconciliation 
even more if it had also been a delayed truth.) It seems that whether complete or incomplete, 
biased or unbiased, poorly-timed or delayed, truth is temperamental, slippery even, contributing 
to reconciliation at one moment and working to open the wounds of the very recent past in the 
next. Perhaps, rather than trusting truth with the important task of ensuring non-repetition, 
amnesty would be best?  
 The editors of La Prensa Gráfica and many others agreed. Now that the "exemplary 
sample" of the truth was known, to continue "stirring up the waters...is inconvenient for the 
[peace] process and for the country," they wrote. Thus, a "total and absolute amnesty," passed as 
soon as possible, would be best.40 But it was not just journalists and politicians who wished for 
amnesty. According to Cristiani, Salvadorans did, too. Now that the report had been published, it 
was clear that it did not correspond to the desire of the "majority of Salvadorans," which was for 
perdón and olvido. To further explain the need for amnesty, he pointed out that the report 
                                                
40 Editorial, "La verdad: el adecuado tratamiento," La Prensa Gráfica, 17 March 1993. 
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contained merely a sample of the violence; "it is important to see what we will do about erasing, 
eliminating, and forgetting the entirety of the past," he declared, for it is not "fair" that some 
might have to face the consequences of their actions while others, "for the simple fact that they 
were not part of the sample," do not.41 The report's incompleteness was, thus, the result of some 
sort of statistical problem, where the sample used to reflect a larger trend was not representative. 
Having established that the report was incomplete and that he was interested in doing the right 
thing, Cristiani urged Salvadorans to support a "general and absolute" amnesty to "turn this 
painful page of our history and to look for a better future for our country." Interestingly, he also 
reaffirmed his belief that the report should serve to "build the El Salvador in which we all want 
to live: an El Salvador at peace, moving forward, and free."42 The logic of Cristiani's thinking 
seems flawed. How exactly could the report help build the new El Salvador if all of the past was 
to be erased, eliminated, and forgotten? Here, Cristiani seemed stuck in a framework, dictated by 
the Peace Accords, which insists that the Truth Commission and its work were important for El 
Salvador's future. Almost everything he says contradicts this, but he seems unable to actually say 
those words. He seems unable to escape this framework, despite the glaringly obvious fact that 
he disagrees with it. For Cristiani, neither truth, nor the incomplete and biased truth the Truth 
Commission gave voice to, would work to prevent repetition and foster reconciliation. Rather, 
amnesty, perdón, and olvido would do this work.  
 Unsurprisingly, the military was also critical of the report and doubted that it would 
contribute to reconciliation. Soon after the Ley de Amnistía was passed, the Armed Forces 
placed an ad in daily newspapers calling the report "unfair, incomplete, illegal, unethical, biased, 
and insolent." In interviews, Minister of Defense Ponce said that, instead of "heal[ing] the 
wounds" of the past and "support[ing] the process of moral and material reconstruction," the 
report was clearly an attempt to "destroy...the social peace." Far from fostering reconciliation, 
the report "creates an atmosphere contrary to the spirit of harmony and the reunification of the 
Salvadoran family."43 Conservative commentator Hermann Bruch echoed this point. He argued 
that the Report had done exactly the opposite of what it had been intended to do. Rather than 
                                                
41 "Mensaje dirigido a la nacion por el excelentismo señor presidents de la República, Licenciado Felix Alfredo 
Cristiani el día 18 de marzo 1993," La Prensa Gráfica, 19 March 1993. 
42 Ibid. 
43 "Categótico rechazo hizo anoche la FA al Informe," La Prensa Gráfica, 24 March 1993; "Fuerza Armada critica 
informe Comisión de la Verdad," Diario Latino, 24 March 1993; Fuerza Armada de El Salvador, "Posición de 
la Fuerza Armada de El Salvador ante el Informe de la Comisión de la Verdad," Diario Latino, 24 March 1993, 
paid ad. 
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contributing to conciliation, as he described it, it had "managed to aggravate the mood" of many 
Salvadorans.44 Rather than truth, the editors of La Prensa Gráfica assured readers that only 
amnesty would "stabilize the national spirit, with an eye toward reconciliation."45 Not only was 
the truth partial, but it was actually working against reconciliation; to correct this, amnesty was 
necessary.  
 That amnesty, perdón, and olvido, and not truth, will lead to reconciliation is El 
Salvador's dominant discourse. Since early 1993, conservatives have repeated it over and over 
again, most clearly and often in discussions that have taken place since then about revoking the 
amnesty. These discussions most often take place in response to legal proceedings in the Inter-
American system46 or to reject attempts to have the law revoked. Thus, the formula that amnesty 
fosters reconciliation and that repealing it would open old wounds reappeared, for example, in 
2000 when the Corte Suprema de Justicia (CSJ, Supreme Court of Justice) declared the Amnesty 
Law constitutional,47 and again in 2002, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2010 when the FMLN, the 
Oficina de Tutela Legal del Arzobispado de San Salvador (Tutela Legal, Archbishop of San 
Salvador's Legal Aid Office), the FMLN once again, a UN Working Group, and the UN Human 
Rights Committee, respectively, proposed that the law be revoked.48 There is no doubt that the 
Amnesty Law is a memory knot. It is, as Stern wrote, a "sit[e] where the social body screams." It 
"evince[s] a power of almost sacred connection to the past, and consequently stir[s] up and 
project[s] polemics about memory and amnesia."49 In El Salvador, there is less discussion about 
memory and much more about truth and forgetting, though, as in Guatemala, and given Stern's 
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description of memory as "the meaning we attach to experience,"50 memory and truth are not so 
different, as will be seen in the next chapter.  
 The continued dominance of a discourse which insists on amnesty and olvido can seen be 
in 2011 when the memory knot of the amnesty became tangled with the memory knot of the 
1989 Jesuit massacre. The explosion of the amnesty discourse was a result of a case in Spain 
against officers for the assassination of the Jesuits and their collaborators; INTERPOL issued an 
international arrest warrant.51 Amidst complaints that the case in Spain violated sovereignty and 
declarations that it had already been tried came declarations that the amnesty was a key 
component of the peace and had been essential in the process of reconciliation.52 The ad ARENA 
took out in El Diario de Hoy in mid-August is representative. ARENA declared, "the cornerstone 
of the peace process is centered on perdón and olvido, so as to make way for the meeting and 
reconciliation of the Salvadoran family." They called on "political institutions and civil society 
organizations not to politicize acts which have already been overcome, nor to open healed 
wounds, to respect the spirit of the Peace Accords and to continue to build the social harmony 
which El Salvador demands."53 In discussions about the Amnesty Law, the social body is 
certainly screaming, either because old wounds—the wounds from the war—had healed but were 
being torn open again by calls to revoke the amnesty, or because, for the human rights 
community, those wounds are still open after 20 or 30 years and only revoking the amnesty, 
knowing the truth, and attaining justice would help them heal. In moments like this, 
conservatives and human rights activists scream very loudly and insist that their recipe for social 
peace is best. 
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conservatives rejected truth in 2011. See, for example, Editorial, "Ante tanto problema, se atiza hoy una antigua 
polémica," La Prensa Gráfica, 3 June 2011. 
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Amnesty and Olvido 
 Amnesty, as Ricoeur pointed out, is little more than forced forgetting; it is forgetting 
dictated by law. This is certainly how it was understood in El Salvador. Though connections 
were made between forgetting and the 1992 Ley de Reconciliación Nacional, such as when 
Justice Minister René Hernández Valiente described it as "perdón and olvido,"54 the equation of 
amnesty and olvido really came to dominate in early 1993. Cristiani, of course, had stated that 
what Salvadorans really wanted was perdón and olvido, adding that the entirety of the past must 
be erased, eliminated, and forgotten. Others agreed. ARENA's Roberto Angulo, for example, 
described the Amnesty as a "step toward reconciliation" because it granted perdón and olvido for 
what had happened during the war, a comment conservative analyst Kirio Waldo Salgado agreed 
with.55 For his part, the PCN's Marco Valladares explained that the amnesty implied forgetting a 
crime so as to "reestablish harmony and social concord."56 Thus, forgetting worked to promote 
reconciliation; it was a step in the right direction. 
 The connection between amnesty and olvido, however, is most clear in statements human 
rights, victims, and like-minded organizations made against amnesty, about both the 1992 Ley de 
Reconciliación Nacional and the 1993 Amnesty Law. These organizations were, perhaps, just 
being etymologically correct or repeating how Cristiani described the Amnesty. Yet when those 
not tied to the military or ARENA made comparisons between amnesty and olvido, they were 
most certainly using olvido to criticize the amnesties, positioning both as opposite to truth and as 
working against reconciliation. Amnesty and olvido were instead working in favor of impunity, 
identified by many as one of the causes of the war.57 If the amnesties were perpetuating one of 
the causes of the war, then how could amnesty also be working to prevent repetition?  
 As part of the Instituto de Estudios Jurídicos de El Salvador (IEJES, Institute of Legal 
Studies of El Salvador), Félix Ulloa, whose father had served as rector of the Universidad de El 
Salvador (UES, University of El Salvador) before his assassination in 1980, was opposed to the 
form of the 1992 amnesty. He was not, however, against perdón itself, as long as it was granted 
once the truth was known and justice served. He wrote that ARENA's attempt to push through a 
                                                
54 "Amnistían 80 subversivos dice Hernández V.," El Diario de Hoy, 12 February 1992. 
55 "Podría aprobar hoy o lunes la Amnistía," La Prensa Gráfica, 20 March 1993; Kirio Waldo Salgado M., "La 
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"general and automatic" amnesty, one which would be little more than perdón and olvido, was a 
slap in the face to those who had hoped for justice. It is impossible, he added, that those who had 
committed "horrendous crimes" during the war go unpunished, "sheltered by the noble and 
legitimate desire for national reconciliation."58 The Comité de Madres y Familiares de 
Detenidos-Desaparecidos y Asesinados Políticos de El Salvador "Monseñor Óscar Arnulfo 
Romero" (Co-Madres, Committee of Mothers and Relatives of the Detained-Disappeared and 
Political Victims "Monseñor Óscar Arnulfo Romero") rejected the Amnesty for similar reasons, 
arguing that amnesty, which only meant "borrón y cuenta nueva"59 and perdón and olvido, 
would continue impunity. From their point of view, they could only perdonar after justice had 
been done.60 The Comité de Familiares de Victimas de Violaciones a los Derechos Humanos 
"Marianella García Villas" (CODEFAM, Committee of Relatives of Victims of Human Rights 
Violations "Marianella García Villas") spoke against the 1993 Amnesty using similar language. 
Not only was the Amnesty an attempt to "throw a mantle of olvido" over the crimes committed 
during the war, but it continued the impunity which had "dominated for two decades and makes 
space for death squads to be resurrected and for human rights violations to continue." Rather 
than amnesty, they called for truth and justice.61 The Centro para la Promoción de los Derechos 
Humanos "Madeleine Lagadec" (CPDH, Center for the Promotion of Human Rights "Madeleine 
Lagadec") took a more combative stance, declaring that "the usual suspects" are against truth and 
justice. "They want," according to the CDPH, "to make the people believe that reconciliation is 
the same as olvido (as in their day, they wanted to make us believe that Peace was the same as 
the Peace of the Cemeteries [sic]—full of dead opponents)."62 
 For these organizations, as for many conservatives, amnesty meant perdón and olvido. 
Yet whereas Cristiani believed that these would benefit El Salvador and help lead to 
reconciliation, human rights groups saw all three as undermining the work truth was meant to do. 
An amnesty not based on truth cannot lead to reconciliation, nor can it work to ensure non-
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repetition. The idea that truth is the basis for reconciliation and non-repetition is the framework 
within which human rights organizations and those with similar outlooks have operated since the 
final Peace was signed, and it will be discussed in greater depth below. But it is clear from these 
few statements that two fundamentally different ideas and discourses related to truth and 
amnesty and the relationship between these and reconciliation exist in El Salvador. Cristiani and 
those of a similar mind came, between January 1992 and March 1993, to declare that truth—that 
is, the partial truth revealed in the Truth Commission report—would lead to continued and even 
increased division in Salvadoran society. The remedy, they argued, was amnesty, perdón, and 
olvido. Amnesty would perform the work that truth had been mandated to perform in the México 
Accord: reconciliation and non-repetition. This is El Salvador's dominant discursive framework. 
Members of and those connected to human rights, victims, and more progressive organizations 
employ a counterdiscourse that rejects amnesty as the sole ingredient in the recipe for 
reconciliation and non-repetition. They believe, for the most part, that amnesty could be the final 
step in the long process of reconstructing the social fabric. But before amnesty and perdón can 
be granted, the truth must be known and justice must be done. Throughout the post-Peace era, 
they have argued that reconciling El Salvador is the work that truth does. It is not a task for 
amnesty alone, and it most certainly is not something that can be achieved with the heavy dose of 
forgetting which conservatives understand amnesty to involve.  
 The different formulas for reconciliation and how it would and will be achieved are 
certainly imagined as being diametrically opposed, most certainly because when conservatives 
spoke of amnesty as perdón and olvido, perdón and olvido were just as sweeping, absolute, and 
unconditional as the 1993 Amnesty itself. There was no space for truth, and certainly not for 
trials. Yet there is nothing in the two Amnesty Laws that says, for example, that truth cannot 
precede perdón. The amnesties seem to have only legal effects; lawmakers did not insist that the 
war or its crimes be forgotten. That the laws were described as ways to forget the entirety of the 
past is telling, and points to a paradox of amnesty in El Salvador. By passing the amnesties, 
conservatives wanted all of the war to be forgotten. Yet the crimes included in the Truth 
Commission report are precisely the crimes most discussed in the public sphere, and more 
specifically in the conservative media. The Amnesty Law did not, despite Cristiani, lead to a 
forgetting of the whole past. The Law has, despite its unconstitutionality, certainly prevented 
trials from taking place in El Salvador, but the most horrific of the crimes for which the 
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military's and ARENA's heroes (i.e. Domingo Monterrosa and Roberto D'Aubuisson) are 
responsible are known and occasionally present in public debate, even if the perpetrators are not 
mentioned in mainstream media. These include the 1980 assassination of Romero, the 1989 
Jesuit massacre, and the 1981 El Mozote massacre. They are, of course, present because human 
rights organizations refuse to allow them to be forgotten; they refuse to allow either the right's 
silence or version of the past to be the only truth present in the public sphere. Human rights 
organizations refuse, as well, to accept amnesty and legislated forgetting. Thus, it is most often 
in relation to the possible revoking of the Amnesty Law when the past enters the (conservative) 
present, and when the right and their opponents most clearly insist on the truth of their own truth, 
and insist that it is either through amnesty or truth that reconciliation will be achieved and non-
repetition best guaranteed.  
 
The Need for Truth 
 While Cristiani and his allies came to view amnesty and forgetting as working for 
reconciliation and non-repetition, the human rights community promoted a counterdiscourse 
based on truth. Truth, they argued (and continue to argue), works to reconcile society. Only 
when truth is known and justice done, can amnesty, but not forgetting, be granted. They do not 
reject amnesty completely, but see it as a final step in a long process. De la Locura a la 
Esperanza, unsurprisingly, championed the work that truth does to promote reconciliation and 
prevent repetition and insisted on the truth of their truth, rejecting criticisms about partiality. The 
Commissioners wrote, 
The truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, as the oath goes. The overall truth 
and the specific truth, the radiant but quiet truth. The whole and its parts, in other words, 
the bright light shone onto a surface to illuminate it and the parts of this same surface lit 
up case by case, regardless of the identity of the perpetrators, always in the search for 
lessons that would contribute to reconciliation and to abolishing such patterns of behavior 
in the new society. 
 
Learning the truth and strengthening and tempering the determination to find it out; 
putting an end to impunity and cover-up; settling political and social differences by 
means of agreement instead of violent action: these are the creative consequences of an 
analytical search for the truth.63 
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The truth was thus a cure for all of El Salvador's ills, and the Commissioners were clear in their 
belief that the truth in the report was the truth of the war. In addition to their comments about the 
"whole truth," the Commissioners stated that the report "records the acts of violence that 
occurred repeatedly during the 12 years of war"; the report, they added, is the "background to the 
country's recent painful history."64 There is little room in these descriptions for other versions of 
the war, and why should there be? The Peace Accords created the Truth Commission because "it 
was necessary that the 'complete truth be known,' " and the commissioners believed they had 
accomplished this task within the time limit established.65 Their confidence in the truth the report 
revealed can be seen in the following declaration: 
Now, the whole truth cannot be told without naming names. After all, the Commission 
was not asked to write an academic report on El Salvador, it was asked to investigate and 
describe exceptionally important acts of violence and to recommend measures to prevent 
the repetition of such acts. This task cannot be performed in the abstract, suppressing 
information (for instance, the names of persons responsible for such acts) where there is 
reliable testimony available.... Not to name names would be to reinforce the very 
impunity to which the Parties instructed the Commission to put an end.66  
 
For Cristiani, before he decided that it was the work of amnesty to promote reconciliation, 
naming names (and so revealing a complete truth) was understood as working against 
reconciliation. For the Truth Commission, exactly the opposite was true. To reveal a partial truth, 
a truth that was not whole, would only serve to perpetuate impunity, which the Commission had 
been created to eliminate. For them, the report's truth was neither biased nor incomplete. The 
report was simply the record of the violence committed during the war. Though it may have been 
a sample of the violations committed, it was certainly a representative sample that revealed the 
truth of the war, and established a regime of truth; this truth should serve to foster reconciliation 
and prevent repetition, just as the Mexico Accord had mandated. The human rights community, 
including the Jesuits at the UCA, the non-governmental Comisión de Derechos Humanos de El 
Salvador (CDHES, Human Rights Commission of El Salvador), the Instituto de Derechos 
Humanos de la Universidad Centroamericana "José Simeón Cañas" (IDHUCA, Human Rights 
Institute of the UCA), and the Centro de Estudios para la Aplicación del Derecho (CESPAD, 
                                                
64 Comisión de la Verdad para El Salvador, From Madness to Hope, 175 and 178-9. 
65 Comisión de la Verdad para El Salvador, From Madness to Hope, 17-8.  
66 Ibid.  
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Center of Studies for the Application of Law),67 repeated the Mexico Accord and Truth 
Commission's support of the work that truth does and spoke out against Cristiani's vision of 
amnesty and forgetting. Their argument is representative of the discourse those opposed to the 
Amnesty use to explain how best reconciliation and non-repetition can be achieved. It must be 
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noted that the Jesuits and the IDHUCA are the elite of the human rights community. It is also 
certainly true that much of what they and other organizations write and say do not reach many 
Salvadorans. But their rejection of amnesty and support for the work of truth are also at least 
occasionally embraced by less "elite" individuals and groups, and the truth discourse can reach 
more than those who read newspapers or other publications. The truth discourse also makes an 
appearance from time to time on the streets of San Salvador. Visible in April 2012 on one of the 
streets near the busy MetroCentro shopping plaza were the words "Ni perdón ni olvido," above. 
Though the phrase was completely lacking in context, it seems likely that it was a rejection of the 
Amnesty Law, given how often the Law has been described as perdón and olvido. Also, not too  
                                                
67 CESPAD later became the Fundación de Estudios para la Aplicación del Derecho (FESPAD, Foundation for the 
Study of the Application of Law).  
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"Peace requires four conditions: truth, justice, love, liberty." 
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far away, peace-themed murals had been painted on the concrete walls surrounding the UES. 
One declared, "Peace requires four conditions: truth, justice, love, liberty." Another proclaimed, 
"There will not be peace without justice and equity." Thus there are more popular echoes of the 
truth discourse that likely reach more Salvadorans than ads or articles in newspapers. And 
certainly, paint on concrete is a more durable and long-lasting medium than newsprint. 
The Jesuits at the UCA believed fiercely in the Truth Commission's truth, as well as in 
the work that truth does, and argued that amnesty works against reconciliation. In the UCA's 
weekly publication in Diario (Co-)Latino, they spoke quite forcefully in favor of the truth and 
against the passage of a hasty amnesty. To pass Cristiani's proposed amnesty would "[not] help 
prevent what happened [in the past and] which today horrifies us so much from happening 
again." Nor would Cristiani's amnesty lead to reconciliation, "given that it is directed exclusively 
toward burying the truth report along with its recommendations."68 Amnesty, thus, works to 
facilitate the repetition of a horrific past. Not revealing the truth about the past, which was what 
                                                
68 UCA, "El informe de la verdad," Realidad Nacional 1, No. 39 (1993). 
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Cristiani proposed with his call for amnesty and olvido, created the risk of "instability and 
confrontation."69 CESPAD also rejected Cristani's amnesty because it would keep "the bitterness 
which impunity produces" alive. It would not, they insisted, lead to reconciliation. Instead, they 
proposed a conditional amnesty, one which began with the acceptance of guilt, followed by 
asking for perdón and promising to never again repeat whatever crime that individual had 
committed. This kind of amnesty, "amnesty-contrition" and not "amnesty-gift," was the only 
kind which would lead the country toward perdón and reconciliation.70 The Jesuits and CESPAD 
rejected amnesty, imposed perdón, and forgetting in favor of the complete truth and justice, and 
then amnesty or perdón. This was the only way to achieve reconciliation. The CDHES repeated 
much of the same reasoning in relation to what would become the 1993 Amnesty Law. The "next 
logical step," they wrote after the Truth Commission report was published, was not amnesty. The 
Commission's report "sets us on the path toward a new stage: that of justice, which should be 
sealed with perdón...and not by official forgetting."71 The CDHES, IDHUCA, and others were 
not against amnesty per se. They were, however, against Cristiani's amnesty since it sought to 
promote forgetting without the perpetrators' identities being known and before trials were carried 
out. It sought, therefore, to "impose an 'easy' forgetting of the atrocities" committed in the war.72 
 The truth discourse appears frequently in ads in conservative/mainstream and leftist 
newspapers, in articles and interviews in Diario (Co-)Latino and sometimes in mainstream 
papers, and in organizations' and institutions' own publications. The human rights community 
called for truth and justice as the necessary prerequisites for perdón fairly regularly, thereby 
maintaining the relevance of the past in the present and challenging the right's silence about it. 
An indication of which truth ought to be known is clear in the CDHES' introduction to their re-
publication of the pro-FMLN Equipo Maíz's popular version of De la Locura a la Esperanza. 
The fact that the CDHES, and in particular the CDHES' Centro de la Memoria Histórica 
"Marianella García Villas" (Center of Historical Memory "Marianella García Villas"), re-
published a popular version with drawings and more accessible (i.e., less legal) language is 
significant in and of itself, but they also repeated the discourse regarding truth and non-
                                                
69 UCA, "Cercano informe de la Comisión de la Verdad," Realidad Nacional 1, No. 38 (1993). 
70 CESPAD, "Amnistia: una tesis alternativa: perdonar a quienes pidan perdón," Diario Latino, 16 March 1993, 
paid ad.  The same ad was published in La Prensa Gráfica the next day. 
71 CDHES, "Amnistía: una tesis alternative, perdonar a quienes pidan perdón," La Prensa Gráfica, 20 March 
1993, paid ad. 
72 Sínoda Luterana Salvadoreño, Socorro Jurídico Cristiano "Monseñor Romero," CDHES, IDHUCA, "El perdón 
no se impone por decreto," La Prensa Gráfica, 24 March 1993, paid ad. 
155 
repetition. Indeed, one of the main objectives of the Centro de la Memoria Histórica is to make 
the truth known.73  
 
 Though the reality is not so black and white, this chapter places the conservative 
discourse which had developed by 1993 and was based on a rejection of the Truth Commission 
report and a celebration of amnesty and olvido in opposition to the discourse of the human rights 
community, which argues that truth, justice, and then perdón work for reconciliation and non-
repetition. Elizabeth Jelin and Stern suggest that the memory/forgetting binary is inaccurate. 
Instead, those who insist on memory when confronted with those who insist on forgetting or 
silence, and vice versa, are really talking about truths, or different memories which are imagined 
as truths. The discourse in El Salvador which situates truth as counter to amnesty and forgetting 
is more in line with what Jelin and Stern see as a more appropriate way to discuss the issue of 
memory. It makes sense to demand that the truth of the past be known when others are even 
more loudly demanding that the past be forgotten, that the wounds of the past not be reopened, 
that the perpetrators not be held responsible, and that Salvadorans look to the future.  
 The war was about power and what the future of El Salvador would be like; when the 
Peace Accords were signed, both sides agreed to fight about these things at the ballot box. But, 
as in previous decades, the post-Peace also features a discursive battle about truth, a struggle 
between truth and amnesty/olvido, a struggle which also has to do with what is best for the 
country's future. For nearly 20 years, conservatives have dominated this debate, insisting that 
only amnesty and olvido would lead to peace. In that time, those who rejected this discourse 
loudly and insistently declared that amnesty and olvido would most certainly not lead to peace, 
and that lasting peace was only possible if built on a foundation of truth. The pro-truth discourse 
received some additional support with the 2009 election of the FMLN to the presidency (which 
will be explored in greater detail in Chapters Five and Six), but the most significant change to the 
public discourse is perhaps the Supreme Court's 2014 decision recognizing the victims' right to 
truth. In a case about the San Francisco Angulo massacre, and quoting various Comisión 
Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (Inter-American Human Rights Commission) and Corte 
Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (CIDH, Inter-American Human Rights Court) rulings to 
the same effect, the Court also pointed to truth (specifically, the truth about one of the army's 
                                                
73 CDHES, De la Locura a la Esperanza: version popular (CDHES: San Salvador, 2003). 
156 
massacres) as essential to combating impunity and guaranteeing non-repetition.74 Though the 
short and long-term effects of this decision remain unclear, that an important and powerful state 
institution—the same that had previously upheld the constitutionality of the Amnesty Law, and 
which began to review the law again in 2013—has finally made a declaration which echoes 
human rights organizations' discourse points to the fragility of the right's seemingly dominant 
discursive framework, and indeed any discursive framework's apparent dominance.  
                                                
74 Sala de lo Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia. San Salvador, 10 February 2014, 
http://perso.unifr.ch/derechopenal/assets/files/jurisprudencia/j_20140408_01.pdf. 
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Chapter Five  
El Salvador: Memory/Historical Memory/Truth/History 
 
"Memoria historica" 
 
-A este hijo de puta 
lo vamos a ir a traer, 
sindicalista de mierda, 
-dijo una voz. 
-Lo vamos a reventar,  
se escuchó más allá entre las sombras. 
-Lo vamos a desaparecer,  
repuso  
otro 
en la penumbra.   
 
--Mario Castrillo1 
 
 Discussions about memory, so present in Guatemala, are not entirely absent in El 
Salvador. And, indeed, talking about memory makes good sense. How else can the right's open 
and frequent calls for amnesty and forgetting be rejected if not by demanding memory? Though 
Stern, Jelin, and others have argued otherwise, memory certainly seems to be the antithesis of 
forgetting. And there are increasingly frequent discussions of memory and historical memory in 
the Salvadoran public sphere, especially by, though not limited to, members of the human rights 
community. As in Guatemala, those in El Salvador who talk about memory or historical memory 
point out that remembering will prevent repetition of the past.2  
 Those with ties to the Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA, Nationalist 
Republican Alliance) or the military agree that remembering the past will prevent repetition. Yet 
if the depths of what lies below the surface discourse are explored, if what Foucault called the 
"the half silent murmur of another discourse"3 is fully given voice, it becomes clear that the 
right's support of memory is less than whole-hearted. Their calls for memory are often vague and 
                                                
1 "Historical Memory."  "-This son of a bitch / we're going to get him, / unionist piece of shit, / -one voice said. / -
We're going to break him, / was heard from the shadows. / -We're going to disappear him, / replied / another / 
from the darkness." (Mario Castrillo, "Memoria histórica," 3000: Suplemento Cultural, 6 March 1993.) 
2 Talk of reconciliation is largely, though not completely absent, from the discourse surrounding memory and 
forgetting. The focus is on "never again."  
3 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Routledge, 2002), 
31.  
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weak, while their demands for amnesty and forgetting are clear and strong. Statements in favor 
of memory are also often paired with a push to forget or lie on a foundation of forgetting; in a 
manner far less subtle than in Guatemala, conservatives frequently call for memory in one breath 
and forgetting in the next. As well, conservatives often call for a limited memory—limited to 
very specific events of the war and limited in terms of what remembering will achieve. That is, 
remembering certain crimes will only help to ensure non-repetition. It will serve no other 
purpose, such as inspiring continued struggles for justice or rights.  
 Conservative discourse about amnesty/olvido and memory both leading to non-repetition, 
however half-hearted their support for memory might be, seems contradictory. Keeping in mind 
that the "conservative" label homogenizes the members of a group who often disagree on a range 
of other issues, how can this contradiction be resolved? How can both forgetting and memory 
lead to non-repetition? Conservatives seem to want the "entirety of the past," as Cristiani said, 
(only some of which was contained in the Truth Commission report) to be forgotten; but they 
also want particular aspects of the past (many of which were not in the report) to be 
remembered.4 At a very basic level, they want the military's crimes to be forgotten and the 
crimes of the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN, Farabundo Martí 
National Liberation Front), the impact of which surely also "urgently requires that the public 
should know the truth,"5 to most definitely be remembered. Here, then, is the underlying constant 
in conservative discourse: a deep criticism and rejection of De la Locura a la Esperanza, though 
the report is rarely mentioned. Instead, it is silenced. Conservatives promote forgetting, via 
silence and the amnesty, because they view the report as partial. They also promote remembering 
the FMLN's crimes because the report is partial, because the Commissioners "forgot" (perhaps 
on purpose) to include the FMLN's crimes, crimes the right believed were very important to 
remember.   
 The way conservatives view the past, their motivations for promoting memory, and the 
way they talk about remembering but in fact hope for forgetting, are best described as 
monumental. Remembering is, at least in theory, what monuments and the commemorative 
ceremonies which surround them are supposed to accomplish; yet, as Jeffrey Olick and Joyce 
                                                
4 The human rights community can also be accused of being similarly selective in what they focus on 
remembering, though highlighting the military's crimes is a more inclusive memory, since the military 
committed far more violations than the guerrilla. 
5 "El Salvador: Mexico Peace Agreements—Provisions Creating the Commission on Truth," 27 April 1991, 
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/commissions/El%20Salvador-Charter.pdf. 
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Robbins point out, monuments are paradoxical, for "once we assign monumental form to a 
memory, we have to some degree divested ourselves of the obligation to remember."6 James 
Young, an outspoken critic of traditional, static stone or metal monuments, argues that such 
monuments provide only the illusion of permanence and of remembering.7 Peter Carrier adds 
that  
[a]lthough the transmission of history as an aesthetic medium for mass consumption does 
fulfill the object of commemoration by 'calling to mind,' it also categorizes and fixes the 
past in a given form that ritually creates and fulfills an appetite for uncritical information, 
and thereby renders ineffective the pertinence of the past in the present. It petrifies the 
past both literally and metaphorically by imposing monolithic form which, ritualized and 
banalized, is historically redundant and effectively invisible.8 
 
Young concludes by declaring, in particular reference to Holocaust memorials and monuments, 
that "the initial impulse to memorialize events such as the Holocaust may actually spring from an 
opposite and equal desire to forget them."9  
 Keeping these ideas in mind when thinking about the right's use of the past and their 
views on remembering, it is possible to see that they want to monumentalize the past so that it no 
longer matters to the present. Yet rather than do this, rather than erect a physical monument 
related to the war, the way the rights talks about the importance of remembering the past "assigns 
monumental form" to the past; they petrify the past, making it "historically redundant and 
effectively invisible."10 
 The human rights community is more whole-hearted in supporting memory and the role it 
has in preventing repetition. Unlike conservatives, they see memory as actively working for non-
repetition, in part because remembering the past implies remembering activism and remembering 
that the injustices that caused the war persist. For the human rights community, the past is not a 
monument, built to be forgotten and serving no real purpose in the present. Rather, the past is 
alive, and it is kept alive by remembering. The past lives and breathes and is highly pertinent to 
the present; it explains and inspires.  
                                                
6 Jeffrey K. Olick and Joyce Robbins, "Social Memory Studies: From 'Collective Memory' to the Historical 
Sociology of Mnemonic Practices," Annual Review of Sociology 24 (1998), 119. 
7 James Young, The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1993), 37 and 47-8. 
8 Peter Carrier, "Historical Traces of the Present: the Uses of Commemoration," Historical Reflections 22, no. 2 
(1996): 440. 
9 Young, The Texture of Memory, 5. 
10 Carrier, "Historical Traces of the Present," 440. 
160 
 Yet what exactly the human rights community means when its members talk about 
memory or historical memory is often far from clear. The words are often used interchangeably, 
and are sometimes even used as synonyms for history, as when the right speaks of them. 
Whereas the right focuses on the FMLN's abuses, as might be expected, the human rights 
community calls on Salvadorans to remember the military and its proxies' human rights 
violations. Thus, what human rights organizations want to be remembered is the truth of the 
Truth Commission, though it is a more complete truth than in the report. That is, they want more 
than the 32 cases the Commission described in depth to be remembered. This "more," however, 
is in keeping with the Commission's findings regarding the military's overwhelming 
responsibility for violations. In their support for memory or historical memory, these 
organizations and individuals often take their discussions further than the simple repetition of the 
mantra that the past be remembered so that it never happens again. They see memory as a tool 
that must very actively be used to help prevent repetition.  
 
Why remember 
 The idea that memory or remembering work to prevent a repetition of the past was 
present in the public sphere in El Salvador from early in the post-Peace era, though memory did 
not dominate the discourse in the same way that forgetting and truth did. Among conservatives, 
president Cristiani, for example, supported memory in his official welcome to the Pope in 
February 1996. The president described the visit, John Paul II's second to El Salvador, as the 
"balm" which will "erase the scars of that tragedy ['the fratricidal confrontation'], which will only 
be remembered as a historical lesson, so that it never happens again."11 As the layers of meaning 
are peeled back from Cristiani's words, his apparent support for memory becomes only that, 
apparent. Cristiani attempts to dictate how and why the past should be remembered, i.e. 
"only...as a historical lesson so that it never happens again." That is, the past should not be used 
                                                
11 Evidently forgetting his support for the work that amnesty and not truth does, he also said that the new El 
Salvador was build on the foundations of a respect for human rights and "guided by truth, liberty, and justice." 
("Mensaje de Bienvenida a Su Santidad Juan Pablo II, Pronunciado por el Señor Presidente de la República de 
El Salvador, Doctor, Armando Calderón Sol," El Diario de Hoy, 9 February 1996.) ARENA's René Figueroa 
took this passivity to another level, stating in 1994 that "we should remember the violence, but only to ask God 
that the terror never returns to our beloved homeland." Figueroa also removes any responsibility for ensuring 
non-repetition from human, and even papal, hands, placing it on the shoulders of a power even higher than John 
Paul II. Memory works neither actively nor passively to prevent repetition; rather, God does. ("Conmemorarán 
dos años de firma de Acuerdos de Paz," La Prensa Gráfica, 16 January 1994.) 
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to inspire current activism or organizing or to make demands on the present. And the past most 
certainly should not be used to accuse or lay blame. 
 Yet even Cristiani's limited call for memory is almost completely undermined by his 
statement that the Pope's visit will erase the scars of the war. There has been much debate about 
whether revoking the 1993 Amnesty would reopen the wounds left by the war, or if those 
wounds had ever healed. By mentioning the scars of the war, Cristiani is repeating his belief that 
the social body's wounds had, in fact, healed and that only scars remained. In this view, El 
Salvador was well along the path to national reconciliation. Amnesty, perdón, and olvido, which 
Cristiani had assigned to the task of promoting national reconciliation, of healing society, were 
clearly doing their work well. But for Cristiani, the scars remained, and reminded Salvadorans of 
the original wound. To celebrate that the Pope's visit would erase the scars is to suggest that this 
one very tangible reminder of the war (ARENA governments had, after all, refused to construct 
monuments related to the war, memorials to the victims or to declare a day for the victims) 
should be erased, that the war should be completely forgotten. Cristiani, of course, had very 
clearly and openly supported forgetting the entirety of the past and even spoke of erasing it. 
Erasing the scars is, perhaps, the final step in his plan for reconciliation: first the wounds are 
healed with amnesty, perdón, and olvido, and then the Pope erases the scars. 
 Cristiani's support for remembering so as to prevent repetition was based on a foundation 
of forgetting and a firm belief that oblivion was essential. In his mind, oblivion works toward 
non-repetition. Taking his calls for remembering at face value, however, as declarations truly in 
support of memory, it is clear that he does not see memory itself as working for non-repetition. 
For conservatives, memory is not a tool; it is not something that is used for a particular purpose. 
Instead, as Cristiani said, Salvadorans should (sometimes) remember the past; it should be kept 
in mind as an example of what the future should not be like. Like art in a museum, the past is 
something you look at, something you do not touch, and then something you turn away from as 
you continue on to the next masterpiece.  
 Discussions about the usefulness of memory also appear in the conservative media. For 
example, in the midst of a rapidly increasing crime rate, La Prensa Gráfica's editors 
acknowledged that historical memory might help to prevent repetition. Recognizing that "the 
wounds, the scars, and their traces will not be erased overnight," the editors wrote in December 
1993 that,  
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The historical memory of the conflict, which will naturally tend to become submerged in 
the collective subconscious, will act as a vaccine against war; nevertheless, the 
consequences of the conflict must be faced in reality. Becoming aware of this is the first 
of the challenges of the peace. It is like looking in a mirror where we see the cruelty 
which we were capable of, so as to move on to civilized and peaceful frameworks of 
coexistence where [this cruelty] will never again be repeated.12  
 
Though the subconscious is not the best place for (a poorly defined) historical memory of 
conflict and trauma to rest (for it is difficult to work through trauma when it is buried in the 
subconscious13) and though the process by which that historical memory "naturally" is 
submerged in the subconscious is unclear, the editors do still repeat the idea that remembering 
will prevent repetition. Yet describing historical memory as a vaccine undermines the work 
memory does. Getting vaccinated is, more often than not, a one-time measure. Once the body has 
been vaccinated, it can safely enter into situations where it might be infected again. To imagine 
that historical memory is a vaccine thus works against non-repetition by eliminating the need to 
actually work for non-repetition by, for example, eliminating the social, structural, and political 
causes of the war.  
 Drawing on Olick, Robbins, Young, and Carrier's views on monuments, certainly 
Cristiani's and the editors' schizophrenic support for a monolithic memory of the "tragedy" 
"spring[s] from an opposite and equal desire to forget" the war. Indeed, their desire to forget is 
far stronger than their hope for memory. More than this, however, the way Cristiani and the 
editors hold up the past as an example, hoping to distance it from the present, is reminiscent of 
John Gillis' discussion of the "national" phase of commemoration, which he suggests began with 
the revolutions in the US and France and ended in the 1960s. Those involved in the revolutions, 
hoping to build a new future for their nations, engaged in a kind of collective, and conscious, 
amnesia of particular parts of the past. Part of this involved commemoration, which helped post-
                                                
12 Editorial, "Viendo efectos de la guerra," La Prensa Gráfica, 9 December 1993. Whether the editors believed 
that the scars would be erased by a visit from the Pope is unclear. 
13 El Diario de Hoy reported on an interesting incident that pointed to continued presence of the past in the 
present, at least in 1997. A former member of one of the military's elite (and human rights violating) battalions, 
the Batallón de Infantería de Reacción Inmediata (BIRI, Immediate Reaction Infantry Battalion) Bracamonte, 
and of the Policía Nacional (National Police), "crazed by liquor and, apparently, by disturbed by 'memories' of 
the war" threw a grenade at a family. (Jaime García, "Muertos y heridos provoca ex soldado," El Diario de Hoy, 
21 January 1997.) He, at least, continued to be traumatized. On a related note, La Prensa Gráfica's Roberto 
Turcios wrote in 2000 that El Salvador "has problems with its memory." The war and the years leading up to it 
"were so traumatic that they remain like indelible nightmares." He concluded that it was not possible to deal 
with this problem by turning "a calendar page." (Roberto Turcios, "Romero," La Prensa Gráfica, 28 March 
2000.)  
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revolution societies break with the past and differentiate between the past and the present, the old 
and the new.14 This is precisely what conservatives do in the post-Peace era. By limiting the role 
of the past in the present, by declaring that the past will only serve the needs of the present in one 
way, conservatives create a distance between past and present. The break between past and 
present that conservatives' monumental understanding of the past revolves around is also clear. 
The past is not an integral part of the present; it is only something that can be turned to if, for 
example, El Salvador seems to be losing its way. (Conservatives' support of a selective forgetting 
of the past will be seen below.) 
 The past, of course, does not have to be monumental in the way that Young and Carrier 
describe. When Maya Lin spoke of her vision of the Vietnam War Memorial in Washington, she 
said, "I thought about what death is, what a loss is. A sharp pain that lessens with time, but can 
never quite heal over. A scar. The idea occurred to me there on the site. Take a knife and cut 
open the earth, and with time the grass would heal it."15 Charles and Stephen Griswold, pointed 
out that this process of healing would only be partial.16 Lin's comments are especially interesting 
in relation to Cristiani's thoughts about how the Pope would erase the scars of the war. They are 
also interesting in relation to what might be assumed from La Prensa Gráfica's editors' comment 
about scars; to say that "the scars...will not be erased over night" can be understood to mean that 
someday they will be. For Lin, however, the scar is an essential reminder of the past, of death, 
and of pain. To wish it gone, as Cristiani certainly does, further underscores the desire for 
oblivion, despite declarations in support of memory and the uses to which it can be put.  
 Human rights activists and progressive sectors are more fully supportive of memory and 
the work it does to ensure non-repetition, and they see the past more like a wound that has not 
yet and perhaps never will fully heal. While many repeated the rather simplistic formula that 
                                                
14 John R. Gillis, "Memory and Identity: The History of a Relationship," in Commemorations: the Politics of 
National Identity, ed. John R. Gillis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 7-10. There was also a 
simultaneous drive to reject the past, but to remember it as a point of reference against which to contrast the 
present, a trend which continued into the mid-twentieth century, as seen in the West German government’s use 
of the memory of Nazism to legitimize democracy; Peter Gray and and Kendrick Oliver, "The Memory of 
Catastrophe," History Today 51, no. 2 (2001): 11; Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 13 and 61. 
15 Maya Lin, quoted in Robert Campbell, "An Emotive Place Apart," A.I.A. Journal (May 1983), 151. 
16 Charles L. Griswold and Stephen S. Griswold, "The Vietnam Veterans Memorial and the Washington Mall: 
Philosophical Thoughts on Political Iconography," Critical Inquiry 12, no.4 (1986): 709. For Gillis, the 
Vietnam War Memorial represented a shift in monument-building and commemorative practices. The 
Memorial, he writes, is an "anarchy of memory" for visitors are made to remember in some way. (John R. 
Gillis, "Memory and Identity," 13-5.) 
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remembering would prevent future violations, often not explicitly acknowledging that "never 
again" requires hard work, others explored the benefits of memory in greater depth. The social 
democratic Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR, National Revolutionary Movement) 
tied remembering and memory to never again, and was among the first in the post-Peace era to 
do so. In a May 1992 ad in La Prensa Gráfica that reflected on 100 days of peace, the MNR 
wrote that "for the first time [those younger than 20 years old] are experiencing another way to 
co-exist, where the dead, the bullets, repression, and insecurity begin to become part of a past 
that should only be remembered as something to which we should not return."17 Here, though the 
MNR limited the usefulness of the past to an "only," as had some conservatives, they were, at 
least, far more specific about what happened in the past. The leftist organization Equipo Maíz 
was more enthusiastic about the role of memory in the present when they announced the 
publication of their book, El Salvador: Imágenes para No Olvidar, 1900-1999, in El Diario de 
Hoy in November 1999. The images that must not be forgotten are a visual reminder of "a 
century in the life and struggle of the people," with a focus on the popular movement, the 
guerrilla, and those who had been killed in that struggle. The announcement declared that the 
best way to prevent a repetition of past errors is to not forget them, "to always have them present 
in one's memory."18 Equipo Maíz did not paint over memory with a thick coat of oblivion as 
Cristiani and others had. Yet remembering a century of struggle is more than simply a whole-
hearted embrace of memory. It was a clear rejection of the right's strong belief that foreign 
communists brought the war to El Salvador; remembering a century of struggle points to long-
standing social injustice as a root cause of the war. More than this, it rejects Cristiani's hope that 
the past would only be remembered to prevent repetition; remembering this century of struggle 
reminds Salvadorans of their long history of organizing to demand change, thereby encouraging 
them to continue to do so.  
                                                
17 "Reconocen positiva la ausencia de conflicto," La Prensa Gráfica, 20 May 1992.  
18 Equipo Maíz, "La Marcha sigue su historia, El Diario de Hoy, 21 November 1999, paid ad. Many others also 
declared that memory would lead to never again, including the Procuraduría para la Defensa de los Derechos 
Humanos (PDDH, Ombudman's Office for the Defense of Human Rights), the Mujeres por la Dignidad y la 
Vida (Las Dignas, Women for Dignity and Life), Guadalupe Mejía, the Comisión de Trabajo en Derechos 
Humanos Pro Memoria Histórica de El Salvador (Comisión Pro Memoria Histórica, Pro Historical Memory 
Human Rights Working Group of El Salvador), and historian Roberto Turcios; PDDH, "Saludemos orgullosos 
el nacimiento de un nuevo El Salvador," La Prensa Gráfica, 14 December 1992, paid ad; Norma Vázquez, 
"Presentación," in Y la Montaña Habló: testimonios de guerrilleras y colaboradoras, eds. Mujeres por la 
Dignidad y la Vida (San Salvador, 1997), 5; Sandra Moreno, "Mi historia, Un día en la vida," El Diario de Hoy, 
17 April 2000; Comisión de Trabajo en Derechos Humanos Pro Memoria Histórica de El Salvador, Diario Co-
Latino, 16 January 2002, paid ad; Roberto Turcios. "Ataque a la memoria," La Prensa Gráfica, 5 May 1998. 
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 Non-conservatives have without a doubt called for memory and celebrated its salutary 
effects more often than conservatives. They have also offered more in depth discussions of 
memory and forgetting and the importance of the past for the present and future. Jesuit José 
María Tojeira's 2000 opinion piece in Diario Co-Latino, shortly after the 30th anniversary of the 
assassination of monseñor Romero, is a case in point. He wrote that, "We cannot forget, not only 
because the people assassinated were respectable, in many cases more respectable and exemplary 
than we are, but also because we do not want the evil to be repeated." Remembering the humans 
rights violations committed during the war, including massacres and the assassination of mayors 
(that is, violations committed by both sides), always contains an "element of denunciation," and 
these crimes must be remembered, for forgetting them does little more than justify them.19 
Tojeira continued his discussion of memory in early November 2004. He wrote that memory 
"rescues a past full of pain, and demands the transformation of all those attitudes and behaviors 
which created tragedies in the past and continue to produce problems in the present."20 For 
Tojeira, the past and present are not so distant and memory does more than just serve as an 
example. Unlike conservatives' limiting of memory to preventing repetition, for the human rights 
community, memory denounces violations and demands change. And these, too, are part of the 
process of ensuring non-repetition. They are tools memory uses in the work that it does. 
 The members of the Asociación Intersectorial para el Desarrollo Económico y el 
Progreso Social (CIPED, Intersectoral Association for Economic Development and Social 
Progress) expanded on the idea that memory demands change. Celebrating the 15th anniversary 
of the Peace and the 75th anniversary of the 1932 massacre, CIPED declared that historical 
memory is "necessary to build peace." As long as memory is absent and "the truth [of memory] 
is not outlined, we will not be able to lay a firm foundation to build peace." Historical memory is 
also necessary for reconciliation, "especially when the reality of the present is full of injustice 
and social, political, economic, and cultural exclusion," precisely the factors which, CIPED 
noted, had led to both the 1932 massacre and the Civil War.21 History, it seemed, was repeating 
itself, and precisely because, as so many pointed out, the past and the causes of the war were 
forgotten,22 a forgetting Cristiani and others promoted through their far more enthusiastic and 
                                                
19 José M. Tojeira, "El Papa y las violaciones de los Derechos Humanos," Diario Co-Latino, 30 March 2000. 
20 José M. Tojeira, "Difuntos, memoria y muerte," Diario Co-Latino, 2 November 2004. 
21 CIPED, "Memoria Histórica; necesario para constuir la paz," Diario Co-Latino, 24 January 2007, paid ad.  
22 Salvadorans, after all, have a tendency to forget. See, for example, "Perisisten las causas de la guerra, dicen 
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unquestionable support for amnesty, perdón, and olvido. To remember, therefore, is more than 
just knowing that something happened. To remember is to denounce and demand change. It is to 
admit that the causes of past violence persist, to admit that the past is not as distant as it might 
seem. These things will work to prevent repetition.  
 
What is remembered 
 In many statements about the war, the picture of what must be remembered is blurry. 
Cristiani's comments, for example, about the "fratricidal confrontation" and "that tragedy" are 
typical. They contribute to this blurriness, and to a whitewashing of the past and responsibility 
for human rights violations. Conservatives and those tied to the military do, however, sometimes 
have a very clear idea of what should be remembered and what is included in "memory." In In 
Defense of the Homeland: The History of the Armed Conflict in El Salvador, 1980-1992, General 
Humberto Corado Figueroa called on Salvadorans to remember the death and destruction caused 
by the FMLN.23 For El Diario de Hoy, the "Memories of the War" include the 1989 Offensive; 
the FMLN's destruction of the Cuscatlán bridge, which had a devastating impact on the 
economy; war stories from Arcatao; and one soldier's war stories.24 Other bits of the war that 
must be remembered include the FMLN's sacking of the National Palace and the FMLN's 
blowing up of the newly constructed Puente de Oro, the Bridge of Gold, in 1981.25 Though the 
stories from Arcatao centered on the army's violations, and did not dance around their 
responsibility, most of El Diario de Hoy's reporting is heavily slanted against the FMLN. La 
Prensa Gráfica is perhaps a bit more open. This openness can be seen from time to time in the 
newspaper's magazine, Enfoques, which published a weekly series of "Memorias" in the late 
1990s. These memories included both the FMLN's killing of Lieutenant Colonel Domingo 
Monterrosa and the 1989 Final Offensive, including the bombing of Federación Nacional 
                                                                                                                                                       
jesuitas," Diario Co-Latino, 17 November 1994; Rosarlin Hernández, "Historia de la memoria perdida," El 
Diario de Hoy, 14 September 1997; Carlos Santos, "Para conjurar el olvido," Revista Eco, 21 July 2000; Sarah 
Currlin and Eric Lemus, "A siete años de Acuerdos de Paz," El Diario de Hoy, 17 January 1999; "Decepción: 
Acuerdos no dieron el ancho," El Diario de Hoy, 14 February 2002; Óscar Picardo Joao, "Sobre 'monumentos', 
'memorias' y 'verdades,'" El Diario de Hoy, 17 December 2003. 
23 General Humberto Corado Figueroa, En Defensa de la Patria: Historia del Conflicto Armado en El Salvador, 
1980-1992 (San Salvador: Tecnoimpresos, 2008), 280. 
24 "Memorias de guerra," Vértice, 14 March 1999; "La memoria de una guerra," El Diario de Hoy, 28 May 1999; 
Mirella Cáceres, "Memorias de Arcatao," Revista Hablamos, 28 April 2002; Lilian Martínez, "Sueños de 
guerra," Vértice, 25 September 2005. 
25 "Singular recibimiento: 'Ya viene el Frente!'" El Diario de Hoy, 3 February 1992; Roxana Hueza, "El oro 
vuelve a brillar," El Diario de Hoy, 1 June 2000.  
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Sindical de Trabajadores Salvadoreños (FENASTRAS, National Trade Union Federation of 
Salvadorian Workers) and the assassination of the Jesuits. The article on the Offensive did not 
mention either the intellectual or material authors of the Jesuit massacre, though Tojeira did in an 
interview on the following page.26  
 As for Diario Co-Latino, the editors, commentators, and journalists do not deny that the 
FMLN violated human rights, but there is no doubt that their focus is on the military's violations. 
They concentrate on reminding Salvadorans of what the right labeled a partial truth in the wake 
of the publication of the Truth Commission report. Over the years, Diario Co-Latino has made it 
clear what parts of the past are included in the list of what to remember. These include the 
Tenango and Guadalupe massacres, the names of the victims of the war, the testimonies from the 
survivors of the military's La Raya massacre, the military's massacre at Las Aradas, and the 
approximately 8000 disappeared.27 As well, the editors took it upon themselves to create a 
section dedicated to the "Memories of the Fallen." Understood as a way to fulfill, in part, the 
Truth Commission's recommendation to build a monument to the victims, photos of guerrillas 
and some important civilian victims of the war were published regularly so that they could 
become part of the country's collective memory.28 Diario Co-Latino also published a series titled 
"Historical Memory," which included articles about the Peace Accords, the 1989 Offensive, and 
Romero's assassination.29  
 El Diario de Hoy, La Prensa Gráfica, and Diario Co-Latino, therefore, agreed that the 
1989 Offensive was important and should be remembered, though they highlighted different 
aspects of that Offensive in their reporting.30 But whether the Offensive fit in the category of 
memory or historical memory is unclear. Perhaps it was historical memory for leftists and 
                                                
26 Omar Cabrera, "Jaque mate a un guerrero," Enfoques, 1 November 1998; Omar Cabrera, "Hasta el tope de la 
guerra," Enfoques, 15 November 1998; " ' La guerra no tenía sentido,' " Enfoques, 15 November 1998. 
27 Ivón López, "Pese a olvido oficial: Conmemoran por segunda vez 17 anivesario de masacre Tenango y 
Guadalupe," Diario Co-Latino, 4 March 2000; Iván Escobar. "Familiares de víctimas de violaciones a Derechos 
Humanos esperan reivindicar a seres quieridos," Diario Co-Latino, 11 January 2002; Leonor Cárdenas, 
"Sobrevivientes de masacre 'La raya' buscan sanar heridas," Diario Co-Latino, 30 March 2009; David Pérez, 
"La memoria de las piedras," Diario Co-Latino, 18 May 2011; "Retratos para no olvidar" Diario Co-Latino, 24 
May 2011  
28 See, for example, "Memoria de los caídos" (series), Diario Co-Latino 1 November 1999. 
29 Mariano Castro Morán," Los Acuerdos de Paz," Diario Co-Latino, 20 and 27 March 2000 and 3 and 10 April 
2000; Paulino Espinoza, "Monseñor Romero, fuente inagotable de inspiración," Diario Co-Latino, 25 March 
2009; Roberto Hugo Preza, "Memorias de Guerra," Diario Co-Latino, 10 November 1999. 
30 For example, the human rights community and left-leaning papers focus on the assassination of the Jesuits. If 
conservative papers mention this, they highlight that it was in the middle of a war, in a confrontation (i.e. the 
Offensive) the FMLN unleashed. Instead of focusing on the Jesuits, they underscore the death and destruction 
the FMLN caused and the fact that their action did not spark a general uprising. 
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memory for more conservative individuals? Or perhaps historical memory and memory are 
interchangeable? Some of the confusion or uncertainty about what historical memory or memory 
actually is brings to mind David Berliner's comments on "The Abuses of Memory." Though he 
was writing more specifically about anthropologists' abuse of memory, much of it reflects how 
the terms are used in the public sphere in El Salvador. Examining how memory is understood in 
anthropological writing, Berliner states that, "by virtue of its semantic multidimensionality, 
memory is an expansive label that seems to migrate into different places." He concludes that, "by 
a dangerous process of expansion, memory gradually becomes everything which is transmitted 
across generations...'almost indistinguishable' then from the concept of culture itself."31 Though 
newspapers generally do not use memory to mean culture, Berliner's view that memory is an 
expansive, as well as "vague [and] fuzzy" label which is "constantly and unthinkingly 
deployed,"32 reflects some of its usage in El Salvador. In newspapers, memory certainly has 
migrated into different places, becoming a convenient, and unclear, label used to describe what 
seems to be little different from simple history. 
 For human rights organizations "the past" which must be remembered was unlike the past 
conservatives wanted to remember, which focused on the FMLN's military actions and human 
rights violations. Human rights organizations' past was roughly the same as "the truth" discussed 
in the previous chapter, a truth centered on overwhelming military responsibility for human 
rights violations. Though the connection is most clear when these organizations' discourse is 
explored, as will be seen, poet and journalist Julio Villarán, writing in El Diario de Hoy's Vertice 
magazine in 2000, brought many of the different ideas circulating in the public sphere about 
truth, memory, and forgetting together quite neatly. He began by asserting that "olvido," or "the 
lack of historical memory," has been a problem for El Salvador since 1992. And this is true 
despite the creation of the Truth Commission, which "revealed details about some crimes"; 
nevertheless, what happened in the past has not been acknowledged and responsibility has not 
been assigned, resulting in only partial reconciliation. He, therefore, called on Salvadorans to 
know and accept the truth, to investigate the crimes committed and who was responsible for 
them. Though there was, he reminded readers, the issue of the constitutionality of the Amnesty to 
resolve, "while the truth, which is a moral demand, hides her face from us, we will continue 
                                                
31 David Berliner, "The Abuses of Memory: Reflections on the Memory Boom in Anthropology," Anthropological 
Quarterly 78, no. 1 (2005): 201-2. 
32 Berliner, "The Abuses of Memory," 206. 
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believing in a twisted or partial history, and we will also continue to be a morally decayed 
country as a result." He concluded by recognizing that knowing what happened in the past might 
not prevent the re-commission of the same "errors," but it would at least make "us think about 
the past and make us cautious."33 For Villarán, there is clearly a connection between 
forgetting/amnesty and truth, as demonstrated in the previous chapter. But there is also a 
connection between these and memory. To forget is to lack historical memory, and what is 
forgotten are the details of the crimes—or perhaps they are simply errors?—committed during 
the conflict, some of which the Truth Commission revealed. Historical memory, then, consists of 
the crimes/errors committed in the war, and El Salvador needs to remember them. El Salvador 
needs "Memory and Truth," as Villarán titled the piece. His embrace of the Truth Commission's 
truth is not entirely complete, for he does acknowledge that it investigated only some of the 
crimes of the war, but it is nevertheless clear that the Amnesty promoted a forgetting of the 
crimes of the war, of the contents of the Truth Commission report, and that these—the historical 
memory of the war—cannot be lost. To do so is to jeopardize El Salvador's future.  
  The connection between not forgetting, historical memory, memory, and truth is very 
clearly seen in the Monumento a la Memoria y la Verdad, where the names of over 30,000 
victims—victims of both the guerrilla and military—have been carved into 85 meters of black 
granite. Gloria Guzmán Orellana, one of the founding members of Mujeres por la Dignidad y la 
Vida (Las Dignas, Women for Dignity and Life) and a woman who was heavily involved in 
promoting and organizing the construction of the Monument for Memory and Truth, co-authored 
a book with Irantzu Mendia Azkue which detailed some of the struggles to build the monument. 
The Comité Pro-Monumento a las Víctimas Civiles de Violaciones a los Derechos Humanos 
(Comité Pro-Monumento, Committee to Build a Monument to the Civilian Victims of Human 
Rights Violations)34 was created in 1997 specifically to promote the construction of a monument 
                                                
33 Julio Villarán, "Memoria y verdad," Vértice, 9 April 2000. 
34 The Pro-Monument Committee included Las Dignas, Tutela Legal del Arzobispado de San Salvador (Tutela 
Legal, Archbishop of San Salvador's Legal Aid Office), Museo de la Palabra y la Imagén (MUPI, Museum of 
the Word and the Image), Asociación Pro-Búsqueda de Niñas y Niños Desaparecidos, (Pro-Búsqueda, Pro-
Search Association of Disappeared Children), Asociación Centro de Paz (CEPAZ, Center of Peace 
Association), Centro para la Promoción de los Derechos Humanos "Madeleine Lagadec" (CPDH, Center for the 
Promotion of Human Rights "Madeleine Lagadec"), Comisión de Derechos Humanos de El Salvador (CDHES, 
Human Rights Commission of El Salvador), Comité de Familiares de Victimas de Violaciones a los Derechos 
Humanos "Marianella García Villas" (Codefam, Committee of Relatives of Victims of Human Rights 
Violations "Marianella García Villas"), Co-Madres, Comité de Madres y Familiares Cristianos de Presos, 
Desaparecidos, y Asesinados (COMAFAC, Christian Committee of Mother and Relatives of Prisoners, the 
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to honor the civilian victims of human rights violations, and only in cases where the victim had 
died or disappeared. The decision about which victims to honor was made after some debate. 
Ultimately, as the authors describe it, the Comité Pro-Monumento decided to honor this limited 
list of victims because it was inconceivable to think of having the names of the perpetrators and 
those they killed on the same monument.35 As seen in the photo below, some view the list as 
incomplete. The two victims listed in the top right corner were catechists. The three names below 
them are of the Aguilar family, massacred by the National Guard in 1979 in Toluca.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Those not remembered in granite.  
Photo taken by author. 12 May 2012. 
 
 The construction of the Monument for Memory and Truth was meant to fulfill the Truth 
Commission's recommendation regarding moral reparations, a recommendation the state had 
failed to fulfill. As a result, victims and civil society organizations took it upon themselves to 
create a space, not only for relatives of the disappeared and others victims to remember and 
mourn their loved ones, but also to prevent a more generalized forgetting. The inscription, 
dedicated in 2003, reads, "This is a memorial for encounters, to never forget [the victims], to 
honor their memory, to return their dignity to them, to not allow the horror to be repeated, and to 
lay the foundation for a culture of peace and true reconciliation. This is a space for hope, to 
continue dreaming and to build a more just, humane, and fair society." This last phrase, of 
course, is exactly why conservatives wanted the past to only be remembered for certain things. 
                                                                                                                                                       
Disappeared, and Assassinated), Asociación de Radios y Programas Participatios de El Salvador (ARPAS, 
Association of Radio and Participatory Programs of El Salvador), Asociación Yek Ineme, and the UCA.   
35 Gloria Guzmán Orellana and Irantzu Mendia Azkue, Mujeres con Memoria: Activistas del Movimiento de 
Derechos Humanos en El Salvador (Bilbao: Hegoa, 2013), 82-3.  
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The Monument for Memory and Truth, which is hard to criticize for truly being inspired by a 
will to forget, as Winter suggests about Holocaust memorials, is both backward and forward 
looking. The names of the victims, hopefully "immortalized in the Salvadoran conscience," will 
form the foundation, the base, of a new El Salvador. The past, and specifically past death, is the 
foundation of the future, of a future where the past can never, and will never, happen again.  
While the names of civilian victims on the monument are only metaphorically the 
foundation of a new El Salvador, the names of the children massacred in El Mozote truly are the 
foundation of something new, as Jesuit and Universidad Centroamericana "José Simeón Cañas" 
(UCA, Central American University "José Simeón Cañas") professor Mauricio Gaborit 
explained. The children's names are written at ground level on the tiles of the town's new church. 
The children, victims of brutal military oppression, are very clearly and definitely the foundation 
of the new church.36 They provide shape and strength to the base, both of which are required to  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The rebuilt church in El Mozote. 
Photo by author. 29 June 2012. 
 
build something new, something that will last. Without a strong foundation, buildings crumble 
and must be built once again. For those who planned the church, it would have been impossible 
                                                
36 Mauricio Gaborit, in conversation with author, 8 November 2013. 
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to erect the new church without the names of the children. In a similar fashion, without the 
victims named on the monument in San Salvador, and tens of thousands not named, it is 
impossible to build a new El Salvador.37 In this view, the dead, their memory, and the truth of the 
Truth Commission are very present and very actively work for non-repetition and reconciliation. 
For the organizations making up the Comité Pro-Monumento, the deaths of the over 30,000 
victims named on the monument, and the deaths of those not on the monument, responsibility for 
which lies on both sides, are truth and memory, and they are the foundation of a new nation. 
ARENA presidents, in contrast, declare that amnesty/forgetting are the foundation of the peace. 
Indeed, in 2013, former president Francisco Flores described the amnesty as the cornerstone of 
the peace;38 more than simply being the foundation of the new El Salvador, for conservatives 
amnesty/forgetting is the stone around which all other stones will be laid. 
 While the Comité Pro-Monumento talked only about truth, memory, and forgetting, that 
many organizations involved in the Comité were also members of the Comisión de Trabajo en 
Derechos Humanos Pro Memoria Histórica de El Salvador (Comisión Pro Memoria Histórica, 
Pro Historical Memory Human Rights Working Group of El Salvador) points to a clear 
connection between these and historical memory. The connection is even more clear in the 
discourse used to describe the work and closing of one of these organizations, the Oficina de 
Tutela Legal del Arzobispado de San Salvador (Tutela Legal, Archbishop of San Salvador's 
Legal Aid Office). Tutela Legal housed an extensive archive of human rights violations 
committed by both sides.39 The link between these denunciations and historical memory is clear 
in long-time director María Julia Hernández's championing of historical memory; she said, 
"Hiding historical memory and denying the inalienable rights of the victims have not provided 
Salvadoran society with a guarantee of non-repetition."40 Tutela Legal worked to document, 
preserve, and reveal the country's historical memory and to ensure that the victims could exercise 
                                                
37 The victims listed on the monument are quite similar to those included in the Truth Commission report, though 
the list of victims on the monument is more complete. Not only are there more names (though not enough as 
relatives or compañeros have added more names with paper and tape), but the monument also includes victims 
from before 1980, the start date of the Truth Commission's investigations. The Comité Pro-Monumento was not 
alone in insisting that pre-1980 events be remembered. Equipo Maíz, for example, insisted that the student 
victims of the military's 30 July 1975 massacre be remembered; Equipo Maíz, "El 30 de julio: fuego que 
enciende a estudiantes," La Página Maíz 300 (30 July 2010.)  
38 Gloria Morán, "Derogar Amnistía, un paso para la democracia," Contrapunto, 25 September 2013, 
http://www.contrapunto.com.sv/ddhh/derogar-amnistia-un-paso-para-la-democracia. 
39 Member of CDHES, conversation with author, 29 May 2012.   
40 Asociación de Derechos Humanos Tutela Legal "Dra. Maria Julia Hernandez," "Nuestra Labor," accessed 10 
September 2014, http://tutelalegalmariajh.com/nuestra_labor.php. 
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their rights, thereby contributing to non-repetition. Part of this work included providing 
information to the Truth Commission; 80% of the cases included in De la Locura a la Esperanza 
are in Tutela Legal's archive.41  
 That human rights violations are historical memory is even more clear in the 
denunciations about the Archdiocese's 30 September 2013 closing of Tutela Legal. The 
Archdiocese, under the direction of Archbishop José Luis Escobar Alas, said on 2 October that 
Tutela Legal had been closed to "adjust" the church's work to focus more on accompanying 
contemporary victims of human rights violations; a new organism would be created with this 
end, for offering legal aid cannot "only focus on the human rights which were violated in that 
historical moment." The archives, which the church recognized were part of the country and 
church's historical memory, would be transferred to a new Center for Documentation and 
Archives and "made available to researchers to help to build a society based on truth, justice, and 
respect for human right."42 This sounds innocuous enough, and certainly there are countless 
victims of post-Peace violence who need legal aid and accompaniment, but based on informal 
conversations with members of human rights organizations, and as Tutela Legal declared on 1 
October, the office was actually closed because the Corte Suprema de Justicia (CSJ, Supreme 
Court of Justice) was about to begin reviewing the constitutionality of the 1993 Amnesty, 
thereby opening the possibility of trials against the perpetrators of human rights violations.43 
Tutela Legal's vast archive contains evidence that might have been used in such trials. The 
human rights community, therefore, believe that the Archbishop, supported by a "fuerza oscura," 
a dark force, as in the photo below, taken at a demonstration in front of the National Cathedral 
protesting the decision, closed Tutela Legal as a way to protect the perpetrators and perpetuate 
impunity, as a way to truly contain evidence of gross human rights violations. 
 
 
 
                                                
41 Tutela Legal, "Tutela Legal informa a los comunicadores nacionales e internacionales y al pueblo salvadoreño," 
Diario Co-Latino, 3 October 2013, paid ad; Member of CDHES, interview with author. 
42 "Comunicado de la Arquidiócesis de San Salvador referente a la disolución de la oficina de Tutela Legal del 
Arzobispado," 2 October 2013, http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/salvador/doc/archivo7.html; Daniel Valencia 
Caravantes  and Gabriel Labrador, "Arzobispado cambia por tercera vez el argumento que lo llevó a cerrar 
Tutela Legal," El Faro, 7 October 2013, http://www.elfaro.net/es/201310/noticias/13544/. 
43 Tutela Legal, "Tutela Legal informa a los comunicadores nacionales e internacionales y al pueblo salvadoreño," 
Diario Co-Latino, 3 October 2013, paid ad. 
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Photo taken by author. 27 October 2013. 
 
The decision to close Tutela Legal was made suddenly, at least from the point of view of 
Tutela's director, Ovidio González, and other employees. They arrived at work to find the gate 
locked. In a protest a few days later, employees denounced the closing, calling for a stop to the 
"kidnapping of historical memory."44 The archives, therefore, are historical memory, a belief 
members of the Red Activista de El Salvador (Activist Network of El Salvador),45 other activists, 
and relatives shared. Those protesting the closing carried signs declaring, "Historical memory is 
not private property," as in the photo, and "Memory is not for sale." Another protest was called 
"Un Abrazo a la Memoria," "An Embrace of Memory." The Comisión Pro Memoria Histórica 
denounced the closing of Tutela Legal as a "serious setback for the preservation of the Historical 
Memory of our country, for the search for much-needed reconciliation."46 The attack on the 
                                                
44 Center for Justice and Accountability, 4 October 2013, 
https://www.facebook.com/CenterForJusticeAndAccountability/photos/pb.52340675418.-
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45 Activista is a worldwide organization of young people who struggle for social justice.  
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violento-cierre-de-la-oficina-de-tutela-legal-del-arzobispado/. Diario Co-Latino reported tha Pro Memoria 
Histórica wanted the archive to be declared a UNESCO World Heritage site, since it contains El Salvador's 
historical memory. See, for example, Alma Vilches, "Organizaciones piden que PDHH resguarde archivos 
históricos de ex Tutela Legal," Diario Co-Latino, 28 October 2013, 
http://www.diariocolatino.com/es/20131028/nacionales/121603/Organizaciones-piden-que-PDHH-resguarde-
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offices and archives of the Asociación Pro-Búsqueda de Niñas and Niños Desaparecidos (Pro-
Búsqueda, Pro-Search Association of Disappeared Children) shortly after was denounced in a 
similar fashion.  
The call for Salvadorans to gather in front of the National Cathedral and protest the 
closing of Tutela Legal, threats made against the Procuraduría para la Defensa de los Derechos 
Humanos (PDDH, Ombudman's Office for the Defense of Human Rights) and the Secretary of 
Culture in their attempt to protect the archive, and the attack on Pro-Búsqueda described these 
events as "crimes against Historical Memory" and demanded that the government investigate and 
punish those responsible. For victims and human rights organizations, and even for Archbishop 
Alas, historical memory and memory were understood to be the same as the human rights 
violations committed during the war, the majority of which were committed by the military and 
paramilitary organizations. Given Tutela Legal's important contribution to the investigations of 
the Truth Commission, in addition to containing the memory or historical memory of El 
Salvador, their archive also contained truth. 
 
Re-remembering the war/rewriting history 
 But declarations that all or some aspect of the past must be remembered are more than 
declarations that memory/historical memory/truth will help prevent repetition; they are more 
than just calls to remember the victims and support the Truth Commission and its findings. 
Human rights organizations called for the complete re-centering of understandings about the 
past; they wanted the victims' perspective to be the focus, as the Centro para la Promoción de los 
Derechos Humanos "Madeleine Lagadec" (CPDH, Center for the Promotion of Human Rights 
"Madeleine Lagadec") wrote in 2006. They proposed educating the youth with this new 
perspective with the aim of constructing a "more just society" in which human rights were 
respected.47 They proposed, therefore, re-writing the narrative of the war so that the victims took 
center stage. Using Manolo Vela Castañeda's "metaphorical" use of memory to describe "the 
                                                                                                                                                       
archivos-hist%C3%B3ricos-de-ex-Tutela-Legal.htm; Miguel Vaquerano, "PDDH pide declarar patrimonio 
histórico archivos de Tutela Legal," 30 October 2013, 
http://www.verdaddigital.com/index.php/nacionales/7103-pddh-pide-declarar-patrimonio-archivos-de-tutela-
legal. 
47 Comisión para la Promoción de los Derechos Humanos "Madeleine Lagadec," Informe de Investigación 
Temática: La Experiencia del CPDH "Madeleine Lagadec" en el Acompañamiento a Familiares de Víctimas en 
la Exigencia de Sus Derechos (San Salvador, 2006), 42. 
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combination of historical narratives and cultural creation around the past,"48 it is clear that re-
remembering the war is precisely what the CPDH proposed.  
 Luis Alvarenga, writing for Diario Co-Latino, had discussed this re-writing of the 
narrative of the war in 2004, affirming that "historical memory should not be ethically neutral," a 
comment which brings to mind Tojeira's view that remembering is denouncing. Alvarenga's 
comments were inspired by what he described as the "'historical cleansing''' of ARENA founder 
Roberto D'Aubuisson's reputation and his responsibility for gross human rights violations. 
Alvarenga identified this cleansing as part of a larger "battle to recover the ideological hegemony 
[the right] lost in the war," and in this battle, the right armed itself with "their symbols, 
personalities, and historical interpretations" to win. In the right-wing, purified view, D'Aubuisson 
became a "guardian of peace and democracy." Since, as Alvarenga stated, historical memory in 
El Salvador was so weak, since there were no other "images" to challenge the right-wing view of 
him, it "is beginning to be etched in the collective conscious" and achieve the "status of truth."49 
 Alvarenga's comments also bring history more clearly into the picture, for he declared 
that it was important for Salvadorans to know "history told from the victims' point of view." 
Returning to the impossibility of historical memory being neutral, he also wrote that decisions 
must be made when dealing with historical memory; "above all," a perspective must be selected. 
Will historical memory be approached from the point of view of the perpetrators, or from that of 
the victims? The right, which worshipped D'Aubuisson as a hero, clearly chose the perpetrator's 
perspective and Alvarenga cautioned against it, against attempting to write history by omitting 
those things which "stand in contrast to" one's own interpretation. The right, therefore, was not 
performing "historiographical work"; rather, they were indoctrinating and ideologizing. The 
ultimate effect of this was to cover up what had happened. None of this helped to interpret the 
past or understand the present, which was, he said, what history was supposed to do.50 Clearly, of 
course, at least some on the left can also be accused of indoctrinating and ideologizing and so not 
performing historiographical work. Alvarenga himself seems to commit this error when he 
rejected the perpetrator's perspective in favor of the victims'. Surely those who write history from 
the victims' perspective also leave out whatever "stand[s] in contrast to" their interpretation and 
                                                
48 Manolo Vela Castañeda, "Memorias de una Batalla: Guatemala," unpublished manuscript, 21-2. 
49 Luis Alvarenga, "Por qué la memoria histórica no debe ser éticamente neutral," Diario Co-Latino, 3 November 
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50 Ibid. 
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experience. Nevertheless, it is clear that when Alvarenga talks about history told from the 
victims' perspective, when he says that historical memory should not be ethically neutral, he is 
talking about the same thing. He uses history and historical memory (which was already equated 
to memory in the public discourse) interchangeably,51 and both, it seems, should be based on 
what the human rights community sees as the truth of the war. Much as the inscription to the 
Monument for Truth and Memory affirms, putting the victims' stories and their truth at the heart 
of an understanding of the past is essential. 
 Jesuit Mauricio Gaborit also acknowledges the existence of two distinct ideas about the 
war. In "Historical Memory: reverting to history from the victims' [perspective]," Gaborit 
describes two distinct narratives which exist in El Salvador: the victims' and the official 
narrative. While the former is a narrative of suffering, the latter "does not recognize this 
suffering, denies it, or presents it in such a way that it is disqualified or denigrated." The state, he 
writes, sees the official version as the only version, as "true and essential for national 
reconciliation, although it is really based on impunity and its objective is its own perpetuation."52 
The perpetrators, in Gaborit's view, seek to turn "their version of what happened" into the official 
history so that this version becomes the collective memory of the war. They do this through 
various strategies, including "forced forgetting," which involves, for example, purposefully 
leaving out important events or "manipulat[ing] the connections between events" and presenting 
the perpetrators as the real victims.53 This official narrative of the war, "constructed by the 
exercise of power" and insisting on wiping the slate clean (i.e., forgetting), stands in opposition 
to a second narrative of the war, based on the "suffering which injustice produces." It is a 
narrative rooted in the experience of the victims and constructed from their own perspective. 
This other narrative, the "memory of these collective events," is geared, first and foremost, 
                                                
51 Of course not all on to the left of the political spectrum believed that history and memory were the same. 
Former guerrilla commander, Dagoberto Gutiérrez, offered his views on the matter in 2011, both online at 
"Simpatizantes FMLN" and in Diario Co-Latino. In the former, he wrote, in relation to the potential capture of 
the officers named in Spain as responsible for the Jesuit massacre, that "History is a trip to the past; memory is 
also a trip to the past but history has a degree of commitment to the truth. Memory is based on 
remembering."(Luis Canizalez, "Dagoberto Gutiérrez: 'Si no hacés justicia en casa, otro la hará,'" Simpatizantes 
FMLN, 11 August 2011, http://www.simpatizantesfmln.org/blog/archives/7596.) He followed this up a few days 
later in Diario Co-Latino with "History, official in this case, indicated that everything is resolved; but memory 
shows that nothing is, that truth, justice, perdón and reconciliation are pending, and that, in their absence, a 
social war which is even more cruel, even more bloody has been set up, and that we are living through the most 
uncertainty in our history." (Dagoberto Gutiérrez, "El regimen verdadero," Diario Co-Latino, 15 August 2011.) 
52 Mauricio Gaborit, "Memoria histórica: revertir la historia desde las víctimas," Estudios Centroamericanos 61, 
no. 693-694 (July-August 2006), 666-7. 
53 Gaborit, "Memoria histórica," 674 and 678.  
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toward "laying the foundation of the right to the truth" and clarifying what happened in the past. 
The reweaving of the social fabric would follow from this foundation, a reweaving that includes 
the "reconstruction of group and interpersonal relations damaged by the official lie." Comparing 
the two narratives, he declares that, while the official narrative relies on "anesthetization and 
amnesia," the second uses "historical memory as the solid foundation of social reconstruction."54 
As had the CPDH and Alvarenga, Gaborit argues that the victims' stories and suffering—the 
memory/historical memory of the war—stand in contrast to a narrative based on lies and 
forgetting, and it is memory/historical memory, and not forgetting, which will help rebuild 
Salvadoran society. At the same time, and unlike the CPDH and Alvarenga, history is not 
identical to historical memory in Gaborit's writing. Rather, narrative/memory/historical 
memory/truth are the building blocks of history. 
 The non-governmental Comisión de Derechos Humanos de El Salvador (CDHES, 
Human Rights Commission of El Salvador) had a similar view of memory/historical memory 
and history. The CDHES, though its Documentation Center of Historical Memory "Marianella 
García Villas," aimed to preserve El Salvador's historical memory—denunciations of human 
rights violations—so that the history of the country would be known.55 For the CDHES, 
historical memory—the thousands of pages of denunciations in the Documentation Center, 
denunciations very similar to those in Tutela Legal's archive that contributed to the Truth 
Commission's investigations—helps to write history, and preserving one will help to make the 
other known. This connection between historical memory and history is also clear in journalist 
Ivón López's 2000 article in Diario Co-Latino about the commemoration of the Tenango and 
Guadalupe massacres. López describes the commemoration as oriented toward "maintain[ing] 
the historical memory of our country" and includes the testimonies of various survivors. These 
testimonies, she wrote, collected by the Movement for the Rescue of Our History, allow 
Salvadorans to know the "cruel history of the war," "Despite official forgetting."56 Here, López 
adds an extra element to the how the past is talked about: commemoration (i.e., remembering the 
testimonies together); the larger discourse, however, remains, as does an understanding of 
historical memory (i.e., the victims' testimonies) as being the foundation of history.  
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56 Ivón López, "Pese al olvido oficial: Conmemoran por segunda vez 17 anivesario de masacre Tenango y 
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President Mauricio Funes, elected in 2009 for the FMLN, agreed. Celebrating the 
anniversary of the peace in El Mozote in 2012, Funes, in the name of the state, asked for perdón 
for the massacre where nearly 1000 were killed over the course of several days in 1981.57 (This 
request for perdón will be discussed in depth in Chapter Six.) He also recognized that Domingo 
Monterrosa, José Azmitia, and Natividad de Jesús Cáceres were responsible for the massacre. 
Funes then instructed the Armed Forces to "revise their interpretation of history in light of the 
historic recognition" he made that day. In addition, Funes instructed the military to stop honoring 
those, like Monterrosa, who could be tied to the commission of gross human rights violations.58 
Diario Co-Latino's 18 January editorial quoted Funes as declaring, "I am here in El Mozote to 
recognize the truth," a truth which included the names of three of those responsible for the 
massacre, "among others named by the Truth Commission." "[T]his painful truth," he added, was 
one which "some have wanted to hide for more than 30 years."59 It was based on this truth—the 
truth De la Locura a la Esperanza revealed—that Funes instructed the military to revise its 
interpretation of history and not to honor perpetrators as heroes, a truth which, as seen above, 
was itself based to a large extent on Tutela Legal's archive of denunciations and testimony. In the 
end, Funes told the military to revise history based on what public discourse about the past had 
already equated with historical memory. 
 Despite the blurriness of some of the reporting on what it was exactly that Funes had 
asked the military to do, whether his instructions were related to historical memory or history,60 
Funes really did seem clear in what he wanted the military to do: revise their interpretation of 
                                                
57 La Prensa Gráfica's interestingly, called the massacre genocide several times in mid-January. (Fernando 
Romero, "Vigésimo aniversario de los Acuerdos de Paz en El Mozote," La Prensa Gráfica, 16 January 2012; 
Fernando Romero, Amadeo Cabrera, and María José Saavedra, "Funes ordena reescribir la historia a la luz de la 
masacre de El Mozote," La Prensa Gráfica, 17 January 2012; "María Márquez quiere saber 'Qué y a quién' 
perdonar," La Prensa Gráfica, 18 January 2012.) 
58 Roberto Flores and Iván Escobar, " 'Este pedido de perdón no pretende borrar el dolor': Presidente Funes," 
Diario Co-Latino, 16 January 2012; Roberto Flores, "Presidente Funes instruye a militares revisar su 
interpretación de la historia," Diario Co-Latino, 17 January 2012. Revising history was not limited to the 
military. Funes made the same request to political parties and also announced that school textbooks would be 
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59 Editorial, "El Mozote y los 20 años del Acuerdo de Paz," Diario Co-Latino, 18 January 2012. 
60 Diario Co-Latino reporter Beatriz Castillo wrote that Minister of Defense José Atilio Benítez confirmed that a 
"commission to evaluate historical memory" would be created. (Beatriz Castillo, "Ministro de Defensa confirma 
creación de comisión que evaluará memoria histórica," Diario Co-Latino.19 January 2012.) La Prensa 
Gráfica's article on the same thing spoke only of reviewing the army's history. (Fernando Romero, "Defensa 
crea comisión para revisar historia del Ejército," La Prensa Gráfica, 19 January 2012.) 
180 
history so that it reflected the Truth Commission and victims' truth of the El Mozote massacre. 
He asked the military to reinterpret history to be more from the victims' perspective, just as the 
CPDH, Alvarenga, and Gaborit had. Indeed, in addition to being unprecedented in post-Peace El 
The Military Museum in the El Zapote Barracks in San Salvador still had a room dedicated to 
Monterrosa, his heroism, and his life as a soldier and officer. Photos by author. 3 June 2012. 
 
Salvador, Funes' request for perdón, his recognition of the military's responsibility for the 
massacre, and his public naming of Monterrosa, Azmitía, and Cáceres as perpetrators contributed 
to precisely the re-interpretation of history which he called on the military and political parties to 
carry out, a history which affirms and does not deny the victims' memory/truth. ARENA 
governments, the media, and the military, as seen in Chapter Four, preferred to silence and forget 
the crimes of the past and forget and erase responsibility for them. Indeed, how could someone 
have committed crimes that had never really happened? To officially declare that Monterrosa 
was anything other than a hero who died saving the nation from the peril of terrorism and 
international communism was unheard of. This recognition alone was significant enough, and 
showed Funes' belief in the victims' truth; as the elected president of the country, his declarations 
were finally (and very belatedly) an official recognition of that truth. Yet in addition to simply 
naming the perpetrators of the massacre and recognizing state responsibility for it, Funes 
requested perdón in the name of the same state which had ultimately been responsible. All of this 
is part of the process of re-interpreting the history of the conflict, this time placing the victims 
and their truth at the center of that history, for it is their truth which provide history's raw 
material. 
 Stepping back from the relationship between historical memory/memory/truth and 
history, Funes asked the military to do more than re-interpret history based on the victims' truth. 
He was also asking the military to re-remember the war; he wanted the military to interpret and 
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understand the war through the victims' eyes, through the eyes of those who see Monterrosa as a 
villain, not a hero. This, to be sure, includes the FMLN. Drawing on Stern and Vela Castañeda, 
to insist that one of the perpetrators no longer be honored as a hero is to ask that the military re-
imagine Monterrosa's role in the war and that it alter its memory, a task which is far more 
difficult to achieve, or even to attempt to achieve.  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
"Our heroes!!!" Monterrosa and Azmitia. Military Museum at El Zapote Barracks.  
Photo by author. 3 June 2012.  
 
Some former officers saw an opportunity in Funes' statement. As they put it, it would 
finally give the military a chance to tell its version of events.61 This attitude is in keeping with the 
work of retired officer, Juan Orlando Zepeda Herrera. In his 2008 book, Zepeda Herrera said he 
sought to "put light where there is still darkness, bring memory where there is forgetting, 
understand what happened, analyzing the causes and effects, that is, to revise the history of what 
happened in El Salvador."62 Retired officer Sigifrido Ochoa Pérez, who was named as one of the 
                                                
61 Fernando Romero, "Militares con reservas ante disposiciones de Funes," La Prensa Gráfica, 18 January 2012; 
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perpetrators of the 1982 El Calabazo massacre,63 was the most outspoken in his opposition to 
Funes' directive. La Prensa Gráfica reported Ochoa Pérez saying that it was "unfortunate" that 
Funes named Monterrosa (who journalist Fernando Romero reminded readers was a friend of 
Ochoa Pérez) as "the main perpetrator of the El Mozote massacre" and ordered the Army to 
review its history. As Romero reported it, Ochoa Pérez declared that Monterrosa "and all those 
who died giving their lives for the country are heroes."64 Diario Co-Latino quoted a few of 
Ochoa Pérez's more fiery statements in an article describing the officer as "challenging" Funes. 
Ochoa Pérez said that, "For us, Azmitia and Monterrosa are heroes, therefore, he should not stick 
his nose into this business of wanting to change history."65 Little energy was wasted in denying 
"the facts" of the massacre; the focus was on Monsterrosa's role in the war and the meaning and 
emotion attached to his life and death. The focus is on memory and how he is remembered, 
thereby silencing the massacre to a large extent. 
  While Ochoa Pérez's statements were wrought with anger, the editors of La Prensa 
Gráfica rejected Funes' actions with less bile, though equal force. The editors expressed their 
dismay at Funes' focus on the El Mozote massacre (responsibility for which the editors failed to 
mention). "As tragic and painful" as the massacre was, they wrote, to focus on just one event of 
"that period" is to continue the partiality with which the war is discussed. Funes' focus on one 
event contributed to the "fragmentation" of what happened, which "inevitably generates an 
interminable blame game." What was needed was a more complete view of the war. The editors 
further criticized Funes for his talk of "rewriting history" with all the "multiple distortions" that 
this has always involved. Though the editors recognized the importance of knowing the truth, it 
was important to search for it "without passion and without partiality." Salvadorans should know 
the truth, not so that they could blame each other for what happened, but so that the "truth 
becomes the supreme deterrent of any type of offensive or abusive behavior."66 Here, the editors 
were taking the cue from Cristiani and limiting the usefulness of truth to non-repetition. They 
were, however, clearer than he was when he spoke of memory; the past should certainly not be 
used to place blame.  
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 The editors repeated the same critical discourse heard after the publication of De la 
Locura a la Esperanza. Funes’ focus on the military’s violations, like that of the Truth 
Commission, was not impartial. Choosing El Mozote was clearly evidence of Funes' politics. But 
perhaps the bigger issue, and further proof of Funes' bias, was that, as the editors suggested, 
talking of rewriting history meant rewriting the oft-repeated declaration that the war ended with 
neither victors nor vanquished. That the war was "tied" had inspired negotiations to begin in 
earnest. It became the foundation of the post-Peace era and was a point of pride for many. When 
Funes insisted on rewriting history (even if he did not really do this), was he, at root, declaring 
the FMLN (presumably) to be the victors of the war, thereby bulldozing the foundation of the 
post-Peace era? The editors' statements could certainly be interpreted as a warning that this was 
what he was attempting to do, but the piece left readers to draw their own conclusions about it as 
the editors retreated to a more familiar focus on the preventative role truth could play in the 
future and on criticizing Funes for "stirring up the waters," as the editorial was titled. There are, 
it seems, surface truths and truths which lie beneath that surface, truths which require the waters 
to be stirred if they are to emerge. While the former prevented repetition, the latter would only 
lead to renewed conflict. The editors' truth was not Funes' below the surface truth, nor was it the 
human rights community's truth. Though the "facts" might have been the same, the editors' truth 
was a truth stripped of the passion and emotion which had inspired many activists to organize 
and fight for decades for the(ir) truth to be known and the fate of the disappeared to be 
discovered. It was a scientific truth, not a human one. But it was also not Ochoa Pérez's truth, 
which was nothing if not emotional. Calling for an impartial search for the truth (which would 
logically reveal an impartial truth) was also a rejection of Ochoa Pérez; how can calling anyone a 
hero be impartial?  
 
Yet perhaps Funes' call for the military to revise its interpretation of history should not 
have caused such alarm. History is something that happened but really has little relevance for the 
present, or so it seems based on statements made by a range of public figures. By the time Funes 
spoke of history, some discursive groundwork had been laid which discounted the importance of 
history. For example, the US declassified thousands of documents in 1993 in the wake of a series 
of attacks on members of the FMLN, which was not yet a political party. The attacks had all the 
characteristics of having been carried out by death squads or similar "illegal armed groups." The 
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report about these documents confirmed the continued existence of death squads in post-Peace El 
Salvador. In addition to rejecting the report, Cristiani declared that it was not worthwhile to 
"investigate what happened in the past," as El Diario de Hoy wrote. The newspaper also quoted 
Cristiani as stating that, "We must waste neither ink nor saliva on questions of the past....the 
important thing is that [the past] does not happen again."67 Perhaps if the report had concluded 
that illegal armed groups no longer existed in El Salvador (or that they never had existed), 
Cristiani's response would have been different. 
Others repeated a similar type of discourse about history's lack of importance in the 
present. As he was parting ways with the FMLN in 1994, former guerrilla commander Joaquín 
Villalobos affirmed that the FMLN was not "politically viable" and should "become part of 
national history."68 For Villalobos, history, like the FMLN, had no place in the present. President 
Antonio Saca repeated that sentiment in 2007. Declaring that the Peace Accords were finiquito, 
that they were finished, that all they required the government and FMLN to do had been done, he 
added that they were "already part of history."69 To be part of history is clearly a sign that 
something is over, that it no longer has a place in the present, that it no longer matters. Marvin 
Galeas, former guerrilla and El Diario de Hoy columnist, made a similar point in his book, 
Crónicas de Guerra. He wrote that for his daughter and her generation, "prison and torture, the 
blood of students flowing on pavement..., the shadowy face under a hood, the angry, distant, and 
fanatical look above a bandana or ski mask, the terrible anguish of a mother who looks for her 
kidnapped or disappeared child are only things which adults sometimes talk about or which are 
mentioned in a Social Studies course in school. [They are] history. Things which happened some 
time ago."70 While he believed that youth should know what happened, he argued that the 
emotions which often accompany a retelling of what happened in the past should remain in the 
past. The past, he said, should not poison the present.71 
 History is unimportant. It is something that is taught in school and can quickly be 
forgotten after the exam because it really does not matter. If this is the common attitude toward 
history, perhaps Funes' chose his words poorly; perhaps, rather than speaking of history, he 
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ought to have spoken of something else, of memory or historical memory. Yet, at the same time, 
the word history is powerful. History is understood as something which does not change. It is the 
story of the past, something which even members of the military recognized, which is surely part 
of the reason why they resisted following Funes' instructions. Nevertheless, it is significant that 
students at the military institute might learn in a course about the history of the war that the 
military massacred civilians, that not all those that the military killed had taken up arms to 
"terrorize" the country and overthrow the government. This represents a shift in El Salvador, a 
shift which includes at least a partial re-evaluation of whose story—whose truth—should be the 
foundation of what Salvadorans know about their past.  
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Chapter Six 
El Salvador and Guatemala: Contested Discourse 
 
 
Olvidar, le dije, es amnesia o amnistía, es crear una sociedad sin historia. Es renegar de nosotros 
mismos. La tabula rasa es una tarea imposible. Siempre hay una huella que permanece vigente, 
sea como reflexión verdadera sea como fantasma que atormenta. Quienes dicen que sólo 
debemos ver hacia el futuro, quieren fundar una nación olvidadiza y sin historia, una nación que 
reniegue de sí misma, que se mutile. Sería un suicidio colectivo. 
–Rafael Lara-Martínez1 
 
 William Roseberry argues that moments of rupture are when "historical markers or 
monuments...provoke profoundly different meanings and memories for different groups within a 
social field." In these moments, the hegemonic process and the struggle over discourse are 
visible.2 Steve Stern makes a similar point about memory knots, declaring that they inspire 
struggles between competing memories and provide a point of entry into understanding memory 
frameworks and how they are formed.3 This chapter explores two such moments of rupture: 
Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN, Farabundo Martí National 
Liberation Front) president Mauricio Funes' 16 January 2012 request for perdón for the El 
Mozote massacre, and Guatemala's 2013 genocide trial of former head of state, Efraín Ríos 
Montt. Discussions about the past exploded in the public sphere at these moments, revealing how 
discourse works and how much, or little, it is possible to maneuver within the limits of pre-
existing discursive/memory/truth frameworks.  
 When Funes was elected, the political dominance of Alianza Republicana Nacionalista 
(ARENA, Nationalist Republican Alliance) certainly ruptured, as did the government's treatment 
of the past. Funes' election marked a shift in the discourse emanating from the presidential 
palace, though this shift remained within the limits set by the larger discourse which pits truth 
against forgetting. In requests for perdón, the granting of awards and honors to significant human 
                                                
1 To forget, I told him, is amnesia or amnesty, it is to create a society without history. It is to repudiate ourselves. 
The tabula rasa is an impossible task. There is always a remnant that remains, whether it is as a true reflection 
or as a ghost that torments. Those who only say that we must look to the future want to found a forgetful nation, 
a nation without history, a nation that disowns itself, which mutilates itself. It would be collective suicide. (Lya 
Ayala, "De Azatlán a Cozcatlán," 3000: suplemento cultural, 14 January 2012.) 
2 William Roseberry, "Hegemony, Power, and Languages of Contention," in The Politics of Difference: Ethnic 
Premises in a World of Power, eds. Edwin N. Wilmsen and Patrick McAllister (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1996), 82-3. 
3 Steve J. Stern, Remembering Pinochet's Chile: On the Eve of London 1998 (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2004), 124. 
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rights activists, and the declaration of massacre sites as national patrimony, Funes administration 
officials increasingly mentioned the past and promoted the work that truth and memory do. As 
for conservatives, with mainstream media's help, they have continued to insist quite loudly on 
the truth of their truth and have maintained their own discourse regarding how best to achieve 
non-repetition and reconciliation (i.e., by forgetting). In this moment of rupture, the struggle over 
discourse is visible, as Funes pushes presidential discourse to be more like that of the human 
rights community. Conservatives' response is to push back, to insist on the work that forgetting 
does, lest their own discourse be consumed by one focusing on truth and memory.  
 Funes' announcement that he would travel to El Mozote to celebrate the 20th anniversary 
of the signing of the final Peace Accord and ask for perdón for the massacre generated much 
debate. This is at least partly due to the fact that his request for perdón, on that day, in that place, 
tangled the memory knot of El Mozote with that of the anniversary of the signing of the Peace 
Accord. In the process, the knots became more knotted, causing the social body to scream even 
louder. But also, when Funes asked for perdón, and recognized the state's responsibility for the 
massacre, the narrative of the conflict which emerged was distinct from the then-dominant, 
conservative historical narrative. Conservatives responded by loudly rejecting both Funes' 
particular truth and his focus on the work that truth does. Thus, when Funes asked for perdón, it 
is possible to see the different forces at work in El Salvador jockeying to be heard. In this 
moment, the contours and limits of El Salvador's post-Peace discourse are clearly visible. 
 Much the same can be said of the discussions that took place in Guatemala surrounding 
the 2013 genocide trial of Efraín Ríos Montt. It is important to note that the trial took place 
during the ultra conservative presidency of Otto Pérez Molina, who the human rights community 
also accuses of being a genocidaire. During the trial, and during Pérez Molina's administration 
more generally, debates about the past have become louder than ever before, and they are not 
only confined to newspapers, as seen below. The existence of a common discursive framework 
determined by the human rights community has meant that, except for a few outliers, few openly 
declare that forgetting will best work toward reconciliation and non-repetition. Instead, there has 
been much debate about the narrative truth of the conflict, about whether genocide was 
committed or not. In this discussion, conservatives insist that the narrative of the conflict should 
not include genocide, while the human rights community insists that it should. Both, therefore, 
promote their version of the truth. 
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"Si hubo genocidio." "Kaibil President: whether you admit it or not, si hubo genocidio."  
6a Avenida. Zona 1. Ciudad de Guatemala. Photo by author. 21 May 2012. 
 
 The trial is certainly one of Roseberry's moments of rupture, as it is a memory knot. In 
the debate about the trial and about the question of genocide, the hegemonic struggle is clearly 
visible and the narrative of the war written. In these discussions about the past, different, 
fragmented groups promote their own views about genocide. Yet these discussions are also about 
the trial itself and about whether debates about the past are productive or destructive, about 
whether debate and the trial contribute to or prevent reconciliation. The debate about genocide 
also reveals the muddied nature of the discursive waters in Guatemala. Well-respected allies of 
the human rights community insisted on memory but also denied that genocide was committed 
and argued that the trial was divisive. They were attacked as a result. The hegemonic process 
revealed at these moments of rupture shows that common discursive frameworks police what can 
be said both externally and internally; these frameworks limit the language those who oppose 
them can use, while also determining the boundaries of what those who embrace them can say. 
In these discussions, it is possible to observe the narrative of the past being written, its 
boundaries pushed and then contracting once again. 
 Underlying the debates about the past are hopes to determine each country's respective 
memory, to dictate what Guatemalans or Salvadorans believe the truth of the conflict to be. This 
is hardly surprising. As Jacques Le Goff noted, determining what people know and remember (or 
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forget) about the past is "one of the great stakes...of dominated and dominating classes, all of 
them struggling for power or for life, for survival and for advancement."4 Yet limiting the range 
of truths, narratives, and memories about the past to only one endangers the goals of 
reconciliation and non-repetition that, in most cases, first inspired the search for "the truth." 
 
El Salvador 
 Calls for memory (a memory rooted in "the truth," as opposed to amnesty and forgetting) 
and a more generalized recognition of human rights violations (both their truth and their place in 
the public sphere) increased significantly during Mauricio Funes' administration. As well, the 
truth/narrative of the past evident in Funes and the FMLN's words closely resembled the human 
rights community's truth of the war, as will be seen. Funes' election represented a moment of 
rupture in El Salvador. Yet it is important to keep the nature of the relationship between Funes, 
the FMLN, the victims, and the human rights community in mind while exploring Funes' 
discourse. While the human rights community certainly cheered Funes and the FMLN's victory, 
their relationship was not always close and easy. As Ralph Sprenkels argues, there is a general 
feeling of "disenchantment" with the FMLN and a feeling that the FMLN has sidelined the very 
organizations which supported it during the war and were, in some cases, its public face.5 
Certainly the experience of the Comité de Madres y Familiares de Detenidos-Desaparecidos y 
Asesinados Políticos de El Salvador "Monseñor Óscar Arnulfo Romero" (Co-Madres, 
Committee of Mothers and Relatives of the Detained-Disappeared and Political Victims 
"Monseñor Óscar Arnulfo Romero") and their campaign to be recognized as a non-profit 
organization points to this. While Co-Madres' status was finally awarded in 2013, in a 
conversation in 2012, a member of Co-Madres was highly critical of the delay, suggesting that 
the FMLM was little different from ARENA in its attitude to past human rights violations.6 
                                                
4 Jacques le Goff, History and Memory, trans. Steven Rendall and Elizabeth Claman (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1992), 97-8. 
5 Ralph Sprenkels, The Price of Peace: The Human Rights Movement in Postwar El Salvador (Amsterdam: 
Center for Latin American Studies and Documentation, 2005), 82-104. 
6 "Gobernación entrega personería jurídica al Comité de Madres y Familiares de Detenidos-Desaparecidos y 
Asesinados Políticos de El Salvador 'Monseñor Óscar Arnulfo Romero,' " Ministerio de Gobernación y 
Desarrollo Teritorial, 28 January 2013, 
http://www.gobernacion.gob.sv/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&catid=1:noticias-
ciudadano&id=1541:gobernacion-entrega-personeria-juridica-al-comite-de-madres-y-familiares-de-detenidos-
desaparecidos-y-asesinados-politicos-de-el-salvador-monsenor-oscar-arnulfo-romero&Itemid=77; Member of 
Co-Madres, interview with author, 7 May 2012. 
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Funes' own relationship with the FMLN was also tense and complex, and declarations that he 
was guided by the teaching and ideology of monseñor Romero were perhaps more important in 
determining his discourse than his ties to the FMLN.7 He was, in this, the first president to 
identify with the victims in some way.  
 Despite these tensions, the FMLN and Funes are very different from ARENA, and the 
past was more present in the public sphere than ever before. Yet the extent of the rupture with 
the past that Funes' election represented must not be over-stated. While the government's 
discourse shifted, the discursive contest between truth and forgetting which dominates El 
Salvador has not. Despite Funes' election, El Salvador has continued to discuss the past, and its 
importance in the present and future, in much the same way since 1992. ARENA, after all, is still 
very powerful, politically controlling significant portions of the country. The mainstream media 
is still owned by conservatives who are generally allied with ARENA and who continue to insist 
on amnesty and forgetting, and that the guerrilla committed just as many violations as the 
military.   
 Even so, it is undeniable that the discourse that rejects forgetting in favor of truth, 
memory, and historical memory is more present and powerful than ever before. Following Stern, 
El Salvador's emblematic memory is no longer what it was during 17 years of ARENA 
government. Stern, of course, underlined the non-permanent nature of emblematic memory as 
dominant memory frameworks lose influence and "dissident" emblematic memories become 
more mainstream and socially important. Stern pointed out that the shift in the dominant memory 
framework can only happen when dissident emblematic memories become more widely 
circulated, for example in the media.8 This certainly has happened in El Salvador since the 
FMLN came to power; since then, mainstream media has increasingly included government 
actions or declarations which echo the human rights community's discourse of truth, memory, 
and historical memory, as well as its narrative of the war, even if only to reject them. 
 In June 2012, the Office of the President published a news update titled "President Funes' 
government recognizes the truth and promotes reparation measures for the victims of the armed 
conflict." In this summary of the government's actions oriented toward recognizing the truth, the 
                                                
7 See, for example, Fernando Romero, "Funes viaja hoy al Vaticano por causa de Óscar Arnulfo Romero," La 
Prensa Gráfica, 22 May 2013. 
8 Stern, Remembering Pinochet's Chile, 116. 
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Presidency affirmed that Funes' actions were "[u]nlike previous governments."9 The break with 
the past was repeated in other government publications. A few months earlier, for example, the 
Secretariat of Communications of the Office of the President published a special insert for the 
20th anniversary of the Peace. "Leaving behind a past marked by the denial of what happened," 
the publication asserted, "the Salvadoran government is carrying out important efforts to rescue 
historical memory and spread the truth of what happened during the past armed conflict."10  
 Efforts to acknowledge and then spread the truth, to rescue historical memory, are 
evidence of a rupture with the past and include, among other things: Funes' recognition of the 
massacred Jesuits' legacy and granting El Salvador's highest honor to them; his recognition of the 
state's responsibility for serious human rights violations and abuses of power committed during 
the war, and his related request for perdón in 2010; his request for perdón in relation to Romero's 
assassination and the construction of a mural at San Salvador's international airport in Romero's 
honor; and the creation, by executive decree, of the Comisión Nacional de Búsqueda de Niños y 
Niñas Desaparecidas durante el Conflicto Armado Interno (National Commission for the Search 
for Children Disappeared during the Internal Armed Conflict).11 As well, in 2011, on the 31st 
anniversary of the massacre at Las Aradas, Secretary of Culture Ramón Rivas confirmed his 
appreciation for grassroots efforts to "keep the historical memory of what happened alive." 
Declaring that what happened must not be forgotten so that it never happens again, he announced 
that he would work to get the massacre site officially declared part of El Salvador's cultural 
heritage, as the survivors wished. And it was the following year. Rivas added that declaring Las 
Aradas a cultural heritage site would help keep human rights violations in the country's historical 
memory.12 Similarly, and also breaking with the past, the Monumento a la Memoria y la Verdad 
(Monument for Memory and Truth) was declared a protected heritage site and former director of 
                                                
9 Presidencia de la República, "Gobierno del Presidente Funes reconoce la verdad e impulsa medidas de 
reparación a víctimas del conflicto armado," Presidencia de la República, 4 June 2012, 
http://www.presidencia.gob.sv/index.php/novedades/noticias/item/2542-04-junio-2012-/-gobierno-del-
presidente-funes-reconoce-la-verdad-e-impulsa-medidas-de-reparaci%C3%B3n-a-v%C3%ADctimas-del-
conflicto-armado.html. 
10 Secretaría de Comunicaciones de la Presidencia, "20 anos de la firma de los Acuerdos de Paz," La Prensa 
Gráfica, 15 January 2012. 
11 Ibid.; Presidencia de la República, "Gobierno del Presidente Funes reconoce la verdad e impulsa medidas de 
reparación a víctimas del conflicto armado," La Prensa Gráfica, 15 January 2012. 
12 Ramón D. Rivas, "La masacre de Las Aradas, río Sumpul," Diario Co-Latino, 20 May 2011. This is so 
important because "heritage" is protected by the Heritage Law. ("Se declara Bien Cultural de la Nación al 
caserío Las Aradas, Chalatenango," 15 May 2012, http://www.elsalvadornoticias.net/2012/05/15/declaran-bien-
cultural-de-la-nacion-al-caserio-las-aradas-chalatenango/.)   
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the Oficina de Tutela Legal del Arzobispado de San Salvador (Tutela Legal, Archbishop of San 
Salvador's Legal Aid Office), María Julia Hernández, was posthumously honored for her work 
recovering historical memory.13 All of these things force open El Salvador's memory box.  
 It is difficult not to notice that the military or other state-sponsored security institutions 
are responsible for all of these violations; it was not the guerrilla who killed Romero or 
(generally speaking) stole children from their families. Thus, in the Funes' administration's 
imaginary, as in the human rights community's, rescuing historical memory and spreading the 
truth seem to only relate to the military's crimes. There is not much space for other memories or 
truths in the truth the Funes administration's new policies were dedicated to discovering. Yet as 
limiting as the truth the Funes administration embraced might be, it is, like the administration's 
policies which dealt with the past, very unlike previous governments' truth. Funes' truth is very 
clearly the same truth the human rights community has long championed. The same can be said 
of Funes' discourse more generally. Whereas previous presidents focused on the work that 
forgetting does, the Funes administration lauded the work that memory and truth do. In this, 
then, Funes and his discourse "belong" with that of the human rights community. 
 The struggle over discourse and the narrative of the war were on full display in debates 
related to Funes' 16 January 2012 speech celebrating the 20th anniversary of the signing of the 
final Peace Accord. The 16th of January is one of Stern's memory knots; it is a day when the past 
is very obviously present and where memories and visions of the past come into focus and 
conflict. The same can be said of El Mozote, and when these two knots intersect, the past is 
doubly present. Funes, as the editors of Diario Co-Latino described, began the day by declaring, 
                                                
13 Laural Bernal, "Declaran Monumento a la Verdad y la Memoria como bien protegido," Diario Co-Latino, 15 
March 2013, http://www.diariocolatino.com/es/20130315/nacionales/113765/Declaran-Monumento-a-la-
Verdad—y-la-Memoria-como-bien-protegido.htm?tpl=69; "Presidente Funes rinde homenaje y condecora de 
forma póstuma a luchadora social María Julia Hernández," 21 November 2013, 
http://www.transparenciaactiva.gob.sv/presidente-funes-rinde-homenaje-y-condecora-de-forma-postuma-a-
luchadora-social-maria-julia-hernandez/. This seems to have continued in the early weeks of former Funes Vice 
President Salvador Sánchez Céren's administration. The PDDH congratulated the Equipo Argentino de 
Antropología Forense (EAAF, Argentina Forensic Anthropology Team) for 30 years of work in support of 
human rights, "the search for the truth and the construction of historical memory" in various countries around 
the world, including in El Salvador. ("Procurador felicita a Equipo Argentino de Antropología Forense por su 
trabajo realizado durante 30 años," 2 July 2014, http://www.pddh.gob.sv/menupress/menuprensa/593-
procurador-felicita-a-equipo-argentino-de-antropologia-forense-por-su-trabajo-realizado-durante-30-anos) and 
the Corte Suprema de Justicia (CSJ, Supreme Court of Justice), which is not in fact part of the executive, 
acknowledged victims' right to truth in their ruling about the San Francisco Angulo massacre. (Sala de lo 
Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, 5 February 2014, 
http://perso.unifr.ch/derechopenal/assets/files/jurisprudencia/j_20140408_01.pdf.) 
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"I am here in El Mozote to recognize the truth."14 He then directed the military to "revise their 
interpretation of history," as discussed in Chapter Five. He also made a formal request for perdón 
for the El Mozote massacre. An excerpt of his speech, accompanied by a child's drawing, was 
published in newspapers on the 17th. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
El Mozote, never again: truth, justice and reparations for the victims. 
Diario Co-Latino, 17 January 2012.  
 
As head of State, I recognize that in the villages of El Mozote, El Pinalito, Ranchería, 
Los Toriles, Jocote Amarillo, Cerro Pando, La Joya, and Cerro Ortiz, during the days and 
nights of 11, 12, and 13 December 1981, soldiers from the Batallón de Infantería de 
Reacción Inmediata [(BIRI, Immediate Reaction Infantry Battalion)] Atlacatl, part of the 
Armed Forces of El Salvador, assassinated close to 1000 people, the majority boys and 
girls.  
 
Endless acts of barbarity and human rights violations were committed here: innocents 
were tortured and executed; women and girls suffered sexual abuses and hundreds of 
                                                
14 Editorial, "El Mozote y los 20 años del Acuerdo de Paz," Diario Co-Latino, 18 January 2012. 
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male and female Salvadorans are now part of a long list of disappeared, while others 
were forces to emigrate and lose everything to save their lives. 
 
In the name of the Salvadoran State I ask the victims' families and nearby communities 
for perdón for this massacre, for the aberrant human rights violations and for the abuses 
committed. 
 
Funes asked for perdón from all the victims and their relatives, highlighting that he did not seek 
to "erase the pain" they felt; rather, his request for perdón was meant to "recognize and dignify" 
the victims of "this tragedy."15 His speech also included a declaration that the Amnesty Law did 
not prevent the Attorney General's office from investigating human rights violations committed 
during the war.16 
 Funes' recognition of military responsibility, his recognition of Domingo Monterrosa's 
responsibility in particular, and his request for perdón are highly significant because they are an 
official recognition of the victims' truth/memory. This recognition is relevant in understanding 
why the human rights community did not reject his perdón as a way to promote forgetting, as 
similar groups did when Guatemalan president Álvaro Arzú asked for perdón in 1998. Though 
perdón was discursively tied to amnesty and forgetting in both countries, Funes' perdón is 
distinct from Arzú's because of Funes' previous actions and the timing of his words. Funes, for 
example, did not ask for perdón as a way to undermine the victims and survivors' truth, nor were 
other declarations he had made in support of memory in previous years weak and/or 
contradictory, as in Arzú's case. 
 But the difference between perdón in El Salvador and Guatemala also lies in how the 
presidents asked for perdón. When Arzú asked for perdón, and announced a larger movement for 
perdón and reconciliation (a reconciliation already tied to forgetting), he did so in relation to 
violence which Guatemalans suffered from "as a result of the decisions of political power and the 
actions of the army and of the security forces of the time," as El Periódico reported.17 His 
statement is vague, if not empty. He asked for perdón for everything, which might be just as 
pointless as not asking for perdón at all. Relatives and survivors repeat that, in order to perdonar, 
they have to know who was responsible. While Arzú recognized that political power and the 
                                                
15 Gobierno de El Salvador, "El Mozote nunca más," Diario Co-Latino, 17 January 2012, paid ad.   
16 Suchit Chávez, "Funes pide a FGR y CSJ investigar crímenes," La Prensa Gráfica, 17 January 2012. 
17 Juan Carlos Llorca, "Un perdón a medias....," El Periódico, 30 December 1998; "Los discursos del perdón 
(extractos)," El Periódico, 30 December 1998. 
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security forces were ultimately responsible for the violence, these are faceless institutions. 
Relatives need names and faces; they need to know who killed their loved ones or razed their 
communities if they are to perdonar. In this regard, Funes was more specific. More than simply 
recognizing that the military had committed atrocities, he named names. He, the president, spoke 
the victims' truth out loud. He confirmed it, and they embraced him for it.  
 Funes' perdón is also not seen as a way to promote forgetting under the guise of memory 
and truth because he asked for perdón; he did not simply lament what happened. This is 
significant when compared to an earlier government's statements. On 2 June 1982, Erlinda and 
Ernestina Serrano Cruz were disappeared in rural Chalatenango, taken from their family by 
members of the Salvadoran army's elite Atlacatl Battalion (the same unit which Funes mentioned 
in his speech at El Mozote) during the military's Operación Limpieza, Operation Cleansing. 
Relatives and the Asociación Pro-Búsqueda de Niñas y Niños Desaparecidos, (Pro-Búsqueda, 
Pro-Search Association of Disappeared Children) brought the case to the Inter-American system 
in 1999. The Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (CIDH, Inter-American Human Rights 
Court) emitted a ruling in March 2005, condemning the state's lack of investigation and requiring 
the state to publicly "recognize responsibility" for the violations and to organize an act of 
desagravio "to repair the damage to the victims and their relatives and to prevent similar events 
from happening again."18 According to the Real Academia Española, an act of desagravio would 
either "erase or repair the offense, giving the offended party complete satisfaction" or "reimburse 
or compensate the damage which was caused." It is important to note that the CIDH's sentence 
did not require the state to ask for perdón. The media, however, reframed the discussion, a 
reframing which mirrored or was mirrored in relatives' words.19 In the public sphere, 
expectations that the state would ask for perdón determined Salvadorans' reactions to official 
statements. 
 The state, however, was clearly not going to ask for perdón. In " 'We are looking for 
children, not the guilty,' " Foreign Minister Francisco Laínez made this clear. He is quoted as 
saying, "It is lamentable that things like this (the disappearance of the Serrano Cruz sisters), 
which took place in the context of a war where the parties involved committed errors, happened." 
                                                
18 CIDH, "Caso de las Hermanas Serrano Cruz vs. El Salvador: Sentencia de 1 de marzo de 2005," 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_120_esp.pdf, 99.  
19 See, for example, Adriana Valle and Gabriel Labrador, "Estado pide perdón por desaparición de hermanas 
Serrano," La Prensa Gráfica, 22 March 2006.  
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In response to the journalists' question about the importance of "the request for perdón," he 
masterfully avoided saying the word and replied, "Recognizing that all Salvadoran families were 
involved in acts committed by one or the other side during the armed conflict reaffirms the need 
for peace and that what has been achieved by the process begun by the Accords should continue, 
be protected and preserved."20 In addition to not uttering the word perdón, Laínez worked 
against the CIDH's ruling about the state's responsibility by repeating that the military was not 
the only one involved in the war and that both sides committed "errors."  
 When the moment came to speak, Laínez's said nothing about perdón. Accompanied by 
the president of the Corte Suprema de Justicia (CSJ, Supreme Court of Justice) and Procuradora 
para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (Ombudsperson for the Defense of Human Rights), 
Laínez stated that, "The State of El Salvador deeply laments all the events which took place 
during the armed conflict which prevailed in our country for more than 12 years and which 
directly affected all Salvadoran families, and first and foremost those [cases] which involved our 
youth. The state especially laments the events related to Erlinda and Ernestina Serrano Cruz."21 
His lamentation is quite distinct from how the media described what would happen.  
 The difference between asking for perdón for the army's forced disappearance of two 
young girls (or even simply recognizing the state's responsibility) and lamenting all of what 
happened was not lost on those present at the ceremony. Relatives and members of the human 
rights community rejected Laínez's words; they shouted out that the state must ask for perdón.22 
The following week, the Instituto de Derechos Humanos de la Universidad Centroamericana 
"José Simeón Cañas" (IDHUCA, Human Rights Institute of the Universidad Centroamericana 
"José Simeón Cañas") and Pro-Búsqueda took out paid ads in La Prensa Gráfica. In the first ad, 
IDHUCA and Pro-Búsqueda pointed out the insufficiencies in Laínez's non-request for perdón, 
highlighting that, "To lament something does not mean that any kind of responsibility has been 
recognized."23  
                                                
20 "Buscamos niños, no culpables," La Prensa Gráfica, 22 March 2006.  
21 Adriana Valle, "Estado lamenta hechos ocurridos en la guerra," La Prensa Gráfica, 23 March 2006. 
22 Ibid.  
23 IDHUCA and Pro-Búsqueda, "La dignidad de las víctimas no tiene precio, La burla oficial, sí," La Prensa 
Gráfica, 25 March 2006, paid ad. Pro-Búsqueda also criticized the government for organizing the act not as way 
to ask for perdón, but as a way to announce the reunion of the Hernández family. The family was separated in 
1981 and the government's official Comisión Interinstitucional de Búsqueda de Niños y Niñas Desaparecidos a 
Consecuencia del Conflicto Armado en El Salvador (Interinstitutional Search Commission for Boys and Girls 
who Disappeared as a Result of the Armed Conflict in El Salvador) had worked to reunite them. After 
criticizing the Comisión Interinstitucional for working toward the reunion of children who had been 
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When Laínez did not ask for perdón, the process whereby the narrative of the past gets 
constructed is clearly visible. But more than this, the state's refusal to ask for perdón (even if this 
was not required by the CIDH), President Tony Saca's refusal to lament what happened himself, 
and human rights organizations' very vocal denunciation of both, added additional weight to the 
word perdón. They linked perdón to truth, to the perpetrators' acknowledgement of their own 
responsibility. Álvaro Saravia's request for perdón, made a few days after Laínez's lament, likely 
only strengthened the connection to truth. Saravia, a former officer in the Salvadoran military, 
asked for perdón in the Miami Herald for his role in Romero's assassination.24 Saravia's request 
for perdón certainly stood in sharp contrast to the state's actions in the Serrano Cruz case. Not 
only was he asking for perdón, but in his request, the identity of one of the perpetrators was 
revealed. Thus, Saravia's request for perdón, like Funes' request six years later, revealed the truth 
of the past, a truth which the human rights community had long insisted must precede perdón.  
 Though perdón began its discursive career in El Salvador very clearly tied to amnesty 
and olvido, as in Guatemala, it was more closely tied to truth by the time Funes requested perdón 
in 2012. As a result, when Funes used the word, it was evidence of his solidarity with the 
victims. Certainly part of the transformation of perdón is related to the difference between 
granting perdón from above and asking for perdón, to the difference between granting pardon 
via amnesty and asking for a perdón tied to truth, a request which can presumably be denied. 
Yet, more than this, the government's 2006 decision to lament the war made perdón all the more 
important for survivors and the human rights community. As a result, when Funes began asking 
for perdón during his administration, not only for El Mozote but also for other human rights 
violations, the human rights community celebrated; while they may have preferred that requests 
                                                                                                                                                       
"involuntarily separated" from their families—phrasing which silenced the military's responsibility for forced 
disappearances—Pro-Búsqueda was quick to point out that this was the Comisión's only success story and that 
the celebration of this success served to "make [the relatives of the Serrano Cruz sisters and the real reason why 
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24 Adriana Valle, "Saravia pide perdón por homicidio de Romero," La Prensa Gráfica, 25 March 2006. He also 
announced he was writing a book which would reveal the names of others of those responsible for Romero's 
assassination. 
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for perdón come from the perpetrators themselves, and while they may have been critical of 
some of Funes' actions, and his inaction on other matters, they certainly did not reject his request 
for perdón or understand it to be his attempt to whitewash the past, to cover over the state's 
responsibility with a lament about the cruelty of war. Rather, they celebrated it as a long-overdue 
acknowledgement of truth and a step on the path toward reconciliation.25 
 Conservatives, on the other hand, were critical of Funes. The debates about Funes' words 
help demonstrate how discursive frameworks are challenged and pushed to their limits, and show 
the process of narrative-making at work, as also seen in the previous chapter. The mayor of San 
Salvador, ARENA's Norman Quijano, for example, described asking for perdón on the 
anniversary of the Peace in El Mozote as being one-sided. He lamented the massacre, but added 
that the guerrilla also committed "excesses," just as the military had. Who, he wondered, would 
go to the sites of those violations and ask for perdón?26 Retired officer Sigifredo Ochoa Pérez, 
then a member of ARENA and candidate for the Legislative Assembly, was the most vocal. As 
reported in Diario Co-Latino, he described Funes' words as "unfortunate" and as "opening 
wounds." He wondered if Funes wanted another war, "Given that his rant and false actions point 
to this." He asked what right Funes had to ask for perdón on behalf of the state, and wondered if 
Funes would ask for perdón for the "horrendous crimes" committed by the FMLN. He took to 
the internet to "dare the president"; there, he declared, "As a soldier, I am ready to defend our 
Patria." La Prensa Gráfica reported Ochoa Pérez as sending Funes the following message: "Mr. 
President, treat soldiers well. We are not your enemies." Speaking with the newspaper, Ochoa 
Pérez added that he believed that Funes should ask for perdón for the FMLN's crimes, which 
included using women, the elderly, and children as "shields" during the war.27  
                                                
25 See for examples, Roberto Flores and Iván Escobar "'Este pedido de perdón no pretende borrar el dolor': 
Presidente Funes," Diario Co-Latino, 16 January 2012; Roberto Flores, "La desconocida sensación del perdón," 
Diario Co-Latino, 21 January 2012; Beatriz Castillo, "Pro Memoria Histórica insta a poder legislativo y judicial 
a promover la verdad," Diario Co-Latino, 18 January 2012; Natalia Zurlent, "Esther Alvarenga: '1932 se repite 
con mayor fuerza en 1980,'" Diario Co-Latino, 27 January 2012; Byron Sosa, "Iglesia católica avala acción de 
Funes," La Prensa Gráfica, 21 January 2012. For officials' reactions, see Zoraya Urbina, "Procurador Luna: 'fue 
una actitud valiente la del Presidente,'" Diario Co-Latino, 17 January 2012; Zoraya Urbina, "Presidente de la 
Asamblea: 'reconciliación debe basarse en la verdad y la justicia,'" Diario Co-Latino, 19 January 2012; Hugo 
Martínez, "Nuestro compromiso con la verdad, la justicia y la reparación de las víctimas," Diario Co-Latino, 23 
January 2012. 
26 Amílcar Mejía and Valeria Menjívar, "Alcaldía conmemora en el Obelisco de la Paz," La Prensa Gráfica, 17 
January 2012. 
27 Zoraya Urbina, "Ochoa Pérez reta al presidente Funes," Diario Co-Latino, 17 January 2012; Diana Verónica 
Ayala, "Funes también debería pedir perdón por las masacres del FMLN," La Prensa Gráfica, 19 January 2012. 
Sigfrido Reyes argued that it was, in fact, Funes' place to ask for perdón on the state's behalf. He was, after all, 
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 Priscilla Hayner's views on truth and reconciliation are useful to consider. She argued 
that rather than focusing on finding the truth about the past, truth commissions should promote a 
view of reconciliation based on "a generally agreed understanding of a country’s history and past 
wrongs," an understanding based on the acceptance of certain fundamental facts as true.28 Funes 
is, of course, not a truth commission, but his (and conservatives') views about the truth of the 
past certainly are similar to the ideas of truth that guide truth commissions. Hayner offers several 
guidelines, in the form of questions, to help measure whether a society is moving toward 
reconciliation. They are helpful in thinking about the different truths debated in 2012. The third 
question is most interesting here. She asks, "Is there one version of the past, or many?" 
Reconciliation, she concludes, "means not only reestablishing friendly relations, but reconciling 
contradictory facts or stories, 'to make (discordant facts, statements, etc.) consistent, accordant, 
or compatible with each other,' " as the Oxford English Dictionary explains.29 Hayner does not 
suggest which fundamental facts must be understood to be true, nor which contradictory stories 
must be reconciled. Lisa J. Laplante and Kelly Phenicie offer more detail about this. They argue 
that consensus about the past should be rooted in the belief that "(1) human rights violations 
occurred, and (2) they were morally and legally wrong."30  
 Consensus, however, which Laplante and Phenicie point to as essential in transitional 
societies, is not universally lauded. Mark Osiel's comments on consensus—or rather, on 
dissensus—are relevant. Osiel argues that "civil dissension" can play an important role in 
growing "solidarity in a deeply divided society."31 Paul Ricoeur, who draws on Osiel in his own 
work, promotes the usefulness of dissensus and of allowing competing memories to be heard. 
Ricoeur warns against the passage of amnesties and the promotion of other initiatives which seek 
to forget conflict and division for the sake of national unity. Instead, he promotes dissensus, 
discussion, and debate.32 In Ofelia Ferrán's words, Ricoeur advises against insisting that 
                                                                                                                                                       
head of state, a state with "historical continuity" since independence in the early nineteenth century. (Zoraya 
Urbina, "Presidente de la Asamblea: 'reconciliación debe basarse en la verdad y la justicia,'" Diario Co-Latino, 
19 January 2012.) 
28 Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity (New York: Routledge, 2001), 
160 and 163. 
29 Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 161-2. 
30 Lisa J. Laplante and Kelly Phenicie, "Media, Trials and Truth Commissions: 'Mediating' Reconciliation in 
Peru’s Transitional Justice Process," International Journal of Transitional Justice 4 (2010): 227. 
31 Mark Osiel, Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory, and the Law (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 
1997), 51-3. 
32 Paul Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of 
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everyone agree on a particular issue and reconcile with one another lest it get in the way of "the 
development of appropriate venues for the emergence of a fruitful and healthy practice of 
controversy....where competing claims and views about the past can be presented in the name of 
a healthy dialogue, and not as political weapons against others."33 Elizabeth Jelin also addresses 
the issue of consensus. Like Osiel and Ricoeur, she cautions against those who hope to make 
sure that a single memory—i.e. their own—be recognized as the only valid "interpretation or 
narrative of the past."34 Instead, she argues for creating "legitimate spaces for expression and 
controversy about different memories," for creating "multiple spaces for debate." For Jelin, 
democracy entails the "recognition of plurality and conflict more than the hope for 
reconciliation, silences, or erasures by fiat." The caveat, however, is that conflict "has to be 
anchored strongly in the rule of law."35  
 By asking for perdón and recognizing the state's responsibility for the massacre, as well 
as by instructing the military to revise its history, rename the barracks in San Miguel after 
someone other than Domingo Monterrosa, and stop honoring perpetrators as heroes, Funes was 
working to re-write the narrative of the war. Yet he was not creating spaces for or necessarily 
encouraging debate. He was attempting to impose one narrative/truth of the past on the military 
and on society. His comments about recognizing the truth and his instructions to the military 
resemble silence or erasure by fiat. Funes was hardly the first to seek to impose one truth on the 
past. The human rights community had long insisted on the existence of one truth, as had 
conservatives. And in 2012, conservatives worked hard to reject Funes' truth and prevent their 
own narrative from being rewritten. Other than the players involved, little had changed since the 
Truth Commission report was published. But in his declarations, Funes was also pushing the 
limits of El Salvador's public discourse. Conservative reaction, as seen in this and the previous 
chapter, was swift and strong. Mainstream media and conservative politicians and other public 
figures rallied against him. The military ignored his instructions to stop honoring Monterrosa. In 
this, the limits of El Salvador's discourse are revealed and the boundaries of the relevance of the 
past in the present, as well as the battle lines, are firmly drawn. As head of state, Funes could ask 
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for perdón for various atrocities, recognize the work of human rights activists, promote the work 
of truth in guaranteeing non-repetition, and insist on the military's responsibility for human rights 
violations; as important as these things were, this was all he could do. He could not 
fundamentally change the discourse of those who have consistently embraced forgetting as 
ensuring non-repetition. Despite being head of state, he could not make the military do what it 
did not want to do; he could not force the military to re-remember the war. This reveals not only 
the limits of discourse, but also the limits of Funes' power.36  
 While Funes may have over-stepped the boundaries of El Salvador's discursive 
framework when he gave instructions to the military, he seemed to recognize both the boundaries 
of discourse and the limits on his power when he did not insist that the Amnesty Law be 
revoked. Rather, he declared that there was nothing in the Amnesty Law which prevented the 
Attorney General's office from investigating human rights violations committed during the war. 
Even though he described attempts to revoke the Amnesty Law as "valid," and reminded 
Salvadorans that the law had been declared unconstitutional, he did not take any action himself.37 
Promoting the truth of the war and the work truth does is one thing. It is something else entirely 
to take concrete, legislative steps to liberate the truth, to unshackle it from the Amnesty Law, and 
to allow it to actually work for non-repetition. In his decision not to work to revoke the Amnesty 
Law, the grey areas between the black and white descriptions of different sectors' discourse are 
revealed. While Funes may have embraced the truth of the human rights community and their 
view on the work of truth and memory, he nevertheless did not echo their discourse in its 
entirety. The human rights community took note and criticized Funes as a result. They wanted 
him to be fully on the side of truth and memory and not located somewhere in between these and 
forgetting, perhaps because they failed to see what truth could accomplish if it were not 
accompanied by justice. 
 
Guatemala 
 The trial against Efraín Ríos Montt and his chief of intelligence, Mauricio Rodríguez 
Sánchez, began on 19 March 2013. Ríos Montt was found guilty of genocide and crimes against 
humanity and condemned to 80 years in prison on 13 May 2013. Rodríguez Sánchez was 
                                                
36 Mauricio Gaborit, in conversation with the author, 8 November 2013. 
37 Fernando Romero, Amadeo Cabrera, and María José Saavedra, "Funes ordena reescribir la historia a la luz de la 
masacre de El Mozote," La Prensa Gráfica, 17 January 2012. 
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absolved. The sentence against Ríos Montt, however, was overturned on a technicality soon 
after. In the months the trial lasted, and in the aftermath of the court's rulings, the public sphere 
exploded with debate about the past, and different sectors' emblematic memories were clearly 
visible. Much of this discussion had to do with the question of whether genocide had been 
committed in Guatemala or not, but it also related to the usefulness of the trial and the effect it 
and a guilty verdict would have on Guatemala. In the back and forth between the human rights 
community and conservatives, and among members of each group, in the heated series of 
assertions and counter-assertions, the process of how narratives are created is revealed, as are the 
complexity and fluidity of group membership. Revealed as well is some of the space that exists 
between the discursive binary of memory versus forgetting.   
 Rather than arguing that Guatemalans must forget the conflict, those who opposed the 
trial argued that genocide had not been committed in Guatemala. They limited themselves to 
promoting a different truth, a different memory of the conflict, as Mario Mérida and others had 
before them. The several publications of the ultra right-wing Fundación contra el Terrorismo 
(Foundation against Terrorism) offer ample evidence of this. In "The Church's Marxist 
Conspiracy," the fourth installment of their series, "The Farce of Genocide in Guatemala," the 
Fundación affirmed that their hope was to "contribute to establishing the historical truth" of the 
conflict, for, "The world deserves to know the truth!" For the Fundación, it was important to 
know the truth of the past, a truth the guerrilla and leftists had hidden in an attempt to 
"manipulate national and international public opinion with their lies and falsehoods." Spreading 
the truth of the conflict—that is, the Fundación's version of the truth, a truth about which the title 
of their publications leaves little doubt—is essential. Without this truth, "authentic national 
reconciliation" would be impossible; without this truth, subsequent generations would only know 
the "slanted and compromised Marxist version" of the conflict, where the military committed 
genocide.38 The Fundación's truth is that the guerrilla, and specifically the Ejército Guerrillero de 
los Pobres (EGP, Army of the Poor), were terrorists and that they had committed genocide. What 
could the approximately 60 massacres of indigenous peoples, including Mam who were 
members of a group who refused to join the EGP in Ixtahuacán, be, if not genocide? What could 
                                                
38 Fundación contra el Terrorismo, "La Farsa del Genocidio en Guateamla: Conspiración Marxista desde la Iglesia 
Católica," El Periódico, 26 May 2013, paid ad, 2. 
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the guerrilla's assassination of an Ixil spiritual leader and members of cofradías be, if not 
genocide?39  
 In their embrace of a truth distinct from that of the human rights community, the 
Fundación is much like other conservatives. However, though the Fundación rejected the human 
rights community's truth, as did other conservatives, their truths are not identical, revealing the 
heterogeneity of "conservatives." The Fundación's insistence that the guerrilla committed 
genocide—that si hubo genocidio, that yes, there was genocide—fits to some extent with broader 
conservative discourse which focuses on the guerrilla's responsibility for violations. It also, 
however, stands in stark contrast to other conservatives' even stronger and more frequently 
repeated declarations that no hubo genocidio en Guatemala, that there was no genocide in 
Guatemala.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A condensed version of the UN definition of genocide:  
"The total or partial extermination of an ethnic group" 
Photo by author. 4 October 2013. 
 
  
                                                
39 Fundación contra el Terrorismo, " Conspiración Marxista desde la Iglesia Católica," 5 and 8-9.   
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 The declarations of Zury Ríos, one of her father's greatest champions, are a good 
example of how important it was that no hubo genocidio. El Periódico published an excerpt of 
an interview Ríos had given to the online Salvadoran newspaper, El Faro, shortly after the trial 
started. In addition to reminding readers that the Ixil had voted for her father many times in the 
post-Peace era (and so no hubo genocidio), she declared that the dead were guerrillas and that 
this was why they had been killed, not because they were indigenous (and so no hubo 
genocidio). Those who wrote the definition on the wall in downtown Guatemala City, above, 
seem to have disagreed. In response to the journalist's comment that she spoke of "all the victims 
as if they had all been guerrillas," even the many children who died, Ríos confirmed that indeed 
many children had died and then asked her own clearly rhetorical question: "And who recruited 
them? Who put them at the front?"40 The answer was obvious: the guerrilla. They, too, 
committed crimes during the conflict (and so no hubo genocidio).  
 The conservative, pro-business Comité Coordinador de Asociaciones Agrícolas, 
Comerciales, Industriales y Financieras (CACIF, Coodinating Committee of Agricultural, 
Commercial, Industrial, and Financial Associations) also weighed in on the issue. In a news 
update published on their webpage, CACIF declared that thousands of "campesinos, workers, 
businesspeople, students, ladinos, indigenous peoples, soldiers, guerrillas..." died, regardless of 
their "origin, social background, race or religion." Given this, CACIF affirmed that it was 
impossible to declare that there had ever been an attempt to eliminate a particular race, an 
assertion they repeated in paid ads in newspapers. No hubo genocidio, they concluded.41  
 Lest it be imagined that only non-indigenous Guatemalans deny genocide, it must be 
noted that CACIF has some indigenous members, further adding to the fractured nature of the 
discursive environment in Guatemala. While many assume that the Ixil who arrived in 
Guatemala City to insist that no hubo genocidio were paid, and even tricked, by Ríos Montt's 
supporters,42 it is more difficult to suggest that this is the case with indigenous members of 
                                                
40 E. De León and C. Mejía, "Se inicia juicio histórico por genocidio contra Ríos Montt," Siglo Veintiuno, 19 
March 2013; "Zuri [sic] Ríos: 'No hubo genocidio,' " Siglo Veintiuno, 19 March 2013.  
41 CACIF, "¡Ahora dicen que los guatemaltecos somos genocidas!" 19 March 2013, 
http://www.cacif.org.gt/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1059&Itemid=468&lang=es. 
CACIF's use of "acts of violence" to talk about violence which took place in the armed conflict is interesting. 
The CEH had carefully categorized the state's violence as human rights violations and the guerrilla's crimes as 
"acts of violence." This raises the question of whether CACIF used the phrase intentionally, to underscore the 
guerrilla's actions without naming them. See also, CACIF, "CACIF llama a Corte de Constitucionalidad a 
preservar gobernabilidad y futuro del país," El Periódico, 13 May 2013, paid ad.   
42 See, for example, HIJOS Guatemala, Radio Guerrilla, and US journalist Xeni Garden's facebook and twitter 
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CACIF. Instead, it is clear that not all indigenous people believe that genocide was committed 
during the conflict.43 That not all indigenous people agree on this issue is not unexpected, for 
there are conservative and leftist indigenous people, just as there are conservative and leftist non-
indigenous people.44 
 Returning to the issue of genocide, it is easy to assume that, when conservatives, such as 
the members of CACIF, affirmed that no hubo genocidio, they meant that the state had not 
committed genocide against its own people as part of the counterinsurgency campaign. It is easy 
to imagine that no hubo genocidio meant that, as Ríos said, the military had killed indigenous 
Guatemalans because they were members of the guerrilla, not because they were indigenous. But 
as an emblematic framework which sorts memories into true and false, into remembered and 
forgotten, no hubo genocidio is vague. Though a perpetrator is implied, no hubo genocidio does 
not name one. As a result, the Fundación's comments that si hubo genocidio but that the guerrilla 
were responsible are not only in opposition to the human rights community's insistence that si 
hubo genocidio and that the state was responsible; they are also in opposition to other 
conservatives' declarations that, quite simply, no hubo genocidio.  
 Conservative Guatemala is not monolithic. No hubo genocidio is some conservatives' 
truth, and it is a truth that generally acknowledges that the military committed violations, but not 
genocide. This truth, this emblematic memory, is unlike that of the human rights community, 
which is also not monolithic. Not all believe in the truth the CEH revealed; not all are guided by 
the assertion that si hubo genocidio. Former Secretary of the Peace, Raquel Zelaya, who also 
signed many of the Peace Accords for the government; Gustavo Porras, former guerrilla and 
member of the government's negotiating team in the 1990s; and Marta Altolaguirre, former 
president of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, declared on 16 April 2013 that 
no hubo genocidio. They are important political figures; while more conservative than most in 
the human rights community,45 they had, in the past, shown a commitment to protecting human 
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rights. Yet, in "Traicionar la paz y dividir a Guatemala," Zelaya, Porras, Altolaguirre, and others 
ventured outside the human rights community's emblematic memory. They rejected the truth of 
the CEH and the larger human rights community, revealing the fissures in what often seems like 
a homogenous group. The authors asserted that "the accusation of genocide" might lead to "a 
heightening of social and political polarization." This is the "dividing Guatemala" part of the title 
of the ad. They then argued that if the trial were to continue, it would facilitate the return of 
political violence, and so would mean that the goals of the peace had been "betrayed," as in the 
first half of the title. The authors concluded that their warning did not mean that "the atrocities 
which took place during the internal armed confrontation should not be known," or that the 
victims did not have the right to begin legal procedures against those responsible. Nevertheless, 
no hubo genocidio. "The accusation of genocide is a legal fabrication"; furthermore, it does not 
"correspond to the wishes of the majority of the population to overcome the past and to find 
national reconciliation."46  
 How can it be that the trial would heighten polarization and facilitate repetition, but that 
the victims have a right to begin judicial proceedings against the perpetrators? How could they 
want the past to be known, but also oppose the trial, where, presumably, the events of the past 
would be revealed, where at least the judicial truth of the past would become clear? The Zelaya 
group's comments seem contradictory. They did, however, clarify some of their comments in the 
next ad they took out, "Commitment to the truth and peace." Published nine days later as a 
response to criticisms from other members of the human rights community, which will be 
discussed below, the ad reiterated the point that the signers did want the past to be known. They 
also repeated their belief that genocide had not been committed, but clarified that it was because 
the conflict had been political, ideological, and economic, and not ethnic. In this, the apparent 
contradictions of their previous ad were explained. They were opposed to the trial because, as 
they argued, a trial for a crime which had not been committed would "create a social and 
political situation which would affect coexistence" in Guatemala. This view allowed them to 
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oppose the trial while still supporting the victims' "legitimate, undeniable, and inalienable" right 
to truth and justice (for crimes other than genocide).47  
 As mentioned above, many in the human rights community were critical of "Traicionar la 
paz y dividir a Guatemala." They rejected its conclusion about genocide, as well as the idea that 
the trial would lead to instability and threaten the peace. These are linked. To argue that genocide 
had not been committed in Guatemala was understood to be the equivalent of promoting 
continued impunity. The Ley de Reconciliación Nacional had specifically excluded genocide 
from amnesty; to declare that the deaths of 1771 Ixil was not genocide meant that the 
perpetrators could seek protection from prosecution, thereby perpetuating impunity.  
Helen Mack, her niece Lucrecia Hernández Mack, Manolo Vela Castañeda, publisher 
Raúl Figueroa Sartí, some relatives of the victims, and journalists and contributors to various 
non-mainstream media outlets, decided to take out their own ad, "True peace is born from 
justice." After affirming that acts of genocide had indeed been committed in Guatemala, as the 
CEH had concluded, the Mack group asserted that justice "is not a threat." The trial, they 
insisted, would not facilitate the return of political violence, as the Zelaya group had suggested. 
Rather, if the past returned, it would be because "inequality, racism, exclusion, poverty, and 
conflict" still exist, despite the social and economic reforms and attempts to "rescue historical 
memory" included in the Peace Accords. Indeed, far from allowing for a return to political 
violence, the trial was an opportunity to "strengthen the justice system." It was, they wrote, a 
chance to show "the country's capacity to build a future of democracy and peace." They 
concluded, "If we want reconciliation, we will have to know and condemn the unjust acts of the 
past and those who perpetrated [them] and give voice to the victims."48 Justice would only do 
Guatemala good. 
 In the original ad and in the Mack group's reaction to it, it becomes clear that the human 
rights community is not a single, unified group with a unitary narrative of the conflict. When the 
limits of the narrative were challenged, when a truth emerged that challenged the emblematic 
memory that si hubo genocidio, even when this alternative narrative/truth was put forward by 
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allies and did not deny that many thousands had been killed or that the state was responsible, the 
broader human rights community stood firm in their belief that there was only one way to 
understand the violence. To argue that no hubo genocidio was unthinkable.  
In many ways, the human rights community's rejection of "Traicionar la paz y dividir a 
Guatemala" was inevitable. Emblematic memory, which most clearly emerges at moments of 
rupture to give meaning to trauma, "also creates a framework for organizing countermemory and 
debate."49 How could the human rights community, which operates within a framework that si 
hubo genocidio, not have rejected the Zelaya group's countermemory completely? They had been 
arguing against conservative declarations that the state had not committed genocide for many 
years. They had also had to deal with conservatives' efforts to stall and derail trials for human 
rights violations committed during the conflict and, of course, very real threats made against 
those who sought justice for those crimes. Zelaya and her co-signers' views fit right into 
conservatives' emblematic (counter)memory and their opposition to justice and so had to be 
rejected, no matter what else they said that fit into the discursive framework of nunca más. 
Emblematic memory allows little room for nuance. Thus, si hubo genocidio is the truth of the 
past;50 it is the only possible truth and the human rights community is quick to rally against its 
own, to discursively "police" or scold them, when they suggest otherwise.  
The rejection of countermemory can also be seen in the ad a second group of human 
rights activists and their allies, including Rosalina Tuyuc; former director of the Centro para la 
Acción Legal en Derechos Humanos (CALDH, Center for Legal Action in Human Rights), 
Frank La Rue; Rigoberta Menchú; highly respected academic, Edelberto Torres-Rivas; CEH 
commissioner Otilia Lux de Cotí; and Bishop Álvaro Ramazini placed in El Periódico. In "There 
                                                
49 Stern, Remembering Pinochet's Chile, 106-7. 
50 The truth of the human rights community, as well as its discursive framework, received a boost from the judges' 
718-page sentence. For those who might not read the entire sentence, newspapers published extracts of it, 
presumably what they viewed as the most important parts. Prensa Libre, for example quoted the judges' 
affirmation that "We firmly believe that recognizing the truth will help to heal the wounds of the past" and that 
justice must precede peace. (Luis Ángel Sas, "Extractos del veredicto contra Efraín Ríos Montt," Prensa Libre, 
12 May 2013, http://www.prensalibre.com/noticias/justicia/Extractos-veredicto-Rios-
Montt_0_917908232.html.) "The truth" they mentioned was, of course, that Ríos Montt was responsible for 
genocide, and it was this truth they believed would lead to reconciliation. In addition to concluding that 
genocide had been committed, the judges strengthened the human rights community's discourse and truth by 
entering Remhi and the CEH as evidence with "probative value." (Organismo Judicial, Sentencia, C-01076-
2011-00015, 662-3.) By affirming the reports' probative value, by affirming that Guatemala's recuperated 
historical memory and the country's clarified history were evidence of Ríos Montt's guilt, the judges were 
legally and officially declaring the reports to be the truth of the conflict, thereby confirming what the human 
rights community had always insisted.  
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is no peace without truth and justice," the Tuyuc group began by rejecting the idea that seeking 
justice, as they interpreted the Zelaya group's words, might have negative consequences. Seeking 
justice, they wrote, is a right enshrined in the Guatemalan Constitution and in international law. 
The signers then went on to refute the Zelaya group's arguments point by point. They argued, in 
particular, that demanding justice is the "fundamental basis of all democracies." Thus, "To ask 
for justice...can NEVER be interpreted as an act of destabilization." The Tuyuc group declared 
that reconciliation "does not entail the irresponsible action of seeking to forget the past; on the 
contrary, it involves fully coming to terms with its consequences as a requirement for building a 
different future." Part of this involved the Guatemalan state recognizing what happened in the 
past, as in Germany, Bosnia, Rwanda.51 
 The Tuyuc group understood the Zelaya group to be embracing conservatives' 
countermemory of the violence and promoting forgetting when they called for reconciliation and 
suggested that justice for a non-existent crime would divide Guatemala. Words are malleable, 
and reconciliation can certainly mean forgetting in one instance, and can have a foundation of 
memory in another, when someone else speaks of it. After all, the Tuyuc group did also argue for  
"Justice for genocide." Discussions of genocide were not confined to during Ríos Montt's trial. 
Parque Central. Guatemala City. Photos by author. 28 February 2012. 
 
 
                                                
51 Frank La Rue, Rigoberta Menchú, Rosalina Tuyuc, Edelberto Torres-Rivas, Otilia Luz de Cotí, Oscar Azmitia, 
Yuri Giovanni Melini, Anabella Giracca, Carlos Sartí, Carolina Escobar Sartí, Fernando Valdez, Mons. Álvaro 
Ramazini, Mons. Julio Cabrera, "No existe paz sin verdad y justicia," El Periódico, 18 April 2013, paid ad. 
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the importance of reconciliation. Even so, the larger human rights community's rejection of the 
Zelaya group's genocide denial and critique of justice in relation to that crime, as seen very 
clearly in the photos above which demand justice for genocide, is similar to how they had 
understood and reacted to conservative discourse over the years. All of this points to a lack of 
open dialogue about the past in Guatemala, a tendency certainly not confined to the human rights 
community. Other sectors and their inflammatory language, quoted above, and threats against 
those with a different truth also point to an inability to discuss what happened, and suggest that 
Guatemala remains unreconciled.  
Edelberto Torres-Rivas' views on debate are interesting to consider. In his initial response 
to "Traicionar la paz y dividir a Guatemala," published in Plaza Pública, he was firmly in favor 
of the trial and debates about genocide, declaring that these were "the beginning of a process 
which should eliminate the hate and rancor which divide us."52 He was critical of Guatemala's 
"culture of monologue" and argued that, as reported in Prensa Libre, "The fact that, for the first 
time in public, people speak in favor and against the genocide, in favor or against the trial, 
speaks well of democracy in Guatemala." It was not an indication, he said, of conflict. Yet as 
much as Torres-Rivas supports a culture of debate, he also seems to reject it. This can be seen 
when he says, "it is lamentable that these illustrious Guatemalans...see the defense of the 
historical truth as dangerous."53 How can this statement be reconciled with sadness about 
Guatemala's culture of monologue? How can you reject a culture of monologue but still insist 
that there is one historical truth?  
Torres-Rivas was, as well, among the first to write against "Traicionar la paz y dividir a 
Guatemala"; his response did not encourage debate. It was personal54 and silenced other views of 
the past and the trial. Despite his comments about eliminating hate and rancor, he wrote that 
"perhaps, because there are 12 [signers of "Traicionar la paz...," who he also called apostles] 
there is a Judas amongst them who wrote a short text, but one full of errors and mistakes." These 
comments work to further divide Guatemala, and point to a binary view of society as divided 
between evil and good. He continued that if "the 12 apostles" really believe that the debate about 
genocide "betrays the peace and divides Guatemala," they "will soon be among the ranks of the 
                                                
52 Torres-Rivas, "Torres-Rivas responde al campo pagado de los ex funcionarios de Arzú." 
53 "Edelberto Torres Rivas: Guatemala no tiene cultura de debate," Prensa Libre, 18 April 2013. 
54 Though not writing about him, the Mack group's comments seem to apply. They wrote, "In the last weeks, the 
citizenry has seen itself immersed in a strong, though necessary, debate about the genocide trial. However, more 
than arguing about the merits of the case, the attacks have been personal." 
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right, holding the veterans' bloody hand."55 In this final statement, it seems clear that the real 
problem he has with the Zelaya group is that they do not support debate. But at the same time, 
there is little space to disagree with Torres-Rivas. If you do, in a bifurcated view of Guatemala 
where your thoughts on whether there was or was not genocide are the determining factor in 
group membership (or so it seems), you are no longer one of "us" but one of them, one of "the 
veterans" of the Fundación contra el Terrorismo. It is not always easy to distinguish between 
those who deny genocide for ideological reasons, like "the veterans," and those who deny it for 
more thoughtful reasons. The words they speak are often very similar. In order to defend 
memory, knowing, justice, and debate, it is, perhaps, best to group them together and approach 
them both as if they were foes, not friends. 
Torres-Rivas, however, does not fit neatly into only one category, at least in terms of his 
views on genocide. Those views, it must be noted, are not the most important or insightful 
aspects of his writing. In 2012 he declared that in the end, "the name does not matter. It 
happened" and "the truth, moral reparations, [and] the recognition that excesses were committed" 
were necessary so that it does not happen again.56 Discussions about the trial, however, show that 
it mattered very much, both for conservatives and the human rights community. Both groups, 
and those who fell in the cracks in between, were passionate about the issue, declaring as loudly 
and as often as they could either that si hubo genocidio (and so the amnesty did not apply) or that 
no hubo genocidio (and so it might). Indeed, Torres-Rivas himself found the question of what to 
call the violence quite significant. How an individual answered the question of whether genocide 
was or was not committed in Guatemala was of the utmost importance in the months surrounding 
the trial, and the question itself was the focus of much discussion in the public sphere, as seen 
above. As a result, his views on the issue will be explored here.  
Torres-Rivas has characterized the conflict in a range of different ways over the years. He 
seems at times to be searching for a third way to understand the violence, to construct a third 
emblematic memory which could perhaps bridge some of the divide between the other two. He 
signed "There is no peace without truth and justice" with Tuyuc and the others which placed 
Guatemala in the same category as Germany, Bosnia, and Rwanda. This was not the first time 
the comparison had been made. He had, in 1999, repeated this when he described the conflict as 
                                                
55 Torres-Rivas, "Torres-Rivas responde al campo pagado de los ex funcionarios de Arzú." 
56 Edelberto Torres-Rivas, "¿En Guatemala hubo genocidio?," El Periódico, 23 September 2012, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20121112035814/http://elperiodico.com.gt/es/20120923//218262.  
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"the Guatemalan Holocaust."57 He confirmed much the same idea in his initial response to 
"Traicionar la paz y dividir a Guatemala," published in Plaza Pública. He wrote that "ferocity 
does not qualify as genocide, but the logic of hate and rancor against racial, religious, and ethnic 
groups does. In this sense, acts of genocide were committed in the Ixcán and Ixíl."58  
 Yet his declaration that si hubo genocidio stands in contrast to his views on genocide 
published in an opinion piece in El Periódico in September 2012. Torres-Rivas begins "Was 
there genocide in Guatemala?" by declaring, "In Guatemala, no hubo genocidio, but something 
worse." This "something worse" was the "the systematic persecution" of leftists, "their relatives 
and friends, of the suspect and, in the final stage, of indigenous communities which had to be 
destroyed to end the 'danger': international communism's far-reaching plot." He went on to talk 
about persecution based on fear and hate, mentioning religious persecution and the Holocaust 
before moving on to discuss political persecution. In Guatemala, "Homicidal persecution…, as 
an expression of inter-group violence, was committed in large measure to punish a way of 
believing, of seeing society, of thinking about it." "Killing because someone thinks differently," 
he added, "is another type of genocide," and this, too, would have been included in the 
Convention had the Soviets not opposed it.59   
 By insisting that politically inspired killing is also genocide, Torres-Rivas refuses to fall 
into the binary debate about genocide that revolves around why people were killed, about the 
intent behind the military's actions. Unlike the Zelaya group and most of the human rights 
community, Torres-Rivas pushes the boundaries of the discourse by expanding the definition of 
genocide. Of course proposing an alternate definition of genocide, while possibly useful in the 
long term, does little in the short term. In the short term, lawyers must use the laws that already 
exist. Though Torres-Rivas does propose an alternative narrative of the violence, he also 
participates in debates about si hubo genocidio or no hubo genocidio to take a firm stand against 
those who seek to use no hubo genocidio to promote forgetting and impunity. In this and in his 
declarations that the Zelaya group was little different than the Fundación contra el Terrorismo, 
                                                
57 Edelberto Torres-Rivas, "Guatemala: la memoria histórica a prueba, reflexiones sobre la muerte, la verdad y el 
olvido," Revista Memoria 121 (March 1999), 49. 
58 Edelberto Torres-Rivas, "Torres-Rivas responde al campo pagado de los ex funcionarios de Arzú." Prensa 
Libre published a few of his comments about the trial and the debate it was generating the next day. He is 
quoted, rather confusingly, as saying that "We do not know if genocide was committed or not." In cases of 
genocide, it was essential to determine who was responsible and "this, without a doubt, was the army." 
("Edelberto Torres Rivas: Guatemala no tiene cultura de debate.") 
59 Torres-Rivas, "¿En Guatemala hubo genocidio?" 
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he is pulled into the divisiveness inherent in Guatemala's competing emblematic frameworks. 
Consensus and dissensus are useful to consider here. It is during these very public debates that 
the limits of the narrative of the past are challenged and defined, but these debates could also be 
the ideal opportunity to work to reconcile "contradictory facts or stories," as Hayner wrote.60 
Torres-Rivas might, at times, be trying to do just that, but his and others' words also at times 
resemble a series of attacks, accusations, and assertions. It seems unlikely that these will 
reconcile facts, stories, memories, or people. 
 The same can be said of the passage of Punto Resolutivo 3-2014. Luis Fernando Pérez 
and Pedro Gálvez, both of the Partido Republicano Institucional (PRI, Institutional Republican 
Party), proposed the non-binding resolution. President Otto Pérez Molina's Partido Patriota (PP, 
Patriot Party) was seemingly not involved in the framing of the bill, though all the PP's 
representatives supported it.61 The Punto Resolutivo declared, "it is not legally viable that the 
elements that constitute the crimes mentioned could have happened in Guatemala, principally 
with regard to the existence in our homeland of a genocide during the internal armed conflict."62 
With this meandering language, lawmakers denied that genocide had been committed in the 
country, as newspapers translated for their readers. Siglo Veintiuno, for example, reported on the 
resolution in "Congress denies genocide in Guatemala." Prensa Libre reported on it in "Punto 
Resolutivo that denies genocide approved."63 Yet this denial of genocide was only one sentence 
among many, the rest of which were based on the belief that the state was responsible for 
"promot[ing] and facilitat[ing] peaceful coexistence." Given that the trial had increased 
                                                
60 Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 161-2. 
61 It must not be forgotten that Pérez Molina is identified with the perpetrators of gross human rights violations, as 
seen in the graffiti calling him the "assassin president" and the "Kaibil president." As well, documentary 
evidence and video footage show him in the Ixil triangle in the early 1980s, standing over a row of dead bodies. 
That the "Trial of the Century" took place during his presidency added to the atmosphere of debate, especially 
since he had denied that genocide had been committed in 2011 (Martín Rodríguez Pellecer, " 'Quiero que 
alguien me demuestre que hubo genocidio,' " Plaza Pública, 25 July 2011, 
http://www.plazapublica.com.gt/content/quiero-que-alguien-me-demuestre-que-hubo-genocidio), in 2013 
("Pérez Molina insiste que en Guatemala no hubo genocidio," Emisoras Unidas, 10 May 2013, 
http://noticias.emisorasunidas.com/noticias/nacionales/perez-molina-insiste-que-guatemala-no-hubo-genocidio) 
and again in 2015 ("No hubo genocidio en Guatemala, sostiene presidente Pérez Molina," 7 January 2015, 
http://www.nacion.com/mundo/centroamerica/genocidio-Guatemala-presidente-Perez-
Molina_0_1462053787.html). 
62 "IACHR Urges Guatemala to Continue Complying with its International Obligations and Fighting against 
Impunity," 16 May 2014, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2014/058.asp. 
63 "Aprueban punto resolutivo que niega genocidio en Guatemala," Prensa Libre, 13 May 2014, 
http://www.prensalibre.com/noticias/justicia/diputados-aprueban-punto_resolutivo-negaria-genocidio-
Guatemala_0_1137486508.html; "Congreso niega genocidio en Guatemala," Siglo Veintiuno, 13 May 2014, 
http://m.s21.com.gt/nacionales/2014/05/13/congreso-aprueba-punto-resolutivo-que-niega-existencia-genocidio. 
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"polarization between brothers, fostering conditions that are counter to peace and which prevent 
a definitive national reconciliation," the lawmakers "urged" the Executive to continue to work in 
favor of and defend "the spirit of reconciliation" which had originally inspired the passage of the 
Ley de Reconciliación Nacional and the signing of the Peace Accords.64  
 The Punto Resolutivo passed on 13 May 2014, shortly after the first anniversary of Ríos 
Montt's conviction. The previous year, the judges had made history by turning Guatemala into 
the first country to try and condemn its own leaders for genocide in domestic courts. The judges 
also helped to support the CEH's official version of the conflict by concluding that the Ixil had 
been victims of acts of genocide, and that Ríos Montt was responsible. In addition, hoping to 
contribute to a reinterpretation of history, the judges declared 23 March, the day Ríos Montt had 
taken power, the Día Contra el Genocidio, the Day Against Genocide. With this, the judges were 
shifting the meaning of the day to focus on the victims and to promote nunca más, so that "never 
again" would have a very present place in the public sphere. With the overturning of the verdict, 
this shift was reversed. Furthermore, in 2014, a conservative Congress wrote over the importance 
of 10 May by claiming 13 May as its own, as the day that genocide was not committed.  
 Just like the Ley de Reconciliación Nacional, Congress's resolution is little more than 
legislated forgetting.65 In the name of reconciliation, the Ley de Reconciliación Nacional 
prevented trials from taking place for a range of political crimes and common crimes connected 
to political crimes. Notably, genocide, torture, and crimes against humanity were excluded from 
the amnesty. As Ricoeur suggests, amnesties such as the Ley de Reconciliación Nacional force a 
more general forgetting of the crimes amnestied, and not just punishment for them. In 
Guatemala, this means that the crimes (except genocide, torture, and crimes against humanity) 
never happened. Inspired by the spirit of reconciliation, the Punto Resolutivo, however, further 
limits the number of crimes which did, in fact, happen to two: torture and crimes against 
                                                
64 Punto Resolutivo 3-2014, proposed 24 April 2014. 
65 Significantly, in terms of the discursive framework, even if Arístedes Crespo, president of the Congress, 
"invited the floor [i.e. Congress] to forget the past," the Punto Resolutivo did not call for forgetting. ("Congreso 
niega genocidio en Guatemala," Siglo Veintiuno, 13 May 2014, 
http://m.s21.com.gt/nacionales/2014/05/13/congreso-aprueba-punto-resolutivo-que-niega-existencia-genocidio.) 
To do so would perhaps have been too much; it would have been starting a completely new painting, instead of 
simply painting over one image/memory/narrative with another. Thus, it seems that Guatemala's common 
discursive framework remains, though Congress was certainly pushing the discourse to the limits with their 
legislated denial of genocide, their approval of a truth which ran counter to the CEH and human rights 
community's truth, and, of course, with Crespo's explicit call for forgetting.  
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humanity.66 With this official statement about genocide, which represents a shift in the official 
position regarding genocide from silence to denial, genocide is forgotten; it is written out of the 
historical narrative.67 The Punto Resolutivo, however, was non-binding and had no judicial 
consequences. As a result, it did not prevent Guatemalan courts from beginning a second trial 
against Ríos Montt and Ródriguez Sánchez in January 2015. The second genocide trial was 
suspended on the first day since, as the defense argued, the fact that one of the judges had written 
a thesis about genocide disqualified her from presiding over the trial.68 
Ironically, of course, the resolution did not silence the question of genocide. Rather, it 
had the opposite effect, keeping the question of genocide alive in the public sphere. 
Nevertheless, with the resolution, the aim was to convert Guatemala from a country where 
genocide had been committed69 into a country where genocide most definitely had not happened. 
With this, lawmakers hoped to whitewash the stain on the country's past, just as the denunciation 
of Pérez Molina, where street artists declared that neither the Ixil nor the Ixcán forget "the 
assassin president," was whitewashed. Denying genocide, thus, becomes the new official 
narrative of Guatemala's past.  
 
 The debate surrounding Funes' instructions to the military and request for perdón and the 
genocide trial bring to mind Stern's comments that "the most dynamic forms of cultural and 
political debate about memory often take place as a context over the primacy or 'truth' of rival 
emblematic memories, in a competitive process to establish which frameworks will displace 
                                                
66 Interestingly, more than one commentator seemed not to be bothered that crimes against humanity had been 
committed in Guatemala. The real issue was genocide. Prensa Libre columnist and self-described "lover of 
liberty and technology," Jorge Jacobs, for example, argued that no hubo genocidio because "the intention" 
aspect of the definition of genocide, which was the key to determining if genocide had been committed or not, 
not the "acts" themselves, was absent in Guatemala. "Without this intention," he wrote, "these acts can be 
categorized as crimes against humanity, but not as genocide," and should be punished. (Jorge Jacobs A., "Cuál 
genocido," Prensa Libre, 16 May 2013.)  
67 In February 2009, Mexican newspaper La Jornada reported that Colom asked for forgiveness from the victims 
of the armed conflict and recognized that what happened in Guatemala was, in fact, genocide. ("En Guatemala 
'hubo genocidio, etnocidio y destrucción de líderes', admite Álvaro Colom," La Jornada, 26 February 2006, 
http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2009/02/26/mundo/027n1mun.) In Guatemala, however, this recognition of 
genocide went unmentioned. See, for example, "Demandan cumplimiento en entrega de resarcimiento," Prensa 
Libre, 26 February 2009.  
68  Claudio Palacios, "Se suspendió inicio de juicio por genocidio tras recusación a jueza," La Hora, 5 January 
2015, http://lahora.gt/se-suspendio-inicio-de-juicio-por-genocidio-tras-recusacion-jueza/. 
69  This of course, exaggerates the previous "official" version of the past, i.e. the CEH’s. The CEH had only 
concluded that acts of genocide had been committed at certain times against certain groups, including the Ixil. 
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others and approach a hegemonic cultural influence."70 Given the explosion of passionate debate 
about Funes' perdón and the question of genocide in Guatemala, and the vocal and often abusive 
rejection of the other side's views, reaching an agreement about the truth of the conflicts, and 
sometimes even their most basic features, seems a far-off goal. Indeed, perhaps the existence of 
such obviously divergent truths was what compelled Funes to instruct the military to rewrite its 
interpretation of history and Guatemalan activists to propose criminalizing genocide denial in the 
first place, as they did shortly after the 2013 verdict. This latter, of course, was before lawmakers 
managed to pass the Punto Resolutivo officially denying genocide. The Cámara Guatemalteca de 
Periodismo (CGP, Guatemalan Chamber of Journalism) and many conservative commentators 
decried CALDH's proposal criminalizing the denial of genocide as limiting freedom of 
expression. Frank La Rue, former director of CALDH, offered a more thoughtful reaction. From 
his position as the UN's Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, he 
recognized that freedom of expression could only be limited to protect the human rights of 
others, which was not the case in Guatemala; it is impossible to see debates about history as 
"damaging." As a result, "statements in favor of or against historical events cannot be 
prohibited." Nevertheless, he wrote, countries like Germany and Austria had made denying the 
Holocaust a serious crime in an attempt to "guarantee that the people do not forget historical 
errors and so there is no chance that they are repeated in the future."71 Following this logic, 
passing an official resolution, even if it is non-binding, which denies genocide has the effect of 
allowing people to forget, if not forcing them to forget, by dictating that the absence of genocide 
is a central component of the official narrative of the past. 
 La Rue's comment about debating the past not being polarizing (to adopt the word those 
who penned the Punto Resolutivo used to describe the effects of the trial and discussion about 
genocide) is interesting. To say these debates are not polarizing points to a belief that it is 
beneficial to talk about what happened in history, even if that history is very recent and its pro- 
and antagonists are still alive (who is who, of course, depends on one's point of view). La Rue's 
comment also suggests that efforts to find the one truth of the past and put forward one narrative 
of a country's history are, at best, misguided. What is forgotten or forcibly silenced in these 
initiatives are memories and events that do not fit into the overarching narrative, leading to the 
                                                
70 Stern, Remembering Pinochet's Chile, 106-7 
71 Frank LaRue, "Libertad de expresión y libertad de opinión," Prensa Libre, 21 May 2013. 
217 
writing of a unitary historical narrative based on a rather simple and un-nuanced understanding 
of the past, often in the name of reconciliation.  
 As Ricoeur, La Rue, and others affirm, debate and discussion about the past are not 
things to avoid at all costs. Indeed, should this almost obsessive search for the one truth of the 
past be successful, the results would likely be disastrous. Not only would a society not achieve 
reconciliation, but the goal of non-repetition would remain out of reach as dissent is quashed 
with extreme violence. Transitional societies, and transitional justice mechanisms, must focus on 
the verb reconciling (both people and stories) and not the noun reconciliation. Figuring out, 
through dialogue and debate, what the "generally agreed understanding" of the past is will do 
more to reconcile a society than imposing a narrative of the past on that society. It is when the 
past forces its way into the present that reconciling will be most effective, if only the different 
sectors would stop and listen to what the social body is screaming out.
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Chapter Seven 
El Salvador and Guatemala: The Two Burials of El Salvador's Dead, and Unburying 
Guatemala's 
 
In Guatemala, history is not dead, but many exhumations are needed. 
-Graffiti. 2a Calle. Zona 2. Ciudad de Guatemala.  
 
 
 Calling for a complete rejection of communism in favor of "the patria/homeland," the 
militaristic march of the Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA, Nationalist Republican 
Alliance) is best sung at full volume. The lyrics declare, "El Salvador will be the tomb where the 
reds will be finished off." In this way, America would be saved.1 A tomb—this was certainly 
what El Salvador became. El Salvador was a tomb for the tens of thousands of Salvadorans 
buried in unmarked graves, in mass graves, in police stations, thrown from the heights of the 
Puerta del Diablo (Devil's Door) outside of San Salvador, or who simply vanished. Their 
secrets—the truth of what had happened to them—were buried or vanished with them. The right 
continued to bury in the post-Peace era. Its discourse silences what the victims and survivors 
knew had happened, burying all of it not under a(nother) layer of dirt, but under layers of 
bureaucratic red tape.  
 There are (at least) two layers of official forgetting in El Salvador: forgetting via burying 
the dead in unmarked graves or burning the bodies of massacred children, and forgetting via 
amnesty. Following this logic, if the victims have been forgotten twice, their bodies buried twice, 
with progressive sectors and human rights organizations protesting both burials throughout, then 
it follows that they need to be exhumed twice. The first (metaphorical) exhumation involves 
officially remembering the dead, remembering that El Salvador suffered through at least 12 years 
of repression and violence and that tens of thousands were killed. To do this, the Amnesty Law 
must be revoked. After this initial remembering (again, on the official level, for there is little 
forgetting in communities), very real, dirty exhumations can take place, for what is the point of 
digging up a field where nothing happened?  
 Though several actual exhumations have taken place in El Salvador, most notably the 
series of exhumations conducted with the assistance of the Equipo Argentino de Antropología 
                                                
1 Alianza Republicana Nacionalista, "Marcha de ARENA," Alianza Republicana Nacionalista, 3 November 
2011, http://www.arena.org.sv/marcha-de-arena.html. Interesting, the song also included lyrics which stated that 
"liberty will be written with blood," recognizing that there would be many victims on both sides.  
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Forense (EAAF, Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team) at El Mozote, there is no official 
policy of exhuming the war-dead in El Salvador, nor is there a non-governmental organization 
dedicated specifically to exhumations. Exhumations of the victims of wartime violations and 
post-Peace crime are the responsibility of the Instituto de Medicina Legal (Institute of Legal 
Medicine), an over-worked state institution that is part of the judicial system. While Guatemala 
also lacks an official state policy of exhuming the dead, various non-governmental organizations 
have taken charge of this work, most notably the Fundación de Antropología Forense de 
Guatemala (FAFG, Forensic Anthropology Foundation of Guatemala) created in part by the 
EAAF, which conducted the first scientific exhumation in Guatemala in 19912; thousands of 
remains have been unearthed in the decades since. 
 The reasons the Salvadoran and Guatemalan states might not actively promote 
exhumations are obvious. Yet exhumations might actually facilitate the state's operations. 
Exhumations undertaken in Guatemala serve to make cemeteries legible to the state, allowing the 
state to properly sort its citizens into categories and facilitate the incorporation of citizens into 
the state's operation. With exhumations, in a manner that recalls Foucault's "art of 
government"—"the way in which one conducts the conduct of men"3—Guatemalans have been 
incorporated into the more mundane and bureaucratic facets of the state and its operation. 
Exhumations help to embed the state in the everyday lives of its citizens, from the initial 
denunciation to the Ministerio Público (MP, Public Ministry) that a clandestine cemetery exists, 
to the issuing of death certificates and marriage licenses and the filling out of paperwork so the 
dead can receive a proper burial. Exploring exhumations and the work of the exhumers from a 
framework which incorporates legibility and the art of government offers insight into the way 
that exhumations allow the state to control the behavior of Guatemalans, both in life and in 
death, and point to ways that the Salvadoran state might also benefit from a similar process. 
 One final point is necessary. Burying is paradoxical. Burying helps ease the pain and 
anger relatives often feel at not having been able to properly bury their dead. These emotions are 
buried under layers of dirt; they are forgotten, helping relatives find some closure. Burials can 
help ease relatives' pain by covering up the body so that the dead can rest peacefully. They are a 
                                                
2 A member of the Comisión de Derechos Humanos de El Salvador (CDHES, Human Rights Commission of El 
Salvador) suggested that Salvadoran NGOs, like the CDHES, receive much less funding than Guatemalan 
NGOs because there was no genocide committed in El Salvador. (Conversation with author, 29 May 2012.) 
3 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-79, ed. Michel Sellenart 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 186 and 1-2. 
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way to protect the body from the elements and scavengers. This last issue is why many of those 
who gave testimony to Guatemala's Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico (CEH, 
Historical Clarification Commission) and Proyecto Interdiocesano de Recuperación de la 
Memoria Histórica (Remhi Project, Interdiocesan Project for the Recuperation of Historical 
Memory) were so saddened about the fate of loved ones whose bodies had been tossed by the 
side of the road like animals.4 Yet burying also turns a piece of earth into a place were relatives 
can go to remember, and graves serve as a permanent reminder of the past. Another way that 
burials are paradoxical is that, in addition to hiding the bodies from the weather, burying also 
covers up less literally. Burying covers up or conceals the crimes of the past, and responsibility 
for those crimes. Thus, covering up or burying (the evidence of a crime) can protect the 
perpetrators from prosecution and prison. In this, relatives' desire to properly bury the dead and 
the state's wish to leave the dead buried coincide, at least partially. 
 But to properly bury the dead, they must first be unburied. They must be exhumed. 
Exhuming reveals and uncovers—the remains, the story of the victim's death, and responsibility 
for her death. As a result, many oppose exhuming. Yet after unburying comes reburying, which 
can prompt forgetting. For when the bones remain in the earth, scattered in fields and forests and 
absent, they can be a powerful indictment of what happened. This absence refuses to be 
forgotten. It will be many years before the dead and disappeared of either country have all been 
exhumed, all the more so because the number to exhume continues to rise in the violence of the 
era of "peace." One wonders if, once all the bones have been unburied, given back their name, 
and reburied, forgetting will be that much easier.  
 
Burying the Past in El Salvador 
 The right buried the past in a few ways in post-Peace El Salvador. Some commentators 
and journalists threw handfuls of dirt in the open grave where the remains of the past lay by 
simply insisting that the past be buried. Alvaro Sánchez wrote in La Prensa Gráfica in May 1992 
that Salvadorans only wanted to "live and work in peace, without the threats that make them 
remember the years of destruction and death" which the country experienced from the early 
                                                
4 See, for example, Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico, Guatemala: Memoria del Silencio, Volume 4, 
Consecuencias y Efectos de la Violencia (Guatemala City: Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico, 1999), 
24. 
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1980s. "This era of terror," he said, "should be buried forever."5 The following year, Ernesto 
Valiente Durán wrote a piece about the soon-to-be published report of the Comisión de la 
Verdad para El Salvador. Demonstrating his lack of faith in men, he placed all his faith in God. 
He commented that only God was "capable of making a Truth Commission where all are given a 
fair sentence." "It is better," he wrote, that the men "down here concern ourselves with the future 
and that we bury the past deep, once and for all."6 In a piece published at the end of 1992, La 
Prensa Gráfica's editors wrote, "Terrible things took place during this war which we are trying 
to bury in a dark corner of our history."7  
 The conservative media focused much of its energy on simply not writing about the 
human rights violations committed during the war, and more specifically, on not writing about 
the ones attributed to the military. The conservative media further silenced (and buried) the 
deaths in the post-Peace era by denying them a place in the public sphere.8 Talking vaguely 
about the "terrible things [that] took place during the war" is one way to silence the victims. So is 
limiting the list of "terrible things" to crimes that already had a place in the public sphere and to 
the "terrorist acts" of the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN, 
Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front).9 Conservative media were also well-versed in the 
art of omission and confusion, which further buried/silenced the victims. For example, 
conservative media generally only mentioned death squads to deny their existence, failed to say 
who had assassinated Rutilio Grande, did not say why the military's elite Batallones de Infantería 
de Reacción Inmediata (BIRI, Immediate Reaction Infantry Battalions) were demobilized after 
the war, suggested that the bombing of Federación Nacional Sindical de Trabajadores 
Salvadoreños (FENASTRAS, National Trade Union Federation of Salvadorian Workers) might 
have been a result of an internal purge, and commented that the "rebels" were responsible for the 
massacre during monseñor Romero's funeral.10 More than twenty years of silencing, omitting, 
and misinforming buried the victims and what had happened to them. 
                                                
5 Alvaro L. Sánchez, "Acuerdos de paz no son objeto negociable," La Prensa Gráfica, 6 May 1992.  
6 Ernesto Valiente Durán, "Esto sí da miedo!!" La Prensa Gráfica, 4 March 1993. 
7 Editorial, "Las secuelas internas del conflicto," La Prensa Gráfica, 29 December 1992. 
8 Diario Co-Latino does much the same. 
9 The list includes the FMLN's killing of US soldiers riding in a helicopter the guerrilla shot down, the 
kidnapping of Inés Duarte, the destruction of infrastructure, the assassinations of Roque Dalton and Melinda 
Anaya Montes, and the Zona Rosa massacre. As for the military's crimes, these include the El Mozote and 
Sumpul massacres, the Jesuit massacre, the rape and assassination of four US religious women (who were often 
not described as having been raped), and the assassination of monseñor Romero. 
10 See, for example, "Laboratorio de ideologías," El Diario de Hoy, 26 May 1999; "Mensaje pronunciado por el 
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 Yet, despite these post-Peace attempts to bury the past, exhumations have been conducted 
in El Salvador. According to the Centro para la Promoción de los Derechos Humanos 
"Madeleine Lagadec" (CPDH, Center for the Promotion of Human Rights "Madeleine 
Lagadec"), 546 exhumations were conducted before 2006.11 These include exhumations at Las 
Aradas, Río Sapullo, Guadalupe-Tenango, Palo Grande, and Santa Rosita.12 The most significant 
exhumation was conducted at El Mozote and nearby communities where close to 1000 civilians 
had been killed in 1981.13 The initial push to exhume the dead came from organizations in 
Morazán. In 1989, these organizations asked the Oficina de Tutela Legal del Arzobispado de San 
Salvador (Tutela Legal, Archbishop of San Salvador's Legal Aid Office) to investigate the 
massacre. The following year (and so before either of the Amnesty Laws were passed), after 
concluding that the army had massacred hundreds of Salvadorans, Tutela Legal, on behalf of 
several survivors, began a lawsuit against the army. As part of the evidence gathering process, 
they planned to conduct exhumations of the mass graves and invited the EAAF to El Salvador to 
assist. The Argentines spent some months in the country, but local judges and other officials in 
the justice system did not allow the exhumations to take place. Tutela Legal invited the EAAF to 
El Salvador again shortly after the Peace Accords were signed. Some preliminary investigations 
were carried out and mass graves identified, but once again, permission to exhume was denied. 
By September, however, the situation had changed. The Truth Commission began operating and 
appointed the EAAF as technical consultants.14 They would be the ones to help to "research the 
                                                                                                                                                       
Señor Presidente de la República, Lic. Alfredo Cristiani, al presidir la ceremonio de desmovilización del 
Batallon de Infanteria de Reacción Inmediata 'Atlacatl, ' " La Prensa Gráfica, 11 December 1992; Enrique 
Altamiro, "Reagan: partero de una nueva era," El Diario de Hoy, 13 June 2004. Some of this brings to mind the 
military's strategy of covering up responsibility for crimes during the war, such as when they spray-painted 
FMLN slogans on the walls of the Universidad Centroamericana "José Simeón Cañas" (UCA, Central 
American University "José Simeón Cañas") after killing the Jesuits to throw blame on the guerrilla.  
11 Comisión para la Promoción de los Derechos Humanos "Madeleine Lagadec," Informe de Investigación 
Temática: La Experiencia del CPDH "Madeleine Lagadec" en el Acompañamiento a Familiares de Víctimas en 
la Exigencia de Sus Derechos (San Salvador, 2006), 35. 
12 "Iniciarán exhumación a víctimas en el Sumpul," Diario Co-Latino, 18 January 2010; "Delegación de La Paz 
participa en proceso de exhumación de víctimas de masacre," El Defensor del Pueblo 35 (April 2011), 15; 
Comisión de Trabajo en Derechos Humanos Pro Memoria Histórica de El Salvador, "A diez años de los 
acuerdos de paz: la verdad resurge de la tierra, rememorando el pasado y advirtiendo nuestro futuro," Diario 
Co-Latino, 16 January 2002, paid ad.  
13 Leigh Binfords's The El Mozote Massacre: Anthropology and Human Rights (Tucson: University of Arizona, 
1996) offers an in-depth discussion of the exhumation.  
14 Luis Fondebrider and Mercedes Doretti, "Forensics," in Encyclopedia of Genocide and Crimes Against 
Humanity, vol. 1, ed. Dinah Shelton (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2005), 
http://find.galegroup.com/gic/infomark.do?&source=gale&idigest=003cdad854f3479a09e7dd1aac53b235&pro
dId=GIC&userGroupName=23mbss&tabID=T001&docId=CX3434600140&type=retrieve&contentSet=EBKS
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death of various people" around El Mozote, as La Prensa Gráfica described what had happened 
there.15 
 The exhumation began on 13 October 1992 and was limited to a building known as "the 
Convent," which had been badly burned at the time of the massacre. For the month the 
exhumation lasted, La Prensa Gráfica offered readers a macabre account of the progress: three 
skulls found so far...18 skulls and remains...56 skulls and a fetus...76 skulls and a fetus.16 In total, 
the forensic anthropologists uncovered 143 remains. One hundred thirty six were under 12 years 
old. Forensic analysis of the remains and bullet fragments also recovered confirmed the 
survivors' story. The army had massacred local residents. The dead had not been killed in a 
confrontation between two sides, as the military had insisted.17  
 The next exhumation was not conducted until 2000. Though the Truth Commission 
promoted continued investigations into violations committed during the war, the Amnesty Law 
was understood to prevent investigations into the past. From 1992 to 2000, the bones remained 
where they were, impatiently waiting to be exhumed and reburied in proper graves. During this 
time, as the EAAF's Luis Fondebrider and Mercedes Doretti, who were involved in the original 
exhumation, relate, relatives continued to insist that exhumations be carried out. Their efforts 
finally paid off in 2000 when their request was approved "on humanitarian grounds." Trials, of 
course, were "ruled out." Exhumations conducted between 2000 and 2004 brought the total 
number of remains to at least 281 individuals.18 
 The need for more exhumations remained. In 2012, the Corte Interamericana de Derechos 
Humanos (CIDH, Inter-American Human Rights Court) condemned El Salvador for working 
against exhumations and its general failure to investigate the massacre. The Court ruled that El 
Salvador must continue to exhume the dead, as part of the relatives' right to know what had 
happened to their loved ones. The CIDH further recognized that burying the dead would allow 
the living to "close the process of mourning which they have been living for many long years." 
                                                                                                                                                       
&version=1.0. See also: Corte Interameriana de Derechos Humanos, "Caso Masacres de El Mozote y Lugares 
Aledaños Vs. El Salvador: Sentencia de 25 de octubre de 2012, (Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas)," 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_252_esp.pdf.  
15 "Piden a Justicia gestione ante países ayuda en Caso El Mozote," La Prensa Gráfica, 15 September 1992. 
16 "Varias osamentas hallan en El Mozote, " La Prensa Gráfica, 18 October 1992; "18 cráneos y osamentas 
localizan en EL Mozote," La Prensa Gráfica, 19 October 1992; "Fiscalía y colaboradores activos en 
exhumaciones de El Mozote," La Prensa Gráfica, 25 October 1992; "Encuentra 76 cráneos en excavaciones de 
El Mozote," La Prensa Gráfica, 11 November 1992. 
17 Fondebrider and Doretti, "Forensics" and CIDH, "Caso Masacres de El Mozote," 91. 
18 CIDH, "Caso Masacres de El Mozote," 93-5 and 56-8. 
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Finally, the Court concluded that the exhumation could also reveal important information to help 
"clarify" what happened and identify the perpetrators. In the El Mozote ruling, the Court also 
pointed out that the local court in Morazán, responsible for allowing exhumations, understood 
the Amnesty as putting an end to all investigations into the past.19 Discussions about the new 
series of exhumations, as recommended by the CIDH, began in 2014. By the end of July, amidst 
debate about whether the EAAF or Medicina Legal would conduct the exhumation, little had 
been done to actually open the graves.20 
 As seen in the CIDH ruling, the state, in the form of the judiciary, was reluctant to allow 
the exhumation to take place. Judges continually placed obstacles to the exhumation and other 
investigations in 1991 and 1992.21 This included, as seen above, refusing to grant permission to 
exhume. The executive also created obstacles. President Cristiani, for example, declared in 1993 
that they had not been able to find any records related to who might have been serving in the 
Atlacatl Battalion at that time. In 1981, he pointed out, a de facto government was running the 
country, suggesting this government did not keep good records; as well, the military was 
undergoing restructuring. The records simply have not been found, he stated, and "we cannot 
invent information."22 More than this, however, Tutela Legal reported in internal memos that the 
judge in Morazán had told them "he had superior orders to delay and block the investigation." 
These orders came from Cristiani, the president of the Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and 
the Minister of Defense. These delaying tactics included not setting a date to begin the 
exhumations, as seen above, but also making rumors that the area was mined seem credible.23  
 Despite the state's best efforts, and likely only because of the presence of the Truth 
Commission in the country, the exhumation did eventually begin. Yet the right would not admit 
defeat in the battle over the memory of the war so easily. Even as the bones were being 
unearthed, some continued to try to insist that the victims had been killed in a confrontation 
                                                
19 CIDH, "Caso Masacre de El Mozote," 127-9. The Court, it should be noted, has consistently ruled that the 
Amnesty Law must be overturned. The link between the Amnesty and the exhumations was also mentioned in 
2000, at least in Diario Co-Latino. See, for example, Santiago Leiva, "Reiniciarán exhumaciones de masacrados 
en El Mozote," Diario Co-Latino, 11 April 2000; Gloria Silvia Orellana, "Dignificación de las víctimas del 
conflicto armado mediante las exhumaciones," Diario Co-Latino, 24 April 2000. The lack of funding was also 
cited as a reason the exhumation stopped.   
20 José Mejía, "Fiscalía iniciaría un nuevo proceso judicial en caso masacre El Mozote," Transparencia Activa, 24 
July 2014.  http://www.transparenciaactiva.gob.sv/fiscalia-iniciaria-un-nuevo-proceso-judicial-en-caso-
masacre-el-mozote/. 
21 CIDH, "Caso Masacre de El Mozote," 86-7. 
22 Ibid.; "Investigación previa en caso del El Mozote," La Prensa Gráfica, 14 October 1992. 
23 CIDH, "Caso Masacre de El Mozote," 102. 
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between the military and the guerrilla. They continued to bury the truth of the war that the bones 
were revealing. La Prensa Gráfica commentator J.E. López, for example, offered his view on the 
massacre on 30 November 1992 in "The myth of 'El Mozote.' " Recognizing that there was 
misinformation circulating in the public sphere, López sought to clarify a few points about what 
had happened at El Mozote. Drawing on a pamphlet published by a former member of the 
military who later joined the FMLN, Francisco Mena Sandoval, López affirmed that El Mozote 
was the site of one of the FMLN's training schools and was, as well, the site of frequent battles 
between the two forces. The fact that children as young as 8 years old were kidnapped and forced 
to join the FMLN, López wrote, explained the discovery of children's bones. And given that the 
community was actually a training school for "terrorists," the victims could not have been 
civilians massacred by the military. He concluded that El Mozote "was an FMLN cemetery,... 
that it was a 'military school' for youth and adults the FMLN kidnapped,...[and that it] was not a 
civilian community, but a 'refuge' for the FMLN."24  
 A frequent champion of this version of the past was director of Medicina Legal, Juan 
Mateu Llort. At the end of 1992, for example, he declared that the possibility that the dead, 
whom he recognized included many children and youth, were killed in battles between the 
military and FMLN could not be discarded. El Mozote was, he added, a region where many 
residents participated in the war and, "In a war, many things can happen."25 In early January 
1993, he rejected the Argentines' conclusions that a massacre had taken place at El Mozote. All 
he hoped for (and despite his declarations) was "to arrive at the truth using scientific methods," 
"apolitically and without any pressure."26  
 These discursive debates about the narrative truth of war were matched in debates about 
what the bones said, though the debates do not seem to have been given much or any space in the 
public sphere. In 1993, Cristiani invited a controversial Spanish doctor and anthropologist, José 
Manuel Reverte Coma, to El Salvador to participate in the exhumation. His interpretation of the 
bones excavated in the Convent—and especially their size—contradicted the EAAF's findings. 
As Guatemalan author Francisco Goldman wrote in 1999, and what he repeated in 2007 in The 
Art of Political Murder: Who Killed the Bishop?, Reverte Coma offered "ridiculous 
interpretations" of the evidence to obstruct the investigation. "All the tiny skeletons," as 
                                                
24 J.E. López, "El mito de 'El Mozote,' " La Prensa Gráfica, 30 November 1992. 
25 "Siguen investigaciones sobre hechos de El Mozote," La Prensa Gráfica, 21 December 1992. 
26 "Antropólogos E.U reanudan excavaciones en El Mozote," El Diario de Hoy, 8 January 1993. 
226 
Goldman reported, "were not from assassinated children...but from adolescent guerrillas, youth 
recruited from a small and malnourished race of men, who had died in battle." Goldman added 
that Reverte Coma had been removed from the investigation at the request of the head of the 
Truth Commission.27  
 The EAAF were also highly critical of Reverte Coma and his conclusion that the bones 
did not belong to children but to malnourished and stressed out youth, and countered his views 
point by point. Aside from the more scientific issues with Reverte Coma's conclusions, the 
EAAF also rejected his idea that "the children killed at El Mozote were old enough to have been 
guerrilla members." Even if they had been "old enough," the EAAF wrote, it does not mean they 
were. The "real problem with Reverte Coma's argument" was that it supported the government's 
theory that the dead were guerrillas. While Reverte Coma "did not explicitly advocate the 
government's theories, ...his hypothesis could have been used to support them." This, 
presumably, would not have been a problem except that his argument "was not based on any 
substantial evidence." Indeed, "All evidence available" pointed to the fact that the government's 
theory were "baseless."28 
 In the end, of course, forensics and the Truth Commission report confirmed that the 
military had massacred the victims. And, of course, the Amnesty Law was passed soon after. As 
Benjamín Cuéllar, the director of the Instituto de Derechos Humanos de la Universidad 
Centroamericana "José Simeón Cañas" (IDHUCA, Human Rights Institute of the Universidad 
Centroamericana "José Simeón Cañas"), said, the Legislative Assembly "buried the Truth 
Commission report under the gravestone of amnesty."29 Thus, amnesty almost completely buried 
the events of the past, evidence of the past, and the truth of the past. These things were only 
                                                
27 Francisco Goldman, The Art of Political Murder: Who Killed the Bishop? (New York: Grove Press, 2007), 380; 
Francisco Goldman, "El asesinato alcanza al obispo," Letras Libres, September 1999, 
http://www.letraslibres.com/revista/convivio/el-asesinato-alcanza-al-obispo. Goldman's interest in Reverte 
Coma was not related to El Salvador; the bishop he was talking about was not Romero. Rather, he was 
concerned with the 1998 assassination of monseñor Juan Gerardi days after he presented Remhi's findings about 
military responsibility to the public. Reverte Coma played a similar role in the investigation in Guatemala as in 
El Salvador, affirming that wounds on Gerardi's body were dog bites. In this view, an arthritic German 
Shepherd had killed Gerardi; military officers had most certainly not been involved. Goldman masterfully 
documents the government and military's efforts to obstruct the investigation into Gerardi's assassination. 
28 In reference to the size of the bones discovered, the EAAF pointed out that they were not "planning to use bone 
development as the sole indicator of age." Instead, they would look at teeth, "which is a much more stable 
variable, and much less dependent on environmental factors." (EAAF, "EAAF's experience with Dr. Reverte 
Coma during the El Mozote case," http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/9019s3547.) 
29 Benjamín Cuéllar Martínez, "El Salvador," in Victims Unsilenced: The Inter-American Human Rights System 
and Transitional Justice in Latin America, Due Process of Law Foundation (Washington: Due Process of Law 
Foundation, 2007), 65. 
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"almost completely" buried because the human rights community and relatives of the war dead 
have kept the past alive and have refused to allow the bones, and their loved ones, to be 
forgotten.  
 
Exhumations and the state in Guatemala 
 Just as had the Salvadoran military and its proxies, the Guatemalan military sowed the 
bodies of tens of thousands throughout the country during the conflict, hoping to reap a bountiful 
harvest of security and nationalism in their attempt to defeat the leftist guerrilla. Many of the 
bodies were tossed into mass graves, wells, or ossuary pits, or left on the side of the road as a 
warning to others: if the living were involved in whatever it was the dead had been involved in, 
they too would be tortured, raped, and assassinated, their bodies dumped for scavengers to feast 
on. The sites where the bodies were buried are Guatemala's clandestine cemeteries. They are 
clandestine not because they are particularly well-hidden or because relatives do not know where 
they are. Instead, they are clandestine because the dead were buried without the proper 
paperwork;30 they were buried illegally, either by the military or by family members who did so 
secretly, despite the army's threats, as a witness from Nebaj in the Ixil triangle told the CEH. The 
witness declared, "So we went to bury [the dead], but secretly, and with fear because they say 
that the Army will return again, ....[the Army says] if someone comes to collect these 
Goddamned people then we will end their lives right there, this is what they said."31 Fear, thus, 
forbade the open burial of the dead, as it did the open performance of funerary rites. The 
existence and location of many clandestine cemeteries was and is an open secret. As 
anthropologist Victoria Sanford wrote, clandestine cemeteries "are truly clandestine only in the 
official negation of their existence and the silence imposed on communities."32 Relatives of the 
dead and disappeared were pushed to demand that exhumations be carried out. They demanded 
exhumations hoping to grant both the dead and the living some peace. They demanded 
exhumations so that they could know what happened to loved ones and could properly bury 
them.  
                                                
30 Juan Ramón Donado Vivar, "Aporte de la Antropologia Social a la Investigación Forense para Casos de 
Desastres Naturales (Cantón Cúa, Municipio de Tacaná, Departamento de San Marcos, 2005-2006)" (thesis, 
Universidad de San Carlos de Guatemala, 2008), 20-21. 
31 CEH, Consecuencias y Efectos de la Violencia, 23. 
32 Victoria Sanford, Buried Secrets: Truth and Human Rights in Guatemala (New York: Palgrave, 2003), 17. 
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 Exhumations in Guatemala predate the end of the armed conflict. Organizations working 
with relatives of the victims of genocide sought out Dr. Clyde Snow. He, along with members of 
the EAAF and Chile's Grupo de Antropología Forense (Forensic Anthropology Group), 
conducted the initial exhumations in El Quiché in 1991 and trained a team of Guatemalans so 
that they would be able to meet continued demands for exhumations. The Equipo de  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
"In Guatemala, history is not dead, but many exhumations are needed."  
2a Calle. Zona 2. Ciudad de Guatemala. Photo by author. 13 December 2013. 
 
Antropología Forense de Guatemala (Forensic Anthropology Team of Guatemala) was formed in 
1992 and later became FAFG.33 FAFG conducts the majority of the exhumations undertaken in 
Guatemala: 1,400 exhumations between 1992 and 2012, most in rural areas.34 Many more, 
according to the author of the declaration in the photo above, are necessary. 
                                                
33 Fundación de Antropología Forense de Guatemala, "Proyectos," accessed 2 October 2013, 
http://www.fafg.org/paginas/proyectos.htm. In 2013, while a handful of FAFG's over 100 team members had 
relatives who had been assassinated or disappeared during the conflict, most of those who work for FAFG do 
not have such personal ties to the violence. (José Suasnavar, in discussion with the author, October 2013.) 
34 Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, "Entrevista con José Suasnavar (FAFG), por FLACSO-
Guatemala," Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, accessed 3 Octobre 2013, 
http://www.flacso.edu.gt/portal/?p=7876. FAFG also conducts exhumations not related to the armed conflict. 
(Fundación de Antropología Forense de Guatemala, "Casos," accessed 2 October 2014, 
http://www.fafg.org/bd/.) The ODHA, Centro para la Acción Legal en Derechos Humanos (CALDH, Center for 
Legal Action in Human Rights), and the Centro de Análisis Forense y Ciencias Aplicadas (CACFA, Center for 
Forensic Analysis and Applied Sciences), have also carried out exhumations. Only CAFCA remains active. 
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 For many years, according to a 2012 interview with José Suasnavar, one of FAFG's 
founders, exhumations were carried out only in rural areas in response to relatives' demands. It 
was in these same rural areas where the CEH had concluded that acts of genocide had been 
committed at certain times against certain indigenous populations. In urban centers, though there 
were denunciations of human rights violations, and especially of forced disappearances, there 
were no known clandestine cemeteries to excavate. Where the bodies of the disappeared had 
been hidden remained a mystery. The obvious difficulty of not having a cemetery to open led 
FAFG to Guatemala City's La Verbena Cemetery, where unidentified bodies have long been and 
continue to be buried without a name as XX. Examining the cemetery's records, investigators 
noticed, first, that between 1980 and 1984, among the worst years of the violence, the number of 
unidentified individuals rose significantly. They also noted that the cause of death was 
consistently recorded as having been violent. Investigators concluded that these might be the 
remains of the forcibly disappeared.35  
 FAFG's exhumation of La Verbena's several ossuary pits is the largest the Foundation has 
undertaken. Based on their investigation of cemetery records, the FAFG team had originally 
expected to locate and identify the remains of approximately 890 individuals. By April 2012, just 
over two years after the exhumation had begun, close to 9,500 bodies had been uncovered.36 It is, 
however, certain that most of these 9,500 bodies are not among the estimated 45,000 
Guatemalans disappeared during the conflict. For decades, the remains of all unidentified bodies, 
mostly indigents, were tossed into the ossuaries. As well, the remains of those whose families 
had stopped paying "rent" on their tombs were thrown into the pits. Nevertheless, at least some 
of the remains excavated from La Verbena belong to the disappeared, and not only those 
disappeared from Guatemala City. 37 FAFG continues to work to recover, analyze and measure, 
and identify the bones. The ultimate goal is to return them to relatives so that they may bury 
loved ones according to their customs. 
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37 José Suasnavar, in discussion with the author, October 2013. 
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 Exhumations in Guatemala are non-governmental projects, and FAFG is a non-
governmental organization which has received funding from the United Nations Development 
Program, the International Organization for Migration, the International Committee of the Red 
Cross, the United States State Department, and the European Union, among others.38 That the 
state hesitates to exhume the dead is understandable given the CEH's allotting of responsibility 
for violations. The CEH concluded that the state was overwhelmingly responsible for human 
rights violations committed during the conflict, violations which the military and its proxies 
carried out. The military and the state are, of course, not equivalent, and certainly the military of 
the 1980s and the state of the post-Peace era are not.39 As well, as anthropologist Steve Striffler 
and others have pointed out, the state is fragmented and state institutions often work at cross 
purposes.40 This was less true during the conflict since the military was able to dominate various 
state institutions and reorient them toward the interests of "national security." After the formal 
return to democracy in 1986, and even more so after the Peace Accords were signed, there 
continued to be some common purpose in a range of state institutions. Political scientist Manolo 
Vela Castañeda, for example, has argued that civilian presidents and military officers created 
alliances whereby civilians would be allowed to govern if they, through their control over the 
Attorney General, made sure trials did not progress.41 Unlike in other cases where much time has 
passed or where the regime changed completely, the post-Peace political power of those 
implicated in crimes means that many are interested in leaving the dead buried. 
 While some state institutions and their members oppose exhumations, the MP continues 
to authorize them; indeed, exhumations cannot be undertaken without the MP's approval. Yet 
despite official permission, those associated with exhumations have consistently received threats 
warning them to stop excavating the past. Victoria Sanford wrote about death threats made 
against FAFG members in 1994 at Plan de Sánchez, Baja Verapaz.42 In February 2002, a 
mysterious fire broke out in the parish house in Nebaj, Quiché, where forensic anthropologists 
stored their equipment.43 In August 2003, Fredy Peccerelli reported that FAFG had officially 
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denounced 15 separate incidents of threats, harassment, or aggression against FAFG personnel to 
the MP so far that year. In one incident, the FAFG team was able to trace the license plate of a 
vehicle that had been following them to the Estado Mayor Presidencial (EMP, Presidential 
General Staff).44 The connection between the state and threats to FAFG is evident in the 2003 
incident. As well, after threats are made, the police and justice system do very little to stop them 
or to prosecute those who had made them, signaling at least tacit support for them. Clearly, in 
Guatemala's slow transition away from internal armed conflict, different state institutions have 
competing agendas.  
 It is not unexpected that various state institutions, especially the security forces, oppose 
exhumations. Exhumations provide additional evidence that the military massacred and 
disappeared tens of thousands of its own citizens.45 Yet there are aspects of exhumations the 
state, in all its complexity and contradictions, can appreciate. Exhumations and the reburial of 
bones in official, non-clandestine, state and church-sanctioned cemeteries help to contain the 
dead in both space and time. With reburial, the bones are no longer scattered around Guatemala, 
lying just beneath the surface, in danger of being exposed after a heavy rain at just the wrong 
time: in the midst of a political campaign in which the candidate has blood on his hands, for 
example. Instead, reburial confines the bones—first in small, identical wooden boxes and then in 
the graves themselves—to one specific, ordered, well-defined place, and one which is often 
surrounded by thick concrete walls which prevent memories, and ghosts, from "escaping." 
Reburial also facilitates the process of containing the memories of the dead in time, to the Day of 
the Dead, when surviving relatives clean the graves, remember the dead, and leave gifts for 
them. Exhumations facilitate containing the memory of the dead, and the memory that, in the 
vast majority of the cases, state security forces were responsible for their deaths, to one place and 
to one time. With exhumation and reburial, no longer is the landscape scarred by places where 
the dead scream out (and clandestine cemeteries are certainly memory knots) to the living to be 
remembered, to be unearthed, to be laid to rest. Exhumations and reburial sanitize the landscape, 
helping to confine painful memories of death to legal cemeteries.46 
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 Exhumations also allow the state to continue its counterinsurgency agenda of surveilling 
and controlling the rural, indigenous population, as Jennifer Schirmer describes in The 
Guatemalan Military Project. Schirmer argues that after massacring tens of thousands of 
indigenous Guatemalans, the military set out to forcefully "reorder" life in the rural highlands.47 
A key aspect of the reorganization of rural life was the resettlement of those who had survived 
the scorched earth campaigns into model villages. With the streets organized in a grid, Schirmer 
describes model villages as "high-security areas built to serve as forms of population control...as 
well as to 'integrate' the local indigenous population into both the antisubversive fight and the 
'nationalist' security and development project."48 Residents, much like forensic anthropologists 
and relatives, were constantly watched. They were surveilled by soldiers and neighbors, leading 
villages to "internaliz[e] discipline and obedience;" this was "Bentham's panopticon 
internalized."49 The integration of civilians into the counterinsurgency was accomplished through 
the creation, in 1981,50 of the Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil (PACs, Civil Self-defense Patrols). 
Rural Guatemalans were forced to patrol, often unarmed, in rotating shifts of 24 hours. Schirmer 
reported that by 1984, out of a total population of seven to eight million, 1.4 million men, to say 
nothing of boys, the elderly, and some women, had been incorporated in the PACs.51 The 
Catholic Church's Remhi Project concluded that the patrols were created to control people and 
territory and allowed the military to have a "permanent presence in the [rural] communities and 
prevent whatever movement which was not under their control."52  
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 With the settlement of the population into model villages and the formation of PACs, 
which were not limited to model villages, rural areas were militarized as never before. 
Inhabitants were heavily controlled by the military and also were dependent on it for basic needs. 
Additional aspects of involving the indigenous population in "national security" were 
"reeducation" and the appropriation of indigenous cultural symbols and their incorporation into 
the counterinsurgency. These, the military hoped, would include the indigenous population into 
"the nation" and increase feelings of patriotism, national identity, and loyalty to the state.53 The 
military, Schirmer argued, hoped to create a "Sanctioned Maya," an apolitical Maya "loyal to 
national symbols, the state, and by extension, the army."54  
 There was nothing subtle about the military's governing of rural areas. Internment in 
model villages, incorporation into PACs, and the creation of a new sanctioned, sanitized Maya 
culture were forced on indigenous Guatemalans at the point of a machete based on the idea that, 
in this way, they would no longer be just beyond the military's or state's grasp, and so would no 
longer pose a threat. Exhumations continue this process of bringing the state into the lives of 
both indigenous and non-indigenous Guatemalans, and the complementary process of involving 
Guatemalans in the functioning of the state. The state and Guatemalans' mutual involvement is 
deep. The state, through one of its instruments, the MP, determines which bones, which histories 
will be excavated and which will not be.55 Justice officials also have to agree to let the bones be 
reburied. Sanford described one incident where a judge first insisted that if the remains were 
reburied, relatives would forfeit the possibility of a criminal trial against the perpetrators.56 Only 
"writing, signing, and sealing many legal documents" convinced the judge to allow the remains 
to be buried without the relatives losing their right to begin judicial proceedings. After all, as 
Sanford points out, "exhumations are carried out as an investigatory procedure of the court." 
Trials, "along with the proper religious burials of massacre victims [are] the central goal[s] of 
legal and forensic investigations into massacres."57 As a result, and further involving state 
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representatives into the process of exhuming the dead, security personnel are charged with 
guarding exhumation sites, at least in part to "conserve legal custody of all evidence exhumed."58 
The state, through central and local representatives of the justice system, thus has significant 
control over exhumations. The state and its representatives control the "lives" of the dead, 
deciding if they will be exhumed and whether, where, and when they will be reburied. Security 
personnel guard exhumation sites; they guard the evidence of responsibility for gross human 
rights violations and they guard those who exhume. Of course whether those who guard 
exhumations were protecting "legal custody of the evidence" or controlling and surveilling the 
living is sometimes unclear (and it is undoubtedly possible to do both at once.) As the FAFG 
team knows, state security forces do follow and threaten those whose work is seen as a threat.59  
 Exhumations and the work of forensic anthropologists also allow the state to better read 
Guatemala, and especially rural Guatemala. They make it more legible. In Seeing Like a State, 
political scientist James Scott described ways that the (abstract, amorphous) state sought to make 
society legible, to make sense of a society it did not understand, in order to facilitate taxation and 
conscription and to ensure internal security. Scott discusses how, by insisting on the use of 
heritable surnames, uniform weights and measures, cadastral land tenure maps, and the census, 
the state attempted to make legible, and "manipulable," from outside and above, the local and 
illegible.60 The simplified version of society which resulted from the state's naming, measuring, 
and land tenure practices, the "maps" which the state created to understand the local, "did not 
successfully represent the actual activity of the society they depicted, nor were they intended to. 
They represented only that slice of it that interested the official observer." All that did not 
interest "the official observer," as an agent of the state, was left off the map.61 The state, thus, 
suffered from "tunnel vision," which allowed it to "brin[g] into sharp focus certain limited 
aspects of an otherwise far more complex and unwieldy reality." The state's narrowed vision 
"makes the phenomenon at the center of the field of vision more legible and hence more 
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susceptible to careful measurement and calculation."62 Yet more than merely simplifying and 
measuring society, the "maps," "when allied with state power, would enable much of the reality 
they depicted to be remade."63  
 At a basic level, exhumations contribute to legibility by officially determining how many 
are buried in a particular grave and who they are. Counting is undeniably a significant aspect of 
exhumations, for exhumations convert piles of bones into the remains of a specific number of 
Guatemalans. With the issuing of a death certificate once the remains have been identified, an 
individual can be placed into the correct category—"deceased." The state, as Scott suggested, 
loves to sort, to name, to categorize, to count, and exhumations allow it to do these things. Ian 
Hacking concurred. He pointed to the United States' census as evidence of the "enthusiasm for 
numerical data." The first census, he explained, had only four questions. The tenth decennial 
census had 13,010.64 Exhumations clearly enable the state's addiction to counting and sorting.  
 As for identifying and naming the dead, which are an additional focus of the work of 
forensic anthropologists, art historian Erika Doss asserted that naming on memorials is 
"annalistic, a mechanical practice of notation whereby individuals are counted and collected into 
groups."65 Doss's claim that naming allows for counting and categorization is especially 
interesting in the case of Guatemala. Whereas naming facilitates counting and categorizing in 
Doss's memorials, and thus increases legibility, from the Guatemalan state's perspective, naming 
might actually increase illegibility. Naming certainly allows the state to know who is alive, dead, 
widowed, a landowner, etc., but ultimately, as Hacking suggested, the state is interested in 
numbers. What is the population of Guatemala? How many Guatemalans are indigenous? A 
question of greater interest to many civil society and international organizations is: how many 
were killed and disappeared in the conflict? What makes sense to the state is the answer to this 
last question: 200,000. Knowing their names clarifies legal issues, especially locally, and allows 
relatives to properly bury their dead, but it does little for the state's ability to read its citizens. 
Were the state involved in memorial projects related to the conflict, as in Doss' work on the 
United States, the "methodical collection and inscription of these names" on memorials would 
facilitate their "reduc[tion] to a deceitful narrative of national consensus." Were this the case, the 
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initial individualizing and subsequent unifying which are part of naming would "depoliticiz[e] 
(or evad[e]) issues of responsibility and simultaneously justif[y] national imperatives."66 Were 
the Guatemalan state involved in memorial processes as are other states, then naming the 162 
victims of the 1982 Dos Erres massacre would increase legibility by reducing the names to just 
one—Guatemalan. Yet the Guatemalan state is only occasionally involved in memorial 
processes, most often when either the Inter American Commission or Court on Human Rights 
rules that it must be.67 Naming does little to increase the state's ability to read the bones. 
  While legibility is a useful lens through which to view exhumations, and while it allows 
some of their complexities to come to light, it is not sufficient. Foucault's discussion of the "art 
of government" contributes to a more full exploration of exhumations and the state's complicated 
relationship to them, and to the living. The art of government offers insight into the way that 
exhumations involve Guatemalans in the state's various institutions, and also involve the state 
and its institutions in Guatemalans' lives, often for the first time.68 Foucault's idea of the art of 
government69 emerged in the series of lectures he gave at the Collège de France in the late 1970s. 
In these lectures, Foucault described the art of government as "the way in which one conducts 
the conduct of men."70 When he spoke of government, therefore, he was referring to how 
people's behavior is controlled "within the framework of, and using the instruments of, a state."71 
  The art of government characteristic of modern, liberal governments emerged in Western 
Europe in the mid-1700s as the population replaced territory as the main goal of government; at 
this time, "the welfare of the population, the improvement of its condition, the increase of its 
                                                
66 Doss, Memorial Mania, 151-2. 
67 See, for example, "Application to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the case of The Las Dos Erres 
Massacre (Case 11.681) against The Republic Of Guatemala," July 30 2008, 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/demandas/11.681%20Masacre%20de%20las%20Dos%20Erres%20Guatemala%2030
%20julio%202008%20ENG.pdf; "Case of Tiu Tojín v. Guatemala, Judgment of November 26, 2008 (Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs)," 26 November 2008, 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_190_ing1.pdf. 
68 Donado Vivar, "Aporte de la Antropologia Social a la Investigación Forense para Casos de Desastres 
Naturales," 14. 
69 As Colin Gordon noted, Foucault used art of government almost synonymously with "rationality of 
government," which Gordon also states is the equivalent of governmentality. As Gordon explained it, "A 
rationality of government will thus mean a way or system of thinking about the nature or the practice of 
government (who can govern; what governing is; what or who is governed), capable of making some form of 
that activity thinkable and practicable both to its practitioners and to those upon whom it was practiced"; Colin 
Gordon, "Governmental rationality: an introduction," in The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, eds. 
Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 1-3. 
70 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-79, ed. Michel Sellenart 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 186 and 1-2. 
71 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 317. 
237 
wealth, longevity, health, etc." became the focus and object of government.72 When people 
became the object of government, the art of government developed, revolving around the 
incorporation of "economy" into government. Foucault understood economy to be the way in 
which the head of a family manages both family members and the family's goods in order to 
increase the family's wealth. Thus, governing a state required expanding the head of a 
household's management, via surveilling and controlling, of his household to the level of society, 
to the "wealth and behavior of each and all."73 It was precisely the government's new focus on 
people, on their "wealth and behavior," and the similar shift from seeing the family as model to 
understanding that the family could be used to control and surveil, which allowed this new art of 
government to emerge. With this shift, the family became "the privileged instrument for the 
government of the population," allowing for the creation of campaigns oriented toward long-life 
and health. But again, these campaigns are not altruistic or un-interested; they are ways for the 
state to keep a watchful eye on its citizens, and to exercise some control over them, all without 
the population being aware of "what is being done to it."74  
 This new art of government, as Foucault described it, was liberal, meaning that it was 
focused on governing less (a lesson Guatemala's counterinsurgency state never learned); one 
should, as Foucault wrote, "always suspect that one governs too much."75 Yet while liberalism is 
based on the idea of governing the least, meaning that freedom of behavior is essential, this 
freedom must be "produced and organized." Freedom is forever being manufactured, a process 
which always seeks to find a balance between individual and collective interests, ensuring that 
neither intrudes on the other or endangers it; this process seeks to ensure that individuals' and 
broader society's interests are put in least danger by balancing security and freedoms. As a result, 
Foucault argued that at the same time as the liberal art of government emerged, so too did a 
range of mechanisms which produced freedom, which "introduc[ed] additional freedom through 
additional control and intervention." "That is to say," wrote Foucault, "control is no longer just 
the necessary counterweight to freedom, as in the case of panopticism: it becomes its 
mainspring."76 
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 Little of this, and quite unlike in model villages, was centered on force, and in his 
exploration of the art of government, Foucault was shifting many of his thoughts about the 
everyday "disciplinary techniques" and "techniques of power" characteristic of prisons onto the 
non-prison population, onto society at large. Thus, rather than exceptional force being central to 
controlling and shaping behavior, un-exceptional self-control and incorporation were.77 What 
Foucault describes as "disciplinary technologies of labor," which include surveilling, inspecting, 
and reporting and are directed toward the body, come to co-exist with non-disciplinary 
technologies of power which "infiltrate" and "embed" themselves in existing disciplinary 
techniques of power. These new non-disciplinary technologies "massify" and contribute to the 
emergence of biopolitics, which sees and deals with the population as a "political problem."78 
Thus, by the end of the 18th century, with the appearance of the liberal art of government and 
biopolitics, and the related emergence of non-disciplinary technologies of power, what becomes 
important to government is the birth rate, the death rate, life span, and other similar things, all of 
which it seeks to control. Of course to control, information is necessary, so demographers 
emerged to measure these things, and "forecasts [and] statistical estimates" appeared. It is, 
Foucault explained, "a matter of taking control of life and the biological processes of man-as-
species and of ensuring that they are not disciplined, but regularized."79  
 The way that the art of government extends the Guatemalan state into citizens' lives and 
seeks to control their behavior is evident in exhumations where behavior is controlled "within the 
framework of, and using the instruments of, a state." Exhumations allow the state to control the 
behavior of its citizens not through force, not through discipline, but through non-disciplinary 
technologies of power. That is, rather than controlling individuals and their behavior with force 
(though Guatemala, and especially rural Guatemala, continues to be highly militarized and brute 
force is still used to control people's actions and where they cannot live), state institutions can, 
through the process of exhuming the dead, control the population and its conduct through 
paperwork. It is paperwork—the filing of a petition to exhume a clandestine cemetery, the 
issuing of death certificates and deeds to land, the registering of a birth—which allows more 
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accurate measures to be taken and statistics to be known. This information allows the state to 
control behavior and to regularize life, and death. The Guatemalan state is thus able to embrace 
its object—the population—as it makes demands on the state, an embrace which seeks to control 
and contain more than to comfort and care for Guatemalans. 
 Though the focus of this section is on how the state benefits from exhumations, on how 
citizens become involved in the state's operations through exhumations, this is certainly not what 
relatives are thinking about when they demand that an exhumation be carried out. As FAFG 
explained in a 1998 post-exhumation report, those buried in clandestine cemeteries were buried 
illegally. Legal burials require, at the very least, an autopsy in cases where the deceased did not 
die a natural death, and the issuing of a death certificate. Since bones excavated from clandestine 
cemeteries were never autopsied, nor were death certificates issued, legally the dead are alive.80 
For relatives, this legal limbo, the sort of zombification of family members where the dead are 
living, is painful on a spiritual level, but it is also the root of serious and frustrating legal 
battles.81 Without a death certificate, widowers and widows cannot remarry, for their spouses are 
still alive. Without a death certificate, children cannot inherit land, nor can it be sold, for the 
owner stubbornly refuses to sell from beyond the grave. Thus, in addition to giving the dead and 
their relatives some peace, and in addition to extending the reach of the state, exhumations make 
sense of the legal complications that go with having a relative buried in a clandestine cemetery.  
 
 There is no reason why the Salvadoran state could not also benefit from exhumations, 
even though exhumations would very likely reveal more undeniably that ARENA and the 
military's heroes are responsible for human rights violations. Even so, the Salvadoran state would 
be able to count and more fully incorporate Salvadorans into its operations if the dead were 
exhumed and buried. The Salvadoran state was unable to govern all Salvadorans' behavior 
during the war, at least in part because many Salvadorans were beyond the state's reach and 
living in FMLN-controlled areas. There will always be an interest, for whichever party is in 
power, in making sure this does not happen again, that no Salvadorans fall between the cracks 
and are not properly governed. The state is surely interested in incorporating living, breathing 
Salvadorans (and their dead relatives) into its operations in the aftermath of so many years when 
                                                
80 Quoted in Donado Vivar, "Aporte de la Antropologia Social,” 20-1. 
81 FAFG, "FAFG," accessed 3 October 2013, www.fafg.org/paginas/fafg.htm. 
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these people were beyond its control, to use its instruments and institutions (Medicina Legal, the 
judicial system, etc.) to embrace these Salvadorans, to count them and to categorize them.  
 But exhumations are fundamentally about victims and relatives, who have spent decades 
demanding truth. The painstaking process of unearthing, identifying, and then reburying the 
bones, and the psychosocial work which accompanies exhumations, help the victims' relatives 
find some sense of peace, a peace based on knowing what happened to the dead, knowing where 
they are buried, and being able to honor them. Guatemalan poet Francisco Morales Santos wrote 
that when Spring returns to Guatemala, it will be fertilized by human bones, "which were 
scattered / by the dance of death." And when Spring returns, "[o]nly then / will the whole bloody 
history, / besieged, / spoken, / and hidden, / be truly mapped out.// Only then the time will come / 
to put our hearts and ears to the ground / to listen to the voices / which we have been summoning 
/ to fight the law of forgetfulness."82 Exhumations "map" the history of the conflict. They help 
combat forgetfulness lest, as Paul Ricoeur wrote, it kill the victims a second time.83    
                                                
82 Francisco Morales Santos, "The Time Will Come," in Our Culture is Our Resistance: Repression, Refuge, and 
Healing in Guatemala, photographs by Jonathan Moller (New York: Powerhouse Books, 2004), 128. 
83 Paul Ricoeur, Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative, and Imagination, trans. David Pellauer, ed. Mark I. 
Wallace (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1995), 290. 
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Conclusion 
The Power of Discourse 
 
    If you shut up truth and bury it under the ground, it will but grow, and gather to itself such 
explosive power that the day it bursts through it will blow up everything in its way. 
—Emile Zola1 
         
Discourse is incredibly powerful. Being able to determine "the central terms around 
which and in terms of which contestation and struggle can occur" is even more so. This is why, 
as William Roseberry writes, it is something the state hopes to achieve.2 Discourse's power is 
clear in Guatemala and El Salvador's post-Peace eras. In Guatemala, the human rights 
community fights to maintain this power, to keep a hold of the reins of discourse, forcing former 
military officers like president Otto Pérez Molina to repeat calls for memory when he might 
prefer that people forget where he served in the early 1980s and what happened there. This, after 
all, allows him to face trial for genocide. Yet Pérez Molina cannot openly call for forgetting. 
Guatemala's discursive framework prevents it. This, however, is what former military officers 
and conservatives more generally do in El Salvador. There, the far weaker Salvadoran human 
rights community has been unable to dictate how the past will be talked about and what place it 
will have in the present and future. Instead, the human rights community counters far more 
powerful conservative sectors' insistence on forgetting with equally persistent calls for truth. 
They demand that the Amnesty/Amnesia Law be revoked, a move that would promote memory, 
as well as justice.   
 But words are not just words. They represent ideas and ways of seeing the world, as well 
as solutions to possible problems. Discursive frameworks limit these as well, meaning "both" is 
not currently a valid answer to the pressing question of whether Guatemalans and Salvadorans 
should remember or forget. Indeed, discursive frameworks limit the range of questions that can 
be asked. The question cannot be Nietzschean: "When and what should Guatemalans and 
Salvadorans remember? When and what should they forget?"  
                                                
1 As quoted in Pierre Dreyfus, ed., Dreyfus: His Life and Letters (London: Hutchinson & Co, 1938), 175. 
2 William Roseberry, "Hegemony and the Language of Contention," in Everyday Forms of State Formation: 
Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule in Modern Mexico, eds. Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 1994), 360-1. 
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 Discursive (and other types of) frameworks are limiting, though those limits certainly do 
slowly change over time. They narrow the way an issue can be talked about and work to 
disqualify possible solutions to problems when they do not fall within the limits of the particular 
framework that dominates. This can be seen when Edelberto Torres-Rivas tried, and failed, to 
broaden the debate about genocide to focus on expanding the definition of the term. They sort 
both solutions and ways of talking into "valid" and "invalid" based on a set of criteria internal to 
those frameworks and discourage "thinking outside the box" and innovative solutions to long-
standing problems. 
 El Salvador's Comisión de la Verdad para El Salvador (Truth Commission for El 
Salvador) and Guatemala's Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico (CEH, Historical 
Clarification Commission) were important in the process of setting the limits on how the past is 
talked about and, more so in Guatemala, supporting the limits that had already been set. But 
neither they nor the countries' discursive frameworks created what Michel Foucault labeled 
regimes of truth. They did not create "the mechanisms and instances which enable one to 
distinguish true and false statements."3 Different truths can still exist, and even thrive, within a 
common discursive framework, as well as one that pits truth against forgetting.  
Yet perhaps the failure of the Salvadoran and Guatemalan commissions to establish a 
regime of truth is positive. Many point to the benefit of continued debate about the past. 
Elizabeth Jelin, for example, highlights the importance and usefulness of creating "legitimate 
spaces for expression and controversy about different memories," for creating "multiple spaces 
for debate." For Jelin, this is what democracy is all about; it involves the "recognition of plurality 
and conflict more than the hope for reconciliation, silences, or erasures by fiat." This must, 
however, "be anchored strongly in the rule of law."4 Ofelia Ferrán rephrased Paul Ricoeur's 
views on the issue of dissensus, writing in support of "fruitful and healthy practice of 
controversy.... where competing claims and views about the past can be presented in the name of 
a healthy dialogue."5  
                                                
3 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon, 
trans. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham, and Kate Soper. (Brighton: The Harvester Press, 1980.), 
131-2. 
4 Elizabeth Jelin, State Repression and the Labors of Memory (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2004), 104-5. 
5 Ofelia Ferrán, Working through Memory: Writing and Remembrance in Contemporary Spanish Narrative 
(Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 2007), 41-2. 
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 The "practice of controversy" in Guatemala and El Salvador, however, is far from 
"fruitful and healthy," as seen in previous chapters. Human rights defenders, both those whose 
work relates directly to the wars but also peasant and anti-mining activists, are frequently 
threatened and killed, much as they were during the conflicts. As well, in El Salvador, both the 
Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN, Farabundo Martí National 
Liberation Front) and Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA, Nationalist Republican 
Alliance) continue to talk as if the war had never ended. As for Jelin's support of dissensus, she 
highlights the need for debates to be "anchored strongly in the rule of law." This is hardly the 
case in either country. In El Salvador, the unconstitutional Amnesty Law still prevents trials for 
crimes committed in the Civil War. In Guatemala, trials for crimes committed during the 
conflict, and reviews of those verdicts, are subject to political and other types of pressure; the 
judiciary is not independent. As well, in both countries, impunity rates for post-Peace crimes are 
extraordinarily high. Rather than law ruling, violence, corruption, impunity, gangs, and 
narcotrafficking often do, all of which have led the Fund for Peace to include both El Salvador 
and Guatemala on its Fragile (and not Failed) State Index. In 2014, El Salvador was in the "high 
warning" category while Guatemala was in the "very high warning" group, as they have been for 
many years.6 As healthy as dissensus might be in theory, it hardly seems to be the reality in either 
El Salvador or Guatemala.  
 El Salvador's Monumento a la Memoria y la Verdad (Monument for Memory and Truth) 
is meant to be a space for encounter and might point to one (limited7) way forward, a way to 
work toward reconciliation, peace, democracy, and non-repetition. A grassroots project, the 
Monumento includes the names of civilians killed by both the guerrilla and military, as well as 
the names of guerrillas and soldiers killed while on leave visiting family or otherwise not 
fulfilling military missions. In this, even though it does exclude non-civilian victims, it is more 
inclusive than other projects devoted to the victims (or heroes) of the war. These other projects 
are very much ARENA or FMLN projects. There is no denying that memory is political, as seen 
in the fact that the ARENA mayor of San Salvador decided to rename the Calle San Antonio 
Abad after Calle Mayor Roberto d'Aubuisson Arrieta since he, too, was an important figure in 
Salvadoran history. Reaction to the decision was swift, as in the photos below. To be sure, 
                                                
6 Fund for Peace, "Fragile States Index 2014," Accessed 3 February 2014, http://ffp.statesindex.org/.  
7 Limited because it does not address the root causes of the war, which will be discussed in the final pages of this 
conclusion. 
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FMLN politicians do the same thing. The mayor of Mejicanos, for example, a city just to the 
north though indistinguishable from San Salvador, worked to re-name the streets after FMLN 
heroes and combatants when he was elected, and to make sure the street signs were red, the color 
of the FMLN.8  
 
"No street with his name. Deaths Squads." 
"Do you need a name for a street? I offer you 30,000." 
Source: Asociación Pro-Búsqueda's facebook page, published 8 December and 1 December 2014  
 
Though the Monument for Memory and Truth repeats the human rights community's 
discourse and refuses to cede space to the idea of amnesty or forgetting, and though it still 
divides Salvadorans (into the overly simplistic categories of civilian victims and 
military/guerrilla perpetrators), it nevertheless works to erase previous divisions and to reconcile 
the different truths of the war that exist in the country. La Prensa Gráfica commentator Óscar 
Picardo Joao pointed this out shortly before the Monument was unveiled in 2003. He described 
the presence of "teachers, campesinos, members of the Armed Forces, insurgents," of Rodrigo 
Porth, the victims of the Zona Rosa massacre, and "guerrillas and unionists" (i.e., both the 
FMLN's and military's victims, though he does not say so) as an "emblematic, pedagogical 
mosaic which proposes a model of coexistence and which, at the same time, denounces 
antagonistic and ideological polarization."9 More than anything, his piece is a denunciation of 
                                                
8 Member of FMLN's Secretaria Nacional de Memoria Histórica, conversation with author, 6 June 2012. 
9 Óscar Picardo Joao, "Sobre 'monumentos', 'memorias' y 'verdades,'" La Prensa Gráfica, 17 December 2003. 
The monument, with its "interminable lists of names...reconstructs a hidden history, it demystifies, it returns 
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those who negotiated and signed the Peace Accords, but his comment about the Monument as an 
example of coexistence is significant. It points to the Monument's inclusiveness and its potential 
power to reconcile, to allow Salvadorans to live with each other. The division between civilian 
victim and armed perpetrator might be easier to work and live (peacefully) with than a division 
between FMLN or ARENA supporters, and including victims of both FMLN and military 
violations works to bridge the gap that separates El Salvador's different truths.    
 The Monumento suggests that some of those who experienced the Salvadoran Civil War 
in flesh and blood, and who survived it (and many did not), are re-imagining truth and memory 
as being more inclusive than the terms have been understood in the past. Though the right's 
continued promotion of forgetting and their apparent rejection of the Monumento itself (as being 
a project of the left) suggest that reconciling in El Salvador (as in Guatemala) is still a work in 
progress, the expanded ideas of truth and memory the Monumento promotes are and will be an 
important tool in working toward reconciling and ensuring non-repetition. Recognizing that 
different truths and memories of the past exist paves the way for reconciling, for reconciling 
distinct truths and memories, and the people who hold them.  
  
                                                                                                                                                       
protagonism to the anonymous, it judges the present, it screams the truth, it points out the lie, it unmasks, it de-
ideologizes, it does justice at the margins of the tribunals, it revives scenes of tears and pain, it makes hidden 
reminiscence public in certain hearts,..it is presented as testimonial architecture of good and evil...and it even 
vindicates the aesthetic of public monuments..." There is nothing the monument does not do, it seems.  
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NOTE ON SOURCES 
 As mentioned in the introduction, this dissertation relies to a large extent on the discourse 
and debates about the past present in (oligopolistic) newspapers since El Salvador and 
Guatemala signed the final Peace Accords on 16 January 1992 and 29 December 1996, 
respectively. In El Salvador, articles and opinion pieces in El Diario de Hoy and La Prensa 
Gráfica form the bulk of research conducted in the country's hemeroteca, or newspaper archive. 
They control 87% of the market and are closely tied with the political right. The leftist Diario 
Co-Latino, which controls less than 10% of the market, was also consulted to provide an entry 
into the non-conservative media. All are little more than party mouthpieces (though for different 
parties), especially around election time. In Guatemala's hemeroteca, I read through Prensa 
Libre, Siglo Veintiuno, and El Periódico. Prensa Libre, originally founded to oppose the 
progressive Jacobo Arbenz government in 1950, is the most read and influential of the three. 
Prensa Libre's parent corporation controls as much as 82% of the market. Siglo Veintiuno voices 
the opinions the business and conservative religious sectors. Its parent corporation controls 
approximately 9% of the market while El Periódico's parent controls roughly 5% of the market.  
The human rights community and government institutions' publications, news releases, 
and ads taken out in newspapers are another major source of information for this dissertation, as 
are these organizations and institutons' webpages or social media pages. Books authored by those 
who participated in the conflicts or peace negotiations in some way, whether the books are about 
their own experiences or not, form a final part of the written sources used to identify public 
discourse and its frameworks. I also observed protests, demonstrations, trials, and 
commemorations; visited monuments and an exhumation; and photographed street art to get a 
more popular understanding of how memory and forgetting are understood.  
Editorials, published interviews, journalists' interpretations and commentary about 
events, and the work and words of NGOs, activists, and artists are the backbone of this 
dissertation. The words they use are analyzed and interrogated to discover the frameworks that 
limit what they say, and to place their words into larger struggles about discourse. Just as 
discursive frameworks determine what individuals can say, their words also push these 
frameworks to the limits, potentially leading to their expansion or contraction.  
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